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History of Philosophy
The Scientific Movement
by Turner, William (S.T.D.)
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The forerunner of the great scientific movement of the sixteenth
century was Nikolaus of Cusa (1401-1464). Nikolaus was born at
Kues, or Cusa, near Treves, in 1401. At an early age he joined the
community of the Brothers of the Common Life at Deventer. Later he
studied law, mathematics, and philosophy at Padua, but finally decided
to abandon the legal profession and took holy orders. In 1448 he was
made cardinal, and two years later was appointed to the see of Brixen.
He died at Todi in Umbria in 1464. His most important works are the
treatise De Docta Ignorantia and the dialogue entitled
Idiotae de Sapientia Libri Tres. These were published at Paris
in 1514 and at Basel in 1565.
In his speculative philosophy Nikolaus occupies a position intermediate
between Aristotelian and modern thought: he insists with special
emphasis on the doctrine of the unity of opposites (coincidentia
oppositorum) and on the principle that the beginning of true wisdom
is the knowledge of one's own ignorance (Docta Ignorantia).
Among his astronomical teachings is that of the rotation of the earth
on its axis, -- a doctrine to which Copernicus subsequently gave
scientific form.
Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543) was born at Thorn in Poland in
1473. After studying at Cracow, Bologna, and Padua, he became canon of
Frauenburg. In a treatise De Orbium Celestium Revolutionibus,
which appeared in 1543 and was dedicated to Pope Paul III, he defended
the heliocentric system of astronomy and definitely placed the earth
among the solar planets.
Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) furnished, by his accurate observations,
materials for the work of Kepler.
Johann Kepler (1571-1631) gave further development to the
heliocentric hypothesis by discovering the form of planetary orbits and
the laws of planetary motions.
Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) taught the twofold motion of the
earth and discovered the satellites of Jupiter and the laws of their
motions.
The discoveries of Boyle (1627-1691) and of Newton
(1642-1727) were as important in the department of physics as were
those of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo in the department of
astronomy. All these, however, are of interest to the student of
philosophy principally because of their effect on the course of
speculative thought.
Influence of Scientific Discoveries on the Development of
Philosophy. The attitude which Catholic and Protestant theologians
of the sixteenth century assumed towards the discoveries of Galileo and
Kepler is well known. The antagonism, however, between the old and the
new modes of thought resulted from a misunderstanding. There is no
inherent contradiction between the broad principles of Aristotelian and
Scholastic philosophy on the one hand and the new physics and astronomy
on the other. Aristotle had advocated the investigation of nature, and
the greatest of the schoolmen had insisted on the importance of
building a science of nature on the basis of empirical knowledge. St.
Thomas, in a remarkable passage, had acknowledged the possible advent
of a theory which would subvert the entire structure of Aristotelian
astronomy: in reference to the hypotheses (suppositiones) by
which the ancient astronomers attempted to explain the irregularities
of the motions of the planets, he had written:
Illorum autem suppositiones quas adiuvenerunt non est necessarium esse
veras . . . quia forte secundum alium modum nondum ab hominibus
comprehensum apparentia circa stellas salvatur. [1]
[1] In Lib. IIum De Coelo, Lect. 17.
In the Sum. Theol., Ia, XXXII, 1, ad 2um,
we find the same thought expressed in language almost identical with
that of the passage quoted in the text.
The Scholastics, therefore, who attacked the representatives of the new
science were false to the principles of their school. Had they known
and fully felt the spirit of Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy
they should have put an end to their fruitless discussions, shaken off
the yoke of a false method, and gone forth with the representatives of
the new science to investigate nature. They should have adopted as
their motto "Anteire decet, non subsequi" and taken the lead in the
advance guard of discovery. Instead of doing this, they antagonized
science, so that when the new age, dominated by the scientific spirit,
sought to found a system of metaphysics, it never for a
moment considered that in the Aristotelian and Scholastic system of
philosophy it already possessed the metaphysics which best accorded
with the results of scientific discovery. When, therefore, we study the
causes of the misunderstanding between science and Scholastic
philosophy, we must lay the burden of the blame on the shoulders of the
degenerate representatives of Scholasticism, who, by betraying at the
critical moment of its history the great system which they were
supposed to defend, did that system a wrong which all the efforts of
their successors have not succeeded in righting. The discredit of
Scholasticism was due not to a lack of ideas, but to a lack of men to
set forth those ideas in the proper light. Moreover (if we are to
vindicate Scholasticism at the expense of Scholastics), we must not
overlook the dependence of the scientific movement itself on Scholastic
philosophy. Humanism grew out of Scholastic soil, and owed more to
Scholastic vigor and clearness of thinking than we are commonly aware
of. The scientific revival also owes much to the learning of the
schools. Columbus and Copernicus, who did more than any of their
contemporaries to revolutionize modes of thought, appealed to their
contemporaries on the strength of texts from Aristotle and Philolaus.
It was by reasoning on the texts of Strabo and Ptolemy that Columbus
convinced himself of the existence of a new country beyond the western
ocean; and it was by meditating on the glory of God and on the spread
of the Christian religion, which he deemed his special vocation in
life, that the great mariner acquired the courage to brave the perils
of unknown seas. We must keep these facts in mind, and not be too
quick to regard the discoveries of this age as out of all relation with
the past. Scientific discoveries form no exception to the law that
thought flows in a continuous stream from one generation to another. [2]
[2] Cf. Symonds, The Revival of Learning, pp. 19 ff., and
Brother Azarias, Aristotle and the Christian Church, p. 126.
FRANCIS BACON
Life. Francis Bacon was the first to attempt the construction of
a system of empirical philosophy on the basis of the principles of the
new scientific method. He was born in London in 1561. After studying at
Cambridge he spent two years in Paris, as companion of the English
ambassador. Returning to England, he adopted the legal profession. In
1595 he entered Parliament, became adviser of the crown in 1604, and
keeper of the Great Seal in 1617. In 1618 he was made lord chancellor,
with the title of Baron Verulam, to which, three years later, that of
Viscount St. Albans was added. He was charged, as is well known, with
bribery and corruption, and, on pleading guilty to the accusations, was
deprived of his office and fined £s;40,000. He died in 1626.
DOCTRINES [3]
[3] Consult Nichol, Bacon (Blackwood's Philosophical
Classics, Edinburgh and Philadelphia, I888); Fischer, Bacon and his
Successors, translated by Oxenford (London, 1857). The most recent
edition of Bacon's complete works is that by Spedding and Heath
(London, 1857 ff.).
Bacon set himself the task of reorganizing all the branches of
scientific knowledge, and with this purpose in view he proposed to
expound a new method of scientific study and to treat of each of the
sciences with special reference to the making of scientific and
practical discoveries. The work in which this plan was to be realized
is called the Instauratio Magna, of which the first part,
entitled De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, treats of the
reorganization of the sciences, and the second part, entitled Novum
Organum, contains the theory of induction and of scientific method.
To the sciences themselves, and to their application to discovery,
Bacon contributed merely a portion of his projected work, descriptive
of natural phenomena, and entitled Historia Naturalis, sive Sylva
Sylvarum.
Philosophy has for its object a knowledge of God, nature, and
man. Our positive knowledge of God belongs to faith, for reason can
give us merely a negative knowledge of God by refuting the objections
urged against faith, and by showing the
absurdity of atheism. "It is true," Bacon says, in a well known
passage in his Essays, "that a little philosophy inclineth men's
minds to atheism: but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to
religion." [4]
[4] Cf. Essay on Atheism (Works, edited by
Spedding, Vol. XII, pp. 132 and 337) and Meditation on Atheism
(Vol. XIV, p. 93).
Bacon distinguishes first philosophy (philosophia prima or
scientia universalis), which treats of the concepts and
principles underlying all the parts of philosophy, and the philosophy
of nature, which is subdivided into speculative and operative, the
latter being defined as natural philosophy in its application to
mechanics and other arts. [5]
[5] Cf. Works, II, 89.
The first step towards attaining a knowledge of nature consists in
purifying the mind by the exclusion of the phantoms, or idols, which
interfere with the acquisition of knowledge. The idols, or false
appearances, are reduced to four classes: (1) Idols of the
tribe. These are common to all men, and are, in some way, derived
from the very nature and limitations of the human mind. Such, for
example, is the tendency to anthropomorphize. "For the mind," Bacon
observes, "is not a plane mirror, but a mirror of uneven surface which
combines its own figure with the figures of the objects it represents."
(2) Idols of the den. These arise from the peculiar character of
the individual. Some minds are naturally analytical, while others are
naturally synthetical. To each belongs its own peculiar class of idols
of the den. (3) Idols of the market place. These arise from the
intercourse of men, and from the peculiarities of language. For words,
Bacon warns us, are symbols of conventional value, and are based on the
carelessly constructed concepts of the crowd. (4) Idols of the
theater. These are false appearances arising from tradition and the
authority of schools and teachers. [6]
[6] Ibid., I, 250 ff.
Having freed his mind from the false appearances of truth, the searcher
after knowledge must next proceed to a personal
and active investigation of nature. He must not spin science
from his own inner consciousness, as the spider spins its web from its
own substance: he must, like the bee, collect material from the world
around him and elaborate that material by the process of reflection and
meditation. He must observe facts and proceed from the observation of
facts to the establishment of laws and axioms. Bacon notes that the
"inductia per enumerationem simplicem," of which alone Aristotle and
the schoolmen treat, is "scanty and slovenly," because it is based on
the observation of positive instances merely, and neglects to take
negative instances into account, whereas induction should
consider negative instances and instances of difference of degree as
well as positive instances. These hints were taken up by John Stuart
Mill, to whom we owe the four experimental methods of induction. The
chief difference between the Aristotelian and the Baconian induction
consists in this, that the former proceeds by accumulation of
instances, while the latter is based on the elimination of
non-typical instances and the discovery of decisive or "prerogative"
instances. [7]
[7] Cf. Works, I, 344 ff.
In his effort to accentuate the importance of the inductive method of
acquiring knowledge, Bacon committed the grave error of throwing
discredit on the deductive, or syllogistic, process. Failing to
recognize that each method has its use, he carried his hostility to the
deductive method so far as to refuse to admit on deductive evidence the
Copernican system of astronomy. [8]
[8] Cf. ibid., VI, 44; IX, 14, 15; X, 422.
Historical Position. Little or nothing has been said of the
contents of Bacon's philosophy. Indeed, it is by the method which he
inaugurated, rather than by the content of his system of thought, that
Bacon is to be judged. His attempts at personal investigation in
accordance with the rules which he laid down were, for the most part,
crude, and were far less successful than the experiments made by many
of his contemporaries.
It was for a long time an axiom almost universally accepted that all
the scientific progress made since the days of Bacon was due to the
employment of the scientific method which he inaugurated. Recently,
however, a more moderate view has begun to prevail. While it is
conceded that Bacon deserves exceptional credit for having called
attention to the necessity of an active investigation of nature, it is
recognized also that he committed a serious mistake in discountenancing
the use of deduction. It is historically demonstrable that the
hypothetical anticipation of nature, by means of deduction, is as
fruitful of scientific discovery as is the use of the inductive method,
and Mill, with all his admiration for Bacon's method, acknowledges that
no great advance can be made in science except by the alternate
employment of induction and deduction. Descartes, who, as we shall see,
advocated and used the deductive method, made more important
contributions to natural science than did Bacon, the author of what has
been called the scientific method.
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