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The Great Republic by the Master Historians
Our Foreign Relations
by Bancroft, Hubert H.


The curtain fell on the last scene of the nineteenth century drama to the ominous music of the bugle and cannon. The echoes only faintly reached our ears, for the Transvaal is remote; and, though the Philippine Islands are linked to us by vocal wires, the rude noise of insurgent-suppression has not the familiar thrilling note of war. The Republic is at peace with the great powers, itself having in the last half-hundred years become one of the greatest.

Yet it begins the new century in a state of unrest. Its responsibilities and risks have multiplied and expanded proportionately to its new power. The nations of Europe have made room for a newcomer in their select circle. The American has invaded the fancied private grounds sacred to the tread of old-world potentates. He has invaded it quietly as a bearer of light, then as a distributor of civilizing merchandise, and now boldly as a conqueror. The Republic has henceforth to be reckoned with as an unknown possibility, with the probabilities indicating a sure growth of world-greatness. The startling fact has caused a general scrutiny of the situation and the drift of things. If the powers are at peace, they are inwardly ill at ease. When Europe, Asia, and Africa feel chills and fever America cannot but feel premonitory symptoms of influenza. These are the little drawbacks to the joy of belonging to a great family. With every fresh move on the international chess-board each player and interested on-looker has to forecast, as best he can, its distant possible effect on his interests. The fine art and science of high diplomacy now becomes a thing of vital moment to the nation. From an easy contentment with paragraphic items about foreign statecraft, the patriotic American newspaper reader must henceforth scan the doings and the sayings of Europe's trained statesmen and Asia's oleaginous, dual-minded handlers of policy. He must learn to distinguish between words that mean less than the spaces that separate them, and omissions that signify the essential pith of the utterance. He will come to perceive how most of what appear to be deliberate decisions prove by and by to be mere feelers, deftly and successfully contrived to elicit the views or schemings of the other party. He will learn that what on their face seem to be startling acts are often simple traps for the unwary. The play is fascinating as it grows familiar. Whether it consumes time that might be used to better advantage in the home, is another question; but certain it is that expansion of responsibilities necessitates expansion of knowledge, insight, and wisdom, qualities already possessed in high degree by the American people, as their splendid history demonstrates; yet there is more need than ever that these virtues shall be broadened and deepened. The opening of the twentieth century is not the time for resting oars or reversing telescope.

Our relations with certain powers and peoples at the close of the century call for notice in this historical survey. And it is proper to follow the order in which our foreign affairs are stated in the President's message to the LXVth Congress. China stands first.

["The dominant question," says the message, "has been the treatment of the Chinese problem. Apart from this our relations with the powers have been happy. The recent troubles in China spring from the anti-foreign agitation which for the last three years has gained strength in the northern provinces. Their origin lies deep in the character of the Chinese race and in the traditions of their government. The Taiping rebellion and the opening of Chinese ports to foreign trade and settlement disturbed alike the homogeneity and the seclusion of China. Meanwhile foreign activity made itself felt in all quarters, not alone on the coast but along the great river arteries and in the remoter districts, carrying new ideas and introducing new associations among a primitive people which had pursued for centuries a national policy of isolation. The telegraph and the railway spreading over their land, the steamers plying on their waterways, the merchant and the missionary penetrating year by year farther to the interior, became to the Chinese mind types of an alien invasion, changing the course of their national life and fraught with vague forebodings of disaster to their beliefs and their self-control.

For several years before the present troubles all the resources of foreign diplomats, backed by moral demonstrations of the physical force of fleets and arms, have been needed to secure due respect for the treaty rights of foreigners and to obtain satisfaction from the responsible authorities for the sporadic outrages upon the persons and property of unoffending sojourners, which from time to time occurred at widely separated points in the northern provinces, as in the case of the outbreaks in Szechuen and Shantung. In the latter province an outbreak, in which German missionaries were slain, was the too natural result of these malevolent teachings. The posting of seditious placards, exhorting to the utter destruction of foreigners and of every foreign thing, continued unrebuked. Hostile demonstrations towards the stranger gained strength by organization.

The sect commonly styled the Boxers developed greatly in the provinces north of the Yangtse, and with the collusion of many notable officials, including some of the immediate councils of the throne itself, became alarmingly aggressive. No foreigner's life outside of the protected treaty ports was safe. No foreign interest was secure from spoliation.]

An English diplomat gives the following account of the Boxer society and its purposes: "Of the many hundreds of secret societies of one sort and another in China but few are actively opposed to the present dynasty,-opposed to it, that is to say, to the extent of wishing to rise against it and crush it. Unfortunately, one of the most influential of those few is the brotherhood we now speak about so lightly. These Boxers are in reality a branch of the brotherhood universally dreaded in China, as well as in Singapore, Penang, northern India, and parts of the United States, and known as the Sam Hop Wui, while, among the European population of Canton, Shanghai, and Pekin, it is usually alluded to as the Great Triad Society. This society, called also the Hung League, and known by many other titles as well, has been in existence so many hundreds of years that its origin is buried in obscurity. The membership of the Boxers, roughly speaking, is rather over than under 4,000,000, for the brotherhood was believed to have 4,000,000 members some ten years ago, and the membership is known to have increased considerably since then. The society is composed of lodges, each of which has a president, whose power for good and evil is considerable. Every president has under him two or more vice-presidents, who are bound to obey his every command, or else suffer a horrible death." The Boxers' society is anti-reform, anti-foreign, and anti-Christian.

The story leading up to the intervention of the allied powers is as follows: In 1898 the Chinese Emperor, Kwang-Hsu, incurred the violent opposition of the conservative Manchu party by adopting a policy which contemplated sweeping reforms in the administration of the government and the conduct of private affairs. He issued an edict sanctioning the establishment of a great national university at Pekin, modelled after those of the United States. Virtually, he wished to adopt the main features of Western civilization.

In August of that year, however, the Empress Dowager, An, the acknowledged head of the Conservatives, relieved the Emperor of all real power, either through a conspiracy or with his consent, and began a vigorous administration of affairs by issuing a decree which practically set aside all the Emperor's reformatory proclamations. In some cases, reformers were dismissed from office; in others, arrested and executed on pretexts that were at least sufficient to satisfy the Empress and her violent councillors that they deserved death. It was reported that Kwang-Hsu had committed suicide,-leading to the supposition that he had been assassinated; but this proved a false rumor, and it seems that at some time during the ensuing two years he again assumed the direction of imperial affairs.

Rumors of the deposition of the Emperor, Kwang-Hsu, were not confirmed; but the Dowager Empress, with her bitter hatred of foreigners, soon became the power behind the throne, and matters began in February to take on an ominous appearance. Lives of missionaries were soon threatened, and the Pekin government either did not or could not restrain the anti-foreign society of Boxers, who in April and May began to show activity in various provinces, and particularly at Swatow and in the Shan-tung province in general. It was not till the early days of June, when the startling intelligence was received that the foreign ministers of all the powers, together with their families and official households and a handful of marine guards, were besieged by Boxer mobs in Pekin. A riot at Shang- hai led to the landing of a French cruiser's marines, who killed and wounded several rioters During the whole of 1899 the agitation was kept up, particular animosity being shown to foreigners.

In April, 1900, disorder and violence had become extreme, and the ministers of the several governments represented at the Chinese capital sent a joint note to the Chinese foreign office announcing, that, unless the Boxers were suppressed, troops would be landed to march into the interior and protect the foreigners.

The United States Government, informed of the condition in which American missionaries, official representatives in the various provinces, and other citizens resident there, were placed by the attitude of these fanatics, had left it to Minister Conger's judgment to frame as strong demands for the protection of American residents as circumstances might warrant, but had instructed him not to commit his Government to any combined action with the other powers. He might enforce his demands with threats, if necessary, but without pledging the Government to any policy. The Chinese authorities professed to accede to what we demanded, but the outrages continued.

One hundred and sixty native Christians were massacred in Chi-li, the Pekin province, and the insurgents burned the railway stations, pulled up the tracks within thirty miles of the capital, and routed the imperial forces. Our Government joined the allied movement to take the business of suppression in hand. "A proposal was made," says the message, "by the other powers, that a combined fleet should be assembled in Chinese waters as a moral demonstration, under cover of which to exact of the Chinese government respect for foreign treaty rights and the suppression of the Boxers. The United States, while not participating in the joint demonstration, promptly sent from the Philippines all ships that could be spared for service on the Chinese coast. A small force of marines was landed at Taku, and sent to Pekin for the protection of the American legation. Other powers took similar action, until some four hundred men were assembled in the capital as legation guards."

On the 28th of May Rear-Admiral Louis Kempff arrived at Taku, his vessel - the United States cruiser Newark - carrying sailors and marines; on the 29th he landed 100 men under Captain McCalla; on the 30th he proceeded with this force thirty-five miles up the Peiho River, to Tien-Tsin, and the next day he started McCalla and fifty men to Pekin, with other foreign troops. The first relief column was composed of about 350 men, - American, British, French, Italian, Russian, and Japanese. The consent of the Chinese government had been asked, but refused; and in view of the extreme danger of foreign legations, missionaries, and refugees at Pekin, it was determined to organize and start this column, which would endeavor to force its way. The Chinese fired on the ships as they landed their men. "The forts were thereupon shelled by the foreign vessels, the American admiral taking no part in the attack, on the ground that we were not at war with China, and that a hostile demonstration might consolidate the anti- foreign elements and strengthen the Boxers to oppose the relieving column." Two days later the Taku forts were captured. The English force had gone to Pekin. After fighting continually for fifteen days, Admiral Seymour's expedition was relieved by a force sent from Taku, and the remnants of it were brought back to the coast. June 18 Baron von Ketteler, the German minister, was murdered in the streets of Pekin, and rumors affirmed that all the legationers had shared the same fate.

Admiral Kempff asked for additional American troops, and orders were promptly sent to Manila to forward the Ninth Infantry to Taku. This regiment reached Taku in July, and was shortly afterwards sent by detachments to Tien-Tsin. On the 26th of June the Fourteenth United States Infantry and Reilly's Battery reached that city, having been ordered from Manila.

In the mean time the allied troops had stormed and taken the forts about Tien- Tsin, after heavy fighting and some loss. In this Admiral Kempff did not participate, deeming that his orders from Washington forbade it; but he was subsequently informed that his powers were ample for seizing forts, fighting battles, or acting in any other manner necessary for the promotion of the prime object in view,-the protection of Americans and American interests.

Murders of missionaries at various stations occurred early in June, and pillage and destruction were fast becoming general; so that there was a sense of insecurity and dread even in provinces remote from the capital, and particularly in the region of the treaty ports, where the citizens of other countries were more numerous, and yet not sufficiently numerous to offer effectual resistance to a frenzied populace.

Early in August the allied forces began their advance upon Pekin, and forced an entrance into the city, relieving the legations after one of the most remarkable sieges in history. The allied forces remained in China, occupying Pekin, though the greater part of the American and Russian forces were withdrawn from the capital. Negotiations between China and the powers are always slow, and the final settlement of the Chinese trouble is yet undecided. December 22 the powers agreed upon twelve demands to be submitted to the Chinese envoys. The terms demand fullest apology to Germany for the killing of its minister, the erection of a monument to him, and full indemnity to the powers for the losses they have sustained. The amount of the indemnities is not stated, the language of the terms insisting only that they shall be "equitable," the powers themselves presumably being the judges.

"The policy of the United States," says the message, "through all this trying period, was clearly announced and scrupulously carried out. A circular note to the powers, dated July 3, proclaimed our attitude. Treating the condition in the North as one of virtual anarchy, in which the great provinces of the South and Southeast had no share, we regarded the local authorities in the latter quarters as representing the Chinese people, with whom we sought to remain in peace and friendship. Our declared aims involved no war against the Chinese nation. We adhered to the legitimate office of rescuing the imperilled legation, obtaining redress for wrongs already suffered, securing, wherever possible, the safety of American life and property in China, and preventing a spread of the disorders or their recurrence. As was then said: `The policy of the government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese empire.'"

Thus the Chinese problem stands as the century opens, so far as it touches American policy.

The following from the pen of the Hon. Charles Denby, formerly United States Minister to China, in Munsey's Magazine, has value as indicating the lines on which American diplomacy may move:

["At the point of the bayonet the foreign powers in 1858 forced China to sign, seal, and conclude certain treaties. There had been treaties made before, but they were not satisfactory to England and France. The new treaties were repudiated by China, and in 1861 French and English soldiers marched to Pekin to force their ratification.

Then commenced for China the difficult lesson of learning how to manage foreign affairs. The foreign ministers came to reside permanently in Pekin. The Tsung-li Yamen was organized, and foreign affairs were controlled by this new board. The foreign trade of China began to increase rapidly. It has now reached the figure of about three hundred millions of dollars annually..

Great Britain has 75 per cent. of China's foreign trade, and two-thirds of the foreign population. It must be said that the policy of England in the far East is just to other nations. She asks nothing but equal rights, and grants equal rights to all nations. She opens treaty ports where all flags are equal. She can readily afford to do this, because she is sure of holding 75 per cent. of all the trade that is developed. Even in Cochin-China, a French province, England does nearly as much trade as France.

Much has been written about our relations with England in the far East. I am glad that those relations are friendly, and on proper and suitable occasions this country and England should act together. They should both protest against the further partition of China. It must be remembered, however, that the American merchant finds in the East no stronger competitor than the British merchant..

It is idle to say China can grant mining or railroad concessions to whom she pleases. That is exactly what she cannot do. In her unpreparedness for war, she must do whatever any other nation demands of her. The inclination of China has always been to turn to America in all industrial enterprises. The recommendations of Sheng Taotai in this regard could not be carried out because the competition of the European powers was too serious and influential.

Let the world assist the most ancient of nations in her efforts to enter worthily into the family of civilized peoples. Let the world respect her autonomy, and she will pay back its services by giving to its commerce the boundless riches of her mines, and the hoarded wealth of centuries."]

While our relations with Great Britain are officially declared to be quite friendly, a cloud, no bigger than a man's hand, is hovering in the diplomatic horizon. The commercial importance of the proposed Nicaragua canal has been alluded to in preceding pages. In this place it is to be considered in its aspect as a possible disturber of international harmony.

Omitting details, it may be stated that an inter-oceanic waterway has long been desired by American statesmen and the commercial world. Schemes have been set afoot to accomplish the work, and, from various causes, have failed. In his message to the Fifty-sixth Congress the President states the situation of affairs as follows:

["The all-important matter of an inter-oceanic canal has assumed a new phase. Adhering to its refusal to reopen the question of the forfeiture of the contract of the Maritime Canal Company, which was terminated for alleged non-execution in October, 1899, the government of Nicaragua has since supplemented that action by declaring the so-styled Eyre-Cragin option void for non-payment of the stipulated advance. Protests in relation to these acts have been filed in the state department and are under consideration. Deeming itself relieved from existing engagements, the Nicaraguan government shows a disposition to deal freely with the canal question in the way of negotiations with the United States or by taking measures to promote the waterway.

Overtures for a convention to effect the building of the canal under the auspices of the United States are under consideration. In the mean time the views of Congress upon the general subject, in the light of the report of the Commission appointed to examine the comparative merits of the various ship-canal projects, may be awaited.

I commend to the early attention of the Senate the convention with Great Britain to facilitate the construction of such a canal, and to remove any objections which might arise out of the convention commonly called the Clayton-Bulwer treaty."]

This convention, known as the Hay-Pauncefote Canal Treaty, from the names of the American and English negotiators, contained the following provisions:

[Article I. It is agreed that the canal can be constructed under the auspices of the government of the United States, either directly at its own cost, or by gift or loan of money to individuals or corporations, or through subscription to or purchase of stock or shares, and that, subject to the provisions of the present convention, the said government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal.

Article II. The high contracting parties, desiring to preserve and maintain the "general principle" of neutralization established in Article VIII. of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention, adopt as basis of such neutralization the following rules, substantially as embodied in the convention between Great Britain and certain other powers, signed at Constantinople October 29, 1888, for the free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal. This is to say:

First -- The canal shall be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to the vessels of commerce and war of all nations, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any nation or its citizens or subjects in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic or otherwise.

Second -- The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within it.

Third -- Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not revictual nor take any stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay, in accordance with the regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service. Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same rules as vessels of war of the belligerents.

Fourth -- No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the canal except in case of accidental hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall be resumed with all possible despatch.

Fifth -- The provisions of this article shall apply to waters adjacent to the canal, within three marine miles of either end. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than twenty-four hours at any one time except in case of distress, and in such case shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of war of the other belligerent.

Sixth -- The plant, establishments, buildings, and all works necessary to the construction, maintenance, and operation of the canal shall be deemed to be part thereof, for the purposes of this convention, and in time of war, as in time of peace, shall enjoy complete immunity from attack or injury by belligerents, and from acts calculated to impair their usefulness as part of the canal.

Seventh -- No fortification shall be erected commanding the canal or the waters adjacent. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder.

Article III. The high contracting parties will immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this convention bring it to the notice of the other powers, and invite them to adhere to it.

Article IV. The present convention shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Britannic Majesty; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington or at London within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.]

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on March 9, 1900, reported the treaty to the Senate, with the following amendment, to be inserted at the end of Section 5 of Article II., known as the Davis amendment: "It is agreed, however, that none of the immediately foregoing conditions and stipulations in Sections Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 of this act shall apply to measures which the United States may find it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defence of the United States and the maintenance of public order." The amendment received the vote of all the members of the Committee except Senator Morgan, who filed a minority report opposing the amendment. It became apparent before the close of the first session of the Fifty-sixth Congress that the treaty could not be ratified by the Senate, with or without the amendment, during that session.

In May, 1900, the House of Representatives passed the Hepburn bill, by a vote of 225 to 35, calling for the construction of the canal by the United States, and authorizing the Government to make "such provisions for defence as may be necessary." Ultimately, the Senate ratified the treaty as changed by "the Davis amendment."

Two sets of objections were raised against this. There were American objections and English objections. The former are illustrated by this communication, sent by then Secretary Frelinghuysen, in 1882, to then Minister Lowell, in London, as follows: "A canal across the isthmus for vessels of all dimensions and every character, under possible conditions hereinafter referred to, would affect this Republic in its trade and commerce; would expose our Western coast to attack; destroy our isolation, oblige us to improve our defences, and to increase our navy; and possibly compel us, contrary to our traditions, to take an active interest in the affairs of European nations. The United States, with their large and increasing population and wealth, cannot be uninterested in a change in the physical conformation of this hemisphere which may injuriously affect the material or political interests of the Republic, and naturally seek that the severance of the isthmus connecting the continents shall be effected in harmony with those interests."

The English objections were stated with some show of suppressed temper. The new treaty was expressly a modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1859, which has always stood as a menace against the building and control of a canal by the United States Government. The case for the English and Canadian objectors was summed up by the London Times, as follows: "The Hay-Pauncefote agreement gave America the right, which she does not posses under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, to construct and control and inter-oceanic canal independently of this country. In other respects it has left that treaty unaltered. In particular it fully preserved the advantages we enjoy under the existing treaty relative to the neutrality of the canal and the protection of commerce under conditions of entire equality. We are quite alive to the value of those advantages, whatever certain members of the Senate may think or pretend to think. It is in consideration of them, and on condition only that they should be preserved, that we consented to the modifications desired by Mr. McKinley and by Mr. Hay. The two parts of the bargain are mutually dependent. We have not agreed and we are not going to agree to the proposed variation of our treaty rights save upon terms acceptable to ourselves. We shall stand upon those rights. It is not the custom of this country to conclude treaties of surrender with any nation -- even with those whose friendship we value most -- and that is a custom from which we have no mind to depart."

Senator Money represented a strong body of opinion when he wrote: "It is immaterial how many nations might guarantee the neutrality of a canal, or on what agreed terms any single nation might control it. The necessities of war would recognize neither treaties nor rights, and the canal would go to the strongest.

"It has been claimed that our west coast would be more easily defended by the ready transfer of our war-ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific; but it should be remembered that the fleets of Great Britain, Germany, and France could be as readily transferred by the same means, so that the attack would be as much facilitated as the defence. It is disputable, therefore, whether our security would be more assured without a considerable increase of our navy. But whatever the cost of such an increase might be to the United States, it would be preferable to the control of the canal by any foreign nation, or even a partnership with us in the control. The first would minimize American prestige in the Central and South American States, and the second would be a virtual surrender of the Monroe Doctrine, which this government cannot afford and would not make."

The time for ratification of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was extended, to allow time for further consideration.

The United States made demands for prompt reparation by the government of the Sultan for injuries suffered by American citizens in Armenia and elsewhere. The usual interminable delays were brought into play by the Turks, and a man-of-war was sent to the Bosphorus as a reminder. The message reported that our claims "everywhere give promise of early and satisfactory settlement. His Majesty's good disposition in this regard has been evinced by the issuance of an irade for rebuilding the American college at Harpoot."

The Hague Convention of the great powers me on the initiative of the Czar of Russia for the purpose of arranging a friendly court of arbitration that should do its utmost to prevent wars. The third Article of the Convention, signed and accepted by all, runs as follows:

"Article 3. Independently of this recourse, the signatory powers consider it to be useful that one or more powers who are strangers to the dispute should, on their own initiative and as far as circumstances will allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the states at variance. The right to offer good offices or mediation belongs to powers who are strangers to the dispute, even during the course of hostilities. The exercise of this right shall never be considered by one or other of the parties to the contest as an unfriendly act."

Under this proviso the President offered the good-will services of the United States in mediation between the Transvaal Republic and Great Britain, on the outbreak of their quarrel. The latter power very courteously but emphatically declined the proposal, as "Her Majesty's Government cannot accept the intervention of any other power." This sort of reply by one of the leading signers of a scheme for amicable intervention is not encouraging for the prospects of arbitration as facilitating the millennium.

American interests in the Far East have been discussed in the light of present facts; it is interesting to view them from the standpoint of those who think they foresee a closer relationship between the United States and Russia. In the North American Review a Russian writer, Vladimir Holmstrem, pleaded on various ingenious reasonings for a Russo-American Understanding. The appeal was made in view of possibilities in China, in which country, it was suggested, the two powers have kindred interests which may be more or less pooled. The writer dwells at length on English policy in China --

"because it shows the great gulf separating the conceptions of a Chinese policy entertained on the one hand by Russia and the United States, and by England on the other. The same remark might be made about other spheres of life and thought: to a student of English and American politics, it is clear how radically different are the ideas held by these two 'cousins across the water.'"

"Our destinies, following their special lines, are developing in such harmony, are so mysteriously interwoven, that our mere existence is mutually beneficial! Facts have responded to the requirements of the time with more accuracy, more insight, and more intrinsic significance than all the lucubrations of politicians on the set theme, that 'blood is thicker than water.' At the present critical epoch for the Far East, Russia and America are again drawn to one another by invisible ties of friendship and good-will. The question of China's integrity and independence absorbs the attention of all; and it rests with Russia and America, the two countries most naturally and most vitally interested in the normal development of the Far East, to determine the fate of a nation that belongs to the same order of self-contained, self-supporting and typical communities as they themselves."

"The identity of interests between our respective countries springs from their requirements, as self-supporting communities, in the best conditions for the development of their facilities and the fulfilment of their destiny. Russia and the United States have a common interest in seeing the road they follow cleared from obstacles without their conflict with one another. The Russo-American understanding we now advocate is no alliance, no agreement on all or on some points, or indeed, on any particular point, but simply co-operation of a spiritual nature founded on mutual good-will and a strong inclination to keep the peace on every occasion. We have common foes, bent on mischief, as Americans will soon realize on their own account; it would be well for us to reach one another a helping hand when needed."

"All depends on the standpoint taken with regard to China by the powers that now come into contact with her. There are two views held with respect to China; the Russian view of friendly help to an empire tottering from outside pressure,-this is the conservative, the Asiatic, the Oriental conception; and the Anglo-German view of aggressive absorption in the name of reforms,-which is the revolutionary conception of European outsiders, the Western conception. I maintain, that, if America would be true to herself and to her noble traditions, she must come over to our side and accept the Eastern conception."

Plentiful materials thus crowd upon any who care to try their hand at forecasting the future of the Republic in its foreign relations.

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