|
|
| & etc |
FEEDBACK
(C)1998-2012
All Rights Reserved.
Site last updated
13 January, 2012
|
|
|
|
Theodore Roosevelt and His Times
Chapter X. Being Wise in Time
by Howland, Harold
|
Perhaps the most famous of Roosevelt's epigrammatic sayings is,
"Speak softly and carry a big stick." The public, with its
instinctive preference for the dramatic over the significant,
promptly seized upon the "big stick" half of the aphorism and
ignored the other half. But a study of the various acts of
Roosevelt when he was President readily shows that in his mind
the "big stick" was purely subordinate. It was merely the ultima
ratio, the possession of which would enable a nation to "speak
softly" and walk safely along the road of peace and justice and
fair play.
The secret of Roosevelt's success in foreign affairs is to be
found in another of his favorite sayings: "Nine-tenths of wisdom
is to be wise in time." He has himself declared that his whole
foreign policy "was based on the exercise of intelligent
foresight and of decisive action sufficiently far in advance of
any likely crisis to make it improbable that we would run into
serious trouble."
When Roosevelt became President, a perplexing controversy with
Great Britain over the boundary line between Alaska and Canada
was in full swing. The problem, which had become acute with the
discovery of gold in the Klondike in 1897, had already been
considered, together with eleven other subjects of dispute
between Canada and the United States, by a Joint Commission which
had been able to reach no agreement. The essence of the
controversy was this: The treaty of 1825 between Great Britain
and Russia had declared that the boundary, dividing British and
Russian America on that five-hundred-mile strip of land which
depends from the Alaskan elephant's head like a dangling halter
rope, should be drawn "parallel to the windings of the coast" at
a distance inland of thirty miles. The United States took the
plain and literal interpretation of these words in the treaty.
The Canadian contention was that within the meaning of the treaty
the fiords or inlets which here break into the land were not part
of the sea, and that the line, instead of following, at the
correct distance inland, the indentations made by these arms of
the sea, should leap boldly across them, at the agreed distance
from the points of the headlands. This would give Canada the
heads of several great inlets and direct access to the sea far
north of the point where the Canadian coast had, always been
assumed to end. Canada and the United States were equally
resolute in upholding their claims. It looked as if the matter
would end in a deadlock.
John Hay, who had been Secretary of State in McKinley's Cabinet,
as he now was in Roosevelt's, had done his best to bring the
matter to a settlement, but had been unwilling to have the
dispute arbitrated, for the very good reason that, as he said,
"although our claim is as clear as the sun in heaven, we know
enough of arbitration to foresee the fatal tendency of all
arbitrators to compromise." Roosevelt believed that the "claim of
the Canadians for access to deep water along any part of the
Alaskan coast is just exactly as indefensible as if they should
now claim the island of Nantucket." He was willing, however, to
refer the question unconfused by other issues to a second Joint
Commission of six. The commission was duly constituted. There was
no odd neutral member of this body, as in an arbitration, but
merely three representatives from each side. Of the British
representatives two were Canadians and the third was the Lord
Chief Justice of England, Lord Alverstone.
But before the Commission met, the President took pains to have
conveyed to the British Cabinet, in an informal but
diplomatically correct way, his views and his intentions in the
event of a disagreement. "I wish to make one last effort," he
said, "to bring about an agreement through the Commission which
will enable the people of both countries to say that the result
represents the feeling of the representatives of both countries.
But if there is a disagreement, I wish it distinctly understood,
not only that there will be no arbitration of the matter, but
that in my message to Congress I shall take a position which will
prevent any possibility of arbitration hereafter." If this should
seem to any one too vigorous flourishing of the "big stick," let
him remember that it was all done through confidential diplomatic
channels, and that the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice of
England, when the final decision was made, fully upheld
Roosevelt's position.
The decision of the Commission was, with slight immaterial
modifications, in favor of the United States. Lord Alverstone
voted against his Canadian than colleagues. It was a just
decision, as most well-informed Canadians knew at the time. The
troublesome question was settled; the time-honored friendship of
two great peoples had suffered no interruption; and Roosevelt
had secured for his country its just due, without public parade
or bluster, by merely being wise--and inflexible--in time.
During the same early period of his Presidency, Roosevelt found
himself confronted with a situation in South America, which
threatened a serious violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Venezuela
was repudiating certain debts which the Venezuelan Government had
guaranteed to European capitalists. German capital was chiefly
involved, and Germany proposed to collect the debts by force.
Great Britain and Italy were also concerned in the matter, but
Germany was the ringleader and the active partner in the
undertaking. Throughout the year 1902 a pacific blockade of the
Venezuelan coast was maintained and in December of that year an
ultimatum demanding the immediate payment of the debts was
presented. When its terms were not complied with, diplomatic
relations were broken off and the Venezuelan fleet was seized.
At this point the United States entered upon the scene, but with
no blare of trumpets.
In fact, what really happened was not generally known until
several years later.
In his message of December, 1901, President Roosevelt had made
two significant statements. Speaking of the Monroe Doctrine, he
said, "We do not guarantee any state against punishment, if it
misconducts itself." This was very satisfactory to Germany. But
he added--"provided the punishment does not take the form of
the acquisition of territory by any non-American power." This
did not suit the German book so well. For a year the matter was
discussed. Germany disclaimed any intention to make "permanent"
acquisitions in Venezuela but contended for its right to make
"temporary" ones. Now the world had already seen "temporary"
acquisitions made in China, and it was a matter of common
knowledge that this convenient word was often to be interpreted
in a Pickwickian sense.
When the "pacific blockade" passed into the stage of active
hostilities, the patience of Roosevelt snapped. The German
Ambassador, von Holleben, was summoned to the White House. The
President proposed to him that Germany should arbitrate its
differences with Venezuela. Von Holleben assured him that his
"Imperial Master" would not hear of such a course. The President
persisted that there must be no taking possession, even
temporarily, of Venezuelan territory. He informed the Ambassador
that Admiral Dewey was at that moment maneuvering in Caribbean
waters, and that if satisfactory assurances did not come from
Berlin in ten days, he would be ordered to proceed to Venezuela
to see that no territory was seized by German forces. The
Ambassador was firm in his conviction that no assurances would be
forthcoming.
A week later Von Holleben appeared at the White House to talk of
another matter and was about to leave without mentioning
Venezuela. The President stopped him with a question. No, said
the Ambassador, no word had come from Berlin. Then, Roosevelt
explained, it would not be necessary for him to wait the
remaining three days. Dewey would be instructed to sail a day
earlier than originally planned. He added that not a word of all
this had been put upon paper, and that if the German Emperor
would consent to arbitrate, the President would praise him
publicly for his broadmindedness. The Ambassador was still
convinced that no arbitration was conceivable.
But just twelve hours later he appeared at the White House, his
face wreathed in smiles. On behalf of his Imperial Master he had
the honor to request the President of the United States to act as
arbitrator between Germany and Venezuela. The orders to Dewey
were never sent, the President publicly congratulated the Kaiser
on his loyalty to the principle of arbitration, and, at
Roosevelt's suggestion, the case went to The Hague. Not an
intimation of the real occurrences came out till long after, not
a public word or act marred the perfect friendliness of the two
nations. The Monroe Doctrine was just as unequivocally invoked
and just as inflexibly upheld as it had been by Grover Cleveland
eight years before in another Venezuelan case. But the quiet
private warning had been substituted for the loud public threat.
The question of the admission of Japanese immigrants to the
United States and of their treatment had long disturbed American
international relations. It became acute in the latter part of
1906, when the city of San Francisco determined to exclude all
Japanese pupils from the public schools and to segregate them in
a school of their own. This action seemed to the Japanese a
manifest violation of the rights guaranteed by treaty. Diplomatic
protests were instantly forthcoming at Washington; and popular
demonstrations against the United States boiled up in Tokyo. For
the third time there appeared splendid material for a serious
conflict with a great power which might conceivably lead to
active hostilities. From such beginnings wars have come before
now.
The President was convinced that the Californians were utterly
wrong in what they had done, but perfectly right in the
underlying conviction from which their action sprang. He saw that
justice and good faith demanded that the Japanese in California
be protected in their treaty rights, and that the Californians be
protected from the immigration of Japanese laborers in mass. With
characteristic promptness and vigor he set forth these two
considerations and took action to make them effective. In his
message to Congress in December he declared: "In the matter now
before me, affecting the Japanese, everything that is in my power
to do will be done and all of the forces, military and civil, of
the United States which I may lawfully employ will be so employed
. . . to enforce the rights of aliens under treaties." Here was
reassurance for the Japanese. But he also added: "The Japanese
would themselves not tolerate the intrusion into their country of
a mass of Americans who would displace Japanese in the business
of the land. The people of California are right in insisting that
the Japanese shall not come thither in mass." Here was
reassurance for the Californians.
The words were promptly followed by acts. The garrison of Federal
troops at San Francisco was reinforced and public notice was
given that violence against Japanese would be put down. Suits
were brought both in the California State courts and in the
Federal courts there to uphold the treaty rights of Japan. Mr.
Victor H. Metcalf, the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, himself a
Californian, was sent to San Francisco to make a study of the
whole situation. It was made abundantly clear to the people of
San Francisco and the Coast that the provision of the Federal
Constitution making treaties a part of the supreme law of the
land, with which the Constitution and laws of no State can
interfere, would be strictly enforced. The report of Secretary
Metcalf showed that the school authorities of San Francisco had
done not only an illegal thing but an unnecessary and a stupid
thing.
Meanwhile Roosevelt had been working with equal vigor upon the
other side of the problem. He esteemed it precisely as important
to protect the Californians from the Japanese as to protect the
Japanese from the Californians. As in the Alaskan and Venezuelan
cases, he proceeded without beat of drum or clash of cymbal. The
matter was worked out in unobtrusive conferences between the
President and the State Department and the Japanese
representatives in Washington. It was all friendly, informal,
conciliatory--but the Japanese did not fail to recognize the
inflexible determination behind this courteous friendliness. Out
of these conferences came an informal agreement on the part of
the Japanese Government that no passports would be issued to
Japanese workingmen permitting them to leave Japan for ports of
the United States. It was further only necessary to prevent
Japanese coolies from coming into the United States through
Canada and Mexico. This was done by executive order just two days
after the school authorities of San Francisco had rescinded their
discriminatory school decree.
The incident is eminently typical of Roosevelt's principles and
practice: to accord full measure of justice while demanding full
measure in return; to be content with the fact without care for
the formality; to see quickly, to look far, and to act boldly.
It had a sequel which rounded out the story. The President's
ready willingness to compel California to do justice to the
Japanese was misinterpreted in Japan as timidity. Certain
chauvinistic elements in Japan began to have thoughts which were
in danger of becoming inimical to the best interests of the
United States. It seemed to President Roosevelt an opportune
moment, for many reasons, to send the American battle fleet on a
voyage around the world. The project was frowned on in this
country and viewed with doubt in other parts of the world. Many
said the thing could not be done, for no navy in the world had
yet done it; but Roosevelt knew that it could. European observers
believed that it would lead to war with Japan; but Roosevelt's
conviction was precisely the opposite. In his own words, "I did
not expect it; . . . I believed that Japan would feel as friendly
in the matter as we did; but . . . if my expectations had proved
mistaken, it would have been proof positive that we were going to
be attacked anyhow, and . . . in such event it would have been an
enormous gain to have had the three months' preliminary
preparation which enabled the fleet to start perfectly equipped.
In a personal interview before they left, I had explained to the
officers in command that I believed the trip would be one of
absolute peace, but that they were to take exactly the same
precautions against sudden attack of any kind as if we were at
war with all the nations of the earth; and that no excuse of any
kind would be accepted if there were a sudden attack of any kind
and we were taken unawares." Prominent inhabitants and newspapers
of the Atlantic coast were deeply concerned over the taking away
of the fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The head of the
Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, who hailed from the State of
Maine, declared that the fleet should not and could not go
because Congress would refuse to appropriate the money; Roosevelt
announced in response that he had enough money to take the fleet
around into the Pacific anyhow, that it would certainly go, and
that if Congress did not choose to appropriate enough money to
bring the fleet back, it could stay there. There was no further
difficulty about the money.
The voyage was at once a hard training trip and a triumphant
progress. Everywhere the ships, their officers, and their men
were received with hearty cordiality and deep admiration, and
nowhere more so than in Japan. The nations of the world were
profoundly impressed by the achievement. The people of the United
States were thoroughly aroused to a new pride in their navy and
an interest in its adequacy and efficiency. It was definitely
established in the minds of Americans and foreigners that the
United States navy is rightfully as much at home in the Pacific
as in the Atlantic. Any cloud the size of a man's hand that may
have been gathering above the Japanese horizon was forthwith
swept away. Roosevelt's plan was a novel and bold use of the
instruments of war on behalf of peace which was positively
justified in the event.
|
|
| |
