The Rights of Man Chapter III - Of the Old and New Systems of Government
by Thomas Paine
Nothing can appear more contradictory than the principles on which
the old governments began, and the condition to which society,
civilisation and commerce are capable of carrying mankind.
Government, on the old system, is an assumption of power, for the
aggrandisement of itself; on the new, a delegation of power for the
common benefit of society. The former supports itself by keeping up a
system of war; the latter promotes a system of peace, as the true
means of enriching a nation. The one encourages national prejudices;
the other promotes universal society, as the means of universal
commerce. The one measures its prosperity, by the quantity of revenue
it extorts; the other proves its excellence, by the small quantity of
taxes it requires.
Mr. Burke has talked of old and new whigs. If he can amuse himself
with childish names and distinctions, I shall not interrupt his
pleasure. It is not to him, but to the Abbe Sieyes, that I address
this chapter. I am already engaged to the latter gentleman to discuss
the subject of monarchical government; and as it naturally occurs in
comparing the old and new systems, I make this the opportunity of
presenting to him my observations. I shall occasionally take Mr.
Burke in my way.
Though it might be proved that the system of government now called
the New, is the most ancient in principle of all that have existed,
being founded on the original, inherent Rights of Man: yet, as
tyranny and the sword have suspended the exercise of those rights for
many centuries past, it serves better the purpose of distinction to
call it the new, than to claim the right of calling it the old.
The first general distinction between those two systems, is, that the
one now called the old is hereditary, either in whole or in part; and
the new is entirely representative. It rejects all hereditary
government:
First, As being an imposition on mankind.
Secondly, As inadequate to the purposes for which government is
necessary.
With respect to the first of these heads- It cannot be proved by what
right hereditary government could begin; neither does there exist
within the compass of mortal power a right to establish it. Man has
no authority over posterity in matters of personal right; and,
therefore, no man, or body of men, had, or can have, a right to set
up hereditary government. Were even ourselves to come again into
existence, instead of being succeeded by posterity, we have not now
the right of taking from ourselves the rights which would then be
ours. On what ground, then, do we pretend to take them from others?
All hereditary government is in its nature tyranny. An heritable
crown, or an heritable throne, or by what other fanciful name such
things may be called, have no other significant explanation than that
mankind are heritable property. To inherit a government, is to
inherit the people, as if they were flocks and herds.
With respect to the second head, that of being inadequate to the
purposes for which government is necessary, we have only to consider
what government essentially is, and compare it with the circumstances
to which hereditary succession is subject.
Government ought to be a thing always in full maturity. It ought to
be so constructed as to be superior to all the accidents to which
individual man is subject; and, therefore, hereditary succession, by
being subject to them all, is the most irregular and imperfect of all
the systems of government.
We have heard the Rights of Man called a levelling system; but the
only system to which the word levelling is truly applicable, is the
hereditary monarchical system. It is a system of mental levelling. It
indiscriminately admits every species of character to the same
authority. Vice and virtue, ignorance and wisdom, in short, every
quality good or bad, is put on the same level. Kings succeed each
other, not as rationals, but as animals. It signifies not what their
mental or moral characters are. Can we then be surprised at the
abject state of the human mind in monarchical countries, when the
government itself is formed on such an abject levelling system?- It
has no fixed character. To-day it is one thing; to-morrow it is
something else. It changes with the temper of every succeeding
individual, and is subject to all the varieties of each. It is
government through the medium of passions and accidents. It appears
under all the various characters of childhood, decrepitude, dotage, a
thing at nurse, in leading-strings, or in crutches. It reverses the
wholesome order of nature. It occasionally puts children over men,
and the conceits of nonage over wisdom and experience. In short, we
cannot conceive a more ridiculous figure of government, than
hereditary succession, in all its cases, presents.
Could it be made a decree in nature, or an edict registered in
heaven, and man could know it, that virtue and wisdom should
invariably appertain to hereditary succession, the objection to it
would be removed; but when we see that nature acts as if she disowned
and sported with the hereditary system; that the mental character of
successors, in all countries, is below the average of human
understanding; that one is a tyrant, another an idiot, a third
insane, and some all three together, it is impossible to attach
confidence to it, when reason in man has power to act.
It is not to the Abbe Sieyes that I need apply this reasoning; he has
already saved me that trouble by giving his own opinion upon the
case. "If it be asked," says he, "what is my opinion with respect to
hereditary right, I answer without hesitation, That in good theory,
an hereditary transmission of any power of office, can never accord
with the laws of a true representation. Hereditaryship is, in this
sense, as much an attaint upon principle, as an outrage upon society.
But let us," continues he, "refer to the history of all elective
monarchies and principalities: is there one in which the elective
mode is not worse than the hereditary succession?"
As to debating on which is the worst of the two, it is admitting both
to be bad; and herein we are agreed. The preference which the Abbe
has given, is a condemnation of the thing that he prefers. Such a
mode of reasoning on such a subject is inadmissible, because it
finally amounts to an accusation upon Providence, as if she had left
to man no other choice with respect to government than between two
evils, the best of which he admits to be "an attaint upon principle,
and an outrage upon society."
Passing over, for the present, all the evils and mischiefs which
monarchy has occasioned in the world, nothing can more effectually
prove its uselessness in a state of civil government, than making it
hereditary. Would we make any office hereditary that required wisdom
and abilities to fill it? And where wisdom and abilities are not
necessary, such an office, whatever it may be, is superfluous or
insignificant.
Hereditary succession is a burlesque upon monarchy. It puts it in the
most ridiculous light, by presenting it as an office which any child
or idiot may fill. It requires some talents to be a common mechanic;
but to be a king requires only the animal figure of man- a sort of
breathing automaton. This sort of superstition may last a few years
more, but it cannot long resist the awakened reason and interest of
man.
As to Mr. Burke, he is a stickler for monarchy, not altogether as a
pensioner, if he is one, which I believe, but as a political man. He
has taken up a contemptible opinion of mankind, who, in their turn,
are taking up the same of him. He considers them as a herd of beings
that must be governed by fraud, effigy, and show; and an idol would
be as good a figure of monarchy with him, as a man. I will, however,
do him the justice to say that, with respect to America, he has been
very complimentary. He always contended, at least in my hearing, that
the people of America were more enlightened than those of England, or
of any country in Europe; and that therefore the imposition of show
was not necessary in their governments.
Though the comparison between hereditary and elective monarchy, which
the Abbe has made, is unnecessary to the case, because the
representative system rejects both: yet, were I to make the
comparison, I should decide contrary to what he has done.
The civil wars which have originated from contested hereditary
claims, are more numerous, and have been more dreadful, and of longer
continuance, than those which have been occasioned by election. All
the civil wars in France arose from the hereditary system; they were
either produced by hereditary claims, or by the imperfection of the
hereditary form, which admits of regencies or monarchy at nurse. With
respect to England, its history is full of the same misfortunes. The
contests for succession between the houses of York and Lancaster
lasted a whole century; and others of a similar nature have renewed
themselves since that period. Those of 1715 and 1745 were of the same
kind. The succession war for the crown of Spain embroiled almost half
Europe. The disturbances of Holland are generated from the
hereditaryship of the Stadtholder. A government calling itself free,
with an hereditary office, is like a thorn in the flesh, that
produces a fermentation which endeavours to discharge it.
But I might go further, and place also foreign wars, of whatever
kind, to the same cause. It is by adding the evil of hereditary
succession to that of monarchy, that a permanent family interest is
created, whose constant objects are dominion and revenue. Poland,
though an elective monarchy, has had fewer wars than those which are
hereditary; and it is the only government that has made a voluntary
essay, though but a small one, to reform the condition of the
country.
Having thus glanced at a few of the defects of the old, or hereditary
systems of government, let us compare it with the new, or
representative system.
The representative system takes society and civilisation for its
basis; nature, reason, and experience, for its guide.
Experience, in all ages, and in all countries, has demonstrated that
it is impossible to control Nature in her distribution of mental
powers. She gives them as she pleases. Whatever is the rule by which
she, apparently to us, scatters them among mankind, that rule remains
a secret to man. It would be as ridiculous to attempt to fix the
hereditaryship of human beauty, as of wisdom. Whatever wisdom
constituently is, it is like a seedless plant; it may be reared when
it appears, but it cannot be voluntarily produced. There is always a
sufficiency somewhere in the general mass of society for all
purposes; but with respect to the parts of society, it is continually
changing its place. It rises in one to-day, in another to-morrow, and
has most probably visited in rotation every family of the earth, and
again withdrawn.
As this is in the order of nature, the order of government must
necessarily follow it, or government will, as we see it does,
degenerate into ignorance. The hereditary system, therefore, is as
repugnant to human wisdom as to human rights; and is as absurd as it
is unjust.
As the republic of letters brings forward the best literary
productions, by giving to genius a fair and universal chance; so the
representative system of government is calculated to produce the
wisest laws, by collecting wisdom from where it can be found. I smile
to myself when I contemplate the ridiculous insignificance into which
literature and all the sciences would sink, were they made
hereditary; and I carry the same idea into governments. An hereditary
governor is as inconsistent as an hereditary author. I know not
whether Homer or Euclid had sons; but I will venture an opinion that
if they had, and had left their works unfinished, those sons could
not have completed them.
Do we need a stronger evidence of the absurdity of hereditary
government than is seen in the descendants of those men, in any line
of life, who once were famous? Is there scarcely an instance in which
there is not a total reverse of the character? It appears as if the
tide of mental faculties flowed as far as it could in certain
channels, and then forsook its course, and arose in others. How
irrational then is the hereditary system, which establishes channels
of power, in company with which wisdom refuses to flow! By continuing
this absurdity, man is perpetually in contradiction with himself; he
accepts, for a king, or a chief magistrate, or a legislator, a person
whom he would not elect for a constable.
It appears to general observation, that revolutions create genius and
talents; but those events do no more than bring them forward. There
is existing in man, a mass of sense lying in a dormant state, and
which, unless something excites it to action, will descend with him,
in that condition, to the grave. As it is to the advantage of society
that the whole of its faculties should be employed, the construction
of government ought to be such as to bring forward, by a quiet and
regular operation, all that extent of capacity which never fails to
appear in revolutions.
This cannot take place in the insipid state of hereditary government,
not only because it prevents, but because it operates to benumb. When
the mind of a nation is bowed down by any political superstition in
its government, such as hereditary succession is, it loses a
considerable portion of its powers on all other subjects and objects.
Hereditary succession requires the same obedience to ignorance, as to
wisdom; and when once the mind can bring itself to pay this
indiscriminate reverence, it descends below the stature of mental
manhood. It is fit to be great only in little things. It acts a
treachery upon itself, and suffocates the sensations that urge the
detection.
Though the ancient governments present to us a miserable picture of
the condition of man, there is one which above all others exempts
itself from the general description. I mean the democracy of the
Athenians. We see more to admire, and less to condemn, in that great,
extraordinary people, than in anything which history affords.
Mr. Burke is so little acquainted with constituent principles of
government, that he confounds democracy and representation together.
Representation was a thing unknown in the ancient democracies. In
those the mass of the people met and enacted laws (grammatically
speaking) in the first person. Simple democracy was no other than the
common hall of the ancients. It signifies the form, as well as the
public principle of the government. As those democracies increased in
population, and the territory extended, the simple democratical form
became unwieldy and impracticable; and as the system of
representation was not known, the consequence was, they either
degenerated convulsively into monarchies, or became absorbed into
such as then existed. Had the system of representation been then
understood, as it now is, there is no reason to believe that those
forms of government, now called monarchical or aristocratical, would
ever have taken place. It was the want of some method to consolidate
the parts of society, after it became too populous, and too extensive
for the simple democratical form, and also the lax and solitary
condition of shepherds and herdsmen in other parts of the world, that
afforded opportunities to those unnatural modes of government to
begin.
As it is necessary to clear away the rubbish of errors, into which
the subject of government has been thrown, I will proceed to remark
on some others.
It has always been the political craft of courtiers and
court-governments, to abuse something which they called
republicanism; but what republicanism was, or is, they never attempt
to explain. let us examine a little into this case.
The only forms of government are the democratical, the
aristocratical, the monarchical, and what is now called the
representative.
What is called a republic is not any particular form of government.
It is wholly characteristical of the purport, matter or object for
which government ought to be instituted, and on which it is to be
employed, Res-Publica, the public affairs, or the public good; or,
literally translated, the public thing. It is a word of a good
original, referring to what ought to be the character and business of
government; and in this sense it is naturally opposed to the word
monarchy, which has a base original signification. It means arbitrary
power in an individual person; in the exercise of which, himself, and
not the res-publica, is the object.
Every government that does not act on the principle of a Republic, or
in other words, that does not make the res-publica its whole and sole
object, is not a good government. Republican government is no other
than government established and conducted for the interest of the
public, as well individually as collectively. It is not necessarily
connected with any particular form, but it most naturally associates
with the representative form, as being best calculated to secure the
end for which a nation is at the expense of supporting it.
Various forms of government have affected to style themselves a
republic. Poland calls itself a republic, which is an hereditary
aristocracy, with what is called an elective monarchy. Holland calls
itself a republic, which is chiefly aristocratical, with an
hereditary stadtholdership. But the government of America, which is
wholly on the system of representation, is the only real Republic, in
character and in practice, that now exists. Its government has no
other object than the public business of the nation, and therefore it
is properly a republic; and the Americans have taken care that This,
and no other, shall always be the object of their government, by
their rejecting everything hereditary, and establishing governments
on the system of representation only. Those who have said that a
republic is not a form of government calculated for countries of
great extent, mistook, in the first place, the business of a
government, for a form of government; for the res-publica equally
appertains to every extent of territory and population. And, in the
second place, if they meant anything with respect to form, it was the
simple democratical form, such as was the mode of government in the
ancient democracies, in which there was no representation. The case,
therefore, is not, that a republic cannot be extensive, but that it
cannot be extensive on the simple democratical form; and the question
naturally presents itself, What is the best form of government for
conducting the Res-Publica, or the Public Business of a nation, after
it becomes too extensive and populous for the simple democratical
form? It cannot be monarchy, because monarchy is subject to an
objection of the same amount to which the simple democratical form
was subject.
It is possible that an individual may lay down a system of
principles, on which government shall be constitutionally established
to any extent of territory. This is no more than an operation of the
mind, acting by its own powers. But the practice upon those
principles, as applying to the various and numerous circumstances of
a nation, its agriculture, manufacture, trade, commerce, etc., etc.,
a knowledge of a different kind, and which can be had only from the
various parts of society. It is an assemblage of practical knowledge,
which no individual can possess; and therefore the monarchical form
is as much limited, in useful practice, from the incompetency of
knowledge, as was the democratical form, from the multiplicity of
population. The one degenerates, by extension, into confusion; the
other, into ignorance and incapacity, of which all the great
monarchies are an evidence. The monarchical form, therefore, could
not be a substitute for the democratical, because it has equal
inconveniences.
Much less could it when made hereditary. This is the most effectual
of all forms to preclude knowledge. Neither could the high
democratical mind have voluntarily yielded itself to be governed by
children and idiots, and all the motley insignificance of character,
which attends such a mere animal system, the disgrace and the
reproach of reason and of man.
As to the aristocratical form, it has the same vices and defects with
the monarchical, except that the chance of abilities is better from
the proportion of numbers, but there is still no security for the
right use and application of them.*[17]
Referring them to the original simple democracy, it affords the true
data from which government on a large scale can begin. It is
incapable of extension, not from its principle, but from the
inconvenience of its form; and monarchy and aristocracy, from their
incapacity. Retaining, then, democracy as the ground, and rejecting
the corrupt systems of monarchy and aristocracy, the representative
system naturally presents itself; remedying at once the defects of
the simple democracy as to form, and the incapacity of the other two
with respect to knowledge.
Simple democracy was society governing itself without the aid of
secondary means. By ingrafting representation upon democracy, we
arrive at a system of government capable of embracing and
confederating all the various interests and every extent of territory
and population; and that also with advantages as much superior to
hereditary government, as the republic of letters is to hereditary
literature.
It is on this system that the American government is founded. It is
representation ingrafted upon democracy. It has fixed the form by a
scale parallel in all cases to the extent of the principle. What
Athens was in miniature America will be in magnitude. The one was the
wonder of the ancient world; the other is becoming the admiration of
the present. It is the easiest of all the forms of government to be
understood and the most eligible in practice; and excludes at once
the ignorance and insecurity of the hereditary mode, and the
inconvenience of the simple democracy.
It is impossible to conceive a system of government capable of acting
over such an extent of territory, and such a circle of interests, as
is immediately produced by the operation of representation. France,
great and populous as it is, is but a spot in the capaciousness of
the system. It is preferable to simple democracy even in small
territories. Athens, by representation, would have outrivalled her
own democracy.
That which is called government, or rather that which we ought to
conceive government to be, is no more than some common center in
which all the parts of society unite. This cannot be accomplished by
any method so conducive to the various interests of the community, as
by the representative system. It concentrates the knowledge necessary
to the interest of the parts, and of the whole. It places government
in a state of constant maturity. It is, as has already been observed,
never young, never old. It is subject neither to nonage, nor dotage.
It is never in the cradle, nor on crutches. It admits not of a
separation between knowledge and power, and is superior, as
government always ought to be, to all the accidents of individual
man, and is therefore superior to what is called monarchy.
A nation is not a body, the figure of which is to be represented by
the human body; but is like a body contained within a circle, having
a common center, in which every radius meets; and that center is
formed by representation. To connect representation with what is
called monarchy, is eccentric government. Representation is of itself
the delegated monarchy of a nation, and cannot debase itself by
dividing it with another.
Mr. Burke has two or three times, in his parliamentary speeches, and
in his publications, made use of a jingle of words that convey no
ideas. Speaking of government, he says, "It is better to have
monarchy for its basis, and republicanism for its corrective, than
republicanism for its basis, and monarchy for its corrective."- If he
means that it is better to correct folly with wisdom, than wisdom
with folly, I will no otherwise contend with him, than that it would
be much better to reject the folly entirely.
But what is this thing which Mr. Burke calls monarchy? Will he
explain it? All men can understand what representation is; and that
it must necessarily include a variety of knowledge and talents. But
what security is there for the same qualities on the part of
monarchy? or, when the monarchy is a child, where then is the wisdom?
What does it know about government? Who then is the monarch, or where
is the monarchy? If it is to be performed by regency, it proves to be
a farce. A regency is a mock species of republic, and the whole of
monarchy deserves no better description. It is a thing as various as
imagination can paint. It has none of the stable character that
government ought to possess. Every succession is a revolution, and
every regency a counter-revolution. The whole of it is a scene of
perpetual court cabal and intrigue, of which Mr. Burke is himself an
instance. To render monarchy consistent with government, the next in
succession should not be born a child, but a man at once, and that
man a Solomon. It is ridiculous that nations are to wait and
government be interrupted till boys grow to be men.
Whether I have too little sense to see, or too much to be imposed
upon; whether I have too much or too little pride, or of anything
else, I leave out of the question; but certain it is, that what is
called monarchy, always appears to me a silly, contemptible thing. I
compare it to something kept behind a curtain, about which there is a
great deal of bustle and fuss, and a wonderful air of seeming
solemnity; but when, by any accident, the curtain happens to be open-
and the company see what it is, they burst into laughter.
In the representative system of government, nothing of this can
happen. Like the nation itself, it possesses a perpetual stamina, as
well of body as of mind, and presents itself on the open theatre of
the world in a fair and manly manner. Whatever are its excellences or
defects, they are visible to all. It exists not by fraud and mystery;
it deals not in cant and sophistry; but inspires a language that,
passing from heart to heart, is felt and understood.
We must shut our eyes against reason, we must basely degrade our
understanding, not to see the folly of what is called monarchy.
Nature is orderly in all her works; but this is a mode of government
that counteracts nature. It turns the progress of the human faculties
upside down. It subjects age to be governed by children, and wisdom
by folly.
On the contrary, the representative system is always parallel with
the order and immutable laws of nature, and meets the reason of man
in every part. For example:
In the American Federal Government, more power is delegated to the
President of the United States than to any other individual member of
Congress. He cannot, therefore, be elected to this office under the
age of thirty-five years. By this time the judgment of man becomes
more matured, and he has lived long enough to be acquainted with men
and things, and the country with him.- But on the monarchial plan
(exclusive of the numerous chances there are against every man born
into the world, of drawing a prize in the lottery of human
faculties), the next in succession, whatever he may be, is put at the
head of a nation, and of a government, at the age of eighteen years.
Does this appear like an action of wisdom? Is it consistent with the
proper dignity and the manly character of a nation? Where is the
propriety of calling such a lad the father of the people?- In all
other cases, a person is a minor until the age of twenty-one years.
Before this period, he is not trusted with the management of an acre
of land, or with the heritable property of a flock of sheep, or an
herd of swine; but, wonderful to tell! he may, at the age of eighteen
years, be trusted with a nation.
That monarchy is all a bubble, a mere court artifice to procure
money, is evident (at least to me) in every character in which it can
be viewed. It would be impossible, on the rational system of
representative government, to make out a bill of expenses to such an
enormous amount as this deception admits. Government is not of itself
a very chargeable institution. The whole expense of the federal
government of America, founded, as I have already said, on the system
of representation, and extending over a country nearly ten times as
large as England, is but six hundred thousand dollars, or one hundred
and thirty-five thousand pounds sterling.
I presume that no man in his sober senses will compare the character
of any of the kings of Europe with that of General Washington. Yet,
in France, and also in England, the expense of the civil list only,
for the support of one man, is eight times greater than the whole
expense of the federal government in America. To assign a reason for
this, appears almost impossible. The generality of people in America,
especially the poor, are more able to pay taxes, than the generality
of people either in France or England.
But the case is, that the representative system diffuses such a body
of knowledge throughout a nation, on the subject of government, as to
explode ignorance and preclude imposition. The craft of courts cannot
be acted on that ground. There is no place for mystery; nowhere for
it to begin. Those who are not in the representation, know as much of
the nature of business as those who are. An affectation of mysterious
importance would there be scouted. Nations can have no secrets; and
the secrets of courts, like those of individuals, are always their
defects.
In the representative system, the reason for everything must publicly
appear. Every man is a proprietor in government, and considers it a
necessary part of his business to understand. It concerns his
interest, because it affects his property. He examines the cost, and
compares it with the advantages; and above all, he does not adopt the
slavish custom of following what in other governments are called
Leaders.
It can only be by blinding the understanding of man, and making him
believe that government is some wonderful mysterious thing, that
excessive revenues are obtained. Monarchy is well calculated to
ensure this end. It is the popery of government; a thing kept up to
amuse the ignorant, and quiet them into taxes.
The government of a free country, properly speaking, is not in the
persons, but in the laws. The enacting of those requires no great
expense; and when they are administered, the whole of civil
government is performed- the rest is all court contrivance.