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History of Philosophy
English Philosophy
by Turner, William (S.T.D.)
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Contemporaneously with the deistic and the general empirical movement
of the eighteenth century there arose in England the school of
associational psychology and utilitarian ethics, which dominated
English thought during the greater part of the nineteenth century.
Associational Psychology. [1] The physician David Hartley
(1705-1757) is regarded as the founder of the association school of
psychology. He reduces all mental phenomena to the sensation and
association of vibrations of the white medullary substance of the brain
and spinal cord. He does not, however, identify the brain with the
thinking substance, or soul; for vibrations merely affect the body, the
sensation of vibrations affecting the soul. Sensations on being
repeated leave traces which are simple ideas. Simple ideas are, by
association, amalgamated into complex ideas. Similarly, assent and
belief are to be explained by association. Hartley protests against the
materialistic identification of soul with body; he maintains that there
is a correspondence between cerebral and psychical processes, but
contends that the latter cannot be reduced to the former.
[1] Consult Bower, Hartley and James Mill (London, 1881);
cf. Porter's Appendix to Ueberweg's History of
Philosophy, II, 421 ff.
Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), theologian, philosopher, chemist,
and physicist, brought out the materialism which was latent in
Hartley's psychology. He teaches that the soul is material, that
thought is a function of the brain, and that psychology is merely the
physics of the nerves. He maintains, however, that psychological
materialism does not imply the denial of the immortality of the soul or
of the existence of God.
Priestley is best known by his great contribution to chemical science,
-- the discovery of oxygen (1774).
Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), who was a botanist, philosopher, and
poet, is reckoned among the associationists of this period. In his
Zoonomia, or the Laws of Organic Life (London, 1794-1796), he teaches
that nature is made up of two substances: matter, which produces
motion, and spirit, which receives and communicates motion. He teaches
further that motion is of three kinds, gravitation, chemistry, and
life. To the last-named kind of motion belong ideas, which are defined
as "contractions, motions, or configurations of the fibers which
constitute the immediate organs of sense." All the complex phenomena of
mental life, namely sensation, comparison, judgment, reasoning,
volition, are explained by the association of ideas which come to us
not singly but in companies or tribes.
This associational psychology necessitates the utilitarian view of
human conduct, -- the view, namely, that certain actions are to be
performed mainly or primarily because they are means to our enjoyment.
This principle was developed into a system of ethics by Jeremy Bentham.
Utilitarian Ethics. [2] The founder of modern English
utilitarianism is Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). In his
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789)
and in his Deontology (1834) he formulates the principle that
the end of morality is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."
Utility means the power of an action to produce happiness. Bentham's
system has consequently been described by J. S. Mill as
utilitarianism. [3] In ultimate analysis it is hedonism; for it teaches
that "every virtuous action results in a balance of pleasure." It is,
however, a hedonism which unites altruism with egoism; for it maintains
that while each one's primary care should be for his own welfare, the
interest of the individual is inseparable from
that of the community. The determinants of utility are, according to
Bentham, the act, the circumstances, the intention and the
consciousness, all of which should be taken into account in the
estimation of the moral value of an action. All virtue he reduces to
two kinds, prudence and benevolence. [4]
[2] Cf. Leslie Stephen, English Utilitarians (3 vols., London,
1900); Albee, History of English Utilitarianism (New York,
1902).
[3] Mill was the first to bring this word into common use. Bentham,
however, had employed it.
[4] Cf. Falckenberg, op. cit., p. 457 (English trans., p.
565).
Revived Associationalism and Utilitarianism. The most important
of Bentham's co-workers was James Mill (1773-1836), author of
the Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829).
In psychology James Mill combines the doctrines of Hartley with those
of Hume, teaching that sensations are kinds of feeling, and that ideas
are what remains after the sensations have disappeared. He was the
first to formulate the doctrine of inseparable association, by which he
explains belief of every kind, -- belief in events, belief in testimony,
and belief in (assent to) the truth of propositions. Similarly, by
means of association, he explains the phenomena of volitional and
emotional life.
In ethics James Mill reasserts Bentham's doctrine that moral value is
identical with utility, and proceeds to give a more definite method of
estimating moral worth. He distinguishes three successive stages in the
evolution or education of the moral sentiments: namely, the association
with certain actions of pleasure or pain, the association with certain
actions of the pleasure or pain arising from the praise or blame of
others, and finally, the association with certain actions of the idea
of future praise or blame.
JOHN STUART MILL
Life. John Stuart Mill, son of James Mill, was born in London in
1806. From 1823 to 1858 he was clerk and chief examiner of
correspondence at the India House. The remainder of his life, with the
exception of two years (1863-1868), during which he was member of
Parliament, was spent at Avignon, where he died in 1873.
Sources. Mill's most important philosophical works are the
System of Logic (1843), Utilitarianism (1863), and An
Examination of Sir William
Hamilton's Philosophy (1865). He contributed valuable essays and
treatises to the literature of social and political philosophy and to
the history of positivism. Consult Bain, John Stuart Mill, a
Criticism (1882); Douglas, John Stuart Mill (Edinburgh,
1895).
DOCTRINES
Logic. Mill defines logic as the science of the operations of
the understanding which are concerned in or subservient to the
estimation of evidence; and evidence he defines as "that which the mind
ought to yield to, not that which it does or must yield to." [5] His
logical inquiry includes, therefore, an investigation of the nature of
mental assent, and an empirical analysis of intuition and belief, as
well as of judgment and reasoning; so that in spite of Mill's frequent
repudiation of the title of metaphysician, he is obliged in his
System of Logic to take up the study of many of the fundamental
problems of metaphysics. Thus, in the chapter entitled "Of the Things
denoted by Names," [6] he draws up the following scheme of
categories: (1) feelings, or states of consciousness; (2)
minds which experience these feelings; (3) bodies which cause
certain of these feelings; and (4) the successions,
coexistences, likenesses, and unlikenesses between feelings or states
of consciousness. Having, however, resolved to make experience the
sole source of knowledge, and to reject all a priori, or
intuitive, knowledge, Mill is obliged to reduce body to "the
permanent possibility of sensations," and mind to "the series of
actual and possible states." He is aware of the difficulty incident to
any phenomenalistic concept of mind; he cannot see how a series can be
aware of itself as a series, and admits that "there is a bond of some
sort among all the parts of the series which makes me say that they
were feelings of a person who was the same person throughout, and this
bond, to me, constitutes my ego." [7]
[5] Logic, Bk. III, Chap. 21.
[6] Op. cit., Bk. I, Chap. 3.
[7] Cf. notes to the Analysis, II, 175. Mill's notes to
his edition of his father's works are important sources of information
with reference to his own psychological doctrines.
Here Mill definitely abandons the associationist view of matter and
mind, and practically admits a noumenal cause of sensations and a
noumenal mind, thus opening, as some one has said, a trapdoor in the
middle of his own philosophy.
Insisting on the principle that we must make experience the test of
experience, Mill maintains that the fundamental axioms of logic and
mathematics are merely generalizations from experience, that the
law of contradiction is simply a summing up of the experience which
tells us of the incompatibility of belief and non-belief, and that the
peculiar accuracy supposed to be characteristic of the first principles
of geometry is hypothetical, that is to say, fictitious. [8] The law
of causation is likewise a generalization from experience; for
causation is nothing but "invariable and unconditional sequence." [9]
[8] Logic, Bk. II, Chap. 5.
[9] Op. cit., Bk. III, Chap. 5.
Mill recognizes but one kind of inference, namely, inference
from particulars to particulars. The syllogism he teaches is not
a proof, for it involves a petitio principii: its function is to
decipher or interpret the major premise which is a record of particular
experiences, these experiences being the only evidence on which the
conclusion rests. [10]
[10] Cf. op. cit., Bk. II, Chap. 3.
Mill's most important contribution to logic is the formulation of the
rules and methods of experimental inquiry. This is the most
successful portion of his work, and it is this which has earned for him
the title of the Aristotle of Inductive Logic. His success is, however,
marred by his inability to give a satisfactory account of the basis of
induction; the uniformity of nature, which he sets down as the ground
of all induction, depends, according to him, on induction, and is not
unconditionally certain.
Ethics. In the opening chapters of the sixth book of the
Logic, Mill endeavors to show that the doctrine of philosophical
necessity does not imply that our actions are performed under
compulsion, but merely that they follow the motive causes by a
certain unconditional sequence which renders the scientific study of
human nature possible. [11]
[11] Cf. Dr. Ward's refutation of Mill in Dublin
Review.
Mill adopts the utilitarian doctrine that in the effects of an
action, that is to say, in its power of promoting happiness, we possess
a clear and natural standard by which to judge its moral worth. With
Bentham he holds that the aim of human action should be the promotion
of the greatest happiness of all sentient beings. He differs,
however, from Bentham in his analysis of the moral feeling, in his
addition of qualitative to quantitative distinction of pleasures, and,
in general, in his attempt to bring utilitarianism into closer harmony
with the requirements of subjective ethics. He is an altruist, whereas
Bentham was, in ultimate analysis, an egoist.
Alexander Bain (1818-1903), author of Senses and
Intellect (third edition, 1868), The Emotions and the Will
(third edition, 1875), Mental and Moral Science (third edition,
1872), and Mind and Body (third edition, 1874), etc., is one of
the most distinguished recent representatives of the English school of
psychology. He avails himself of the aid which contemporary
physiological science affords in the study of mental phenomena, and
while he is commonly reckoned among the associationists, he seems to
abandon the fundamental tenet of associationism, when he acknowledges
similarity as the basis of all association of ideas.
Doctrine of Evolution. Evolution, in the sense of a transition
from the simpler to the more complex, from the lower to the higher
forms of existence, is a concept almost as old as philosophy itself.
The evolution of the physical universe from a primitive mass by a
process of purely mechanical changes was implicitly contained in many
of the ancient and in some modern systems of philosophy, notably in
Descartes' and Kant's. The idea of development was applied to history
by Herder (1744-1803), to astronomy by Laplace (1749-1827), to the
zoological
sciences by Buffon (1707-1788), Lamarck (1744-1829), and
Cuvier (1769-1832), to anatomy and embryology by Wolff
(1733-1794) and Von Baer (1792-1876), and to geology by
Lyell (1797-1875). The history of evolution in the modern
meaning of the word, namely that of the development of the sum of
living beings from less perfect forms of existence, by means of natural
causes, begins with the name of Charles Darwin (1809-1882), who
was the first to establish the doctrine of development as a scientific
theory in biology. [12]
[12] Consult Truth and Error in Darwinism, by Hartmann, trans. in
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vols. XI-XIII; Wallace,
Darwinism (London, 1889); Roinanes, Darwin and after
Darwin (3 vols., London, 1892-1895); cf. Weber, op.
cit., pp. 560 ff.; also T. H. Green, Works, I, 373 ff.
As in the case of Newton, Galileo, and Copernicus, Darwin's scientific
discoveries, while belonging to the history of natural science, are of
interest in the history of philosophy because of the new point of
view which they established. For, just as Newton had unified the
whole physical universe by means of a single law, so Darwin unified the
phenomena of the biological world under a single concept, and revealed
the existence of continuity in a region where up to that time
continuity had not been scientifically demonstrated; and just as Lyell
had shown that the present state of the earth's surface is to be
explained by the agency of natural causes, which are even now at work,
so Darwin undertook to show that the flora and fauna of the earth
originated by development, and that the agencies in the process of
development were the same as those which are in operation at the
present time.
Darwin's method affords an interesting example of the use of
inductive and accumulative argument. During his voyage on the Beagle
(1831-1836) he began his observations on the fauna of South America,
noting especially the geographical distribution of species and the
similarity and difference existing between the present and preexisting
forms. On his return to England
Malthus [13] (1766-1834) Essay on Population suggested to
him the idea of the struggle for existence. This may be regarded
as his provisional hypothesis, to the verification of which he devoted
twenty-one years preliminary to publishing his celebrated work, the
Origin of Species (1859). The observations on which the process
of verification is based may be reduced to (1) observations of the
effect of artificial selection, (2) observations of the kinship
existing between extinct species and species which are extant, (3)
observations of the geographical distributions of animals, and (4)
observations of the embryological development of animals. In the work
entitled The Descent of Man (1871) Darwin applied the evolution
theory to the origin of the human species. He was, however, willing to
concede that there are what have since been called "gaps" in
evolution; he confessed his inability to account for the origin of
life, and always regarded the first beginning of variation as something
mysterious.
[13] Cf. Flint, Agnosticism (New York, 1903).
Darwin laid the foundation of modern evolutionistic ethics by
referring the moral feeling to natural selection, or the struggle for
existence, which fosters such qualities and faculties in the individual
as confer the greatest benefit, not on the individual, but on the group
or species.
A. R. Wallace (born 1822), who shares with Darwin the honor of
establishing the doctrine of natural selection, was more careful than
Darwin to exclude from the general process of development the higher
powers of the human mind, and to give a large scope to the operation of
the teleological principle in the evolutionary process.
W. K. Clifford (1845-1879), John Tyndall (1820-1893),
George J. Romanes (1848-1894), and Thomas Huxley
(1825-1895) are the most distinguished among those who applied the
Darwinian doctrine to the different departments of natural science. It
was the last mentioned who in 1859 first used the word agnostic
to designate one who is conscious of the inadequacy of our knowledge to
solve the problem, What is the reality corresponding to
our ultimate scientific, philosophical, and religious ideas? I None of
these men, however, with the exception of Clifford, attempted to
construct a system of metaphysics, or to evolve a theory of reality
from the principles of evolutionistic philosophy. This task was
reserved for Spencer.
HERBERT SPENCER
Life. Herbert Spencer [14] was born in 1820 at Derby. It was at
first intended that he should adopt the profession of teacher, to which
his father belonged; but he decided to take up civil engineering. At
the age of twenty-five he abandoned this profession to devote himself
to literary work. In 1850 appeared his first important publication,
entitled Social Statics. This was followed by the Principles
of Psychology (1855), and Progress: its Law and Cause
(1857), in which, two years before the publication of Darwin's
Origin of Species, the view was expounded that all development
is a transition from homogeneity to heterogeneity, and the principle of
evolution was enunciated as a universal law. The First
Principles (1862), Principles of Biology (1863-1867),
Principles of Sociology (1877 ff.), and Principles of
Ethics (1879-1893) form parts of a scheme of Synthetic
Philosophy. [15] Spencer died December 8, 1903.
[14] Cf. Hudson's Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert
Spencer (New York, 1894).
[15] For the outlines of this scheme, cf. Spencer's
Prospectus, prefixed to the First Principles; cf.
also Collins' Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy (New York,
1889). Consult Bowne, The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer (New
York, 1874).
DOCTRINES
The historical antecedents of the synthetic philosophy may be
reduced to three: (1) from Hamilton and Mansel, and thus ultimately
from Kant, Spencer drew his metaphysical principles, namely, relativity
of knowledge and agnosticism; (2) from Comte and the Comtists he
derived the positivism which appears in his definition of the scope of
science and in a general way in his plan of the coordination of
sciences; and (3) from Wolff the anatomist, from Von Baer the
embryologist, and from
Lyell the geologist he borrowed the principle of development which the
publication of Darwin's work elevated to the rank of a scientific law
in the biological world. [16]
[16] Cf. McCosh, Realistic Philosophy, II, 255 ff.
1. Agnosticism. Neither scientific ideas nor religious beliefs
can express the ultimate nature of reality. The highest scientific
ideas, such as space, time, matter, involve contradictions
(antinomies), and theologians themselves admit the inadequacy of our
idea of the Infinite; for "to think that God is as we think Him to be
would be blasphemy." Moreover, the nature of consciousness itself shows
that all knowledge is relative. The conclusion, therefore, is
inevitable, that ultimate religious ideas and ultimate scientific ideas
are merely symbols of the actual, not cognitions of it, and that "if
religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation
must be this deepest, widest, and most certain of facts, -- that the
power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." The
ultimate philosophical, as well as the ultimate religious, is unknown
and unknowable. [17] Therefore, when Spencer teaches that the ultimate,
or Absolute, reveals itself in the forms and laws under which phenomena
occur, -- "The persistent impressions, being persistent results of a
persistent cause, are for practical purposes the same as the cause
itself, and may be habitually dealt with as its equivalents," [18] -- he
practically abandons the position of the agnostic and confesses that
the Absolute is not utterly unknowable.
[17] First Principles, P. 1.
[18] Op. cit., par. 47.
2. Definition and Data of Philosophy. All knowledge is confined
to the relations of things. Common knowledge is ununified knowledge;
science is partially unified knowledge; philosophy is completely
unified knowledge. The data of philosophy are: (1) the
existence of likenesses and differences, as is proved by the permanence
of our consciousness of congruity and incongruity; (2) the distinction
of self and not-self, the former being
constituted by the current of faint manifestations, and the
latter by the current of vivid manifestations, of the unknowable
power; (3) space, time, matter, motion, and force, these being "certain
most general forms" into which the manifestations of the unknowable are
separated, and the reality of which science at every moment assumes;
for by reality we are to understand persistence in
consciousness, and the persistence of space and time consists in
this, that they are the universal relations of coexistence and
sequence, by which (as postulates) we think, while the persistence of
matter, motion, and force consists in the indestructibility,
continuity, and persistence, respectively, of these ultimate scientific
ideas.
Passing now from these analytic truths, we come to inquire, What is the
law of universal synthesis? What is the universal formula which
shall combine all the particular formulas of science and philosophy?
The answer is, The continuous redistribution of matter and
motion, which involves the double process of evolution (an
integration of matter and a dissipation of motion) and
dissolution (a disintegration of matter and an absorption of
motion). If, now, the word evolution is taken to designate the
process of development in all its complexity, "Evolution is an
integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during
which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a
definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion
undergoes a parallel transformation." [19] This is proved by induction to
be the law of the physical universe and of psychic and social life. And
just as in Hegel's philosophy, development implied three stages, so in
Spencer's theory, evolution starts with the instability of the
homogeneous, and proceeds, through the multiplication of effects and
segregation, to the equilibration of forces which constitutes the
impassable limit of evolution, -- the point where dissolution begins.
[19] Op. cit., par. 144. In the sixth edition (1901) of the
First Principles, the word " relatively" is inserted before the
words "definite" and "indefinite."
3. Special Philosophy of the Sciences. The other portions of the
synthetic philosophy, namely the special philosophy of biology,
psychology, sociology, and ethics, are merely the application of the
evolution formula to the different branches of philosophic inquiry.
Biology. Spencer defines life as "the continuous adjustment of
internal relations to external relations." [20] He then proceeds to the
study of growth, function, adaptation, genesis, heredity, variation,
etc. Taking up [21]
the problem of the origin of life, he contrasts the
special-creation hypothesis with the evolution hypothesis, and
adduces in favor of the latter arguments from classification,
embryology, morphology, and distribution. The factors in organic
evolution are, he teaches, both internal and external.[22] "He excludes
all consideration of the question how life first arose, though it is
clear that he regards the lowest forms of life as continuous in their
essential nature with sub-vital processes." [23] For Darwin's phrase,
"natural selection," Spencer substitutes "the survival of the fittest."
[20] Principles of Biology, par. 30.
[21] Op. cit., Chap. V.
[22] Op. cit., pars. 148-158.
[23] Sully, in Encyc. Brit. (ninth edition), article,
"Evolution."
Psychology. Applying to the study of mental phenomena the method
found to be so fruitful of results in the study of vital phenomena in
general, Spencer arrives at the conclusion that among mental
phenomena there are no organic differences, -- reflex action,
feelings, instinct, intelligence being merely different stages in the
process of development from the simple to the complex, from the
indefinite to the definite, from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.
With regard to the substance of mind Spencer holds that all
mental action whatsoever is explained by the continuous differentiation
and integration of states of consciousness. He is not, however, a
phenomenalist: "Existence," he says, "means nothing more than
persistence; and hence in mind that which
persists in spite of all changes, and maintains the unity of the
aggregate in defiance of all attempts to divide it, . . . is that which
we must postulate as the substance of mind in contradistinction to the
varying forms it assumes." [24] This substance of mind is unknowable.
[24] Principles of Psychology, par. 59.
With regard to the origin of ideas, Spencer, rejecting on the
one hand the empiricism of Locke and Hume, and on the other hand the
absolute a priorism of Leibniz and Kant, teaches that while the
universal and necessary elements of intellectual knowledge are a
priori with reference to the individual, they are not a
priori with reference to the race. Between the theory of the
empiricist, who refers all the elements of knowledge to the experience
of the individual, and that of the transcendentalist, who regards the
universal and necessary elements of thought as "forms of intuition,"
Spencer finds a via media. In accordance with the general
principle of evolution, he refers the elements characterizing
intellectual thought to "organized and semi-organized arrangements,"
which, existing in the cerebral nerves of the child, sum up the
experience of all his ancestors. Here as elsewhere Spencer seems to
forget that the survival of the organized and semi-organized
arrangements merely proves their practical utility in the struggle for
existence, and can in no way guarantee their validity as tests of
absolute truth. [25]
[25] Cf. Höffding, op. cit., II, 474.
From such inherited dispositions arises our inability to conceive the
contradictory of certain principles and truths of fact. This inability
to conceive the contradictory is the ultimate test of all beliefs, the
criterion of truth. The universal postulate may therefore be formulated
as follows: "A cognition which we are obliged to accept because we
cannot conceive its contradictory is to be classed as having the
highest possible certainty." [26]
[26] Cf. Principles of Psychology, par. 426.
Epistemology. Spencer's epistemology is comprised in his
doctrine of transfigured realism. He rejects idealism on the
ground of the priority, immediateness, and superior distinctness of the
realistic conception of mental processes. [27] He next proceeds to show
that "while some objective existence, manifested under some
conditions, remains as the final necessity of thought, there does not
remain the implication that this existence and these conditions are
more to us than the unknown correlatives of our feelings and the
relations among our feelings." [28] This realism "stands widely
distinguished from crude realism; and to mark the distinction it may
properly be called transfigured realism." [29]
[27] Op. cit., pars. 406-408.
[28] Op. cit., par. 473.
[29] Ibid.
Sociology. In his various treatises on sociology Spencer
conceives society, after the manner of the individual organism, as
possessing a variety of organs and functions, and as tending to evolve
itself by a series of adjustments to the social and physical
environment. He insists on the innerness of the principle of social
development, and emphasizes the truth that societies and
constitutions are not made, but grow. He is, however,
careful to point out one very important distinction between the
individual organism and the social organism: in the individual the
parts exist for the sake of the whole, while in the society the whole
exists for the sake of the parts. This distinction is overlooked in
those forms of society in which militarism and
officialism predominate. Industrialism is the basis of
modern social reconstruction. The highest type of social organization
will, however, be reached when freer scope shall be given to the play
of those activities which are exercised for the sake of the
satisfaction they afford, and not for the sake of obtaining the means
of subsistence.
Ethics. Spencer's system of ethics may be briefly described as
the substitution of rational utilitarianism for the empirical
utilitarianism of the school of Bentham. The goal of the process
of ethical development is the ideal man in the ideal state, --
a view which combines, as the earlier form of utilitarianism had
combined, altruism with egoism. But instead of insisting on the
"hedonistic calculus" of the earlier utilitarians, Spencer emphasizes
the rational deduction of the moral ideal from the necessary laws, --
physical, biological, psychological, and sociological, -- the
recognition of which, rather than the calculation of the happiness to
which human action leads, furnishes the cognitive basis for moral
action. Moral phenomena must be considered as part of the aggregate
of phenomena which evolution has wrought out; the moral sense itself is
a product of evolution: "I believe that the experiences of utility
organized and consolidated throughout all past generations of the human
race have been producing corresponding modifications, which, by
continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain
faculties of moral intuition, -- certain emotions responding to right
and wrong which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of
utility." [30]
[30] Letter to Mr. Mill, quoted by Bain, Mental and Moral
Science, p. 722.
The most distinguished of the opponents of utilitarian ethics in
England was Dr. Martineau (1805-1900), author of Types of
Ethical Theory (1885). He defended what is known as the
preferential theory of ethics, according to which the morality of an
action is not to be judged by its pleasure-producing effect, but rather
by the perfection of the motives inspiring it, virtue being defined as
the rejection of lower and the adoption of higher motives.
St. George Mivart (1827-1900) occupied a unique position among
the English representatives of the philosophy of evolution during the
latter half of the nineteenth century. In The Genesis of Species
(1871), On Truth (1889), etc., he appeared as the defender of
theistic evolution, and sought to reconcile the evolutionistic
hypothesis with the essential doctrines of Scholastic philosophy.
Idealism. German idealism was first introduced into England by
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) and Thomas Carlyle
(1795-1881). During the latter half of the nineteenth century the
Hegelian philosophy found many able exponents in Great Britain, of whom
the most prominent are J. H. Stirling (born 1820), John
Caird (1820-1898), Edward Caird (born 1835), and Thomas
Hill Green (1836-1882). [31] Green's Prolegomena to Ethics
(fourth edition, 1899) represents the first important contribution to
English Hegelianism. Green considers that metaphysics is the foundation
of ethics, and that without a metaphysical theory a theory of ethics
is "wasted labor." The primary questions of metaphysics are: What
are the facts of my own individual consciousness? and, What is the
simplest explanation I can give of the origin of these facts? That is
necessarily true which is required to explain my experience. Applying
this test to the evolution doctrine, Green, while admitting the fact of
the biological evolution of man, protests against any biological
explanation which cannot account for the facts of individual
consciousness. "If there are reasons," he writes, "for holding that
man, in respect to his animal nature, is descended from 'mere' animals,
. . . this does not affect our conclusion in regard to the
consciousness of which, as he now is, man is the subject, a conclusion
founded on analysis of what he now is and does." [32]
[31] Cf. Fairbrother, Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green
(London, 1896). Green's Works were edited by Nettleship (3 vols.,
London, 1885-1888).
[32] Prolegomena to Ethics, par. 83.
The "whole" is not material, but spiritual, -- a world of
"thought relations" consisting of three main facts, self,
cosmos, and God. Self is first in the order of knowledge:
God the Eternal Consciousness, which manifests itself in the spiritual
cosmos, is first in the order of being. "The unification of the
manifold in the world implies the presence of the manifold to a mind,
for which, and through the action of which, it is a related
whole. The unification of the manifold of sense in our consciousness
of a world implies a certain self-realization of this mind in us
through certain processes (life and feeling) of the world which only
exist through it." [33]
[33] Proteg., par. 82.
In his ethical doctrines Green insists on self-reflection as the
only possible method of learning what is the inner man or mind that our
action expresses, and he emphasizes the importance of man's looking
forward to a moral ideal to be attained by conscious effort, rather
than backward to a series of natural changes through which man came to
be what he is. "Our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of personal
worth," not the well-being of the race but the perfection of human
character according to the divine plan. [34]
[34] Op. cit., par. 180-291.
Historical Position. It is impossible to judge with anything
like definiteness systems of thought, some of which are still in the
process of formation, while others are in the process of dissolution.
When, however, we look back over the course of English philosophy
during the nineteenth century, two conclusions appear to be
indisputable; namely, that the associationist account of the mind and
of mental processes has been definitely abandoned, and that whatever
changes the evolution doctrine may have wrought in the method and
standpoint of philosophy, its importance as a contribution to ultimate
philosophic truth must depend largely on whether it will materially
affect the great gnostic idealistic movement, which during the last
quarter of a century has apparently superseded the agnostic empirical
movement. It is not to the evolutionistic synthesis of Spencer but
rather to the idealistic constructions of such men as Green that we
must look for a solution of the question, What is the present tendency,
and what is likely to be the future trend, of philosophical speculation
in England?
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