[1] The Pythagoreans of Magna Graecia were the first to introduce greek
philosophy into Italy. Pythagorean philosophy, however, never took deep
root in Roman soil. Indeed, although Pythagorean speculation flourished
in Italy as early as the sixth century,
it was not until the beginning of the second century before Christ
that Rome began to feel the power of Greek literature and Greek art,
and it was about the same time that the influence of Greek philosophy
was first felt. That the Romans did not accept without a struggle this
imposition of a foreign culture is evident from the fact that in 161
B.C. residence in Rome was, by a decree of the Senate, forbidden to
philosophers and rhetoricians. Later, however, the conquest of Greece
and the military expeditions of Pompey, Caesar, Antony, and Augustus
broadened the minds of the Romans, rendered them susceptible to the
beauty of Greek literature, and led to the inflow of Greek learning and
to the establishment in Rome of the representative teachers of Greek
philosophy. Cicero was, therefore, contrasting his own age with the
more conservative past when he said: "Philosophia jacuit usque ad hanc
aetatem."
[1] Cf. Zeller, Eclectics, pp. 5 ff.; Ritter and Preller,
op. cit., pp. 452 ff.
In accepting the philosophy of Greece, the Roman spirit asserted its
practical tendency, selecting what was more easily assimilated, and
modifying what it accepted, by imparting to it a more practical
character. Thus it was the ethical philosophy of the Epicureans and
Stoics and the Eclectic systems of later times, rather than the
philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, that throve when transplanted to
Roman soil.
CICERO
Life. Marcus Tullius Cicero is the best known representative of
Roman Eclecticism. He was born at Arpinum 106 a.c. and died at Formiae
43 B.C. He had for teachers Phaedrus the Epicurean, Philo of Larissa,
representing the New Academy, Diodotus the Stoic, and Antiochus, an
exponent of the later Eclecticism of the Academy. In addition to the
advantages to be derived from such a training, he possessed a
knowledge, widely extended if not always accurate, of the philosophical
literature of pre-Socratic and Socratic schools. He did not lay claim to
any great independence as a philosopher, being willing, as he tells us,
to take credit merely for the art with which he clothed Greek
philosophy in Roman dress: "Verba tantum affero, quibus abundo." [2]
In this self-appointed task Cicero
is not ways successful, his account of the doctrines of the
pre-Socratic philosophers being especially inaccurate.
[2] Ad Atticum, XII, 52.
Sources. Cicero's principal philosophical works are:
Academica, or Quaestiones Academicae, Tusculanae
Disputationes, De Finibus, De Natura Deorum, De Officiis, De
Divinatione (unfinished), De Republica (of which about a
third part was discovered and published in 1822 by Cardinal Mai),
Paradoxa Stoicorum, De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Fato.
DOCTRINES
General Idea of Philosophy. Cicero describes himself [3] as a
member of the New Academy. His philosophy is, in point of fact, an
Eclecticism based on Scepticism. So impressed was he with the war of
philosophical systems that he despaired of arriving at certainty and was
content to accept probability as the guide of conduct. But whenever he
discovered that philosophical schools could be reconciled, he strove to
coordinate the common elements into a system loosely connected, as is
every system Eclecticism.
[3] Tusc., V, 4.
Theory of Knowledge. All our knowledge rests, in ultimate
analysis, on immediate certainty, which is variously called notiones
innatae, notiones nobis insitae, or, since immediate knowledge is
common to all men, consensus gentium. In the Tusculan
Disputations, for example, Cicero speaks of the principles of
morality as innate; "sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina innata
virtutum." [4] These elements of knowledge are antecedent to all
experience. We have, therefore, in Cicero's theory of knowledge, the
first explicit expression of the doctrine of innate ideas.
[4] Op. cit., III, 1.
Theological Notions. Cicero, in his proof of the existence God,
falls back on the innate idea of God, the presence of which in
the minds of all men is proved by the universality the belief in a
Supreme Being. He brings forward also the teleological argument in its Stoic form, contending that the
Epicurean doctrine of chance is as absurd as would be the expectation
that the twenty-one letters of the Latin alphabet could, by being
poured out at random, produce the Annals of Ennius. [5] He
attaches great importance to the doctrine of Providence and of the
divine government of the universe.
[5] De Nat. Deorum, II, 37.
Anthropology. With the belief in God is intimately associated
the conviction of the dignity of man. The soul is of supernatural
origin: "Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest." [6] It is
different from matter. Still, Cicero does not altogether exclude the
Stoic idea of the soul as a firelike substance. He teaches that the
soul is immortal, having recourse to the Platonic arguments as well
as to inner conviction and universal consent. In his incomplete
treatise De Fato he proves the freedom of the will by
similar arguments.
[6] Tusc., I, 27.
Ethics. In this portion of his philosophy Cicero is a follower
of the Eclectic Stoics. On the one hand he rejects the Epicurean
doctrine that pleasure is the highest good; but when, on the other
hand, he adopts the Stoic doctrine of virtue, he is too much of a man
of the world not to recognize that the Stoic morality is too exalted or
too severe to be applied to everyday life. Accordingly, he modifies the
severity of Stoicism by introducing the Platonic and Aristotelian
teaching, that honors, wealth, etc., are goods, although subordinate to
virtue, which is the chief good. [7] He teaches that while virtue is
sufficient for vita beata, external goods also are necessary for
vita beatissima, -- a distinction borrowed from Antiochus of
Ascalon. The morally good (honestum) is that which is intrinsically
praiseworthy.
[7] Cf.De Fin., IV, 6ff.
Historical Position. Cicero, as has been said, laid no claim to
originality as a philosopher. He merely collected and assimilated the
philosophical doctrines of the Greeks. He is the truest representative
of the Eclecticism of this period.
Chief among Cicero's followers was Varro (116-27 B.C.), whom
Seneca calls doctissimus Romanorum. He was more famous as a
scholar than as an independent philosopher. Like Cicero, he was a Stoic
and an Eclectic. Unlike the other philosophers of Rome, Titus
Lucretius Carus (95-51 B.C.) is not an Eclectic. In his poem, De
Rerum Natura, he adheres closely to the doctrine of Epicurus. [8]
[8] Cf. p. 176. On the influence of Lucretius on mediaeval
philosophy, cf. Philippe, Lucrèse dans la theologie
chrétienne (Paris, 1896).
Under the first emperors, the school of the Sextians acquired
considerable importance. The founder, Quintus Sextius, was born
about 70 B.C. He was succeded by his son, under whose leadership the
school came to include among its adherents Sotion, Celsus, and
Fabianus . Soon, however, it dwindled into insignificance, so that
in Seneca's time it had entirely ceased to exist. From the few scattered
utterances of the Sextians which have come down to us and from the
account given by Seneca, it is evident that the teaching of the school
was Stoicism tinged one or two points of doctrine with Pythagoreanism.
In the first century of our era there flourished in Rome an important
branch of the Stoic school. It included Lucius Annaeus Cornutus
(died A.D. 68), Aulus Persius Flaccus (A.D. 34-62), Lucius
Annaeus Seneca, and his nephew Marcus Annaeus Lucanus (A.D.
39-65). Seneca, the most important of these, was born about the
beginning the Christian era at Corduba in Spain. He owed his
philosophical training to the Sextians and other Stoics. In A.D. 65, he
committed suicide by order of Nero, whose counselor he had been. His
writings possess great value as sources for the history of the Stoic
school. He agrees in all essentials with the early Stoics, although in
many points of detail he follows the later representatives of the
school, who modified the doctrines Zeno and Chrysippus in more than one
respect.
Towards the end of the first century Musonius Rufus was
distinguished in Rome as a teacher of Stoic philosophy. He
confined his teaching, however, more strictly than Seneca had done, to
the ethical application of Stoicism. The most important of his
disciples was Epictetus, the philosopher-slave, a Phrygian, who
lived in Rome from the time of Nero to that of Trajan (A.D. 117). The
works, entitled Diatribai and Egcheiridion,
contain the discourses of Epictetus as written down by his disciple,
Arrian. Epictetus defines philosophy to consist in learning what to
avoid and what to desire. In accordance with this definition, he
develops a system of practical philosophy, teaching, with the Stoics,
that happiness is to be found in independence of external things.
Closely allied to Epictetus is the emperor-philosopher, Marcus
Aurelius Antoninus (A.D. 121-180). His work, entitled ta eis
heauton, consists of aphorisms written down in the form of
memoranda, or notes for personal guidance. His teaching agrees with
that of the Stoics. He insists more than did the other Stoics on the
kinship of man to God. In order to secure happiness, man must loose his
soul from the bonds of interest in things external and, retiring within
himself, learn to become like to God by becoming resigned to the will
of God, and by loving all his fellow-men, excluding neither the weak
and erring nor the ungrateful and hostile.
Retrospect. The philosophy of the Romans reflects the essential
traits of the Roman character. It is practical in its aims; it
subordinates theoretical inquiry to problems of conduct, thus depriving
itself of the power of systematic development, and condemning itself to
the circumscribed task of assimilating and applying what the Greek
masters had taught.
Character of Greek Philosophy. We have now reached a point
whence we may look back over the whole course of the development of
Greek speculation before we turn to the study of a new era, in which
Greek civilization and Greek philosophy came into contact with the
religions of the East and were influenced by them.
The civilization of Greece had a character peculiar to itself. The
"national spirit" (to use a Hegelian phrase) which dominated the life
of the nation determined the character of the literature, the art, the
political institutions as well as the philosophy of the country. What,
then, is the character which the national spirit of Greece imparted to
Greek philosophy? The answer to this question is best reached by a
comparison of Greek with Oriental philosophy on the one hand, and with
mediaeval and modern philosophy on the other.
Compared with Oriental philosophy, the philosophy of Greece is
remarkable, in the first place, for its manifold completeness. It
contained in germ all the systems that were to appear in subsequent
times; scarcely a problem of speculative or practical philosophy failed
to receive attention at the hands of the philosophers of Greece.
Oriental speculation, on the contrary, being centered round a few
problems of physics, theology, and ethics, fell far short of Hellenic
speculation in breadth and completeness. In the next place, while
Oriental thought was stagnant, producing throughout long ages of
inquiry not more than a few schools, and exhibiting in its development
a certain languid sameness, the course of thought in Greece was free
and active, producing a variety of systems of speculation and
manifesting all the freedom, force, and supple pliancy of the Greek
mind. Finally, the comparison of Greek with Oriental philosophy
furnishes an instance of the essential racial difference between Greece
and the Orient. The East was ruled by metaphor, the Oriental mind being
strangely averse to the direct and natural mode of expression. The
Greek mind, on the contrary, abhorred all intricacy and metaphorical
tortuousness; it went towards the truth with a directness, and
formulated conclusions with a boldness, which may appear childish in
the case of a Thales or an Anaximander, but which, nevertheless, must
command our admiration when we come to reflect how far Thales and
Anaximander have advanced beyond the mythological
concept of the universe. Completeness, productive activity, and
directness are, therefore, the qualities which Greek philosophy
exhibits when compared with the philosophy of the East.
The comparison of Greek with modern philosophy suggests at the very
outset the trait which is most distinctive of Greek civilization. Greek
life, Greek art, Greek literature, and Greek religion were objective.
Modern civilization, on the contrary, is more subjective than
objective. To this general contrast of Greek life and modern life the
philosophy of Greece and modern philosophy offer no exception. At
first, in the period of beginnings, Greek philosophy was entirely
objective; in the second period, the period of greatest perfection, the
subjective element in philosophical speculation received due attention;
it was only in the third period, when philosophy began to degenerate,
that the subjective element became unduly prominent. In Greek
philosophy, at the period of its greatest perfection, in its Golden
Age, we find the union of the subjective and objective elements, the
belief in the continuity of the spiritual with the material, -- a
continuity which is not incompatible with the distinction between
matter and spirit. We find, too, the conviction that the inquiry into
the conditions of knowledge does not destroy, but rather confirms the
trustworthiness of our impressions of the external world. Modern
philosophy, on the contrary, starts out with the supposition that there
is an original antithesis between object and subject, between matter
and mind, between the impression of sense and the verdict of pure
reason. The Greek, even in his most abstract idealism, was never so
abstract as the modern transcendentalist, and in his philosophical
realism he always knew how to stop short of the crudeness of
materialism. Modern speculation has tended towards centralizing
philosophy on self the Greek always considered that other-self, nature,
is the chief subject of inquiry. In a word, Greek philosophy, at least
in the Golden Age of its development, was more true to nature than
modern speculation is.
This fidelity to nature is, however, a source of weakness as well as of
strength. The spirit of naturalness prevented the Greek from
looking beyond nature for his ideal in art; it prevented him in his
philosophy from carrying his theological peculations far enough to
determine, for example, the notion of personality. It was left for
Christian speculation to complete the work of Plato and Aristotle and,
by laboring in the Greek spirit of completeness and manifoldness, to
determine, as it did in the Golden Age of mediaeval philosophy, that
faith and reason are at once distinct and continuous. In this way,
Christian philosophy carried the Greek fidelity to nature into (the
region of the supernatural, refusing to admit an antagonism between
these two phases of reality -- the world of reason and the world of
faith -- just as the Greeks had refused to admit the antithesis
between mind and matter, which is the postulate of modern philosophy.
Before we come to the philosophy of the Christian era, it is necessary
to outline the rise and course of thought in the Alexandrian school;
for it was in Alexandria that the ancient world first came into contact
with the civilization of the new era.