An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding Vol II Chapter IV. - Of the Names of Simple Ideas
by John Locke
1. Names of simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each something
peculiar.
Though all words, as I have shown, signify nothing immediately but the
ideas in the mind of the speaker; yet, upon a nearer survey, we shall
find the names of SIMPLE IDEAS, MIXED MODES (under which I comprise
RELATIONS too), and NATURAL SUBSTANCES, have each of them something
peculiar and different from the other. For example:--
2. First, Names of simple Ideas, and of Substances intimate real
Existence.
First, the names of SIMPLE IDEAS and SUBSTANCES, with the abstract ideas
in the mind which they immediately signify, intimate also some real
existence, from which was derived their original pattern. But the names
of MIXED MODES terminate in the idea that is in the mind, and lead not
the thoughts any further; as we shall see more at large in the following
chapter.
3. Secondly, Names of simple Ideas and Modes signify always both real
and nominal Essences.
Secondly, The names of simple ideas and modes signify always the real
as well as nominal essence of their species. But the names of natural
substances signify rarely, if ever, anything but barely the nominal
essences of those species; as we shall show in the chapter that treats
of the names of substances in particular.
4. Thirdly, Names of simple Ideas are undefinable.
Thirdly, The names of simple ideas are not capable of any definition;
the names of all complex ideas are. It has not, that I know, been yet
observed by anybody what words are, and what are not, capable of being
defined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the
occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men's discourses, whilst
some demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined; and others
think they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication made by a more
general word, and its restriction, (or to speak in terms of art, by a
genus and difference,) when, even after such definition, made according
to rule, those who hear it have often no more a clear conception of the
meaning of the word than they had before. This at least I think, that
the showing what words are, and what are not, capable of definitions,
and wherein consists a good definition, is not wholly besides our
present purpose; and perhaps will afford so much light to the nature
of these signs and our ideas, as to deserve a more particular
consideration.
5. If all names were definable, it would be a Process IN INFINITUM.
I will not here trouble myself to prove that all terms are not
definable, from that progress IN INFINITUM, which it will visibly lead
us into, if we should allow that all names could be defined. For, if the
terms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where at
last should we stop? But I shall, from the nature of our ideas, and the
signification of our words, show WHY SOME NAMES CAN, AND OTHERS CANNOT
BE DEFINED; and WHICH THEY ARE.
6. What a Definition is.
I think it is agreed, that a DEFINITION is nothing else but THE SHOWING
THE MEANING OF ONE WORD BY SEVERAL OTHER NOT SYNONYMOUS TERMS. The
meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for by him
that uses them, the meaning of any term is then showed, or the word is
defined, when, by other words, the idea it is made the sign of, and
annexed to, in the mind of the speaker, is as it were represented, or
set before the view of another; and thus its signification ascertained.
This is the only use and end of definitions; and therefore the only
measure of what is, or is not a good definition.
7. Simple Ideas, why undefinable.
This being premised, I say that the NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS, AND THOSE
ONLY, ARE INCAPABLE OF BEING DEFINED. The reason whereof is this, That
the several terms of a definition, signifying several ideas, they can
all together by no means represent an idea which has no composition
at all: and therefore a definition, which is properly nothing but the
showing the meaning of one word by several others not signifying each
the same thing, can in the names of simple ideas have no place.
8. Instances: Scholastic definitions of Motion.
The not observing this difference in our ideas, and their names, has
produced that eminent trifling in the schools, which is so easy to be
observed in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple
ideas. For, as to the greatest part of them, even those masters
of definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the
impossibility they found in it. What more exquisite jargon could the wit
of man invent, than this definition:--'The act of a being in power, as
far forth as in power;' which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it
was not already known by its famous absurdity, to guess what word it
could ever be supposed to be the explication of. If Tully, asking a
Dutchman what BEWEEGINGE was, should have received this explication
in his own language, that it was 'actus entis in potentia quatenus in
potentia;' I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have
understood what the word BEWEEGINGE signified, or have guessed what idea
a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would signify to another,
when he used that sound?
9. Modern definition of Motion.
Nor have the modern philosophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the
jargon of the schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded
in defining simple ideas, whether by explaining their causes, or any
otherwise. The atomists, who define motion to be 'a passage from one
place to another,' what do they more than put one synonymous word for
another? For what is PASSAGE other than MOTION? And if they were asked
what passage was, how would they better define it than by motion? For is
it not at least as proper and significant to say, Passage is a motion
from one place to another, as to say, Motion is a passage, &c.? This is
to translate, and not to define, when we change two words of the same
signification one for another; which, when one is better understood than
the other, may serve to discover what idea the unknown stands for; but
is very far from a definition, unless we will say every English word in
the dictionary is the definition of the Latin word it answers, and that
motion is a definition of MOTUS. Nor will 'the successive application of
the parts of the superficies of one body to those of another,' which the
Cartesians give us, prove a much better definition of motion, when well
examined.
10. Definitions of Light.
'The act of perspicuous, as far forth as perspicuous,' is another
Peripatetic definition of a simple idea; which, though not more
absurd than the former of motion, yet betrays its uselessness and
insignificancy more plainly; because experience will easily convince any
one that it cannot make the meaning of the word LIGHT (which it pretends
to define) at all understood by a blind man, but the definition of
motion appears not at first sight so useless, because it escapes this
way of trial. For this simple idea, entering by the touch as well as
sight, it is impossible to show an example of any one who has no other
way to get the idea of motion, but barely by the definition of that
name. Those who tell us that light is a great number of little globules,
striking briskly on the bottom of the eye, speak more intelligibly than
the Schools: but yet these words never so well understood would make the
idea the word light stands for no more known to a man that understands
it not before, than if one should tell him that light was nothing but a
company of little tennis-balls, which fairies all day long struck with
rackets against some men's foreheads, whilst they passed by others. For
granting this explication of the thing to be true, yet the idea of the
cause of light, if we had it never so exact, would no more give us the
idea of light itself, as it is such a particular perception in us, than
the idea of the figure and motion of a sharp piece of steel would give
us the idea of that pain which it is able to cause in us. For the cause
of any sensation, and the sensation itself, in all the simple ideas of
one sense, are two ideas; and two ideas so different and distant one
from another, that no two can be more so. And therefore, should Des
Cartes's globules strike never so long on the retina of a man who was
blind by a gutta serena, he would thereby never have any idea of light,
or anything approaching it, though he understood never so well what
little globules were, and what striking on another body was. And
therefore the Cartesians very well distinguish between that light which
is the cause of that sensation in us, and the idea which is produced in
us by it, and is that which is properly light.
11. Simple Ideas, why undefinable, further explained.
Simple ideas, as has been shown, are only to be got by those impressions
objects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed
to each sort. If they are not received this way, all the words in the
world, made use of to explain or define any of their names, will never
be able to produce in us the idea it stands for. For, words being
sounds, can produce in us no other simple ideas than of those very
sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connexion which is
known to be between them and those simple ideas which common use has
made them the signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any
words can give him the taste of a pine apple, and make him have the true
idea of the relish of that celebrated delicious fruit. So far as he
is told it has a resemblance with any tastes whereof he has the ideas
already in his memory, imprinted there by sensible objects, not
strangers to his palate, so far may he approach that resemblance in his
mind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but exciting
in us other simple ideas by their known names; which will be still
very different from the true taste of that fruit itself. In light and
colours, and all other simple ideas, it is the same thing: for the
signification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary.
And no DEFINITION of light or redness is more fitted or able to produce
either of those ideas in us, than the SOUND light or red, by itself.
For, to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a sound, however
formed, is to expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible;
and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses. Which is all
one as to say, that we might taste, smell, and see by the ears: a sort
of philosophy worthy only of Sancho Panza, who had the faculty to see
Dulcinea by hearsay. And therefore he that has not before received into
his mind, by the proper inlet, the simple idea which any word stands
for, can never come to know the signification of that word by any other
words or sounds whatsoever, put together according to any rules of
definition. The only way is, by applying to his senses the proper
object; and so producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the
name already. A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his head
about visible objects, and made use of the explication of his books and
friends, to understand those names of light and colours which often
came in his way, bragged one day, That he now understood what SCARLET
signified. Upon which, his friend demanding what scarlet was? The
blind man answered, It was like the sound of a trumpet. Just such an
understanding of the name of any other simple idea will he have, who
hopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made use of to
explain it.
12. The contrary shown in complex ideas, by instances of a Statue and
Rainbow.
The case is quite otherwise in COMPLEX IDEAS; which, consisting of
several simple ones, it is in the power of words, standing for the
several ideas that make that composition, to imprint complex ideas in
the mind which were never there before, and so make their names be
understood. In such collections of ideas, passing under one name,
definition, or the teaching the signification of one word by several
others, has place, and may make us understand the names of things which
never came within the reach of our senses; and frame ideas suitable to
those in other men's minds, when they use those names: provided that
none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas,
which he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in his
thought. Thus the word STATUE may be explained to a blind man by other
words, when PICTURE cannot; his senses having given him the idea of
figure, but not of colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him.
This gained the prize to the painter against the statuary: each of which
contending for the excellency of his art, and the statuary bragging that
his was to be preferred, because it reached further, and even those who
had lost their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it. The painter
agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man; who being
brought where there was a statue made by the one, and a picture drawn by
the other; he was first led to the statue, in which he traced with his
hands all the lineaments of the face and body, and with great admiration
applauded the skill of the workman. But being led to the picture, and
having his hands laid upon it, was told, that now he touched the head,
and then the forehead, eyes, nose, &c., as his hand moved over the
parts of the picture on the cloth, without finding any the least
distinction: whereupon he cried out, that certainly that must needs be a
very admirable and divine piece of workmanship, which could represent to
them all those parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive anything.
13. Colours indefinable to the born-blind.
He that should use the word RAINBOW to one who knew all those colours,
but yet had never seen that phenomenon, would, by enumerating the
figure, largeness, position, and order of the colours, so well
define that word that it might be perfectly understood. But yet that
definition, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind
man understand it; because several of the simple ideas that make
that complex one, being such as he never received by sensation and
experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind.
14. Complex Ideas definable only when the simple ideas of which they
consist have been got from experience.
Simple ideas, as has been shown, can only be got by experience from
those objects which are proper to produce in us those perceptions. When,
by this means, we have our minds stored with them, and know the names
for them, then we are in a condition to define, and by definition to
understand, the names of complex ideas that are made up of them. But
when any term stands for a simple idea that a man has never yet had in
his mind, it is impossible by any words to make known its meaning to
him. When any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but is
ignorant that that term is the sign of it, then another name of the
same idea, which he has been accustomed to, may make him understand
its meaning. But in no case whatsoever is any name of any simple idea
capable of a definition.
15. Fourthly, Names of simple Ideas of less doubtful meaning than those
of mixed modes and substances.
Fourthly, But though the names of simple ideas have not the help of
definition to determine their signification, yet that hinders not but
that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain than those of
mixed modes and substances; because they, standing only for one simple
perception, men for the most part easily and perfectly agree in their
signification; and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about
their meaning. He that knows once that whiteness is the name of that
colour he has observed in snow or milk, will not be apt to misapply that
word, as long as he retains that idea; which when he has quite lost, he
is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands it
not. There is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together,
which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes; nor a
supposed, but an unknown, real essence, with properties depending
thereon, the precise number whereof is also unknown, which makes the
difficulty in the names of substances. But, on the contrary, in simple
ideas the whole signification of the name is known at once, and consists
not of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the idea may be varied,
and so the signification of name be obscure, or uncertain.
16. Simple Ideas have few Ascents in linea praedicamentali.
Fifthly, This further may be observed concerning simple Simple ideas and
their names, that they have but few ascents in linea praedicamentali,
(as they call it,) from the lowest species to the summum genus. The
reason whereof is, that the lowest species being but one simple idea,
nothing can be left out of it, that so the difference being taken away,
it may agree with some other thing in one idea common to them both;
which, having one name, is the genus of the other two: v.g. there is
nothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red to make
them agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name; as
RATIONALITY being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agree
with brute in the more general idea and name of animal. And therefore
when, to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both white
and red, and several other such simple ideas, under one general name,
they have been fain to do it by a word which denotes only the way they
get into the mind. For when white, red, and yellow are all comprehended
under the genus or name colour, it signifies no more but such ideas
as are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only
through the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term to
comprehend both colours and sounds, and the like simple ideas, they do
it by a word that signifies all such as come into the mind only by one
sense. And so the general term QUALITY, in its ordinary acceptation,
comprehends colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and tangible qualities,
with distinction from extension, number, motion, pleasure, and pain,
which make impressions on the mind and introduce their ideas by more
senses than one.
17. Sixthly, Names of simple Ideas not arbitrary, but perfectly taken
from the existence of things.
Sixthly, The names of simple ideas, substances, and mixed modes have
also this difference: that those of MIXED MODES stand for ideas
perfectly arbitrary; those of SUBSTANCES are not perfectly so, but refer
to a pattern, though with some latitude; and those of SIMPLE IDEAS are
perfectly taken from the existence of things, and are not arbitrary at
all. Which, what difference it makes in the significations of their
names, we shall see in the following chapters.
Simple modes.
The names of SIMPLE MODES differ little from those of simple ideas.