LETTER I
CONCERNING THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE IN CHOOSING THE RULERS BY WHOM TAXES
ARE IMPOSED
TUESDAY MORNING
[December 17, 1754]
SIR:
I return return you the loose sheets of the plan, with
thanks to your Excellency for communicating them.
I apprehend that excluding the people of the
colonies from all share in the choice of the grand council will give
extreme dissatisfaction, as well as the taxing them by act of Parliament,
where they have no representative. It is very possible that this general
government might be as well and faithfully administered without the people
as with them; but where heavy burthens have been laid on them, it has been
found useful to make it as much as possible their own act; for they bear
better, when they have, or think they have, some share in the direction;
and when any public measures are generally grievous, or even distasteful,
to the people, the wheels of government move more heavily.
LETTER II
ON THE IMPOSITION OF DIRECT TAXES UPON THE COLONIES
WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT
WEDNESDAY MORNING
[December 18, 1754]
SIR:
I mentioned it yesterday to your Excellency as my
opinion that excluding the people of the colonies from all share
in the choice of the grand council would probably give extreme
dissatisfaction, as well as the taxing them by act of Parliament, where
they have no representative. In matters of general concern to the people,
and especially where burthens are to be laid upon them, it is of use to
consider, as well what they will be apt to think and say, as what they
ought to think. I shall therefore, as your Excellency requires it of me,
briefly mention what of either kind occurs to me on this occasion.
First, they will say, and perhaps with justice, that the
body of the people in the colonies are as loyal and as firmly attached to
the present constitution and reigning family as any subjects in the king's
dominions.
That there is no reason to doubt the readiness and
willingness of the representatives they may choose to grant from time to
time such supplies for the defense of the country as shall be judged
necessary, so far as their abilities will allow.
That the people in the colonies who are to feel the
immediate mischiefs of invasion and conquest by an enemy, in the loss of
their estates, lives, and liberties, are likely to be better judges of the
quantity of forces necessary to be raised and maintained, forts to be
built and supported. and of their own abilities to bear the expense than
the Parliament of England at so great a distance.
That governors often come to the colonies merely to make
fortunes, with which they intend to return to Britain; are not always men
of the best abilities and integrity; have many of them no estates here,
nor any natural connections with us that should make them heartily
concerned for our welfare; and might possibly be fond of raising and
keeping up more forces than necessary, from the profits accruing to
themselves, and to make provision for their friends and dependents.
That the conselors in most of the colonies being
appointed by the crown, on the recommendation of governors, are often
persons of small estates, frequently dependent on the governors for
offices, and therefore too much under influence. 2
That there is therefore great reason to be jealous of a
power in such governors and councils to raise such sums as they shall
judge necessary, by draft on the Lords of the Treasury, to be afterward
laid on the colonies by act of Parliament, and paid by the people here;
since they might abuse it by projecting useless expeditions, harassing the
people, and taking them from their labor to execute such projects, merely
to create offices and employments, and gratify their dependents, and
divide profits.
That the Parliament of England is at a great distance,
subject to the misinformed and misled by such governors and councils,
whose united interests might probably secure them against the effect of
any complaint from hence.
That it is supposed an undoubted right of Englishmen not
to be taxed but by their own consent, given through their representatives.
That the colonies have no representatives in Parliament.
That to propose taxing them by Parliament, and refuse
them the liberty of choosing a representative council to meet in the
colonies, and consider and judge of the necessity of any general tax and
the quantum, shows a suspicion of their loyalty to the crown, or of their
regard for their country, or of their common sense and understanding,
which they have not deserved.
That compelling the colonies to pay money without their
consent would be rather like raising contributions in an enemy's country
than taxing of Englishmen for their own public benefit.
That it would be treating them as a conquered people and
not as true British subjects.
That a tax laid by the representatives of the colonies
might easily be lessened as the occasions should lessen; but being once
laid by Parliament, under the influence of the representations made by
governors, would probably be kept up and continued for the benefit of
governors, to the grievous burthen and discouragement of the colonies, and
prevention of their growth and increase.
That a power in governors to march the inhabitants from
one end of the British and French colonies to the other, being a country
of at least 1,500 square miles, without the approbation or the consent of
their representatives first obtained to such expeditions, might be
grievous and ruinous to the people, and would put them on a footing with
the subjects of France in Canada, that now groan under such oppression
from their governor, who for two years past has harassed them with long
and destructive marches to Ohio.
That if the colonies in a body may be well governed by
governors and councils appointed by the crown, without representatives,
particular colonies may as well or better be so governed; a tax may be
laid upon them all by act of Parliament for support of government, and
their assemblies may be dismissed as a useless part of the constitution.
That the powers, proposed by the Albany Plan of Union to
be vested in a grand council representative of the people, even with
regard to military matters, are not so great as those the colonies of
Rhode Island and Connecticut are intrusted with by their charters and have
never abused; for, by this plan, the president-general is appointed by the
crown and controls all by his negative; but in those governments the
people choose the governor and yet allow him no negative.
That the British colonies bordering on the French are
properly frontiers of the British Empire; and the frontiers of an empire
are properly defended at the joint expense of the body of the people in
such empire. It would now be thought hard by act of Parliament to oblige
the Cinque Ports or seacoasts of Britain to maintain the whole navy,
because they are more immediately defended by it, not allowing them at the
same time a vote in choosing members of the Parliament; 3
and if the frontiers of America bear the expense of their own defense, it
seems hard to allow them no share in voting the money, judging of the
necessity and sum, or advising the measures.
That, besides the taxes necessary for the defense of the
frontiers, the colonies pay yearly great sums to the mother-country
unnoticed: for
1. Taxes paid in Britain by the landholder or
artificer must enter into and increase the price of the produce of land
and of manufactures made of it; and a great part of this is paid by
consumers in the colonies, who thereby pay a considerable part of the
British taxes.
2. We are restrained in our trade with foreign
nations; and where we could be supplied with any manufacture cheaper
from them, but must buy the same dearer from Britain, the difference of
price is a clear tax to Britain.
3. We are obliged to carry a great part of our produce
directly to Britain; and where the duties laid upon it lessen its price
to the planter, or it sells for less than it would in foreign markets,
the difference is a tax paid to Britain.
4. Some manufactures we could make, but are forbidden,
and must take them of British merchants; the whole price is a tax paid
to Britain.
5. By our greatly increasing the demand and
consumption of British manufactures, their price is considerably raised
of late years; the advantage is clear profit to Britain and enables its
people hefter to pay great taxes; and much of it, being paid by us, is
clear tax to Britain.
6. In short, as we are not suffered to regulate our
trade and restrain the importation and consumption of British
superfluities, as Britain can the consumption of foreign superfluities,
our whole wealth centers finally amongst the merchants and inhabitants
of Britain; and if we make them richer, and enable them better to pay
their taxes, it is nearly the same as being taxed ourselves and equally
beneficial to the crown.
These kinds of secondary taxes, however, we do not
complain of, though we have no share in the laying or disposing of them;
but to pay immediate heavy taxes, in the laying, appropriation, and
disposition of which we have no part, and which perhaps we may know to be
as unnecessary as grievous, must seem hard measure to Englishmen, who
cannot conceive that by hazarding their lives and fortunes in subduing and
settling new countries, extending the dominion and increasing the commerce
of the mother-nation, they have forfeited the native rights of Britons,
which they think ought rather to be given to them, as due to such merit,
if they had been before in a state of slavery.
These, and such kind of things as these, I apprehend
will be thought and said by the people, if the proposed alteration of the
Albany plan should take place. Then the administration of the board of
governors and council so appointed, not having any representative body of
the people to approve and unite m its measures, and conciliate the minds
of the people to them, will probably become suspected and odious,
dangerous animosities and feuds will arise between the governors and
governed, and every thing go into confusion.
Perhaps I am too apprehensive in this matter; but,
having freely given my opinion and reasons, your Excellency can judge
better than I whether there be any weight in them; and the shortness of
the time allowed me will, I hope, in some degree excuse the imperfections
of this scrawl.
With the greatest respect and fidelity, I have the honor
to be
Your Excellency's most obedient and most humble servant,
B.
FRANKLIN
LETTER III
ON THE SUBJECT OF UNITING THE COLONIES MORE INTIMATELY WITH GREAT
BRITAIN BY ALLOWING THEM REPRESENTATIVES IN PARLIAMENT
BOSTON, December 22, 1754
SIR:
Since the conversation your Excellency was pleased to
honor me with, on the subject of uniting the colonies more
intimately with Great Britain, by allowing them representatives in
Parliament, I have something further considered that matter and am of
opinion that such a union would be very acceptable to the colonies,
provided they had a reasonable number of representatives allowed them; and
that all the old acts of Parliament restraining the trade or cramping the
manufactures of the colonies be at the same time repealed, and the British
subjects on this side the water put, in those respects, on the
same footing with those in Great Britain, till the new Parliament,
representing the whole, shall think it for the interest of the whole to
re-enact some or all of them. It is not that I imagine so many
representatives will be allowed the colonies as to have any great weight
by their numbers, but I think there might be sufficient to occasion those
laws to be better and more impartially considered, and perhaps to overcome
the interest of a petty corporation, or of any particular set of
artificers or traders in England, who heretofore seem, in some instances,
to have been more regarded than all the colonies or than was consistent
with the general interest or best national good. I think, too, that the
government of the colonies by a Parliament in which they are fairly
represented would be vastly more agreeable to the people than the method
lately attempted to be introduced by royal instructions, as well as more
agreeable to the nature of an English constitution and to English liberty;
4 and that such laws as now seem
to bear hard on the colonies would (when judged by such a Parliament for
the best interest of the whole) be more cheerfully submitted to and more
easily executed.
I should hope, too, that by such a union the people of
Great Britain and the people of the colonies would learn to consider
themselves as not belonging to a different community with different
interests but to one community with one interest, which I imagine would
contribute to strengthen the whole and greatly lessen the danger of future
separations.
It is, I suppose, agreed to be the general interest of
any state that its people be numerous and rich; men enough to fight in its
defense and enough to pay sufficient taxes to defray the charge; for these
circumstances tend to the security of the state and its protection from
foreign power. But it seems not of so much importance whether the fighting
be done by John or Thomas, or the tax paid by William or Charles. The iron
manufacture employs and enriches British subjects, but is it of any
importance to the state whether the manufacturers live at Birmingham, or
Sheffield, or both, since they are still within its bounds, and their
wealth and persons still at its command? Could the Goodwin Sands be laid
dry by banks, 5 and land equal to
a large country thereby gained to England, and presently filled with
English inhabitants, would it be right to deprive such inhabitants of the
common privileges enjoyed by other Englishmen -- the right of vending
their produce in the same ports, or of making their own shoes, because a
merchant or a shoemaker living on the old land might fancy it more for his
advantage to trade or make shoes for them? Would this be right even if the
land were gained at the expense of the state? And would it not seem less
right if the charge and labor of gaining the additional territory to
Britain had been borne by the settlers themselves? And would a not the
hardship appear yet greater if the people of the new country should be
allowed no representatives in the Parliament enacting such impositions?
Now, I look on the colonies as so many countries gained
to Great Britain, and more advantageous to it than if they had been gained
out of the seas around it of coasts and joined to its land; for, being in
different climates, they afford greater variety of produce, and being
separated by the ocean, they increase much more its shipping and seamen;
and since they are all included in the British Empire, which has only
extended itself by their means, and the strength and wealth of the parts
are the strength and wealth of the whole, what imports it to the general
state whether a merchant, a smith, or a hatter grow rich in Old or New
England? And if, through increase of people, two smiths are wanted for one
employed before, why may not the new smith be allowed to live and
thrive in the new country, as well as the old in the old?
In fine, why should the countenance of a state be partially
afforded to its people, unless it be most in favor of those who have most
merit? And if there be any difference, those who have most contributed to
enlarge Britain's empire and commerce, increase her strength, her wealth,
and the numbers of her people, at the risk of their own lives and private
fortunes in new and strange countries, methinks ought rather to expect
some preference. With the greatest respect and esteem, I have the honor to
be
Your Excellency's most obedient and most humble servant,
B.
FRANKLIN |
