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Theodore Roosevelt and His Times
Chapter XIII. The Progressive Party
by Howland, Harold
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The Progressive party and the Progressive movement were two
things. The one was born on a day, lived a stirring, strenuous
span of life, suffered its fatal wound, lingered on for a few
more years, and received its coup de grace. The other sprang like
a great river system from a multitude of sources, flowed onward
by a hundred channels, always converging and uniting, until a
single mighty stream emerged to water and enrich and serve a
broad country and a great people. The one was ephemeral,
abortive--a failure. The other was permanent, creative--a
triumph. The two were inseparable, each indispensable to the
other. Just as the party would never have existed if there had
been no movement, so the movement would not have attained such a
surpassing measure of achievement so swiftly without the party.
The Progressive party came into full being at the convention
held in Chicago on August 5, 1912 under dramatic circumstances.
Every drama must have a beginning and this one had opened for
the public when, on the 10th of February in the same year, the
Republican Governors of West Virginia, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Wyoming, Michigan, Kansas, and Missouri addressed a letter to
Roosevelt, in which they declared that, in considering what
would best insure the continuation of the Republican party as a
useful agency of good government, they had reached the
conclusion that a large majority of the Republican voters of the
country favored Roosevelt's nomination, and a large majority of
the people favored his election as the next President. They
asserted their belief that, in view of this public demand, he
should soon declare whether, if the nomination came to him
unsolicited and unsought, he would accept it. They concluded
their request with this paragraph:
"In submitting this request we are not considering your personal
interests. We do not regard it as proper to consider either the
interest or the preference of any man as regards the nomination
for the Presidency. We are expressing our sincere belief and best
judgment as to what is demanded of you in the interests of the
people as a whole. And we feel that you would be unresponsive to
a plain public duty if you should decline to accept the
nomination, coming as the voluntary expression of the wishes of a
majority of the Republican voters of the United States, through
the action of their delegates in the next National Convention."
The sincerity and whole-heartedness of the convictions here
expressed are in no wise vitiated by the fact that the letter was
not written until the seven Governors were assured what the
answer to it would be. For the very beginning of our drama, then,
we must go back a little farther to that day in late January of
1912 when Theodore Roosevelt himself came face to face with a
momentous decision. On that day he definitely determined that his
duty to the things in which he profoundly believed--and no less
to the friends and associates who shared his beliefs--constrained
him once more to enter the arena of political conflict and lead
the fight.
Roosevelt had come to this conclusion with extreme reluctance. He
had no illusions as to the probable effect upon his personal
fortunes. Twice he had been President once by the hand of fate,
once by a great popular vote. To be President again could add
nothing to his prestige or fame; it could only subject him for
four years to the dangerous vagaries of the unstable popular
mood. He had nothing to gain for himself by entering the ring of
political conflict again; the chances for personal loss were
great. His enemies, his critics, and his political adversaries
would have it that he was eaten up with ambition, that he came
back from his African and European trip eager to thrust himself
again into the limelight of national political life and to demand
for himself again a great political prize. But his friends, his
associates, and those who, knowing him at close range, understood
him, realized that this was no picture of the truth. He accepted
what hundreds of Progressive leaders and followers throughout the
country--for the man in the ranks had as ready access to him as
the most prominent leader, and received as warm
consideration--asserted was his clear duty and obligation.
A letter which he had written two days before Christmas, 1911,
shows unmistakably how his mind was working in those days of
prologue to the great decision. The letter was entirely private,
and was addressed to my father who was a publisher and a friend
and not a politician. There is, therefore, no reason whatever why
the letter should not be accepted as an accurate picture of Mr.
Roosevelt's mind at that time:
"Now for the message Harold gave
me, that I should write you a little concerning political
conditions. They are very, very mixed. Curiously enough, my
article on the trusts was generally accepted as bringing me
forward for the Presidential nomination. Evidently what really
happened was that there had been a strong undercurrent of feeling
about me, and that the talk concerning the article enabled this
feeling to come to the surface. I do not think it amounts to
anything. It merely means that a great many people do not get the
leadership they are looking for from any of the prominent men in
public life, and that under the circumstances they grasp at any
one; and as my article on the McNamaras possessed at least the
merit of being entirely clearcut and of showing that I knew my
own mind and had definite views, a good many plain people turned
longingly to me as a leader. Taft is very weak, but La Follette
has not developed real strength east of the Mississippi River,
excepting of course in Wisconsin. West of the River he has a
large following, although there is a good deal of opposition to
him even in States like Kansas, Washington, and California. East
of the Mississippi, I believe he can only pick up a few delegates
here and there. Taft will have most of the Southern delegates, he
will have the officeholders, and also the tepid and acquiescent,
rather than active, support of the ordinary people who do not
feel very strongly one way or the other, and who think it is the
usual thing to renominate a President. If there were a strong
candidate against him, he would I believe be beaten, but there
are plenty of men, many of the leaders not only here but in
Texas, for instance, in Ohio, in New Hampshire and Illinois, who
are against him, but who are even more against La Follette, and
who regard themselves as limited to the alternative between the
two. There is, of course, always the danger that there may be a
movement for me, the danger coming partly because the men who may
be candidates are very anxious that the ticket shall be
strengthened and care nothing for the fate of the man who
strengthens it, and partly because there is a good deal of honest
feeling for me among plain simple people who wish leadership, but
who will not accept leadership unless they believe it to be
sincere, fearless, and intelligent. I most emphatically do not
wish the nomination. Personally I should regard it as a calamity
to be nominated. In the first place, I might very possibly be
beaten, and in the next place, even if elected I should be
confronted with almost impossible conditions out of which to make
good results. In the tariff, for instance, I would have to face
the fact that men would keep comparing what I did, not with what
the Democrats would or could have done but with an ideal, or
rather with a multitude of entirely separate and really
incompatible ideals. I am not a candidate, I will never be a
candidate; but I have to tell the La Follette men and the Taft
men that while I am absolutely sincere in saying that I am not a
candidate and do not wish the nomination, yet that I do not feel
it would be right or proper for me to say that under no
circumstances would I accept it if it came; because, while wildly
improbable, it is yet possible that there might be a public
demand which would present the matter to me in the light of a
duty which I could not shirk. In other words, while I
emphatically do not want office, and have not the slightest idea
that any demand for me will come, yet if there were a real public
demand that in the public interest I should do a given job, it
might be that I would not feel like flinching from the task.
However, this is all in the air, and I do not for one moment
believe that it will be necessary for me even to consider the
matter. As for the Democrats, they have their troubles too.
Wilson, although still the strongest man the Democrats could
nominate, is much weaker than he was. He has given a good many
people a feeling that he is very ambitious and not entirely
sincere, and his demand for the Carnegie pension created an
unpleasant impression. Harmon is a good old solid Democrat, with
the standards of political and commercial morality of twenty
years ago, who would be eagerly welcomed by all the conservative
crowd. Champ Clark is a good fellow, but impossible as President.
"I think a good deal will depend upon what this Congress does.
Taft may redeem himself. He was fairly strong at the end of the
last session, but went off lamentably on account of his wavering
and shillyshallying on so many matters during his speaking trip.
His speeches generally hurt him, and rarely benefit him. But it
is possible that the Democrats in Congress may play the fool, and
give him the chance to appear as the strong leader, the man who
must be accepted to oppose them."
This was what Roosevelt at the end, of December sincerely
believed would be the situation as time went on. But he
underestimated the strength and the volume of the tide that was
rising.
The crucial decision was made on the 18th of January. I was in
the closest possible touch with Roosevelt in those pregnant days,
and I know, as well as any but the man himself could know, how
his mind was working. An entry in my diary on that date shows the
origin of the letter of the seven governors:
"Senator Beveridge called on T. R. to urge him to make a public
statement soon. T. R. impressed by his arguments and by letters
just received from three Governors, Hadley, Glasscock, and Bass.
Practically determined to ask these Governors, and Stubbs and
Osborne, to send him a joint letter asking him to make a public
statement to the effect that if there is a genuine popular demand
for his nomination he will not refuse-in other words to say to
him in a joint letter for publication just what they have each
said to him in private letters. Such joint action would give him
a proper reason--or occasion--for making a public declaration. T.
R. telegraphed Frank Knox, Republican State Chairman of Michigan
and former member of his regiment, to come down, with intention
of asking him to see the various governors. H. H., at Ernest
Abbott's suggestion, asked him not to make final decision till he
has had conference--already arranged--with editorial staff. T. R.
agrees, but the inevitableness of the matter is evident.
After that day, things moved rapidly. Two days later the diary
contains this record: "Everett Colby, William Fellowes Morgan,
and Mark Sullivan call on T. R. All inclined to agree that time
for statement is practically here. T. R.--"The time to use a man
is when the people want to use him." M. S.--"The time to set a
hen is when the hen wants to set." Frank Knox comes in response
to telegram. Nat Wright also present at interview where Knox is
informed of the job proposed for him. Gifford Pinchot also
present at beginning of interview while T. R. tells how he views
the situation, but leaves (at T. R.'s suggestion) before real
business of conference begins. Plan outlined to Knox, who likes
it, and subsequently, in H. H.'s office, draws up letter for
Governors. Draft shown to T. R., who suggests a couple of added
sentences emphasizing that the nomination must come as a real
popular demand, and declaring that the Governors are taking their
action not for his sake, but for the sake of the country. Knox
takes copy of letter and starts for home, to go out to see
Governors as soon as possible."
On the 22d of January the Conference with The Outlook editorial
staff took place and is thus described in my diary:
"T. R. had long conference with entire staff. All except R. D. T.
[Mr. Townsend, Managing Editor of The Outlook] and H. H. inclined
to deprecate a public statement now. T. R.--"I have had all the
honor the American public can give me. If I should be elected I
would go back not so young as I once was, with all the first fine
flavor gone, and take up the horrible task of going in and out,
in and out, of the same hole over and over again. But I cannot
decline the call. Too many of those who have fought with me the
good fight for the things we believe in together, declare that at
this critical moment I am the instrument that ought to be used to
make it possible for me to refuse. I believe I shall be broken in the using.
But I cannot refuse to permit myself to be used. I am
not going to get those good fellows out on the end of a limb and
then saw off the limb." R. D. T. suggested that it be said
frankly that the Governors wrote the joint letter at T. R.'s
request. T. R. accepted like a shot. Went into H. H.'s room,
dictated two or three sentences to that effect, which H. H. later
incorporated in letter. [This plan was later given up, I believe
on the urging of some or all of the Governors involved.]
T. R.--"I can't go on telling my friends in private letters what
my position is, but asking them not to make it public, without
seeming furtive." In afternoon H. H. suggests that T. R. write
first draft of his letter of reply soon as possible to give all
possible time for consideration and revision. T. R. has two
inspirations--to propose presidential primaries in order to be
sure of popular demand, and to use statement made at Battery when
he returned home from Europe."
The next day's entry reads as follows:
"Sent revised letter to Knox. T. R. said, "Not to make a public
statement soon would be to violate my cardinal principle--never
hit if you can help it, but when you have to, hit hard. Never hit
soft. You'll never get any thanks for hitting soft." McHarg
called with three men from St. Louis. T. R. said exactly the same
thing as usual--he would never accept the nomination if it came
as the result of an intrigue, only if it came as the result of a
genuine and widespread popular demand. The thing he wants to be
sure of is that there is this widespread popular demand that he
"do a job," and that the demand is genuine."
Meanwhile Frank Knox was consulting the seven Governors, each one
of whom was delighted to have an opportunity to say to Roosevelt
in this formal, public way just what they had each said to him
privately and forcefully. The letter was signed and delivered to
T. R. On the 24th of February Roosevelt replied to the letter of
the seven Governors in unequivocal terms, "I will accept the
nomination for President if it is tendered to me, and I will
adhere to this decision until--the convention has expressed its
preference." He added the hope that so far as possible the people
might be given the chance, through direct primaries, to record
their wish as to who should be the nominee. A month later, in a
great address at Carnegie Hall in New York, he gave voice
publicly to the same thought that he had expressed to his friends
in that editorial conference: "The leader for the time being,
whoever he may be, is but an instrument, to be used until broken
and then cast aside; and if he is worth his salt he will care no
more when he is broken than a soldier cares when he is sent where
his life is forfeit that the victory may be won. In the long
fight for righteousness the watchword for all is, 'Spend and be
spent.' It is of little matter whether any one man fails or
succeeds; but the cause shall not fail, for it is the cause of
mankind."
The decision once made, Roosevelt threw himself into the contest
for delegates to the nominating convention with his unparalleled
vigor and forcefulness. His main opponent was, of course, the man
who had been his friend and associate and whom he had done more
than any other single force to make President as his successor.
William Howard Taft had the undivided support of the national
party organization; but the Progressive Republicans the country
over thronged to Roosevelt's support with wild enthusiasm. The
campaign for the nomination quickly developed two aspects, one of
which delighted every Progressive in the Republican party, the
other of which grieved every one of Roosevelt's levelheaded
friends. It became a clean-cut conflict between progress and
reaction, between the interests of the people, both as rulers and
as governed, and the special interests, political and business.
But it also became a bitter conflict of personalities between the
erstwhile friends. The breach between the two men was afterwards
healed, but it was several years after the reek of the battle had
drifted away before even formal relations were restored between
them.
A complicating factor in the campaign was the candidacy of
Senator La Follette of Wisconsin. In July, 1911, La Follette had
begun, at the earnest solicitation of many Progressive leaders in
Congress and out, an active campaign for the Republican
nomination. Progressive organizations were perfected in numerous
States and "in less than three months," as La Follette has
written in his Autobiography, his candidacy "had taken on
proportions which compelled recognition." Four months later a
conference of some three hundred Progressives from thirty States,
meeting in Chicago, declared that La Follette was, because of
his record, the logical candidate for the Presidency. Following
this conference he continued to campaign with increasing vigor,
but concurrently the enthusiasm of some of his leading supporters
began to cool and their support of his candidacy to weaken.
Senator La Follette ascribes this effect to the surreptitious
maneuvering of Roosevelt, whom he credits with an overwhelming
appetite for another Presidential term, kept in check only by his
fear that he could not be nominated or elected. But there is no
evidence of any value whatever that Roosevelt was conducting
underground operations or that he desired to be President again.
The true explanation of the change in those Progressives who had
favored the candidacy of La Follette and yet had gradually ceased
to support him, is to be found in their growing conviction that
Taft and the reactionary forces in the Republican party which he
represented could be defeated only by one man--and that not the
Senator from Wisconsin. In any event the La Follette candidacy
rapidly declined until it ceased to be a serious element in the
situation. Although the Senator, with characteristic consistency
and pertinacity, stayed in the fight till the end, he entered the
Convention with the delegates of but two States, his own
Wisconsin and North Dakota, pledged to support him.
The pre-convention campaign was made unusually dramatic by the
fact that, for the first time in the history of Presidential
elections, the voters of thirteen States were privileged not only
to select the delegates to the Convention by direct primary vote
but to instruct them in the same way as to the candidate for whom
they should cast their ballots. There were 388 such popularly
instructed delegates from California, Georgia, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. It was
naturally in these States that the two candidates concentrated
their campaigning efforts. The result of the selection of
delegates and of the preferential vote in these States was the
best possible evidence of the desire of the rank and file of the
party as to the Presidential candidate. Of these 388 delegates,
Senator La Follette secured 36; President Taft 71--28 in Georgia,
2 in Illinois, 18 in Massachusetts, 14 in Ohio, and 9 in
Pennsylvania; and Roosevelt 281--26 in California, 56 in
Illinois, 16 in Maryland, 18 in Massachusetts, 16 in Nebraska, 28
in New Jersey, 34 in Ohio, 10 in Oregon, 67 in Pennsylvania, and
10 in South Dakota. Roosevelt therefore, in those States where
the voters could actually declare at primary elections which
candidate they preferred, was the expressed choice of more than
five times as many voters as Taft.
When the Republican convention met in Chicago an interesting and
peculiar situation presented itself. There were 1078 seats in the
Convention. Of the delegates elected to those seats Taft had
committed to him the vast majority of the delegates from the
States which have never cast an electoral vote for a Republican
candidate for President since there was a Republican party.
Roosevelt had in support of him the great majority of the
delegates from the States which are normally Republican and which
must be relied upon at election time if a Republican President is
to be chosen. Of the 1078 seats more than 200 were contested.
Aside from these contested seats, neither candidate had a
majority of the delegates. The problem that confronted each side
was to secure the filling of a sufficient number of the disputed
seats with its retainers to insure a majority for its candidate.
In the solution of this problem the Taft forces had one
insuperable advantage. The temporary roll of a nominating
convention is made up by the National Committee of the party. The
Republican National Committee had been selected at the close of
the last national convention four years before. It accordingly
represented the party as it had then stood, regardless of the
significant changes that three and a quarter years of Taft's
Presidency had wrought in party opinion.
In the National Committee the Taft forces had a strength of more
than two to one; and all but an insignificant number of the
contests were decided out of hand in favor of Mr. Taft. The
temporary roll of the Convention therefore showed a distinct
majority against Roosevelt. From the fall of the gavel, the
Roosevelt forces fought with vigor and determination for what
they described as the "purging of the roll" of those Taft
delegates whose names they declared had been placed upon it by
fraud. But at every turn the force of numbers was against them;
and the Taft majority which the National Committee had
constituted in the Convention remained intact, an impregnable
defense against the Progressive attack.
These preliminary engagements concerned with the determination of
the final membership of the Convention had occupied several days.
Meanwhile the temper of the Roosevelt delegates had burned hotter
and hotter. Roosevelt was present, leading the fight in
person--not, of course, on the floor of the Convention, to which
he was not a delegate, but at headquarters in the Congress Hotel.
There were not wanting in the Progressive forces counsels of
moderation and compromise. It was suggested by those of less
fiery mettle that harmony might be arrived at on the basis of the
elimination of both Roosevelt and Taft and the selection of a
candidate not unsatisfactory to either side. But Roosevelt,
backed by the majority of the Progressive delegates, stood firm
and immovable on the ground that the "roll must be purged" and
that he would consent to no traffic with a Convention whose
make-up contained delegates holding their seats by virtue of
fraud. "Let them purge the roll," he declared again and again,
"and I will accept any candidate the Convention may name." But
the organization leaders knew that a yielding to this demand for
a reconstitution of the personnel of the Convention would result
in but one thing--the nomination for Roosevelt--and this was the
one thing they were resolved not to permit.
As the hours of conflict and turmoil passed, there grew steadily
and surely in the Roosevelt ranks a demand for a severance of
relations with the fraudulent Convention and the formation of a
new party devoted, without equivocation or compromise, to
Progressive principles. A typical incident of these days of
confusion and uncertainty was the drawing up of a declaration of
purpose by a Progressive alternate from New Jersey, disgusted
with the progress of the machine steam roller and disappointed at
the delayed appearance of a positive Progressive programme of
action. Circulated privately, with the knowledge and approval of
Roosevelt, it was promptly signed by dozens of Progressive
delegates. It read as follows:
"We, the undersigned, in the event that the Republican National
Convention as at present constituted refuses to purge its roll of
the delegates fraudulently placed upon it by the action of the
majority of the Republican National Committee, pledge ourselves,
as American citizens devoted to the progressive principles of
genuine popular rule and social justice, to join in the
organization of a new party founded upon those principles, under
the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt."
The first signer of the declaration was Governor Hiram W. Johnson
of California, the second, Governor Robert S. Vessey of South
Dakota, the third, Governor Joseph M. Carey of Wyoming, and
farther down the list were the names of Gifford and Amos Pinchot,
James R. Garfield, ex-Governor John Franklin Fort of New Jersey,
with Everett Colby and George L. Record of the same State,
Matthew Hale of Massachusetts, "Jack" Greenway of Arizona, Judge
Ben B. Lindsey of Colorado, Medill McCormick of Illinois, George
Rublee of New Hampshire, and Elon Huntington Hooker, of New York,
who was to become the National Treasurer of the new party. The
document was, of course, a purely informal assertion of purpose;
but it was the first substantial straw to predict the whirlwind
which the masters of the convention were to reap.
When at last it had become unmistakably clear that the Taft
forces were and would remain to the end in control of the
Convention, the Progressive delegates, with a few exceptions,
united in dramatic action. Speaking for them with passion and
intensity Henry J. Allen of Kansas announced their intention to
participate no longer in the actions of a convention vitiated by
fraud. The Progressive delegates would, he declared, remain in
their places but they would neither vote nor take any part
whatever in the proceedings. He then read, by permission of the
Convention, a statement from Roosevelt, in which he pronounced
the following indictment:
"The Convention has now declined to purge the roll of the
fraudulent delegates placed thereon by the defunct National
Committee, and the majority which has thus indorsed the fraud was
made a majority only because it included the fraudulent delegates
themselves who all sat as judges on one another's cases . . . .
The Convention as now composed has no claim to represent the
voters of the Republican party . . . . Any man nominated by the
Convention as now constituted would merely be the beneficiary of
this successful fraud; it would be deeply discreditable for any
man to accept the Convention's nomination under these
circumstances; and any man thus accepting it would have no claim
to the support of any Republican on party grounds and would have
forfeited the right to ask the support of any honest man of any
party on moral grounds."
So while most of the Roosevelt delegates sat in ominous quiet and
refused to vote, the Convention proceeded to nominate Taft for
President by the following vote: Taft 561--21 votes more than a
majority; Roosevelt 107; La Follette 41; Cummins 17; Hughes 2;
absent 6; present and not voting 344.
Then the Taft delegates went home to meditate on the fight which
they had won and the more portentous fight which they must wage
in the coming months on a broader field. The Roosevelt delegates,
on the other hand, went out to Orchestra Hall, and in an exalted
mood of passionate devotion to their cause and their beloved
leader proceeded to nominate Theodore Roosevelt for the
Presidency and Hiram Johnson for the Vice-Presidency. A committee
was sent to notify Roosevelt of the nomination and when he
appeared in the hall all precedents of spontaneous enthusiasm
were broken. This was no conventional--if the double entendre may
be permitted--demonstration. It had rather the quality of
religious exaltation.
Roosevelt made a short speech, in which he adjured his hearers to
go to their several homes "to find out the sentiment of the
people at home and then again come together, I suggest by mass
convention, to nominate for the Presidency a Progressive on a
Progressive platform that will enable us to appeal to Northerner
and Southerner, Easterner and Westerner, Republican and Democrat
alike, in the name of our common American citizenship. If you
wish me to make the fight I will make it, even if only one State
should support me."
Thus ended the first act in the drama. The second opened with the
gathering of some two thousand men and women at Chicago on August
5, 1912. It was a unique gathering. Many of the delegates were
women; one of the "keynote" speeches was delivered by Miss Jane
Addams of Hull House. The whole tone and atmosphere of the
occasion seemed religious rather than political. The old-timers
among the delegates, who found themselves in the new party for
diverse reasons, selfish, sincere, or mixed, must have felt
astonishment at themselves as they stood and shouted out Onward
Christian Soldiers as the battle-hymn of their new allegiance.
The long address which Roosevelt made to the Convention he
denominated his "Confession of Faith." The platform which the
gathering adopted was entitled "A Contract with the People." The
sessions of the Convention seethed with enthusiasm and burned hot
with earnest devotion to high purpose. There could be no doubt in
the mind of any but the most cynical of political reactionaries
that here was the manifestation of a new and revivifying force to
be reckoned with in the future development of American political
life.
The platform adopted by the Progressive Convention was no less a
novelty. Its very title--even the fact that it had a title marked
it off from the pompous and shopworn documents emanating from the
usual nominating Convention--declared a reversal of the
time-honored view of a platform as, like that of a street-car,
"something to get in on, not something to stand on." The
delegates to that Convention were perfectly ready to have their
party sued before the bar of public opinion for breach of
contract if their candidates when elected did not do everything
in their power to carry out the pledges of the platform. The
planks of the platform grouped themselves into three main
sections: political reforms, control of trusts and combinations,
and measures of "social and industrial justice."
In the first section were included direct primaries, nation-wide
preferential primaries for the selection of candidates for the
Presidency, direct popular election of United States Senators,
the short ballot, the initiative, referendum and recall, an
easier method of amending the Federal constitution, woman
suffrage, and the recall of judicial decisions in the form of a
popular review of any decision annulling a law passed under the
police power of the State.
The platform in the second place opposed vigorously the
indiscriminate dissolution of trusts and combinations, on the
ground that combination in the business field was not only
inevitable but necessary and desirable for the promotion of
national and international efficiency. It condemned the evils of
inflated capitalization and unfair competition; and it proposed,
in order to eliminate those is evils while preserving the
unquestioned advantages that flow from combination, the
establishment of a strong Federal commission empowered and
directed to maintain permanent active supervision over industrial
corporations engaged in interstate commerce, doing for them what
the Federal Government now does for the national banks and,
through the Interstate Commerce Commission, for the
transportation lines.
Finally in the field of social justice the platform pledged the
party to the abolition of child labor, to minimum wage laws, the
eight-hour day, publicity in regard to working conditions,
compensation for industrial accidents, continuation schools for
industrial education, and to legislation to prevent industrial
accidents, occupational diseases, overwork, involuntary
unemployment, and other injurious effects incident to modern
industry.
To stand upon this platform and to carry out the terms of this
"contract with the people," the Convention nominated without
debate or dissent Theodore Roosevelt for President and Hiram W.
Johnson of California for Vice-President. Governor Johnson was an
appropriate running mate for Roosevelt. In his own State he had
led one of the most virile and fast moving of the local
Progressive movements. He burned with a white-hot enthusiasm for
the democratic ideal and the rights of man as embodied in
equality of opportunity, freedom of individual development, and
protection from the "dark forces" of special privilege, political
autocracy and concentrated wealth. He was a brilliant and fiery
campaigner where his convictions were enlisted.
So passed the second act in the drama of the Progressive party.
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