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History of Philosophy
Contemporary Philosophy
by Turner, William (S.T.D.)
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Germany. In Germany there seems to be at the present time a
tendency towards reconstruction on a realistic basis. Darwin's
evolutionary hypothesis and the law of the conservation of energy,
which was formulated and proved by Robert Mayer (1814-1878),
demanded a reconstruction of the philosophy of nature, and in answer to
this demand there appeared various systems.
(a) Materialism, represented by Karl Vogt (1817-1895),
author of Vorlesungen über den Menschen, etc. (1863),
Jakob Moleschott (1822-1893), author of Der Kreislauf des
Lebens (1852), Ludwig Büchner, author of Kraft und
Stoff (1855), and Ernst Haeckel, author of
Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte (1868), Die Welt
rätsel (1899). With these is contrasted Albert Lange
(1828-1875), the historian of materialism, who, while maintaining
that materialism is indispensable as a method of investigation, teaches
that it is untenable as a system. [1]
[1] Falckenberg, op. cit., p. 489 (English trans., p. 615).
(b) Neo-Criticism. The Neo-Criticists, deploring the effects of
the "deluge of romanticism," return to the principle of criticism, and
in their idealistic reconstruction give fuller scope to the scientific
view than their predecessors succeeded in doing. Chief among the
Neo-Criticists are Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), author of
Metaphysik (1840), Medizinische Psychologie (1852),
Mikrokosmos (1856-1864), etc., and Eugen Dühring,
author of Natürliche Dialektik (1865), etc. Lotze's
philosophy may be said to combine Herbartian with Fichtean and Hegelian
metaphysics. Dühring devotes special attention to epistemology,
emphasizing the antithesis between the ideal continuity of thought and
the fragmentary character of given empirical reality. The most
enthusiastic of the Neo-Kantians is Friedrich Paulsen, [2] who
defines philosophy as "the sum of all scientific knowledge." He is
equally opposed to the intellectualism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel,
who "absolutely ignore experience and pay it no regard whatever," and
to the materialism of Vogt, Buchner, etc., who overlook the essential
distinction between the psychical and the physical order of reality. He
adopts a theory of metaphysical and psychological parallelism
(pan-psychism), and insists, as Rousseau and Schopenhauer
insisted, on the recognition of the demands of the heart and the
supremacy of will over intellect.
[2] Cf. Introduction to Philosophy, trans. by Thily (New York,
1895).
In the philosophy of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-1872)
the realistic reaction appears in the form of a revived
Aristotelianism. His principal works are Logische
Untersuchungen (1840), Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik
(1860), and Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie (1846).
(c) Specialization of Philosophy. A third phase of the rcalistic
reaction appears in the empirical philosophy, which, in obedience to
the principle of the division of labor, is tending towards
specialization of philosophical inquiry. Under this head may be
included the physiologist, E. H. Weber; the psychologists
Fechner and Wundt, founders of the science of psycho-
physics, [3] Brentano, Stumpf; the educationalists and
folk-psychologists, Steinthal, Lazarus; the logician
Sigwart; the epistemologists, E. L. Fischer and
Hermann Schwarz. To these may be added Tonnies, Daring,
Ziegler, who devote special attention to ethical problems;
Hermann, Karl Fischer, students of the philosophy of history;
and Zeller, J. E. Erdmann, Kuno Fischer, Falckenberg, Windelband,
Otto Willmann, and Clemens Baeumker, historians of
philosophy.
[3] Cf. Ribot, Psychologie allemande contemporaine,
trans. by Baldwin (New York, 1886).
Avenarius (1843-1896) represents the critical philosophy of
experience (empirio-criticism).
France. In France the current of contemporary thought seems to
have set towards a neo-criticism, which aims at
spiritualistic reconstruction: "After passing," writes M.
Fouillée, "through a period in which the intellect was in revolt
against the heart, we are entering into one in which the heart is in
revolt against the intellect." [4] Vacherot (1809-1897), author
of La métaphysique et la science (1858), represents the
form of idealism prevalent in France about the middle of the nineteenth
century, -- the reaction against positivism. More recently,
Renouvier, Secrétan, Pillon, Boutroux, represent a
critical philosophy, [5] which is tending towards partial dogmatism
(existence of the Infinite, freedom of the will, etc.).
[4] Revue des Deux Mondes, mars 15, 1896.
[5] Renouvier, Essai de critique générale (1854),
Science de la morale (1869), Principes de la nature
(1864), Philosophie analytique de l'histoire (1896-1897), etc.;
Secrétan, De la philosophie de Leibniz (1840), La
philosophie de la liberté (1849), La raison et le
christianisme (1863), etc. Pillon, L'année
philosophique (first number, 1891); Boutroux, Questions de
morale et d'education (1895), etc.
Paul Janet (1823-1899), an eclectic spiritualist, represents the
continuation of the philosophy of Cousin and Jonifroy, while Alfred
Fouillée defends a system of monism based on the concept of
idées forces, -- a monism which combines the
intellectualism of Hegel with the voluntarism of Schopenhauer. [6]
[6] Janet, Causes finales (1876), etc.; Foullée,
L'avenir de la métaphysique fondée sur
l'expérience (1889), L'évolution des
idées-forces (1890), etc.
M. L'Abbé Piat, one of the most distinguished
representatives of constructive spiritualism in France at the present
time, expounds and defends the essential doctrines of Thomistic
philosophy. He is to be reckoned among the most enlightened and
successful of the Neo-Thomists. [7]
[7] L'intellect actif (1891), L'idée (1896), La
liberté (1894-1895), Socrate (1901), etc.
Among the psychologists, Ribot, Delboeuf, Paulhan, represent a
modified form of phenomenalism, while Bernheim, Charcot (1825-
1893), Binet, Luys, and Pierre Janet represent the French
school of pathological psychology, and psycho-physics. [8]
[8] Ribot, L'hérédité (1882), La
psychologie anglaise contemporaine (1870), La psychologie
allemande contemporaine (1879), Maladies de la memoire
(1881), etc.; Delboeuf, Études psychologiques (1873),
Théorie générale de la sensibilité
(1875), etc.; Paulhan, La physiologie de l'esprit (1888), Les
caractères (1894), etc. ; Binet, Les altérations de la
personnalité (1892), and, in collaboration with M. Feri, Le
magnétisme animale (troisième édition, 1890);
Luys, Le cerveau et ses fonctions (1875); Bernheim, La
suggestion, etc. (1884); Charcot (1825-1893), Les
démoniaques dans l'art (1887); Pierre Janet,
L'automatisme psychologique (1889).
The socialism of Fourier (1772-1837), Proudhon
(1809-1865), etc., gave, towards the middle of the nineteenth century,
an impetus to sociological inquiry which has produced the contemporary
French school of sociology. The chief contributors to the literature of
sociology are M. Tarde and René Worms.
England. In England the Neo-Hegelian movement has been gaining
strength during the last quarter of a century. In addition to J. H.
Stirling, T. H. Green, John Caird, Edward Caird, [9] of whom mention
has already been made, William Wallace, F. H. Bradley, David G.
Ritchie, Andrew Seth, John McTaggart, and others exhibit different
phases of contemporary interest in transcendental criticism and
construction on an idealistic basis. [10] "The springs of
this movement," Professor Wallace observes, "lie in the natural and
national revulsion of English habits of mind. Slowly, but at length,
the storms of the great European revolution found their way to our
intellectual world, and shook Church and State, society and literature.
. . . The insularity which had secluded and narrowed the British mind
since the middle of the eighteenth century needed something deeper and
stronger than French 'ideology' to bring it abreast of the requirements
of the age. Whatever may be the drawbacks of transcendentalism, they
are virtues when set beside the vulgar ideals of enlightenment by
superficialization." [11]
[9] John Caird, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion
(1880), etc.; Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel
Kant (1889), etc.
[10] Wallace, Prolegomena to the Logic of Hegel (second edition,
1894); Bradley, Appearance and Reality (1893); Ritchie,
Darwin and Hegel (1893); Andrew Seth, Hegelianism and
Personality (1887); McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Dialectic
(1898), Hegelian Cosmology (1901).
[11] Prolegomena to Hegel's Philosophy, Preface, p. xi.
Alexander Campbell Fraser, [12] in his Philosophy of
Theism, advocates the necessity of philosophic faith. Arthur
James Balfour, in his Defence of Philosophic Doubt (1879) and
his Foundations of Belief (1895), opposes both realism and
idealism and advocates the principle of authority.
[12] Philosophy of Theism (First Series, 1895 ; Second Series,
1896), Collected Works of Berkeley, Selections from Berkeley,
etc.
In the special departments of philosophic study there have appeared in
recent times the logicians, George Boole (1815-1864), W.
Stanley Jevons (1835-1882), John Veitch, J. N. Keynes, Thomas
Fowler; the moral philosophers, Henry Sidgwick [13] (1838-
1900), James Martineau (1805-1900), Henry Calderwood, Leslie
Stephen; the psychologists, James Sully, C. Lloyd Morgan,
and W. B. Carpenter (1813-1885); and the pathologists, Henry
Maudsley, C. A. Mercier.
[13] Cf. "On the Ethical Theory of Henry Sidgwick," Mind,
April, 1901.
Italy. In Italy the official philosophy, whether Hegelian,
positivistic, phenomenalistic, or Rosminian, manifests a spirit of
bitter hostility towards religion in the positive form of
Catholicism. So far the Neo-Scholastic movement is apparently without
influence on the centers of secular education.
Mention must here be made of the Italian school of criminology
and psychiatry represented by Lombroso and
Mantegazza.
America. In America the Neo-Hegelian movement has found
distinguished representatives in John Watson and W. T.
Harris. [14] The future course of philosophic thought in this country
is, however, likely to be influenced less by the Neo-Hegelians than by
the Neo-Voluntarists, who teach that "the ultimate test for us of what
a truth means is the conduct it dictates or inspires," and that "the
whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite
difference it will make to you and me at definite instants of our lives
if this world-formula or that world-formula be the one which is true."
This pragmatism may be said to interpret the meaning of conceptions by
asking what difference they make in the matter of life, conduct, and
activity experience; for the Cartesian, "Cogito, ergo sum," it
substitutes "Ago, ergo sum." It was first proposed as a maxim by C.
S. Peirce. [15] Its chief representatives in this country are
Professor William James of Harvard, and Professor William
Caldwell [16] of Northwestern University. The latter contends that
Professor James, while rightly appealing to pragmatism as a method,
fails to carry the principle of voluntarism far enough. He suggests the
adoption of a broader metaphysical principle, according to which
reality should be defined as "that which sustains a more or less
verifiable and determinable relation to our activity."
[14] Watson, Comte, Mill, and Spencer, an Outline of Philosophy
(Glasgow, 1895); Harris, Hegel's Logic (Chicago, 1890), etc.
[15] In Popular Science Monthly (January, 1878); cf.
Dictionary of Philosophy article, "Pragmatism"; Mind
(October, 1900); Phil. Review, Sept. 1903, Jan. 1904.
[16] James, Principles of Psychology (New York, 1893); The
Will to Believe, etc. (1897), The Varieties of Religious
Experience (1902), etc.; Caldwell, Schopenhauer's System in its
Philosophical Significance (New York, 1896); cf.
International Journal of Ethics (July, 1898); Mind (October,
1900).
In connection with this neo-voluntarism, or "new ethical" movement,
mention must be made of Professor Josiah Royce [17]
of Harvard, who declares that "philosophy turns altogether upon trying
what our various fundamental ideas mean," defines the individual to be
that which is the object of exclusive interest, and in general
adopts some non-rational standard, such as concrete experience
(loyalty, love, interest) rather than elements constitutive of abstract
thought-value, as the ultimate test of philosophic truth. "To be means
simply to express, to embody the complete internal meaning of a certain
absolute system of ideas. . . . Our theory of the nature of Meaning is
to be founded upon a definition in terms of Will and Purpose." [18]
[17] The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (1893), The Conception
of God (1897), Studies of Good and Evil (1898), The
Conception of Immortality (1900), The World and the
Individual (First Series, 1899; Second Series, 1901).
[18] The World and the Individual (First Series, pp. 36, 37).
Mention must also be made of psychologists who, like Professor J. M.
Baldwin [19] of Princeton, contend that all cognitive activity is at the
same time emotional activity, and that intellectual development is a
continual growth in motor accommodation and in practical
inventiveness. [20]
[19] Mental Development, etc. (New York, 1895), Social and
Ethical Interpretations, etc. (New York, 1897), Fragments in
Philosophy and Science (1902); cf. especially, Social and
Ethical Interpretations, pp. 243 and 295.
[20] Cf. New World (September, 1898), VII, 504 ff.
In the writings of Professor John Dewey [21] of the University of
Chicago there is traceable the influence of the English Hegelians,
especially that of Green. There is, however, a manifest tendency on the
part of Dr. Dewey to modify the purely intellectual idealism of Green
by recognizing the motor tendency of our ideas, and thus bringing
idealism into closer relation to the determination of values. Professor
Frank Thilly [22] of the University of Missouri has done good
service to philosophy in America by his translations and by his able
presentation of ethical problems. In the published works of Professor
G. T. Ladd [23] the preponderant influence
seems to be that of Lotze. Indeed, between Lotze's treatment of the
problem of values and the contemporary pragmatic notion of
philosophical method there exists a similarity which is suggestive of
causal dependence. For, just as in Lotze's teleological idealism,
reality is referred not to a purely rational category but to worth or
value, which is determined by the purpose of life, so also in the
pragmatism with which so much of recent philosophical literature is
imbued, "The ultima ratio of every creed, the ultima
ratio of truth itself, is that it works." [24]
[21] Psychology (1886), Outlines of Ethics (1892), etc.
cf. Psychol. Bull., January 15, 1904.
[22] Introduction to Ethics (New York, 1900); translations of
Weber's History of Philosophy (New York, 1896), Paulsen's
Introduction to Philosophy (New York, 1895), Paulsen's System
of Ethics (New York, 1899).
[23] Physiological Psychologv (1887), Introduction to
Philosophy (1891), Philosophy of Mind (1895), Philosophy
of Knowledge (1897), A Theory of Reality (1890), etc.
[24] Andrew Seth, Man's Place in the Cosmos, p. 307.
Retrospect. When contrasted with the philosophy of the
eighteenth century, the philosophy of the nineteenth century exhibits,
in the first place, a spirit of constructive activity. The eighteenth
century was largely destructive in its aim and tendency; the age of
illumination, which terminated that century, drew a line of separation
between the intellectual and the spiritual, between the scientific and
the religio-aesthetic, between culture and belief, and placed the
individual in sharp antithesis to the social order. It treated with
levity, and often with contempt, every effort to harmonize these
elements into a constructive system of thought. The nineteenth century,
however, changed all this. Thoroughly in earnest with theism and the
problems of theistic philosophy, it attempted to combine into a
synthetic system the spiritual, the religious, and the aesthetic
elements of human life, as well as the intellectual and scientific. It
studied the relation between the individual and society from the point
of view of organic unity and dependence, rather than from that of
mechanical independence and natural conflict. Not that philosophy in
the nineteenth century succeeded in effecting a complete and systematic
unification of these various elements. The century which has just come
to a close was happily alive to the importance and value of
constructive effort; but it was unfortunately condemned to start its
construction on the foundation which a previous age had
laid. If, therefore, at the beginning of the twentieth century, a
final philosophy seems as far from being attained as it seemed a
hundred years ago, it is not because men have not striven, for they
have striven earnestly, to find the true solution of the problems of
philosophy; nor is it because they have neglected what their
predecessors had too often underestimated, but because they could not
break altogether with the past -- with the subjectivism, the
psychological dualism, and the false sense of philosophic method which
they had inherited from Descartes.
Indeed, post-Kantian philosophy, the philosophy of the nineteenth
century, exhibits in a high degree the subjectivism which is a
characteristic of modern life. It is true that this trait is not
always, and in all its aspects, a defect. For instance, while, as is
well known, the beautiful and the spiritual in their objective phases
played a far more important part in Greek life and in mediaeval life
than they play in modern life, yet it is the modern world that, owing
to its clearer consciousness of inner experience, first undertook to
analyze the sentiment of the beautiful and the religious sentiment. The
subjectivism of modern philosophy appears, too, in its fuller
realization of the difficulty of the philosopher's task. No doubt the
work of unifying all knowledge and formulating a rational explanation
of the complex world revealed by modern science, is far more imposing
than the problem which confronted Thales; but when due allowance is
made for the greater complexity of the problems which confront modern
philosophy, must it not be charged to the too great subjectivism of our
age that while it has felt more intensely, thought more profoundly, and
analyzed more acutely, it has accomplished less than any preceding age?
As in the individual, so also in the race; too much questioning and too
little active responsibility and practical realization of the problems
of life lead inevitably to the despair of knowing anything. Must an era
of reflection be an era of irresolution and hesitancy? The
neo-voluntaristic movement of the present
hour may be taken as an indication of the incompetency of "mere
intellect" to explain all reality, and the importance which is at the
present time attached to philosophic faith may be regarded as an
assertion of the limitations of the analytic faculty and an affirmation
of the need of constructive synthesis. Both these contemporary
tendencies of thought may well meet in a common endeavor to restore a
method which, uniting the objective with the subjective and making the
supernatural continuous with the natural, would give free scope to
reason within the limits of rational inquiry and leave at the same time
ample room for the exercise of religious faith.
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