An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding Vol II Chapter VI. - Of the Names of Substances
by John Locke
1. The common Names of Substances stand for Sorts.
The common names of substances, as well as other general terms, stand
for SORTS: which is nothing else but the being made signs of such
complex ideas wherein several particular substances do or might agree,
by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common
conception, and signified by one name. I say do or might agree: for
though there be but one sun existing in the world, yet the idea of it
being abstracted, so that more substances (if there were several) might
each agree in it, it is as much a sort as if there were as many suns as
there are stars. They want not their reasons who think there are, and
that each fixed star would answer the idea the name sun stands for, to
one who was placed in a due distance: which, by the way, may show us how
much the sorts, or, if you please, GENERA and SPECIES of things (for
those Latin terms signify to me no more than the English word sort)
depend on such collections of ideas as men have made, and not on the
real nature of things; since it is not impossible but that, in propriety
of speech, that might be a sun to one which is a star to another.
2. The Essence of each Sort of substance is our abstract Idea to which
the name is annexed.
The measure and boundary of each sort or species, whereby it is
constituted that particular sort, and distinguished from others, is that
we call its ESSENCE, which is nothing but that abstract idea to which
the name is annexed; so that everything contained in that idea is
essential to that sort. This, though it be all the essence of natural
substances that WE know, or by which we distinguish them into sorts, yet
I call it by a peculiar name, the NOMINAL ESSENCE, to distinguish it
from the real constitution of substances, upon which depends this
nominal essence, and all the properties of that sort; which, therefore,
as has been said, may be called the REAL ESSENCE: v.g. the nominal
essence of gold is that complex idea the word gold stands for, let
it be, for instance, a body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable,
fusible, and fixed. But the real essence is the constitution of the
insensible parts of that body, on which those qualities and all the
other properties of gold depend. How far these two are different, though
they are both called essence, is obvious at first sight to discover.
3. The nominal and real Essence different.
For, though perhaps voluntary motion, with sense and reason, joined to a
body of a certain shape, be the complex idea to which I and others annex
the name MAN, and so be the nominal essence of the species so called:
yet nobody will say that complex idea is the real essence and source of
all those operations which are to be found in any individual of that
sort. The foundation of all those qualities which are the ingredients
of our complex idea, is something quite different: and had we such a
knowledge of that constitution of man; from which his faculties of
moving, sensation, and reasoning, and other powers flow, and on which
his so regular shape depends, as it is possible angels have, and it is
certain his Maker has, we should have a quite other idea of his essence
than what now is contained in our definition of that species, be it what
it will: and our idea of any individual man would be as far different
from what it is now, as is his who knows all the springs and wheels and
other contrivances within of the famous clock at Strasburg, from that
which a gazing countryman has of it, who barely sees the motion of the
hand, and hears the clock strike, and observes only some of the outward
appearances.
4. Nothing essential to Individuals.
That ESSENCE, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to sorts, and
that it is considered in particular beings no further than as they are
ranked into sorts, appears from hence: that, take but away the abstract
ideas by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names,
and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly
vanishes: we have no notion of the one without the other, which plainly
shows their relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am; God and
nature has made me so: but there is nothing I have is essential to me.
An accident or disease may very much alter my colour or shape; a fever
or fall may take away my reason or memory, or both; and an apoplexy
leave neither sense, nor understanding, no, nor life. Other creatures of
my shape may be made with more and better, or fewer and worse faculties
than I have; and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body
very different from mine. None of these are essential to the one or the
other, or to any individual whatever, till the mind refers it to some
sort or species of things; and then presently, according to the abstract
idea of that sort, something is found essential. Let any one examine his
own thoughts, and he will find that as soon as he supposes or speaks
of essential, the consideration of some species, or the complex idea
signified by some general name, comes into his mind; and it is in
reference to that that this or that quality is said to be essential.
So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me or any other
particular corporeal being, to have reason? I say, no; no more than it
is essential to this white thing I write on to have words in it. But if
that particular being be to be counted of the sort MAN, and to have the
name MAN given it, then reason is essential to it; supposing reason
to be a part of the complex idea the name man stands for: as it is
essential to this thing I write on to contain words, if I will give it
the name TREATISE, and rank it under that species. So that essential and
not essential relate only to our abstract ideas, and the names annexed
to them; which amounts to no more than this, That whatever particular
thing has not in it those qualities which are contained in the abstract
idea which any general term stands for, cannot be ranked under that
species, nor be called by that name; since that abstract idea is the
very essence of that species.
5. The only essences perceived by us in individual substances are those
qualities which entitle them to receive their names.
Thus, if the idea of BODY with some people be bare extension or space,
then solidity is not essential to body: if others make the idea to which
they give the name BODY to be solidity and extension, then solidity is
essential to body. That therefore, and that alone, is considered as
essential, which makes a part of the complex idea the name of a sort
stands for; without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that
sort, nor be entitled to that name. Should there be found a parcel of
matter that had all the other qualities that are in iron, but wanted
obedience to the loadstone, and would neither be drawn by it nor receive
direction from it, would any one question whether it wanted anything
essential? It would be absurd to ask, Whether a thing really existing
wanted anything essential to it. Or could it be demanded, Whether this
made an essential or specific difference or no, since WE have no other
measure of essential or specific but our abstract ideas? And to talk of
specific differences in NATURE, without reference to general ideas in
names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, What is
sufficient to make an essential difference in nature between any two
particular beings, without any regard had to some abstract idea, which
is looked upon as the essence and standard of a species? All such
patterns and standards being quite laid aside, particular beings,
considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their
qualities equally essential; and everything in each individual will be
essential to it; or, which is more, nothing at all. For, though it may
be reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron?
yet I think it is very improper and insignificant to ask, whether it be
essential to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen with; without
considering it under the name IRON, or as being of a certain species.
And if, as has been said, our abstract ideas, which have names annexed
to them, are the boundaries of species, nothing can be essential but
what is contained in those ideas.
6. Even the real essences of individual substances imply potential
sorts.
It is true, I have often mentioned a REAL ESSENCE, distinct in
substances from those abstract ideas of them, which I call their
nominal essence. By this real essence I mean, that real constitution
of anything, which is the foundation of all those properties that are
combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the nominal
essence; that particular constitution which everything has within
itself, without any relation to anything without it. But essence, even
in this sense, RELATES TO A SORT, AND SUPPOSES A SPECIES. For, being
that real constitution on which the properties depend, it necessarily
supposes a sort of things, properties belonging only to species, and not
to individuals: v. g. supposing the nominal essence of gold to be a body
of such a peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fusibility,
the real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter on which
these qualities and their union depend; and is also the foundation of
its solubility in aqua regia and other properties, accompanying that
complex idea. Here are essences and properties, but all upon supposition
of a sort or general abstract idea, which is considered as immutable;
but there is no individual parcel of matter to which any of these
qualities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable from
it. That which is essential belongs to it as a condition whereby it
is of this or that sort: but take away the consideration of its being
ranked under the name of some abstract idea, and then there is nothing
necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the real
essences of substances, we only suppose their being, without precisely
knowing what they are; but that which annexes them still to the species
is the nominal essence, of which they are the supposed foundation and
cause.
7. The nominal Essence bounds the Species to us.
The next thing to be considered is, by which of those essences it is
that substances are determined into sorts or species; and that, it is
evident, is by the nominal essence. For it is that alone that the name,
which is the mark of the sort, signifies. It is impossible, therefore,
that anything should determine the sorts of things, which WE rank under
general names, but that idea which that name is designed as a mark for;
which is that, as has been shown, which we call nominal essence. Why
do we say this is a horse, and that a mule; this is an animal, that an
herb? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that sort, but
because it has that nominal essence; or, which is all one, agrees to
that abstract idea, that name is annexed to? And I desire any one but
to reflect on his own thoughts, when he hears or speaks any of those or
other names of substances, to know what sort of essences they stand for.
8. The nature of Species as formed by us.
And that the species of things to us are nothing but the ranking them
under distinct names, according to the complex ideas in US, and not
according to precise, distinct, real essences in THEM, is plain from
hence:--That we find many of the individuals that are ranked into
one sort, called by one common name, and so received as being of one
species, have yet qualities, depending on their real constitutions,
as far different one from another as from others from which they are
accounted to differ specifically. This, as it is easy to be observed
by all who have to do with natural bodies, so chemists especially are
often, by sad experience, convinced of it, when they, sometimes in vain,
seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur, antimony, or
vitriol, which they have found in others. For, though they are bodies of
the same species, having the same nominal essence, under the same name,
yet do they often, upon severe ways of examination, betray qualities so
different one from another, as to frustrate the expectation and labour
of very wary chemists. But if things were distinguished into species,
according to their real essences, it would be as impossible to find
different properties in any two individual substances of the same
species, as it is to find different properties in two circles, or
two equilateral triangles. That is properly the essence to US, which
determines every particular to this or that CLASSIS; or, which is the
same thing, to this or that general name: and what can that be else, but
that abstract idea to which that name is annexed; and so has, in truth,
a reference, not so much to the being of particular things, as to their
general denominations?
9. Not the real Essence, or texture of parts, which we know not.
Nor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently (which is the
end of sorting) denominate them, by their real essences; because we know
them not. Our faculties carry us no further towards the knowledge and
distinction of substances, than a collection of THOSE SENSIBLE IDEAS
WHICH WE OBSERVE IN THEM; which, however made with the greatest
diligence and exactness we are capable of, yet is more remote from the
true internal constitution from which those qualities flow, than, as I
said, a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance of that famous
clock at Strasburg, whereof he only sees the outward figure and motions.
There is not so contemptible a plant or animal, that does not confound
the most enlarged understanding. Though the familiar use of things about
us take off our wonder, yet it cures not our ignorance. When we come
to examine the stones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, we
presently find we know not their make; and can give no reason of
the different qualities we find in them. It is evident the internal
constitution, whereon their properties depend, is unknown to us: for to
go no further than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst
them, What is that texture of parts, that real essence, that makes lead
and antimony fusible, wood and stones not? What makes lead and iron
malleable, antimony and stones not? And yet how infinitely these come
short of the fine contrivances and inconceivable real essences of
plants or animals, every one knows. The workmanship of the all-wise
and powerful God in the great fabric of the universe, and every part
thereof, further exceeds the capacity and comprehension of the most
inquisitive and intelligent man, than the best contrivance of the most
ingenious man doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational
creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into sorts, and
dispose them into certain classes under names, by their real essences,
that are so far from our discovery or comprehension. A blind man may as
soon sort things by their colours, and he that has lost his smell as
well distinguish a lily and a rose by their odours, as by those internal
constitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish
sheep and goats by their real essences, that are unknown to him, may
be pleased to try his skill in those species called CASSIOWARY and
QUERECHINCHIO; and by their internal real essences determine the
boundaries of those species, without knowing the complex idea of
sensible qualities that each of those names stand for, in the countries
where those animals are to be found.
10. Not the substantial Form, which know Not.
Those, therefore, who have been taught that the several species of
substances had their distinct internal SUBSTANTIAL FORMS, and that it
was those FORMS which made the distinction of substances into their true
species and genera, were led yet further out of the way by having their
minds set upon fruitless inquiries after 'substantial forms'; wholly
unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure or
confused conception in general.
11. That the Nominal Essence is that only whereby we distinguish Species
of Substances, further evident, from our ideas of finite Spirits and of
God.
That our ranking and distinguishing natural substances into species
consists in the nominal essences the mind makes, and not in the real
essences to be found in the things themselves, is further evident from
our ideas of spirits. For the mind getting, only by reflecting on its
own operations, those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits, it
hath or can have no other notion of spirit but by attributing all those
operations it finds in itself to a sort of beings; without consideration
of matter. And even the most advanced notion we have of GOD is but
attributing the same simple ideas which we have got from reflection on
what we find in ourselves, and which we conceive to have more perfection
in them than would be in their absence; attributing, I say, those simple
ideas to Him in an unlimited degree. Thus, having got from reflecting on
ourselves the idea of existence, knowledge, power and pleasure--each of
which we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of
each the better--joining all these together, with infinity to each of
them, we have the complex idea of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent,
infinitely wise and happy being. And though we are told that there are
different species of angels; yet we know not how to frame distinct
specific ideas of them: not out of any conceit that the existence of
more species than one of spirits is impossible; but because having no
more simple ideas (nor being able to frame more) applicable to such
beings, but only those few taken from ourselves, and from the actions of
our own minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several parts
of our bodies; we can no otherwise distinguish in our conceptions the
several species of spirits, one from another, but by attributing those
operations and powers we find in ourselves to them in a higher or lower
degree; and so have no very distinct specific ideas of spirits, except
only of GOD, to whom we attribute both duration and all those other
ideas with infinity; to the other spirits, with limitation: nor, as
I humbly conceive, do we, between GOD and them in our ideas, put any
difference, by any number of simple ideas which we have of one and not
of the other, but only that of infinity. All the particular ideas of
existence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, &c., being ideas derived
from the operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all sorts
of spirits, with the difference only of degrees; to the utmost we can
imagine, even infinity, when we would frame as well as we can an idea of
the First Being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote, in
the real excellency of his nature, from the highest and perfectest of
all created beings, than the greatest man, nay, purest seraph, is from
the most contemptible part of matter; and consequently must infinitely
exceed what our narrow understandings can conceive of Him.
12. Of finite Spirits there are probably numberless Species in a
continuous series of gradations.
It is not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, that there
may be many species of spirits, as much separated and diversified one
from another by distinct properties whereof we have no ideas, as the
species of sensible things are distinguished one from another by
qualities which we know and observe in them. That there should be more
species of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of sensible
and material below us, is probable to me from hence: that in all the
visible corporeal world, we see no chasms or gaps. All quite down from
us the descent is by easy steps, and a continued series of things, that
in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are fishes
that have wings, and are not strangers to the airy region: and there are
some birds that are inhabitants of the water, whose blood is cold as
fishes, and their flesh so like in taste that the scrupulous are allowed
them on fish-days. There are animals so near of kin both to birds and
beasts that they are in the middle between both: amphibious animals link
the terrestrial and aquatic together; seals live at land and sea, and
porpoises have the warm blood and entrails of a hog; not to mention what
is confidently reported of mermaids, or sea-men. There are some brutes
that seem to have as much knowledge and reason as some that are called
men: and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that,
if you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other, there
will scarce be perceived any great difference between them: and so on,
till we come to the lowest and the most inorganical parts of matter, we
shall find everywhere that the several species are linked together,
and differ but in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider the
infinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think that it
is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe, and the great
design and infinite goodness of the Architect, that the species of
creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us toward
his infinite perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us
downwards: which if it be probable, we have reason then to be persuaded
that there are far more species of creatures above us than there are
beneath; we being, in degrees of perfection, much more remote from the
infinite being of God than we are from the lowest state of being, and
that which approaches nearest to nothing. And yet of all those distinct
species, for the reasons abovesaid, we have no clear distinct ideas.
13. The Nominal Essence that of the Species, as conceived by us, proved
from Water and Ice.
But to return to the species of corporeal substances. If I should ask
any one whether ice and water were two distinct species of things, I
doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: and it cannot be
denied but he that says they are two distinct species is in the right.
But if an Englishman bred in Jamaica, who perhaps had never seen nor
heard of ice, coming into England in the winter, find the water he put
in his basin at night in a great part frozen in the morning, and, not
knowing any peculiar name it had, should call it hardened water; I ask
whether this would be a new species to him, different from water? And I
think it would be answered here, It would not be to him a new species,
no more than congealed jelly, when it is cold, is a distinct species
from the same jelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold in the furnace
is a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman. And
if this be so, it is plain that OUR DISTINCT SPECIES are NOTHING BUT
DISTINCT COMPLEX IDEAS, WITH DISTINCT NAMES ANNEXED TO THEM. It is true
every substance that exists has its peculiar constitution, whereon
depend those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it; but the
ranking of things into species (which is nothing but sorting them under
several titles) is done by us according to the ideas that WE have of
them: which, though sufficient to distinguish them by names, so that we
may be able to discourse of them when we have them not present
before us; yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal
constitutions, and that things existing are distinguished by nature into
species, by real essences, according as we distinguish them into species
by names, we shall be liable to great mistakes.
14. Difficulties in the supposition of a certain number of real Essences
To distinguish substantial beings into species, according to the usual
supposition, that there are certain precise essences or forms of things,
whereby all the individuals existing are, by nature distinguished into
species, these things are necessary:--
15. A crude supposition.
First, To be assured that nature, in the production of things, always
designs them to partake of certain regulated established essences, which
are to be the models of all things to be produced. This, in that crude
sense it is usually proposed, would need some better explication, before
it can fully be assented to.
16. Monstrous births.
Secondly, It would be necessary to know whether nature always attains
that essence it designs in the production of things. The irregular and
monstrous births, that in divers sorts of animals have been observed,
will always give us reason to doubt of one or both of these.
17. Are monsters really a distinct species?
Thirdly, It ought to be determined whether those we call monsters be
really a distinct species, according to the scholastic notion of the
word species; since it is certain that everything that exists has its
particular constitution. And yet we find that some of these monstrous
productions have few or none of those qualities which are supposed to
result from, and accompany, the essence of that species from whence they
derive their originals, and to which, by their descent, they seem to
belong.
18. Men can have no ideas of Real Essences.
Fourthly, The real essences of those things which we distinguish into
species, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known; i.e. we
ought to have ideas of them. But since we are ignorant in these four
points, the supposed real essences of things stand US not in stead for
the distinguishing substances into species.
19. Our Nominal Essences of Substances not perfect collections of the
properties that flow from the Real Essence.
Fifthly, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that, having
framed perfect complex ideas of the properties of things flowing from
their different real essences, we should thereby distinguish them into
species. But neither can this be done. For, being ignorant of the real
essence itself, it is impossible to know all those properties that flow
from it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we
may certainly conclude that that essence is not there, and so the thing
is not of that species. We can never know what is the precise number of
properties depending on the real essence of gold, any one of which
failing, the real essence of gold, and consequently gold, would not be
there, unless we knew the real essence of gold itself, and by that
determined that species. By the word GOLD here, I must be understood to
design a particular piece of matter; v. g. the last guinea that was
coined. For, if it should stand here, in its ordinary signification, for
that complex idea which I or any one else calls gold, i. e. for the
nominal essence of gold, it would be jargon. So hard is it to show the
various meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing else but
words to do it by.
20. Hence names independent of Real Essence.
By all which it is clear, that our distinguishing substances into
species by names, is not at all founded on their real essences; nor can
we pretend to range and determine them exactly into species, according
to internal essential differences.
21. But stand for such collections of simple ideas as we have made the
Name stand for.
But since, as has been remarked, we have need of GENERAL words, though
we know not the real essences of things; all we can do is, to collect
such a number of simple ideas as, by examination, we find to be united
together in things existing, and thereof to make one complex idea.
Which, though it be not the real essence of any substance that exists,
is yet the specific essence to which our name belongs, and is
convertible with it; by which we may at least try the truth of these
nominal essences. For example: there be that say that the essence of
body is EXTENSION; if it be so, we can never mistake in putting the
essence of anything for the thing itself. Let us then in discourse put
extension for body, and when we would say that body moves, let us say
that extension moves, and see how ill it will look. He that should say
that one extension by impulse moves another extension, would, by the
bare expression, sufficiently show the absurdity of such a notion. The
essence of anything in respect of us, is the whole complex idea
comprehended and marked by that name; and in substances, besides the
several distinct simple ideas that make them up, the confused one of
substance, or of an unknown support and cause of their union, is always
a part: and therefore the essence of body is not bare extension, but an
extended solid thing; and so to say, an extended solid thing moves, or
impels another, is all one, and as intelligible, as to say, BODY moves
or impels. Likewise, to say that a rational animal is capable of
conversation, is all one as to say a man; but no one will say that
rationality is capable of conversation, because it makes not the whole
essence to which we give the name man.
22. Our Abstract Ideas are to us the Measures of the Species we make in
instance in that of Man.
There are creatures in the world that have shapes like ours, but are
hairy, and want language and reason. There are naturals amongst us that
have perfectly our shape, but want reason, and some of them language
too. There are creatures, as it is said, (sit fides penes authorem, but
there appears no contradiction that there should be such,) that, with
language and reason and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, have
hairy tails; others where the males have no beards, and others where
the females have. If it be asked whether these be all men or no, all
of human species? it is plain, the question refers only to the nominal
essence: for those of them to whom the definition of the word man, or
the complex idea signified by that name, agrees, are men, and the other
not. But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence;
and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several
creatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible for us
to answer, no part of that going into our specific idea: only we have
reason to think, that where the faculties or outward frame so much
differs, the internal constitution is not exactly the same. But what
difference in the real internal constitution makes a specific difference
it is in vain to inquire; whilst our measures of species be, as they
are, only our abstract ideas, which we know; and not that internal
constitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair
only on the skin be a mark of a different internal specific constitution
between a changeling and a drill, when they agree in shape, and want of
reason and speech? And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign
to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling
and a reasonable man? And so of the rest, if we pretend that distinction
of species or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame and secret
constitutions of things.
23. Species in Animals not distinguished by Generation.
Nor let any one say, that the power of propagation in animals by the
mixture of male and female, and in plants by seeds, keeps the supposed
real species distinct and entire, For, granting this to be true, it
would help us in the distinction of the species of things no further
than the tribes of animals and vegetables. What must we do for the rest?
But in those too it is not sufficient: for if history lie not, women
have conceived by drills; and what real species, by that measure, such a
production will be in nature will be a new question: and we have reason
to think this is not impossible, since mules and jumarts, the one from
the mixture of an ass and a mare, the other from the mixture of a bull
and a mare, are so frequent in the world. I once saw a creature that was
the issue of a cat and a rat, and had the plain marks of both about it;
wherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sort
alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which he that shall
add the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in
nature, will find it hard, even in the race of animals, to determine by
the pedigree of what species every animal's issue is; and be at a
loss about the real essence, which he thinks certainly conveyed by
generation, and has alone a right to the specific name. But further,
if the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by
propagation, must I go to the Indies to see the sire and dam of the one,
and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other,
to know whether this be a tiger or that tea?
24. Not by substantial Forms.
Upon the whole matter, it is evident that it is their own collections of
sensible qualities that men make the essences of THEIR several sorts of
substances; and that their real internal structures are not considered
by the greatest part of men in the sorting them. Much less were any
SUBSTANTIAL FORMS ever thought on by any but those who have in this one
part of the world learned the language of the schools: and yet those
ignorant men, who pretend not any insight into the real essences, nor
trouble themselves about substantial forms, but are content with knowing
things one from another by their sensible qualities, are often better
acquainted with their differences; can more nicely distinguish them
from their uses; and better know what they expect from each, than those
learned quick-sighted men, who look so deep into them, and talk so
confidently of something more hidden and essential.
25. The specific Essences that are common made by Men.
But supposing that the REAL essences of substances were discoverable by
those that would severely apply themselves to that inquiry, yet we could
not reasonably think that the ranking of things under general names was
regulated by those internal real constitutions, or anything else but
their OBVIOUS appearances; since languages, in all countries, have
been established long before sciences. So that they have not been
philosophers or logicians, or such who have troubled themselves about
forms and essences, that have made the general names that are in use
amongst the several nations of men: but those more or less comprehensive
terms have, for the most part, in all languages, received their birth
and signification from ignorant and illiterate people, who sorted
and denominated things by those sensible qualities they found in them;
thereby to signify them, when absent, to others, whether they had an
occasion to mention a sort or a particular thing.
26. Therefore very various and uncertain in the ideas of different men.
Since then it is evident that we sort and name substances by their
nominal and not by their real essences, the next thing to be considered
is how, and by whom these essences come to be made. As to the latter, it
is evident they are made by the mind, and not by nature: for were they
Nature's workmanship, they could not be so various and different in
several men as experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it,
we shall not find the nominal essence of any one species of substances
in all men the same: no, not of that which of all others we are the most
intimately acquainted with. It could not possibly be that the abstract
idea to which the name MAN is given should be different in several men,
if it were of Nature's making; and that to one it should be animal
rationale, and to another, animal implume bipes latis unguibus. He that
annexes the name man to a complex idea, made up of sense and spontaneous
motion, joined to a body of such a shape, has thereby one essence of the
species man; and he that, upon further examination, adds rationality,
has another essence of the species he calls man: by which means the same
individual will be a true man to the one which is not so to the other.
I think there is scarce any one will allow this upright figure, so well
known, to be the essential difference of the species man; and yet how
far men determine of the sorts of animals rather by their shape than
descent, is very visible; since it has been more than once debated,
whether several human foetuses should be preserved or received to
baptism or no, only because of the difference of their outward
configuration from the ordinary make of children, without knowing
whether they were not as capable of reason as infants cast in another
mould: some whereof, though of an approved shape, are never capable of
as much appearance of reason all their lives as is to be found in an
ape, or an elephant, and never give any signs of being acted by a
rational soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, which
only was found wanting, and not the faculty of reason, which nobody
could know would be wanting in its due season, was made essential to the
human species. The learned divine and lawyer must, on such occasions,
renounce his sacred definition of animal rationale, and substitute some
other essence of the human species. [Monsieur Menage furnishes us with
an example worth the taking notice of on this occasion: 'When the abbot
of Saint Martin,' says he, 'was born, he had so little of the figure of
a man, that it bespake him rather a monster. It was for some time under
deliberation, whether he should be baptized or no. However, he was
baptized, and declared a man provisionally [till time should show what
he would prove]. Nature had moulded him so untowardly, that he was
called all his life the Abbot Malotru; i.e. ill-shaped. He was of Caen.
(Menagiana, 278, 430.) This child, we see, was very near being excluded
out of the species of man, barely by his shape. He escaped very narrowly
as he was; and it is certain, a figure a little more oddly turned had
cast him, and he had been executed, as a thing not to be allowed to pass
for a man. And yet there can be no reason given why, if the lineaments
of his face had been a little altered, a rational soul could not have
been lodged in him; why a visage somewhat longer, or a nose flatter, or
a wider mouth, could not have consisted, as well as the rest of his ill
figure, with such a soul, such parts, as made him, disfigured as he was,
capable to be a dignitary in the church.]
27. Nominal Essences of particular substances are undetermined by
nature, and therefore various as men vary.
Wherein, then, would I gladly know, consist the precise and unmovable
boundaries of that species? It is plain, if we examine, there is no
such thing made by Nature, and established by her amongst men. The real
essence of that or any other sort of substances, it is evident, we know
not; and therefore are so undetermined in our nominal essences, which we
make ourselves, that, if several men were to be asked concerning some
oddly-shaped foetus, as soon as born, whether it were a man or no, it
is past doubt one should meet with different answers. Which could not
happen, if the nominal essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the
species of substances, were not made by man with some liberty; but
were exactly copied from precise boundaries set by nature, whereby it
distinguished all substances into certain species. Who would undertake
to resolve what species that monster was of which is mentioned by
Licetus (lib. i. c. 3), with a man's head and hog's body? Or those other
which to the bodies of men had the heads of beasts, as dogs, horses, &c.
If any of these creatures had lived, and could have spoke, it would have
increased the difficulty. Had the upper part to the middle been of human
shape, and all below swine, had it been murder to destroy it? Or must
the bishop have been consulted, whether it were man enough to be
admitted to the font or no? As I have been told it happened in France
some years since, in somewhat a like case. So uncertain are the
boundaries of species of animals to us, who have no other measures
than the complex ideas of our own collecting: and so far are we from
certainly knowing what a MAN is; though perhaps it will be judged great
ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet I think I may say, that
the certain boundaries of that species are so far from being determined,
and the precise number of simple ideas which make the nominal essence so
far from being settles and perfectly known, that very material doubts
may still arise about it. And I imagine none of the definitions of the
word MAN which we yet have, nor descriptios of that sort of animal, are
so perfect and exact as to satisfy a considerate inquisitive person;
much less to obtain a general consent, and to be that which men would
everywhere stick by, in the decision of cases, and determining of life
and death, baptism or no baptism, in productions that mights happen.
28. But not so arbitrary as Mixed Modes.
But though these nominal essences of substances are made by the mind,
they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes. To the
making of any nominal essence, it is necessary, First, that the ideas
whereof it consists have such a union as to make but one idea, how
compounded soever. Secondly, that the particular ideas so united be
exactly the same, neither more nor less. For if two abstract complex
ideas differ either in number or sorts of their component parts, they
make two different, and not one and the same essence. In the first of
these, the mind, in making its complex ideas of substances, only follows
nature; and puts none together which are not supposed to have a union in
nature. Nobody joins the voice of a sheep with the shape of a horse;
nor the colour of lead with the weight and fixedness of gold, to be the
complex ideas of any real substances; unless he has a mind to fill his
head with chimeras, and his discourse with unintelligible words. Men
observing certain qualities always joined and existing together, therein
copied nature; and of ideas so united made their complex ones of
substances. For, though men may make what complex ideas they please, and
give what names to them they will; yet, if they will be understood WHEN
THEY SPEAK OF THINGS REALLY EXISTING, they must in some degree conform
their ideas to the things they would speak of; or else men's language
will be like that of Babel; and every man's words, being intelligible
only to himself, would no longer serve to conversation and the ordinary
affairs of life, if the ideas they stand for be not some way answering
the common appearances and agreement of substances as they really exist.
29. Our Nominal Essences of substances usually consist of a few obvious
qualities observed in things.
Secondly, Though the mind of man, in making its complex ideas of
substances, never puts any together that do not really, or are not
supposed to, co-exist; and so it truly borrows that union from nature:
yet the number it combines depends upon the various care, industry, or
fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with some
few sensible obvious qualities; and often, if not always, leave out
others as material and as firmly united as those that they take. Of
sensible substances there are two sorts: one of organized bodies, which
are propagated by seed; and in these the SHAPE is that which to us is
the leading quality, and most characteristical part, that determines
the species. And therefore in vegetables and animals, an extended solid
substance of such a certain figure usually serves the turn. For however
some men seem to prize their definition of animal rationale, yet should
there a creature be found that had language and reason, but partaked not
of the usual shape of a man, I believe it would hardly pass for a man,
how much soever it were animal rationale. And if Balaam's ass had all
his life discoursed as rationally as he did once with his master, I
doubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the name man, or
allowed him to be of the same species with himself. As in vegetables
and animals it is the shape, so in most other bodies, not propagated by
seed, it is the COLOUR we most fix on, and are most led by. Thus
where we find the colour of gold, we are apt to imagine all the other
qualities comprehended in our complex idea to be there also: and we
commonly take these two obvious qualities, viz. shape and colour, for so
presumptive ideas of several species, that in a good picture, we readily
say, this is a lion, and that a rose; this is a gold, and that a silver
goblet, only by the different figures and colours represented to the eye
by the pencil.
30. Yet, imperfect as they thus are, they serve for common converse.
But though this serves well enough for gross and confused conceptions,
and inaccurate ways of talking and thinking; yet MEN ARE FAR ENOUGH
FROM HAVING AGREED ON THE PRECISE NUMBER OF SIMPLE IDEAS OR QUALITIES
BELONGING TO ANY SORT OF THINGS, SIGNIFIED BY ITS NAME. Nor is it a
wonder; since it requires much time, pains, and skill, strict inquiry,
and long examination to find out what, and how many, those simple ideas
are, which are constantly and inseparably united in nature, and are
always to be found together in the same subject. Most men, wanting
either time, inclination, or industry enough for this, even to some
tolerable degree, content themselves with some few obvious and outward
appearances of things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for
the common affairs of life: and so, without further examination, give
them names, or take up the names already in use. Which, though in common
conversation they pass well enough for the signs of some few obvious
qualities co-existing, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a
settled signification, a precise number of simple ideas, much less all
those which are united in nature. He that shall consider, after so
much stir about genus and species, and such a deal of talk of specific
differences, how few words we have yet settled definitions of, may with
reason imagine, that those FORMS which there hath been so much noise
made about are only chimeras, which give us no light into the specific
natures of things. And he that shall consider how far the names of
substances are from having significations wherein all who use them do
agree, will have reason to conclude that, though the nominal essences of
substances are all supposed to be copied from nature, yet they are all,
or most of them, very imperfect. Since the composition of those complex
ideas are, in several men, very different: and therefore that these
boundaries of species are as men, and not as Nature, makes them, if at
least there are in nature any such prefixed bounds. It is true that many
particular substances are so made by Nature, that they have agreement
and likeness one with another, and so afford a foundation of being
ranked into sorts. But the sorting of things by us, or the making of
determinate species, being in order to naming and comprehending them
under general terms, I cannot see how it can be properly said, that
Nature sets the boundaries of the species of things: or, if it be so,
our boundaries of species are not exactly conformable to those in
nature. For we, having need of general names for present use, stay not
for a perfect discovery of all those qualities which would BEST show us
their most material differences and agreements; but we ourselves divide
them, by certain obvious appearances, into species, that we may the
easier under general names communicate our thoughts about them. For,
having no other knowledge of any substance but of the simple ideas that
are united in it; and observing several particular things to agree with
others in several of those simple ideas; we make that collection our
specific idea, and give it a general name; that in recording our
thoughts, and in our discourse with others, we may in one short word
designate all the individuals that agree in that complex idea, without
enumerating the simple ideas that make it up; and so not waste our time
and breath in tedious descriptions: which we see they are fain to do who
would discourse of any new sort of things they have not yet a name for.
31. Essences of Species under the same Name very different in different
minds.
But however these species of substances pass well enough in ordinary
conversation, it is plain that this complex idea wherein they observe
several individuals to agree, is by different men made very differently;
by some more, and others less accurately. In some, this complex idea
contains a greater, and in others a smaller number of qualities; and so
is apparently such as the mind makes it. The yellow shining colour makes
gold to children; others add weight, malleableness, and fusibility; and
others yet other qualities, which they find joined with that yellow
colour, as constantly as its weight and fusibility. For in all these and
the like qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex
idea of that substance wherein they are all joined as another. And
therefore different men, leaving out or putting in several simple ideas
which others do not, according to their various examination, skill, or
observation of that subject, have different essences of gold, which must
therefore be of their own and not of nature's making.
32. The more general our Ideas of Substances are, the more incomplete
and partial they are.
If the number of simple ideas that make the nominal essence of the
lowest species, or first sorting, of individuals, depends on the mind of
man, variously collecting them, it is much more evident that they do so
in the more comprehensive classes, which, by the masters of logic, are
called genera. These are complex ideas designedly imperfect: and it is
visible at first sight, that several of those qualities that are to
be found in the things themselves are purposely left out of generical
ideas. For, as the mind, to make general ideas comprehending several
particulars, leaves out those of time and place, and such other, that
make them incommunicable to more than one individual; so to make other
yet more general ideas, that may comprehend different sorts, it leaves
out those qualities that distinguish them, and puts into its new
collection only such ideas as are common to several sorts. The same
convenience that made men express several parcels of yellow matter
coming from Guinea and Peru under one name, sets them also upon making
of one name that may comprehend both gold and silver, and some other
bodies of different sorts. This is done by leaving out those qualities,
which are peculiar to each sort, and retaining a complex idea made up
of those that are common to them all. To which the name METAL being
annexed, there is a genus constituted; the essence whereof being that
abstract idea, containing only malleableness and fusibility, with
certain degrees of weight and fixedness, wherein some bodies of several
kinds agree, leaves out the colour and other qualities peculiar to gold
and silver, and the other sorts comprehended under the name metal.
Whereby it is plain that men follow not exactly the patterns set them by
nature, when they make their general ideas of substances; since there is
no body to be found which has barely malleableness and fusibility in
it, without other qualities as inseparable as those. But men, in making
their general ideas, seeking more the convenience of language, and quick
dispatch by short and comprehensive signs, than the true and precise
nature of things as they exist, have, in the framing their abstract
ideas, chiefly pursued that end; which was to be furnished with store
of general and variously comprehensive names. So that in this whole
business of genera and species, the genus, or more comprehensive, is but
a partial conception of what is in the species; and the species but a
partial idea of what is to be found in each individual. If therefore any
one will think that a man, and a horse, and an animal, and a plant, &c.,
are distinguished by real essences made by nature, he must think nature
to be very liberal of these real essences, making one for body, another
for an animal, and another for a horse; and all these essences liberally
bestowed upon Bucephalus. But if we would rightly consider what is done
in all these genera and species, or sorts, we should find that there is
no new thing made; but only more or less comprehensive signs, whereby we
may be enabled to express in a few syllables great numbers of particular
things, as they agree in more or less general conceptions, which we
have framed to that purpose. In all which we may observe, that the more
general term is always the name of a less complex idea; and that each
genus is but a partial conception of; the species comprehended under it.
So that if these abstract general ideas be thought to be complete, it
can only be in respect of a certain established relation between them
and certain names which are made use of to signify them; and not in
respect of anything existing, as made by nature.
33. This all accommodated to the end of the Speech.
This is adjusted to the true end of speech, which is to be the easiest
and shortest way of communicating our notions. For thus he that would
discourse of things, as they agreed in the complex idea of extension and
solidity, needed but use the word BODY to denote all such. He that
to these would join others, signified by the words life, sense, and
spontaneous motion, needed but use the word ANIMAL to signify all which
partaked of those ideas, and he that had made a complex idea of a body,
with life, sense, and motion, with the faculty of reasoning, and a
certain shape joined to it, needed but use the short monosyllable MAN,
to express all particulars that correspond to that complex idea. This is
the proper business of genus and species: and this men do without any
consideration of real essences, or substantial forms; which come not
within the reach of our knowledge when we think of those things, nor
within the signification of our words when we discourse with others.
34. Instance in Cassowaries.
Were I to talk with any one of a sort of birds I lately saw in St.
James's Park, about three or four feet high, with a covering of
something between feathers and hair, of a dark brown colour, without
wings, but in the place thereof two or three little branches coming down
like sprigs of Spanish broom, long great legs, with feet only of three
claws, and without a tail; I must make this description of it, and so
may make others understand me. But when I am told that the name of it
is CASSUARIS, I may then use that word to stand in discourse for all my
complex idea mentioned in that description; though by that word, which
is now become a specific name, I know no more of the real essence
or constitution of that sort of animals than I did before; and knew
probably as much of the nature of that species of birds before I learned
the name, as many Englishmen do of swans or herons, which are specific
names, very well known, of sorts of birds common in England.
35. Men determine the Sorts of Substances, which may be sorted
variously.
From what has been said, it is evident that MEN make sorts of things.
For, it being different essences alone that make different species, it
is plain that they who make those abstract ideas which are the nominal
essences do thereby make the species, or sort. Should there be a body
found, having all the other qualities of gold except malleableness, it
would no doubt be made a question whether it were gold or not, i.e.
whether it were of that species. This could be determined only by that
abstract idea to which every one annexed the name gold: so that it
would be true gold to him, and belong to that species, who included not
malleableness in his nominal essence, signified by the sound gold; and
on the other side it would not be true gold, or of that species, to him
who included malleableness in his specific idea. And who, I pray, is it
that makes these diverse species, even under one and the same name, but
men that make two different abstract ideas, consisting not exactly
of the same collection of qualities? Nor is it a mere supposition to
imagine that a body may exist wherein the other obvious qualities of
gold may be without malleableness; since it is certain that gold itself
will be sometimes so eager, (as artists call it,) that it will as little
endure the hammer as glass itself. What we have said of the putting in,
or leaving out of malleableness, in the complex idea the name gold is by
any one annexed to, may be said of its peculiar weight, fixedness, and
several other the like qualities: for whatever is left out, or put in,
it is still the complex idea to which that name is annexed that makes
the species: and as any particular parcel of matter answers that idea,
so the name of the sort belongs truly to it; and it is of that species.
And thus anything is true gold, perfect metal. All which determination
of the species, it is plain, depends on the understanding of man, making
this or that complex idea.
36. Nature makes the Similitudes of Substances.
This, then, in short, is the case: Nature makes many PARTICULAR THINGS,
which do agree one with another in many sensible qualities, and probably
too in their internal frame and constitution: but it is not this real
essence that distinguishes them into species; it is men who, taking
occasion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein they
observe often several individuals to agree, range them into sorts, in
order to their naming, for the convenience of comprehensive signs;
under which individuals, according to their conformity to this or that
abstract idea, come to be ranked as under ensigns: so that this is of
the blue, that the red regiment; this is a man, that a drill: and in
this, I think, consists the whole business of genus and species.
37. The manner of sorting particular beings the work of fallible men,
though nature makes things alike.
I do not deny but nature, in the constant production of particular
beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike
and of kin one to another: but I think it nevertheless true, that the
boundaries of the species, whereby men sort them, are made by men; since
the essences of the species, distinguished by different names, are, as
has been proved, of man's making, and seldom adequate to the internal
nature of the things they are taken from. So that we may truly say, such
a manner of sorting of things is the workmanship of men.
38. Each abstract Idea, with a name to it, makes a nominal Essence.
One thing I doubt not but will seem very strange in this doctrine, which
is, that from what has been said it will follow, that each abstract
idea, with a name to it, makes a distinct species. But who can help it,
if truth will have it so? For so it must remain till somebody can show
us the species of things limited and distinguished by something else;
and let us see that general terms signify not our abstract ideas, but
something different from them. I would fain know why a shock and a hound
are not as distinct species as a spaniel and an elephant. We have no
other idea of the different essence of an elephant and a spaniel,
than we have of the different essence of a shock and a hound; all the
essential difference, whereby we know and distinguish them one from
another, consisting only in the different collection of simple ideas, to
which we have given those different names.
39. How Genera and Species are related to naming.
How much the making of species and genera is in order to general names;
and how much general names are necessary, if not to the being, yet at
least to the completing of a species, and making it pass for such, will
appear, besides what has been said above concerning ice and water, in
a very familiar example. A silent and a striking watch are but one
species, to those who have but one name for them: but he that has the
name WATCH for one, and CLOCK for the other, and distinct complex ideas
to which those names belong, to HIM they are different species. It
will be said perhaps, that the inward contrivance and constitution is
different between these two, which the watchmaker has a clear idea of.
And yet it is plain they are but one species to him, when he has but one
name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make
a new species? There are some watches that are made with four wheels,
others with five; is this a specific difference to the workman? Some
have strings and physics, and others none; some have the balance loose,
and others regulated by a spiral spring, and others by hogs' bristles.
Are any or all of these enough to make a specific difference to
the workman, that knows each of these and several other different
contrivances in the internal constitutions of watches? It is certain
each of these hath a real difference from the rest; but whether it be an
essential, a specific difference or no, relates only to the complex idea
to which the name watch is given: as long as they all agree in the idea
which that name stands for, and that name does not as a generical name
comprehend different species under it, they are not essentially nor
specifically different. But if any one will make minuter divisions, from
differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to such
precise complex ideas give names that shall prevail; they will then be
new species, to them who have those ideas with names to them, and can by
those differences distinguish watches into these several sorts; and
then WATCH will be a generical name. But yet they would be no distinct
species to men ignorant of clock-work, and the inward contrivances of
watches, who had no other idea but the outward shape and bulk, with the
marking of the hours by the hand. For to them all those other names
would be but synonymous terms for the same idea, and signify no more,
nor no other thing but a watch. Just thus I think it is in natural
things. Nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs (if I may so say)
within, are different in a RATIONAL MAN and a CHANGELING; no more
than that there is a difference in the frame between a DRILL and a
CHANGELING. But whether one or both these differences be essential or
specifical, is only to be known to us by their agreement or disagreement
with the complex idea that the name man stands for: for by that alone
can it be determined whether one, or both, or neither of those be a man.
40. Species of Artificial Things less confused than Natural.
From what has been before said, we may see the reason why, in the
species of artificial things, there is generally less confusion and
uncertainty than in natural. Because an artificial thing being a
production of man, which the artificer designed, and therefore well
knows the idea of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no other
idea, nor to import any other essence, than what is certainly to be
known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the idea or essence of
the several sorts of artificial things, consisting for the most part
in nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts, and sometimes
motion depending thereon, which the artificer fashions in matter, such
as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to
attain a certain idea thereof; and so settle the signification of the
names whereby the species of artificial things are distinguished, with
less doubt, obscurity, and equivocation than we can in things natural,
whose differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the
reach of our discoveries.
41. Artificial Things of distinct Species.
I must be excused here if I think artificial things are of distinct
species as well as natural: since I find they are as plainly and orderly
ranked into sorts, by different abstract ideas, with general names
annexed to them, as distinct one from another as those of natural
substances. For why should we not think a watch and pistol as distinct
species one from another, as a horse and a dog; they being expressed in
our minds by distinct ideas, and to others by distinct appellations?
42. Substances alone, of all our several sorts of ideas, have proper
Names.
This is further to be observed concerning substances, that they alone of
all our several sorts of ideas have particular or proper names, whereby
one only particular thing is signified. Because in simple ideas, modes,
and relations, it seldom happens that men have occasion to mention often
this or that particular when it is absent. Besides, the greatest part of
mixed modes, being actions which perish in their birth, are not capable
of a lasting duration, as substances which are the actors; and wherein
the simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the name
have a lasting union.
43. Difficult to lead another by words into the thoughts of things
stripped of those abstract ideas we give them.
I must beg pardon of my reader for having dwelt so long upon this
subject, and perhaps with some obscurity. But I desire it may be
considered, how difficult it is to lead another by words into the
thoughts of things, stripped of those specifical differences we give
them: which things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them,
I thereby rank them into some sort or other, and suggest to the mind the
usual abstract idea of that species; and so cross my purpose. For,
to talk of a man, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary
signification of the name man, which is our complex idea usually annexed
to it; and bid the reader consider man, as he is in himself, and as he
is really distinguished from others in his internal constitution, or
real essence, that is, by something he knows not what, looks like
trifling: and yet thus one must do who would speak of the supposed real
essences and species of things, as thought to be made by nature, if it
be but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing signified
by the general names which substances are called by. But because it is
difficult by known familiar names to do this, give me leave to endeavour
by an example to make the different consideration the mind has of
specific names and ideas a little more clear; and to show how the
complex ideas of modes are referred sometimes to archetypes in the minds
of other intelligent beings, or, which is the same, to the signification
annexed by others to their received names; and sometimes to no
archetypes at all. Give me leave also to show how the mind always refers
its ideas of substances, either to the substances themselves, or to the
signification of their names, as to the archetypes; and also to make
plain the nature of species or sorting of things, as apprehended and
made use of by us; and of the essences belonging to those species: which
is perhaps of more moment to discover the extent and certainty of our
knowledge than we at first imagine.
44. Instances of mixed Modes names KINNEAH and NIOUPH.
Let us suppose Adam, in the state of a grown man, with a good
understanding, but in a strange country, with all things new and unknown
about him; and no other faculties to attain the knowledge of them but
what one of this age has now. He observes Lamech more melancholy than
usual, and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his wife Adah,
(whom he most ardently loved) that she had too much kindness for another
man. Adam discourses these his thoughts to Eve, and desires her to take
care that Adah commit not folly: and in these discourses with Eve he
makes use of these two new words KINNEAH and NIOUPH. In time, Adam's
mistake appears, for he finds Lamech's trouble proceeded from having
killed a man: but yet the two names KINNEAH and NIOUPH, (the one
standing for suspicion in a husband of his wife's disloyalty to him; and
the other for the act of committing disloyalty,) lost not their distinct
significations. It is plain then, that here were two distinct complex
ideas of mixed modes, with names to them, two distinct species of
actions essentially different; I ask wherein consisted the essences of
these two distinct species of actions? And it is plain it consisted in a
precise combination of simple ideas, different in one from the other. I
ask, whether the complex idea in Adam's mind, which he called KINNEAH,
were adequate or not? And it is plain it was; for it being a combination
of simple ideas, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without
respect to anything as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted,
and gave the name KINNEAH to, to express in short to others, by that one
sound, all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex one;
it must necessarily follow that it was an adequate idea. His own choice
having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it should,
and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate; it being
referred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent.
45. These words, KINNEAH and NIOUPH, by degrees grew into common use,
and then the case was somewhat altered. Adam's children had the same
faculties, and thereby the same power that he had, to make what complex
ideas of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds; to abstract them,
and make what sounds they pleased the signs of them: but the use of
names being to make our ideas within us known to others, that cannot be
done, but when the same sign stands for the same idea in two who would
communicate their thoughts and discourse together. Those, therefore,
of Adam's children, that found these two words, KINNEAH and NIOUPH, in
familiar use, could not take them for insignificant sounds, but must
needs conclude they stood for something; for certain ideas, abstract
ideas, they being general names; which abstract ideas were the essences
of the species distinguished by those names. If therefore, they would
use these words as names of species already established and agreed on,
they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds, signified by
these names, to the ideas that they stood for in other men's minds, as
to their patterns and archetypes; and then indeed their ideas of
these complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt
(especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple ideas)
not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds, using
the same names; though for this there be usually a remedy at hand, which
is to ask the meaning of any word we understand not of him that uses it:
it being as impossible to know certainly what the words jealousy and
adultery (which I think answer [Hebrew] and [Hebrew]) stand for in
another man's mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it was
impossible, in the beginning of language, to know what KINNEAH and
NIOUPH stood for in another man's mind, without explication; they being
voluntary signs in every one.
46. Instances of a species of Substance named ZAHAB.
Let us now also consider, after the same manner, the names of substances
in their first application. One of Adam's children, roving in the
mountains, lights on a glittering substance which pleases his eye. Home
he carries it to Adam, who, upon consideration of it, finds it to be
hard, to have a bright yellow colour, and an exceeding great weight.
These perhaps, at first, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it;
and abstracting this complex idea, consisting of a substance having that
peculiar bright yellowness, and a weight very great in proportion to its
bulk, he gives the name ZAHAB, to denominate and mark all substances
that have these sensible qualities in them. It is evident now, that,
in this case, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before, in
forming those ideas of mixed modes to which he gave the names KINNEAH
and NIOUPH. For there he put ideas together only by his own imagination,
not taken from the existence of anything; and to them he gave names to
denominate all things that should happen to agree to those his abstract
ideas, without considering whether any such thing did exist or not: the
standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his idea of
this new substance, he takes the quite contrary course; here he has
a standard made by nature; and therefore, being to represent that to
himself, by the idea he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in no
simple idea into his complex one, but what he has the perception of from
the thing itself. He takes care that his idea be conformable to this
archetype, and intends the name should stand for an idea so conformable.
47.
This piece of matter, thus denominated ZAHAB by Adam, being quite
different from any he had seen before, nobody, I think, will deny to be
a distinct species, and to have its peculiar essence; and that the name
ZAHAB is the mark of the species, and a name belonging to all things
partaking in that essence. But here it is plain the essence Adam made
the name ZAHAB stand for was nothing but a body hard, shining, yellow,
and very heavy. But the inquisitive mind of man, not content with the
knowledge of these, as I may say, superficial qualities, puts Adam upon
further examination of this matter. He therefore knocks, and beats it
with flints, to see what was discoverable in the inside: he finds it
yield to blows, but not easily separate into pieces: he finds it will
bend without breaking. Is not now ductility to be added to his former
idea, and made part of the essence of the species that name ZAHAB stands
for? Further trials discover fusibility and fixedness. Are not they
also, by the same reason that any of the others were, to be put into the
complex idea signified by the name ZAHAB? If not, what reason will there
be shown more for the one than the other? If these must, then all the
other properties, which any further trials shall discover in this
matter, ought by the same reason to make a part of the ingredients of
the complex idea which the name ZAHAB stands for, and so be the essence
of the species marked by that name. Which properties, because they are
endless, it is plain that the idea made after this fashion, by this
archetype, will be always inadequate.
48. The Abstract Ideas of Substances always imperfect and therefore
various.
But this is not all. It would also follow that the names of substances
would not only have, as in truth they have, but would also be supposed
to have different significations, as used by different men, which would
very much cumber the use of language. For if every distinct quality
that were discovered in any matter by any one were supposed to make a
necessary part of the complex idea signified by the common name given
to it, it must follow, that men must suppose the same word to signify
different things in different men: since they cannot doubt but different
men may have discovered several qualities, in substances of the same
denomination, which others know nothing of.
49. Therefore to fix the Nominal Species Real Essence supposed.
To avoid this therefore, they have supposed a real essence belonging to
every species, from which these proper ties all flow, and would have
their name of the species stand for that. But they, not having any idea
of that real essence in substances, and their words signifying nothing
but the ideas they have, that which is done by this attempt is only to
put the name or sound in the place and stead of the thing having that
real essence, without knowing what the real essence is, and this is that
which men do when they speak of species of things, as supposing them
made by nature, and distinguished by real essences.
50. Which Supposition is of no Use.
For, let us consider, when we affirm that 'all gold is fixed,' either
it means that fixedness is a part of the definition, i. e., part of the
nominal essence the word gold stands for; and so this affirmation, 'all
gold is fixed,' contains nothing but the signification of the term gold.
Or else it means, that fixedness, not being a part of the definition of
the gold, is a property of that substance itself: in which case it is
plain that the word gold stands in the place of a substance, having the
real essence of a species of things made by nature. In which way of
substitution it has so confused and uncertain a signification,
that, though this proposition--'gold is fixed'--be in that sense an
affirmation of something real; yet it is a truth will always fail us in
its particular application, and so is of no real use or certainty. For
let it be ever so true, that all gold, i. e. all that has the real
essence of gold, is fixed, what serves this for, whilst we know not, in
this sense, WHAT IS OR IS NOT GOLD? For if we know not the real essence
of gold, it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that
essence, and so whether IT be true gold or no.
51. Conclusion.
To conclude: what liberty Adam had at first to make any complex ideas of
MIXED MODES by no other pattern but by his own thoughts, the same have
all men ever since had. And the same necessity of conforming his ideas
of SUBSTANCES to things without him, as to archetypes made by nature,
that Adam was under, if he would not wilfully impose upon himself, the
same are all men ever since under too. The same liberty also that Adam
had of affixing any new name to any idea, the same has any one still,
(especially the beginners of languages, if we can imagine any such;) but
only with this difference, that, in places where men in society have
already established a language amongst them, the significations of words
are very warily and sparingly to be altered. Because men being furnished
already with names for their ideas, and common use having appropriated
known names to certain ideas, an affected misapplication of them cannot
but be very ridiculous. He that hath new notions will perhaps venture
sometimes on the coining of new terms to express them: but men think it
a boldness, and it is uncertain whether common use will ever make them
pass for current. But in communication with others, it is necessary that
we conform the ideas we make the vulgar words of any language stand for
to their known proper significations, (which I have explained at large
already,) or else to make known that new signification we apply them to.