Life. Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza was born in 1632 at Amsterdam
where his parents, who were Portuguese Jews, had sought refuge from
religious persecution. He received his early education in the Jewish
academy at Amsterdam; later, he studied natural science under the
tuition of a free-thinking physician named Van den Ende, and was
initiated into the mysteries of Talmudic literature and philosophy by
the Rabbi Morteira. In 1656 he was solemnly excommunicated by the
Synagogue on account of his heterodox views and obliged to leave his
native city. After a few years spent at Rhynsburg and Voorburg, he
repaired, in 1669, to The Hague, where he earned his livelihood by
polishing lenses. In 1673 he declined the offer of a professorship at
Heidelberg, preferring the quiet and independence of the humble life
which he had elected to lead. He chose poverty for his lot, and when
he died, in 1677, his worldly possessions were barely sufficient to pay
a few trivial debts which he had contracted during his illness.
Sources. The principal philosophical works of Spinoza are De
intellectus Emendatione, Ethica Ordine Geometrica Demonstrata Tractatus
Politicus, Tractatus Theologico-politicus, Principia Philosophiae
Cartesianae (in geometrical form), Cogitata Metaphysica, and
a Short Treatise on God and Man (written in Dutch). The best
edition of Spinoza's works is that of Van Vloten and Land (The Hague,
1882-1883, in 2 vols; reprinted, 1895, in 3 vols.), Pollock's
Spinoza, his Life and Philosophy (London, 1880), and Principal
Caird's Spinoza (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics,
Edinburgh and Philadelphia, 1888), are excellent introductions to the
philosophy of Spinoza. [1] The Ethica was translated by White
(London, 1883) and by Elwes (London, 1883-1884).
[1] Consult also Martineau, A Study of Spinoza (London, 1882),
Types of Ethical Theory (Oxford, 1886), and articles on Spinoza
in the Encyc. Brit., and in the Jounal of Speculative
Philosophy, Vols. XI and XVI.
DOCTRINES
Spinoza's Idea of Philosophy. It will be impossible to arrive at
a definite idea of Spinoza's system or to reconcile the widely
divergent interpretations of his philosophy, unless we first inquire
into the motive which actuated him in his philosophical
speculations, and try to discover the point of view from which he
looked out on the world of life and thought. In the treatise De
Intellectus Emendatione he gives us a kind of mental autobiography
and tells us that his aim in philosophy is to seek the knowledge which
makes men happy. His thought, therefore, is not set in motion by a
problem of causality; nor is he interested in the question of the value
of knowledge; but he is troubled at the unrest, of which the whole
world is full, and he approaches the problems of philosophy in the
ethical rather than in the scientific spirit, with the hope of leading
his reader to look upon things in that aspect of them which shall
conduce to greater spiritual and moral perfection. This is the
significance of the title Ethica, by which he designated his
great metaphysical treatise.
To this ethical aim of his philosophy Spinoza subordinated
everything else, even logical consistency and systematic coherency,
causing to converge in one channel of thought Cartesianism, the
pantheism of Bruno and Maimonides, and the mysticism of the
Neo-Platonists and the cabalistic philosophers.
Starting Point; Definitions. Spinoza's method is even more
formally and technically mathematical than that of Descartes. The
Ethica starts with definitions and axioms, and proceeds, by a
process of syllogistic proof, to the establishment of propositions and
corollaries.
Spinoza defines substance as follows (def. III):
Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur: hoc
est id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo formari
debeat.
And here, whatever view we may take as to the preponderance of
Descartes' influence on Spinoza's mind, we cannot fail to observe that
Spinoza's definition is but an interpretation of the ambiguous words in
which Descartes defined substance: "Res quae ita existit, ut nulla alia
re indigeat ad existendum."
Spinoza next proceeds to define attribute: "Per attributum
intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tamquam ejusdem
essentiam constituens" (def. IV). In the following definition (def. V)
he describes mode: "Per modum intelligo substantiae affectiones, sive
id quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur."
Substance. Substance, attribute, and mode are the cardinal ideas
in Spinoza's system of thought. Having defined them, therefore, he
proceeds to show from the definitions:
(a) That substance is one, infinite (prop. VIII), and indivisible
(prop. XII).
(b) That the one substance is God (prop. XIV). Now, God is defined
(def. VI) as "Ens absolute infinitum, hoc est substantia constans
infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam
exprimit." God is, then, an infinity of infinities; and, although an
attribute, such as thought, or a mode, such as space, may be infinite,
God alone is infinite in the infinity of his infinite attributes: they
are infinite in one respect; he is infinite in all respects.
The Existence of God is a necessary truth. In proof of this
Spinoza advances the argument that God is substance, and substance must
exist (prop. VII); for, not depending on anything else for its
existence, it must cause itself, and therefore its essence must contain
existence. In the second place, Spinoza (prop. XI) advances in proof of
the existence of God an argument of which the following is the major
premise: "Id necessario existit cujus nulla ratio vel causa datur quin
impedit quominus existat." He then proceeds to argue that neither in
the Divine Nature nor outside it is there any cause which could prevent
the existence of God. The argument, as is evident, is guilty of the
fallacy of passing from the order of ideas to the order of existence
and merely proves the self-evident truth that if God exists, existence
is a necessary attribute of the Divinity. Thirdly, Spinoza advances the
following proof of the existence of God:
SPINOZA'S DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANCE
Posse non existere impotentia est, et, contra, posse existere potentia
est (ut per se notum). Si itaque id quod jam necessario existit non
nisi entia finita sunt, sunt ergo entia finita potentiora Ente absolute
infinito. Atqui hoc (ut per se notum) absurdum est. Ergo vel nihil
existit, vel Ens absolute infinitum necessario etiam existit. Atqui nos
vel in nobis vel in alio quod necessario existit existimus. Ergo Ens
absolute infinitum, hoc est (per def. VI) Deus, necessario existit.
In a scholion appended to this argument Spinoza, after calling
attention to the apparently a posteriori form of the proof,
remarks that in reality we do not argue from the existence of the
finite to that of the infinite, that the conviction that God exists is
based, not on the reality of the finite, but rather on the unreality,
that is, on the imperfection, of all finite being. For, the more
perfect a substance is, the more reality it possesses.
God is the Only Substance (prop. XIV). Whatever is, is in God
(prop. XV). It follows (prop. XVIII) that God is the immanent, not the
transient, cause of all finite existence. It remains, therefore, for us
to find in His unity that from which the differences of things are
derived. This Spinoza attempts to do by means of the doctrine of
attributes and modes.
Attributes of the Divine Substance. The first determination of
the infinite is by means of the attributes thought and extension. God
is, indeed, an infinity of attributes; thought and extension are merely
the two attributes under which the human mind is capable of
representing Him. Instead, therefore, of Descartes' doctrine of the
antithesis of the substance of mind to the substance of matter, we have
the doctrine of one substance conceived under the antithetical
attributes, thought and extension. For thought is merely one way of
looking at God, and extension another; so that when I say Deus est
res cogitans and Deus est res extensa, I am speaking of one
and the same reality conceived in two different ways. The attributes,
therefore, are not ways in which God determines Himself, but rather
ways in which we determine Him, [2] and consequently the first attempt
to find in the one the reason of the difference of the many is a
failure. Indeed, Spinoza, if he were consistent, should have ended
where he began, namely, at the definition of the one substance, and
never have even attempted to derive the many from the one. Not
deterred, however, by his first failure, Spinoza in his doctrine of
modes renews the attempt to find a derivation of the finite from the
infinite.
[2] Cf. Epistola XXVI.
Modes of the Divine Substance. The attributes were never,
it seems, intended to mean finite being; for the character of
independence (per se concipi) belongs to attribute, as it does
to substance; but the mode, which can neither exist nor be
conceived without substance (def. V), is surely finite, and here, if
anywhere, we shall find the derivation of the finite from the infinite.
For modes are, apparently, the countless parts into which the divine
substance is sundered, the numberless billows which the ocean of
eternal being casts up from its unfathomed depths.
It is only in so far as God is determined to particular modes of being
that He can be said to cause them. My body is caused by God inasmuch as
it is a determination of Him; so, too, is my soul; so also are the
various objects in the world around me. When, therefore, I ask, Are
these modes identical with God? Am I God? I must answer that I am not
God, for He is infinite and I am determined to this particular mode;
but take away the determination of my mode of being, and I am God. In
this sense we are diminished Gods. There are, therefore, two
ways of viewing concrete finite things: first, as they are determined
in time and space; and secondly, sub specie aeternitatis, that
is, prescinding from all determination and looking at things merely as
flowing necessarily from the divine substance.
(a) We are now in a position to ask, Is Spinoza a pantheist? for
the answer to this question will depend on the answer to this other
question, Does Spinoza hold that finite things, as such, exist at all,
that the modes have any existence apart from the
substance, that they determine the substance in the sense of a real
determination? Spinoza [3] expressly teaches that nothing proceeds
from the infinite except the infinite. Are the modes then infinite,
since they come from the infinite? He answers that the modes come from
God inasmuch as (quatenus) God is modified by finite modes, and
may, therefore, be finite. This, however, is merely a subterfuge. The
real answer is given when, on the ground that all determination is
negation, all limit is not-being, Spinoza finally denies that the mode
is real. The senses, it is true, present the world to us as consisting
of finite beings really determined and distinct from one another and
from the infinite; yet, if we view things sub specie
aeternitatis and reflect that all determination is negation,
then all distinction and all finiteness disappear, and we find that we
have returned to the starting point, to the assertion, namely, that God
is one and all is God. We may, indeed, distinguish between natura
naturans, which is substance absolutely devoid of determination --
the indivisible one -- and natura naturata, which is substance
infinitely modified and determined to an infinity of modes of being.
But the distinction dissolves when we reflect that determination is
negation, and that consequently the sum of all determinations is equal
to nothing. We may therefore maintain the formula: substance = God =
nature. [4]
[3] Ethica, II, 28, schol.
[4] Cf. op. cit., I, 19, schol.
It is clear, now, that the mode is as unreal as the attribute, and that
substance evades all attempts at differentiation and determination. We
can see how things lead up to substance, but we cannot see how they are
derived from it. The substance, which is the central concept in
Spinoza's system of thought, has been compared to the lion's den,
whither many tracks lead, but whence none can be seen to return.
(b) The self-maintaining impulse. Spinoza once more renews the
attempt to derive the finite from the infinite, when [5] he describes the
finite as only partly negative (ex parte negatia).
There is, then, in the finite a positive element which, when we come
to examine it, we find to be a self-maintaining impulse, an effort
(conatus), by which it seeks to preserve its existence. in
Ethica, III, 6, this impulse is said to be the essence of
finite being. But here, once more, when we ask how this positive
element is related to the substance, Spinoza is obliged to answer that
it is a determination of God. [6] We are, therefore, thrown back on the
monism with which we started: there is no being but God.
[5] Op. cit., I, 8, schol.
[6] Op. cit., II, 45; III, 6.
(c) Description of the infinite. Abandoning now all attempt at
deriving the many from the one, let us inquire with Spinoza into the
nature of the one substance. We must not expect to define it; for to
define is to determine. We may, however, describe it by predicating
terms of it analogously, as the schoolmen would say. It is, for
example, a cause, not in the sense in which fire is a cause of heat,
but rather in the sense in which the blackboard may be said to be the
cause of the figures which limit, or determine, portions of its
surface. The one substance may be said to be eternal, in the sense that
its essence involves existence, or, to use Spinoza's peculiar
phraseology, in the sense that it is the cause of itself. But what
surprises us most in Spinoza's description of the one substance, is the
assertion that it possesses neither intellect nor will, these being
determinations belonging to natura naturata. [7] It is evident,
therefore, that the infinite is a geometrical rather than a dynamic
infinite, that there is in it no principle of freedom or finality, that
all things proceed from it by necessary and immutable law, just as the
properties of a triangle (to use Spinoza's favorite illustration)
proceed from the nature of the triangle. God is not a self-determining,
self-integrating spirit, but an inert, impersonal substance.
[7] Op. cit., I, 32 and corollary.
Philosophy of the Finite. The first determinations of substance
are, as we have seen, mind and matter, or substance conceived as
thinking and substance conceived as extended.
These attributes, although antithetical and therefore exclusive of
interaction, are arranged in a certain parallelism, so that every mode
of substance has its thought aspect and its extension aspect. For
example, the idea of a circle, and the circle itself are the thought
aspect and the extension aspect of one and the same mode of substance.
To this parallelism we shall return later on. Before taking up
the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of matter it is necessary to
speak of the infinite modes.
(a) The infinite modes are introduced in order to fill up the
gap between God and finite modes: as modes, they are finite; as
infinite modes, they belong to the sphere of the infinite. These
infinite modes [8] are either modifications of the absolute nature of
some attribute or modifications of an attribute already modified, but
so modified as to be eternal and infinite. When asked for examples,
Spinoza [9] answers that to the first class belongs infinite intellect
as an infinite mode of thought, and motion and rest as infinite
modifications of extension; while to the second class belongs the form
of the whole universe (facies totius universi) which, though it
varies in an infinity of ways, is always the same.
[8] Op. cit. I, 21, 22.
[9] Ep. LXVI.
This final attempt at mediation between the infinite and the finite is,
like all Spinoza's previous attempts in the same direction, a failure.
For the modes must, in ultimate analysis, be either finite or infinite.
The doctrine of infinite modes is, however, interesting by reason of
its striking resemblance to the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the Logos,
which was just such an illogical introduction of a something
intermediate between the one and the many. Indeed, Spinoza himself was
aware of the resemblance. [10] The doctrine is also of interest as
showing once more how Spinoza's speculative intuition realized the
necessity of introducing into his system some principle productive
of differentiation and plurality, -- a principle which, however,
the logic of his system would not and could not admit.
[10] Cf. Short Treatise, 1, 9.
From each of the infinite modes proceeds an infinity of finite modes;
from infinite intellect proceed all finite minds, and from infinite
extension proceed all finite bodies. We come, therefore, to the
philosophy of body and mind.
(b) Philosophy of body. Extension is infinite (1) because it is
an attribute of God, and (2) because its development could be impeded
neither by a mode of thought nor by a mode of extension; and whatever
is finite is so because it is in some way impeded in its development.
Extension is not only infinite, it is also one and continuous, because
(and whatever problem Spinoza happens to be discussing, he always takes
us back to this point) substance is one and continuous. There is,
therefore, no substantial, but merely a modal divisibility of
extension. [11]
[11] Eth., II, 2, 13.
Extension is essentially active, not inert, as Descartes taught; for it
is, as we have seen, an attribute of substance, and substance, although
incapable of self-differentiation, is essentially and eternally active.
Every extended mode of substance is, therefore, preceded by and
followed by an infinite series of movements. Thus, for the mechanism of
Descartes, Spinoza substitutes a dynamism of a peculiar kind, namely, a
dynamism based on the eternal activity of the infinite substance, not
on the activity of matter itself. [12]
[12] Op. cit., II, 13, Lemma III.
Particular bodies are systems of movements. The molecules of the living
body, for instance, are constantly changing; yet the body remains the
same because the same relation continues to exist between the molecules
-- the set of movements remains the same. But the living body is
itself part of a larger system of movements, -- of the terrestrial
planet, for instance, -- and this in turn forms part of a still larger
system; so that the isolated individuality of any one body is an
illusion of the imagination: a comprehensive view, that is an adequate
knowledge of any particular body, reveals it to be but part of the
universal system of movements.
But whence comes the order in this cosmic system of movements? Whence
the adaptation of organ to function and of individual to environment?
Spinoza has already answered in general terms that in the geometrical
process of the finite from the infinite there is no place for the
concept of finality. So, too, in the philosophy of body, he teaches
that the extension modes of substance proceed from substance as
extended not as thinking. There can, therefore, be no
intended adaptation. The processes of the cosmos proceed by an
unconscious geometry, in the same way as the spider spins its web
without any knowledge of the proportion and symmetry of figures. It is
only by imagination that we distinguish objects, fancy them to be
individual, group them in figures, and arrange them so as to produce
beauty of form or color. This arrangement was not intended in the
processes themselves; so that, if we see beauty and adaptation in the
geometrical processes of nature, it is due to the illusions arising
from the inadequacy of our knowledge.
(c) Philosophy of mind. Spinoza's psychology is partly
foreshadowed in his doctrine of substance. Thought, as an infinite
attribute of the infinite substance is eternal and necessary; it is the
thought of God by God. Minds (created minds, as we
commonly call them) and ideas are modes of substance under the aspect
of thought, just as bodies are modes of substance under the aspect of
extension. The order and connection of ideas is already determined by
the order and connection of extension modes: idem est ordo idearum
et ordo rerum. [13] To every thought mode corresponds an extension
mode, and this parallelism, being universal, implies that
everything thinks. Indeed, Spinoza openly teaches that animals, plants,
and even inanimate objects think; for the essence of a thing is the
self-maintaining impulse, and an impulse is a tendency
(conatus), and tendency implies thought. Plant thought, however,
and animal thought Spinoza confesses to be thought of a very
rudimentary kind.
[13] Op. cit., II, 7.
The human mind is, like every other mind, a mode of the divine
substance. But what kind of mode? It is defined, in the first place, as
the idea of the body. [14] We commonly say that man is composed of body and
soul. In reality man is substance, determined to that particular mode
of extension which we call body, and to that particular mode of thought
which is the idea of body, and which we call soul. Body and soul are,
therefore one and the same thing conceived under the aspects of
extension and of thought, respectively. It will be observed, however,
that although Spinoza reduces the soul to an idea, he is far from
maintaining with the phenomenalist that the soul has no substantial
reality; for he maintains that the soul is a mode of the great reality
which is the one substance. It will be observed also that since the
soul is the idea of the body, or in other words the consciousness of
the organic states of the body, the conclusion that we must be aware of
everything which takes place in the body, and that consequently every
man must be an adept in physiology, appears at first sight inevitable.
Spinoza, wishing to ward against this reductio ad absurdum of his
definition, teaches that "the human mind does not involve an adequate
knowledge of the parts of the body," [15] and that "the ideas of the
affections of the body, in so far as they are related only to the human
mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused." [16]
[14] Op. cit., II 13.
[15] Op. cit., II 23.
[16] Op. cit., II 28.
The human mind is defined, in the second place, as the idea of an
idea (idea ideae or idea mentis). [17] In other words, mind, after
having been defined as consciousness, is now defined as
self-consciousness. The second definition is supplementary of
the first, and, like the first, defines mind with distinct reference to
body. For, when we say that mind is the idea of an idea, we mean the
idea of the idea of the body. Self-consciousness is consciousness of
self as revealed by bodily states, [18] or the reflex consciousness of
our perceptions of those states.
[17] Op. cit., II 21.
[18] Op. cit., II 23.
Having defined mind, we next turn to the study of knowledge,
which is the characteristic attitude of the mind towards things. In the
first exercise of the mind, our knowledge is inadequate,
fragmentary, and confused. The reason of this imperfection
is the fact that at first our point of view is purely individual, the
point of view of one who, being himself part of the world of reality,
apprehends merely those portions of reality with which he comes in
contact. The inadequacy of this kind of knowledge is increased by the
tendency of the mind to form fictitious universals, such as
"being," "man," etc., which are not a sign of the mind's strength, but
rather of its weakness; that is to say, of its inability to keep
impressions apart from each other when they reach a certain limit in
number and complexity. [19]
[19] Op. cit., II, 49, Schol. I.
From this imperfect and inadequate knowledge man must pass to perfect
and adequate knowledge, by abandoning the individual and partial
point of view and by rising above himself and finite conditions;
for perfect and adequate knowledge is untroubled by finite conditions
and by the peculiarities of individual temperament. [20] In this
development from inadequate to adequate knowledge, Spinoza
distinguishes two stages:
[20] Cf. ibid., Schol. II.
(alpha) Reason (ratio) is the knowledge of the laws or principles
which are common to all bodies, and which determine, not their
accidental, but their essential relations. [21] This kind of knowledge is
acquired not immediately, but by deduction. Arguing from
effect to cause, we arrive at a knowledge of the permanent and
essential properties of things and of their unalterable laws and
natures, -- a knowledge which is superior to the imperfect
individualistic knowledge, inasmuch as the latter reveals to us merely
the illusory surface qualities of things. Studied from the point of
view of reason, things assume a certain permanency, and consequently
rational knowledge may be said to be a knowledge of things sub
quadam specie aeternitatis.
[21] Op. cit., II, 39.
Rational knowledge is, however, necessarily incomplete. It enables us
to arrive at generic and specific concepts, -- partial unifications,
-- but it cannot lift us up to that point where knowledge is
completely unified and all things are viewed sub specie
aeternitatis. This point we reach by means of
(beta) Intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva). In this stage of
development the mind, being farthest removed from the individual point
of view, no longer proceeds inferentially from one part of reality to
another, but taking a comprehensive intuitive view of all reality,
apprehends all things in the light of the first principle (substance)
and, looking at all things sub specie aeternitatis, sees all in
God and God in all. From this point of view, space, time, difference
are seen to disappear and to be swallowed up in the immensity of God.
He who has reached this point "evolves all his ideas from that which
represents the origin and source of all nature, so that that idea
appears to be the source of all others"; he has arrived at the
culminating point in the development of human knowledge. [22]
[22] Op. cit., II, 47.
We may remark in this theory of development of knowledge: (1) that
whereas Descartes was content with making clearness and
distinctness of perception a criterion of truth, Spinoza
requires that, in addition to clearness and distinctness, our knowledge
possess also adequacy, or comprehensiveness; (2) that Spinoza
maintains the power of the human mind to comprehend infinite
substance, that is to know God adequately; (3) that error exists only
where knowledge is confused and inadequate; that consequently the mind
never errs if it views things sub specie aeternitatis, and that
since it is the will which determines whether a man shall or shall not
attain intuitive knowledge, will and not intellect is the source of
error; (4) that the three stages of development of knowledge may be
described as sense-knowledge, scientific knowledge, and
philosophical knowledge. We must, however, always remember that
Spinoza sets the practical above the theoretical, and that he considers the third to
be the most perfect kind of knowledge, not because it implies greater
speculative insight into the nature of things, but because it sets the
soul at rest and, like the ecstatic knowledge of which the mystics
speak, enables us to despise the unrest and worry caused by the
untoward events of life. This consideration brings us to the study of
the ethical problems, on which all Spinoza's philosophy converges.
The Moral Nature of Man. We have seen that the essence of finite
things is the conatus existendi, the self-maintaining impulse.
In man, this self-realizing impulse accompanies each of the three
stages of knowledge, assuming in each a different complexion. In the
plane of confused knowledge it manifests itself as emotions; in
the higher plane of rational knowledge it manifests itself as
will; and in the highest plane, namely, that of intuitive
knowledge, it manifests itself as the intellectual love of God,
in which consists the blessed life of immortality.
(a) Let us consider the mind in the state of confused knowledge. Its
being is thought: it is a diminished God, a God repressed, as it were,
by the modes which limit its thought on every side. Like every other
finite being, it strives not only to maintain itself, but also to
extend its being by breaking through the modes which hem it in. But,
unlike other finite beings, the mind is conscious of this
effort. It is conscious also of the modes which affect it through
the body, and it knows whether such modes diminish or increase its
power of thought. This consciousness is emotion. In the third
definition of the third part of the Ethica, emotion is defined:
Per Affectum intelligo Corporis affectiones quibus ipsius Corporis
agendi potentia augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur, et simul
harum affectionum ideas,
and in the eleventh proposition of the same part Spinoza proves that
whatever increases or diminishes the body's power of action,
increases or diminishes the mind's power of thought. Emotion,
then, is the (obscure and inadequate) consciousness of a transition
from a less to a greater, or from a greater to a less, power of body or
mind.
The fundamental emotion is desire (cupiditas), which is perhaps
more properly described as the mental prerequisite of all emotional
activity ; for it is the self-maintaining impulse itself. When a mode
of the body, such as the sight of a flower, increases the mind's
activity, there results the emotion of pleasure, or joy
(laetitia); when, on the contrary, a mode of the body, such as the
hearing of unwelcome news, diminishes the mind's activity, there
results the emotion of sadness (tristitia). Love is the
idea of an external thing which is the cause of joy, and hatred
is the idea of an external thing which is the cause of sadness.
Hope is the fluttering (inconstans) joy, and fear
the intermittent sadness arising from the idea of an event which is of
doubtful occurrence. When the element of doubt is removed, hope becomes
security and fear passes into despair. The emotional
state called gaudium is joy arising from the remembrance of a
certain event as past, while its opposite, regret (conscientiae
morsus), is sadness arising from the remembrance of a certain event
which has occurred. Both these states imply a previous doubt as to
whether the event to which they refer did or did not occur. [23]
[23] Op. cit., II, 12 ff.
The emotions are associated by contiguity, resemblance, and
causation. This portion of Spinoza's Ethica is replete
with instances of acute psychological analysis. The greatest defect in
his treatment of the emotions is the exclusion of all intellectual
emotions, such as zeal, love of God, love of justice, love of country,
etc. [24]
[24] Cf. op. cit., II, 27 ff.
The emotional life of man belongs, according to Spinoza, to the
condition of bondage. As long as we continue to look on the
modes of the finite world as they affect us through the
modes of our own bodies, so long are we merely part of nature and
subject to nature's inevitable laws. We may imagine that we are free,
because we have no clear knowledge of the antecedents of the modes
which affect us, but in reality every indistinct consciousness is
itself physically determined, and we are no more free to act than the
straw which floats down the river is free to turn and float against the
current. In this condition of bondage man's moral life has not properly
begun at all; for in this condition there is no right or wrong, but
only pleasure or pain. Man's moral life begins in the stage of rational
knowledge, in which the emotions give place to will.
(b) In the second stage of knowledge we possess adequate instead
of inadequate ideas. Taking a broader view and contemplating the vast
order of the universe and its eternal laws, we see that the objects of
our love and aversion are really parts of the complex totality ruled by
the inexorable laws of nature, and the vehemence of our passions
appears to us, as it really is, no more reasonable than the child's
anger at the stone which has hurt it. [25] Reason can no more be moved by
pleasure or pain, by love or hatred of any finite cause of our
emotions, than it can love or hate a triangle because the latter
possesses three angles which are equal to two right angles. Thus the
mind, when it has arrived at the plane of rational knowledge, having
lifted itself above the cloudland of emotional life, having risen above
the storm of passion, is no longer buffeted by every wind of feeling,
or constrained by pleasure and pain, -- in a word, it passes from the
state of bondage to the state of freedom. There is a rational
element in every passion, and when, having acquired an adequate idea of
the passion, we recognize that rational element, blind impulse gives
way to deliberate pursuit or avoidance. Remark that in the stage of
rational knowledge this rational element is not yet located in God, but
merely in the common properties of things or in universal
law. The perfection of freedom and the final location of all the objects of
will in God Himself, is attained by means of intuitive knowledge.
[25] Op. cit., V, 4, schol.
It is somewhat surprising to find that Spinoza describes the moral
emancipation of man as a process of intellectual development, without
distinct reference to will, which is the proper subject of moral
excellence. The explanation is to be found in the fact that Spinoza
identifies will with intellect. "Will and understanding," he says, "are
one and the same." [26] Intelligence contains in itself that free
voluntary activity which we are accustomed to regard as the exclusive
function of will; for good or evil means whatever helps
or hinders our power of thought. [27]
[26] Op. cit., II, 49, corollary.
[27] Op. cit., IV, 27.
It is of great importance to note that freedom, as understood by
Spinoza, is, even in the sense of free understanding rather than of
free will, incompatible with his general concept of the universe, and
is maintained only at the expense of logical consistency. If man in the
state of confused knowledge is a slave to passion, "because he is part
of nature" and is therefore subject to the iron rule of necessity,
which governs all things from substance down to the least of the modes
of substance, it follows that man cannot become free except by ceasing
to be part of nature, and this he can never do. If in the state of
bondage there is no germ of freedom, freedom cannot be developed by any
development of knowledge. Spinoza cannot consistently avoid
determinism. He should never have tried to emancipate man, just as he
should never have attempted to derive the manifold from the one.
(c) We come now to the third stage in the moral emancipation of the
human mind, namely, to that in which man attains to the intellectual
love of God and the blessed immortality. In the fifth part
of the Ethica Spinoza teaches that the mind, arriving at the
culminating stage of intellectual development (scientia
intuitiva) wherein it sees all things in God, "can bring it about
that all bodily affections and images of things are referred to the
idea of God." [28] When this state is reached all passion ceases, and
emotion and volition are absorbed in the knowledge and love of God
(amor intellectualis Dei). This intellectual love of God is the
highest kind of virtue, and it not only makes man free but also confers
immortality. For this love has no relation to the body or to bodily
states, and consequently it cannot in any way be affected by the
destruction of the body. But here it naturally occurs to us to ask,
What has become of the principle that to every mode of thought there
corresponds a mode of extension? When the body perishes, what extension
mode corresponds to the eternal thought which is bliss and immortality?
Spinoza answers that, while the mode of extension which is the human
body conditioned by time and space perishes, there remains the essence
of the body which is conceived under a form of eternity. At the same
time the sensitive and imaginative part of the soul perishes with the
actual body, so that the ultimate conclusion is that both body and soul
are partly mortal and partly immortal. [29]
[28] Op. cit., V, 14.
[29] Op. cit., V, 20 ff.
We must not overlook the fact that in his Ethica Spinoza speaks
of the eternity rather than of the immortality of the
soul; and by eternity he does not primarily mean unending duration, but
a kind of rational necessity by which a thing forms, once for all, an
integral part of the universe, although, of course, what is necessarily
a part of the universe cannot cease to exist. Moreover, this eternity
or deathlessness is a condition into which the soul enters in this
life. "The immortality which is sanctioned by Spinoza's principles
is not a quantitative, but a qualitative endowment, -- not existence
for indefinite time, but the quality of being above all time." [30]
Spinoza does not conceive immortality as originally and equally
inherent in all men; he Conceives it as something to be acquired by
each man for himself, and as capable of being acquired in different
degrees.
[30] Caird, Spinoza, p. 291.
Finally, we may ask whether the immortality of which Spinoza speaks is
immortality at all. Is there in this concept of immortality a survival
of the individual? On the one hand, Spinoza teaches that imagination
and memory perish with the actual body; and with these faculties perish
all the recollections, associations, educated nerve-processes, and
everything else which serves to perpetuate personal traits and
characteristics. On the other hand, Spinoza is careful to guard against
the doctrine of absorption of the individual in God; for he teaches [31]
that final happiness is a state in which man, in attaining the highest
unity with God, attains at the same time the highest consciousness of
self, so that in this union the distinction between God and creature is
not obliterated, but rather accentuated. The conclusion seems to be that
the blessed life is a state in which we shall retain our individuality,
but shall have, apparently, no means of recognizing ourselves as the
same individuals. [32]
[31] Eth., V, 33.
[32] On Spinoza's doctrine of immortality, cf. Mind,
April, 1896.
Historical Position. What first arrests our attention in the
study of Spinoza's philosophy is the strict geometrical method which he
adopted. Starting with the definition of substance, he proceeds to
deduce from a single truth a whole system of philosophy. From this
definition we follow him to the point where he first attempts to
account for the diversity of things, and there his first lapse into
inconsistency occurs. In order to account for the diversity of things
he is forced to assume something besides the one inert substance, and
over and over again he surreptitiously introduces a principle which the
logic of his premises can never justify. The truth is that, as has
already been said, if Spinoza had been perfectly consistent he should
never have attempted to go beyond the definition of substance, which is
his starting point, and should also have been the final goal of his
system.
In attempting to explain away the inconsistencies of Spinoza's thought,
some have overlooked the individualistic elements in
his system and represented him merely as a pantheist, while others,
looking upon the pantheistic elements as mere formulas, represent him
as an empiricist. [33] ,To one he is a "God-intoxicated man"; to another
he is a sordid and filthy atheist (sordidus et lutulentus atheus).
Both these views are in a certain sense correct, and yet both are
wrong. For if we consider merely the speculative elements in Spinoza's
philosophy, we must pronounce him to be at once a pantheist and an
empiricist, an anomalous being reminding us of the winged bull of
Assyrian art, -- a creature of air and a creature of earth. But, as
has been pointed out above, Spinoza's aim was practical, rather than
theoretical. We must not picture him as concerned merely with the
speculative aspect of the problems of philosophy; we must rather
picture him as he represents himself, and as we know him from the
events of his life, -- a poor, persecuted Jew, rejected by his
co-religionists and despised by his Christian neighbors, bearing in
patience the sufferings which were his lot in life. For him metaphysics
was what it never had been even for Plato, a religion and a refuge. In
it he hoped to find that view of the universe which would reconcile him
to his own hard fate and enable him to rise to a plane where his
enemies could not reach him. We should bear these facts in mind when we
criticise Spinoza, and, though they should not render us blind to his
errors, which are many and serious, they should enable us to understand
his thought, which is often sublime and is always deserving of
sympathetic attention.
[33] For different interpretations of Spinoza, consult Pollock, Spinoza,
his Life and Philosophy, pp. 348 ff.
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