The Great Republic by the Master Historians Our Foreign Relations byBancroft, Hubert H.
The curtain fell on the last scene of the nineteenth century drama to the
ominous music of the bugle and cannon. The echoes only faintly reached our ears,
for the Transvaal is remote; and, though the Philippine Islands are linked to us
by vocal wires, the rude noise of insurgent-suppression has not the familiar
thrilling note of war. The Republic is at peace with the great powers, itself
having in the last half-hundred years become one of the greatest.
Yet it begins the new century in a state of unrest. Its responsibilities and
risks have multiplied and expanded proportionately to its new power. The nations
of Europe have made room for a newcomer in their select circle. The American has
invaded the fancied private grounds sacred to the tread of old-world potentates.
He has invaded it quietly as a bearer of light, then as a distributor of
civilizing merchandise, and now boldly as a conqueror. The Republic has
henceforth to be reckoned with as an unknown possibility, with the probabilities
indicating a sure growth of world-greatness. The startling fact has caused a
general scrutiny of the situation and the drift of things. If the powers are at
peace, they are inwardly ill at ease. When Europe, Asia, and Africa feel chills
and fever America cannot but feel premonitory symptoms of influenza. These are
the little drawbacks to the joy of belonging to a great family. With every fresh
move on the international chess-board each player and interested on-looker has
to forecast, as best he can, its distant possible effect on his interests. The
fine art and science of high diplomacy now becomes a thing of vital moment to
the nation. From an easy contentment with paragraphic items about foreign
statecraft, the patriotic American newspaper reader must henceforth scan the
doings and the sayings of Europe's trained statesmen and Asia's oleaginous,
dual-minded handlers of policy. He must learn to distinguish between words that
mean less than the spaces that separate them, and omissions that signify the
essential pith of the utterance. He will come to perceive how most of what
appear to be deliberate decisions prove by and by to be mere feelers, deftly and
successfully contrived to elicit the views or schemings of the other party. He
will learn that what on their face seem to be startling acts are often simple
traps for the unwary. The play is fascinating as it grows familiar. Whether it
consumes time that might be used to better advantage in the home, is another
question; but certain it is that expansion of responsibilities necessitates
expansion of knowledge, insight, and wisdom, qualities already possessed in high
degree by the American people, as their splendid history demonstrates; yet there
is more need than ever that these virtues shall be broadened and deepened. The
opening of the twentieth century is not the time for resting oars or reversing
telescope.
Our relations with certain powers and peoples at the close of the century call
for notice in this historical survey. And it is proper to follow the order in
which our foreign affairs are stated in the President's message to the LXVth
Congress. China stands first.
["The dominant question," says the message, "has been the treatment of the
Chinese problem. Apart from this our relations with the powers have been happy.
The recent troubles in China spring from the anti-foreign agitation which for
the last three years has gained strength in the northern provinces. Their origin
lies deep in the character of the Chinese race and in the traditions of their
government. The Taiping rebellion and the opening of Chinese ports to foreign
trade and settlement disturbed alike the homogeneity and the seclusion of China.
Meanwhile foreign activity made itself felt in all quarters, not alone on the
coast but along the great river arteries and in the remoter districts, carrying
new ideas and introducing new associations among a primitive people which had
pursued for centuries a national policy of isolation. The telegraph and the
railway spreading over their land, the steamers plying on their waterways, the
merchant and the missionary penetrating year by year farther to the interior,
became to the Chinese mind types of an alien invasion, changing the course of
their national life and fraught with vague forebodings of disaster to their
beliefs and their self-control.
For several years before the present troubles all the resources of foreign
diplomats, backed by moral demonstrations of the physical force of fleets and
arms, have been needed to secure due respect for the treaty rights of foreigners
and to obtain satisfaction from the responsible authorities for the sporadic
outrages upon the persons and property of unoffending sojourners, which from
time to time occurred at widely separated points in the northern provinces, as
in the case of the outbreaks in Szechuen and Shantung. In the latter province an
outbreak, in which German missionaries were slain, was the too natural result of
these malevolent teachings. The posting of seditious placards, exhorting to the
utter destruction of foreigners and of every foreign thing, continued unrebuked.
Hostile demonstrations towards the stranger gained strength by organization.
The sect commonly styled the Boxers developed greatly in the provinces north of
the Yangtse, and with the collusion of many notable officials, including some of
the immediate councils of the throne itself, became alarmingly aggressive. No
foreigner's life outside of the protected treaty ports was safe. No foreign
interest was secure from spoliation.]
An English diplomat gives the following account of the Boxer society and its
purposes: "Of the many hundreds of secret societies of one sort and another in
China but few are actively opposed to the present dynasty,-opposed to it, that
is to say, to the extent of wishing to rise against it and crush it.
Unfortunately, one of the most influential of those few is the brotherhood we
now speak about so lightly. These Boxers are in reality a branch of the
brotherhood universally dreaded in China, as well as in Singapore, Penang,
northern India, and parts of the United States, and known as the Sam Hop Wui,
while, among the European population of Canton, Shanghai, and Pekin, it is
usually alluded to as the Great Triad Society. This society, called also the
Hung League, and known by many other titles as well, has been in existence so
many hundreds of years that its origin is buried in obscurity. The membership of
the Boxers, roughly speaking, is rather over than under 4,000,000, for the
brotherhood was believed to have 4,000,000 members some ten years ago, and the
membership is known to have increased considerably since then. The society is
composed of lodges, each of which has a president, whose power for good and evil
is considerable. Every president has under him two or more vice-presidents, who
are bound to obey his every command, or else suffer a horrible death." The
Boxers' society is anti-reform, anti-foreign, and anti-Christian.
The story leading up to the intervention of the allied powers is as follows: In
1898 the Chinese Emperor, Kwang-Hsu, incurred the violent opposition of the
conservative Manchu party by adopting a policy which contemplated sweeping
reforms in the administration of the government and the conduct of private
affairs. He issued an edict sanctioning the establishment of a great national
university at Pekin, modelled after those of the United States. Virtually, he
wished to adopt the main features of Western civilization.
In August of that year, however, the Empress Dowager, An, the acknowledged head
of the Conservatives, relieved the Emperor of all real power, either through a
conspiracy or with his consent, and began a vigorous administration of affairs
by issuing a decree which practically set aside all the Emperor's reformatory
proclamations. In some cases, reformers were dismissed from office; in others,
arrested and executed on pretexts that were at least sufficient to satisfy the
Empress and her violent councillors that they deserved death. It was reported
that Kwang-Hsu had committed suicide,-leading to the supposition that he had
been assassinated; but this proved a false rumor, and it seems that at some time
during the ensuing two years he again assumed the direction of imperial affairs.
Rumors of the deposition of the Emperor, Kwang-Hsu, were not confirmed; but the
Dowager Empress, with her bitter hatred of foreigners, soon became the power
behind the throne, and matters began in February to take on an ominous
appearance. Lives of missionaries were soon threatened, and the Pekin government
either did not or could not restrain the anti-foreign society of Boxers, who in
April and May began to show activity in various provinces, and particularly at
Swatow and in the Shan-tung province in general. It was not till the early days
of June, when the startling intelligence was received that the foreign ministers
of all the powers, together with their families and official households and a
handful of marine guards, were besieged by Boxer mobs in Pekin. A riot at Shang-
hai led to the landing of a French cruiser's marines, who killed and wounded
several rioters During the whole of 1899 the agitation was kept up, particular
animosity being shown to foreigners.
In April, 1900, disorder and violence had become extreme, and the ministers of
the several governments represented at the Chinese capital sent a joint note to
the Chinese foreign office announcing, that, unless the Boxers were suppressed,
troops would be landed to march into the interior and protect the foreigners.
The United States Government, informed of the condition in which American
missionaries, official representatives in the various provinces, and other
citizens resident there, were placed by the attitude of these fanatics, had left
it to Minister Conger's judgment to frame as strong demands for the protection
of American residents as circumstances might warrant, but had instructed him not
to commit his Government to any combined action with the other powers. He might
enforce his demands with threats, if necessary, but without pledging the
Government to any policy. The Chinese authorities professed to accede to what we
demanded, but the outrages continued.
One hundred and sixty native Christians were massacred in Chi-li, the Pekin
province, and the insurgents burned the railway stations, pulled up the tracks
within thirty miles of the capital, and routed the imperial forces. Our
Government joined the allied movement to take the business of suppression in
hand. "A proposal was made," says the message, "by the other powers, that a
combined fleet should be assembled in Chinese waters as a moral demonstration,
under cover of which to exact of the Chinese government respect for foreign
treaty rights and the suppression of the Boxers. The United States, while not
participating in the joint demonstration, promptly sent from the Philippines all
ships that could be spared for service on the Chinese coast. A small force of
marines was landed at Taku, and sent to Pekin for the protection of the American
legation. Other powers took similar action, until some four hundred men were
assembled in the capital as legation guards."
On the 28th of May Rear-Admiral Louis Kempff arrived at Taku, his vessel - the
United States cruiser Newark - carrying sailors and marines; on the 29th he
landed 100 men under Captain McCalla; on the 30th he proceeded with this force
thirty-five miles up the Peiho River, to Tien-Tsin, and the next day he started
McCalla and fifty men to Pekin, with other foreign troops. The first relief
column was composed of about 350 men, - American, British, French, Italian,
Russian, and Japanese. The consent of the Chinese government had been asked, but
refused; and in view of the extreme danger of foreign legations, missionaries,
and refugees at Pekin, it was determined to organize and start this column,
which would endeavor to force its way. The Chinese fired on the ships as they
landed their men. "The forts were thereupon shelled by the foreign vessels, the
American admiral taking no part in the attack, on the ground that we were not at
war with China, and that a hostile demonstration might consolidate the anti-
foreign elements and strengthen the Boxers to oppose the relieving column." Two
days later the Taku forts were captured. The English force had gone to Pekin.
After fighting continually for fifteen days, Admiral Seymour's expedition was
relieved by a force sent from Taku, and the remnants of it were brought back to
the coast. June 18 Baron von Ketteler, the German minister, was murdered in the
streets of Pekin, and rumors affirmed that all the legationers had shared the
same fate.
Admiral Kempff asked for additional American troops, and orders were promptly
sent to Manila to forward the Ninth Infantry to Taku. This regiment reached Taku
in July, and was shortly afterwards sent by detachments to Tien-Tsin. On the
26th of June the Fourteenth United States Infantry and Reilly's Battery reached
that city, having been ordered from Manila.
In the mean time the allied troops had stormed and taken the forts about Tien-
Tsin, after heavy fighting and some loss. In this Admiral Kempff did not
participate, deeming that his orders from Washington forbade it; but he was
subsequently informed that his powers were ample for seizing forts, fighting
battles, or acting in any other manner necessary for the promotion of the prime
object in view,-the protection of Americans and American interests.
Murders of missionaries at various stations occurred early in June, and pillage
and destruction were fast becoming general; so that there was a sense of
insecurity and dread even in provinces remote from the capital, and particularly
in the region of the treaty ports, where the citizens of other countries were
more numerous, and yet not sufficiently numerous to offer effectual resistance
to a frenzied populace.
Early in August the allied forces began their advance upon Pekin, and forced an
entrance into the city, relieving the legations after one of the most remarkable
sieges in history. The allied forces remained in China, occupying Pekin, though
the greater part of the American and Russian forces were withdrawn from the
capital. Negotiations between China and the powers are always slow, and the
final settlement of the Chinese trouble is yet undecided. December 22 the powers
agreed upon twelve demands to be submitted to the Chinese envoys. The terms
demand fullest apology to Germany for the killing of its minister, the erection
of a monument to him, and full indemnity to the powers for the losses they have
sustained. The amount of the indemnities is not stated, the language of the
terms insisting only that they shall be "equitable," the powers themselves
presumably being the judges.
"The policy of the United States," says the message, "through all this trying
period, was clearly announced and scrupulously carried out. A circular note to
the powers, dated July 3, proclaimed our attitude. Treating the condition in the
North as one of virtual anarchy, in which the great provinces of the South and
Southeast had no share, we regarded the local authorities in the latter quarters
as representing the Chinese people, with whom we sought to remain in peace and
friendship. Our declared aims involved no war against the Chinese nation. We
adhered to the legitimate office of rescuing the imperilled legation, obtaining
redress for wrongs already suffered, securing, wherever possible, the safety of
American life and property in China, and preventing a spread of the disorders or
their recurrence. As was then said: `The policy of the government of the United
States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to
China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all
rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and
safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all
parts of the Chinese empire.'"
Thus the Chinese problem stands as the century opens, so far as it touches
American policy.
The following from the pen of the Hon. Charles Denby, formerly United States
Minister to China, in Munsey's Magazine, has value as indicating the lines on
which American diplomacy may move:
["At the point of the bayonet the foreign powers in 1858 forced China to sign,
seal, and conclude certain treaties. There had been treaties made before, but
they were not satisfactory to England and France. The new treaties were
repudiated by China, and in 1861 French and English soldiers marched to Pekin to
force their ratification.
Then commenced for China the difficult lesson of learning how to manage foreign
affairs. The foreign ministers came to reside permanently in Pekin. The Tsung-li
Yamen was organized, and foreign affairs were controlled by this new board. The
foreign trade of China began to increase rapidly. It has now reached the figure
of about three hundred millions of dollars annually..
Great Britain has 75 per cent. of China's foreign trade, and two-thirds of the
foreign population. It must be said that the policy of England in the far East
is just to other nations. She asks nothing but equal rights, and grants equal
rights to all nations. She opens treaty ports where all flags are equal. She can
readily afford to do this, because she is sure of holding 75 per cent. of all
the trade that is developed. Even in Cochin-China, a French province, England
does nearly as much trade as France.
Much has been written about our relations with England in the far East. I am
glad that those relations are friendly, and on proper and suitable occasions
this country and England should act together. They should both protest against
the further partition of China. It must be remembered, however, that the
American merchant finds in the East no stronger competitor than the British
merchant..
It is idle to say China can grant mining or railroad concessions to whom she
pleases. That is exactly what she cannot do. In her unpreparedness for war, she
must do whatever any other nation demands of her. The inclination of China has
always been to turn to America in all industrial enterprises. The
recommendations of Sheng Taotai in this regard could not be carried out because
the competition of the European powers was too serious and influential.
Let the world assist the most ancient of nations in her efforts to enter
worthily into the family of civilized peoples. Let the world respect her
autonomy, and she will pay back its services by giving to its commerce the
boundless riches of her mines, and the hoarded wealth of centuries."]
While our relations with Great Britain are officially declared to be quite
friendly, a cloud, no bigger than a man's hand, is hovering in the diplomatic
horizon. The commercial importance of the proposed Nicaragua canal has been
alluded to in preceding pages. In this place it is to be considered in its
aspect as a possible disturber of international harmony.
Omitting details, it may be stated that an inter-oceanic waterway has long been
desired by American statesmen and the commercial world. Schemes have been set
afoot to accomplish the work, and, from various causes, have failed. In his
message to the Fifty-sixth Congress the President states the situation of
affairs as follows:
["The all-important matter of an inter-oceanic canal has assumed a new phase.
Adhering to its refusal to reopen the question of the forfeiture of the contract
of the Maritime Canal Company, which was terminated for alleged non-execution in
October, 1899, the government of Nicaragua has since supplemented that action by
declaring the so-styled Eyre-Cragin option void for non-payment of the
stipulated advance. Protests in relation to these acts have been filed in the
state department and are under consideration. Deeming itself relieved from
existing engagements, the Nicaraguan government shows a disposition to deal
freely with the canal question in the way of negotiations with the United States
or by taking measures to promote the waterway.
Overtures for a convention to effect the building of the canal under the
auspices of the United States are under consideration. In the mean time the
views of Congress upon the general subject, in the light of the report of the
Commission appointed to examine the comparative merits of the various ship-canal
projects, may be awaited.
I commend to the early attention of the Senate the convention with Great Britain
to facilitate the construction of such a canal, and to remove any objections
which might arise out of the convention commonly called the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty."]
This convention, known as the Hay-Pauncefote Canal Treaty, from the names of the
American and English negotiators, contained the following provisions:
[Article I. It is agreed that the canal can be constructed under the auspices of
the government of the United States, either directly at its own cost, or by gift
or loan of money to individuals or corporations, or through subscription to or
purchase of stock or shares, and that, subject to the provisions of the present
convention, the said government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to
such construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the
regulation and management of the canal.
Article II. The high contracting parties, desiring to preserve and maintain the
"general principle" of neutralization established in Article VIII. of the
Clayton-Bulwer Convention, adopt as basis of such neutralization the following
rules, substantially as embodied in the convention between Great Britain and
certain other powers, signed at Constantinople October 29, 1888, for the free
navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal. This is to say:
First -- The canal shall be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace,
to the vessels of commerce and war of all nations, on terms of entire equality,
so that there shall be no discrimination against any nation or its citizens or
subjects in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic or otherwise.
Second -- The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be
exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within it.
Third -- Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take any stores
in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such
vessels through the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay, in
accordance with the regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may
result from the necessities of the service. Prizes shall be in all respects
subject to the same rules as vessels of war of the belligerents.
Fourth -- No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or
warlike materials in the canal except in case of accidental hindrance of the
transit, and in such case the transit shall be resumed with all possible
despatch.
Fifth -- The provisions of this article shall apply to waters adjacent to the
canal, within three marine miles of either end. Vessels of war of a belligerent
shall not remain in such waters longer than twenty-four hours at any one time
except in case of distress, and in such case shall depart as soon as possible;
but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours
from the departure of a vessel of war of the other belligerent.
Sixth -- The plant, establishments, buildings, and all works necessary to the
construction, maintenance, and operation of the canal shall be deemed to be part
thereof, for the purposes of this convention, and in time of war, as in time of
peace, shall enjoy complete immunity from attack or injury by belligerents, and
from acts calculated to impair their usefulness as part of the canal.
Seventh -- No fortification shall be erected commanding the canal or the waters
adjacent. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such
military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against
lawlessness and disorder.
Article III. The high contracting parties will immediately upon the exchange of
the ratifications of this convention bring it to the notice of the other powers,
and invite them to adhere to it.
Article IV. The present convention shall be ratified by the President of the
United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by
Her Britannic Majesty; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington or
at London within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.]
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on March 9, 1900, reported the treaty
to the Senate, with the following amendment, to be inserted at the end of
Section 5 of Article II., known as the Davis amendment: "It is agreed, however,
that none of the immediately foregoing conditions and stipulations in Sections
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 of this act shall apply to measures which the United States
may find it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defence of the
United States and the maintenance of public order." The amendment received the
vote of all the members of the Committee except Senator Morgan, who filed a
minority report opposing the amendment. It became apparent before the close of
the first session of the Fifty-sixth Congress that the treaty could not be
ratified by the Senate, with or without the amendment, during that session.
In May, 1900, the House of Representatives passed the Hepburn bill, by a vote of
225 to 35, calling for the construction of the canal by the United States, and
authorizing the Government to make "such provisions for defence as may be
necessary." Ultimately, the Senate ratified the treaty as changed by "the Davis
amendment."
Two sets of objections were raised against this. There were American objections
and English objections. The former are illustrated by this communication, sent
by then Secretary Frelinghuysen, in 1882, to then Minister Lowell, in London, as
follows: "A canal across the isthmus for vessels of all dimensions and every
character, under possible conditions hereinafter referred to, would affect this
Republic in its trade and commerce; would expose our Western coast to attack;
destroy our isolation, oblige us to improve our defences, and to increase our
navy; and possibly compel us, contrary to our traditions, to take an active
interest in the affairs of European nations. The United States, with their large
and increasing population and wealth, cannot be uninterested in a change in the
physical conformation of this hemisphere which may injuriously affect the
material or political interests of the Republic, and naturally seek that the
severance of the isthmus connecting the continents shall be effected in harmony
with those interests."
The English objections were stated with some show of suppressed temper. The new
treaty was expressly a modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1859, which
has always stood as a menace against the building and control of a canal by the
United States Government. The case for the English and Canadian objectors was
summed up by the London Times, as follows: "The Hay-Pauncefote agreement gave
America the right, which she does not posses under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, to
construct and control and inter-oceanic canal independently of this country. In
other respects it has left that treaty unaltered. In particular it fully
preserved the advantages we enjoy under the existing treaty relative to the
neutrality of the canal and the protection of commerce under conditions of
entire equality. We are quite alive to the value of those advantages, whatever
certain members of the Senate may think or pretend to think. It is in
consideration of them, and on condition only that they should be preserved, that
we consented to the modifications desired by Mr. McKinley and by Mr. Hay. The
two parts of the bargain are mutually dependent. We have not agreed and we are
not going to agree to the proposed variation of our treaty rights save upon
terms acceptable to ourselves. We shall stand upon those rights. It is not the
custom of this country to conclude treaties of surrender with any nation -- even
with those whose friendship we value most -- and that is a custom from which we
have no mind to depart."
Senator Money represented a strong body of opinion when he wrote: "It is
immaterial how many nations might guarantee the neutrality of a canal, or on
what agreed terms any single nation might control it. The necessities of war
would recognize neither treaties nor rights, and the canal would go to the
strongest.
"It has been claimed that our west coast would be more easily defended by the
ready transfer of our war-ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific; but it should
be remembered that the fleets of Great Britain, Germany, and France could be as
readily transferred by the same means, so that the attack would be as much
facilitated as the defence. It is disputable, therefore, whether our security
would be more assured without a considerable increase of our navy. But whatever
the cost of such an increase might be to the United States, it would be
preferable to the control of the canal by any foreign nation, or even a
partnership with us in the control. The first would minimize American prestige
in the Central and South American States, and the second would be a virtual
surrender of the Monroe Doctrine, which this government cannot afford and would
not make."
The time for ratification of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was extended, to allow
time for further consideration.
The United States made demands for prompt reparation by the government of the
Sultan for injuries suffered by American citizens in Armenia and elsewhere. The
usual interminable delays were brought into play by the Turks, and a man-of-war
was sent to the Bosphorus as a reminder. The message reported that our claims
"everywhere give promise of early and satisfactory settlement. His Majesty's
good disposition in this regard has been evinced by the issuance of an irade for
rebuilding the American college at Harpoot."
The Hague Convention of the great powers me on the initiative of the Czar of
Russia for the purpose of arranging a friendly court of arbitration that should
do its utmost to prevent wars. The third Article of the Convention, signed and
accepted by all, runs as follows:
"Article 3. Independently of this recourse, the signatory powers consider it to
be useful that one or more powers who are strangers to the dispute should, on
their own initiative and as far as circumstances will allow, offer their good
offices or mediation to the states at variance. The right to offer good offices
or mediation belongs to powers who are strangers to the dispute, even during the
course of hostilities. The exercise of this right shall never be considered by
one or other of the parties to the contest as an unfriendly act."
Under this proviso the President offered the good-will services of the United
States in mediation between the Transvaal Republic and Great Britain, on the
outbreak of their quarrel. The latter power very courteously but emphatically
declined the proposal, as "Her Majesty's Government cannot accept the
intervention of any other power." This sort of reply by one of the leading
signers of a scheme for amicable intervention is not encouraging for the
prospects of arbitration as facilitating the millennium.
American interests in the Far East have been discussed in the light of present
facts; it is interesting to view them from the standpoint of those who think
they foresee a closer relationship between the United States and Russia. In the
North American Review a Russian writer, Vladimir Holmstrem, pleaded on various
ingenious reasonings for a Russo-American Understanding. The appeal was made in
view of possibilities in China, in which country, it was suggested, the two
powers have kindred interests which may be more or less pooled. The writer
dwells at length on English policy in China --
"because it shows the great gulf separating the conceptions of a Chinese policy
entertained on the one hand by Russia and the United States, and by England on
the other. The same remark might be made about other spheres of life and
thought: to a student of English and American politics, it is clear how
radically different are the ideas held by these two 'cousins across the water.'"
"Our destinies, following their special lines, are developing in such harmony,
are so mysteriously interwoven, that our mere existence is mutually beneficial!
Facts have responded to the requirements of the time with more accuracy, more
insight, and more intrinsic significance than all the lucubrations of
politicians on the set theme, that 'blood is thicker than water.' At the present
critical epoch for the Far East, Russia and America are again drawn to one
another by invisible ties of friendship and good-will. The question of China's
integrity and independence absorbs the attention of all; and it rests with
Russia and America, the two countries most naturally and most vitally interested
in the normal development of the Far East, to determine the fate of a nation
that belongs to the same order of self-contained, self-supporting and typical
communities as they themselves."
"The identity of interests between our respective countries springs from their
requirements, as self-supporting communities, in the best conditions for the
development of their facilities and the fulfilment of their destiny. Russia and
the United States have a common interest in seeing the road they follow cleared
from obstacles without their conflict with one another. The Russo-American
understanding we now advocate is no alliance, no agreement on all or on some
points, or indeed, on any particular point, but simply co-operation of a
spiritual nature founded on mutual good-will and a strong inclination to keep
the peace on every occasion. We have common foes, bent on mischief, as Americans
will soon realize on their own account; it would be well for us to reach one
another a helping hand when needed."
"All depends on the standpoint taken with regard to China by the powers that now
come into contact with her. There are two views held with respect to China; the
Russian view of friendly help to an empire tottering from outside pressure,-this
is the conservative, the Asiatic, the Oriental conception; and the Anglo-German
view of aggressive absorption in the name of reforms,-which is the revolutionary
conception of European outsiders, the Western conception. I maintain, that, if
America would be true to herself and to her noble traditions, she must come over
to our side and accept the Eastern conception."
Plentiful materials thus crowd upon any who care to try their hand at
forecasting the future of the Republic in its foreign relations.