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A Constitutional History of the United States
Chapter III - The Problem of Imperial Organization. The Albany Plan
by McLaughlin, Andrew C.
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By the middle of the eighteenth century Britain was faced with the
problem of imperial organization. We cannot say that her leaders were fully
conscious of the fact; but looking back upon those years it is plain to us
that, if her empire was to survive undamaged, a problem of great difficulty
presented itself. And this problem, as we now view the facts, was central and
insistent in its demands. Even if the blind could not see it, the question was
there. Could the empire be so organized and arranged that it could find
adequate means of preserving and using its strength? Could actual conditions be
so envisaged that colonial valor and colonial enterprise would, without
diminution of colonial self-government, contribute their vigor to the essential
unity and development of the empire? The pressing and immediate question
appeared to be means of securing men and money for imperial defense;' but the
necessity of the case demanded the establishment of a system which would not
only recognize imperial unity but conserve local rights and local self-respect.
Principles of self-government, consonant with the actual competence and
experience of the colonies, must find their place in the system; principles of
individual liberty, the outgrowth of English constitutionalism — and
deeply cherished by the colonists — must be watchfully guarded; and all
arrangements and plans must be adjusted to the needs of a powerful and
developing general system of empire.
That Britain failed to find a solution of the problem the reader need
not be told. The story of conflict and failure is of immense consequence in the
history of British imperial growth; but we are entering upon the study of
events which produced the United States; and our attention is called to the
fact that essentially the problem was passed on to the American states when
they became free to organize their own empire. To solve the problem of imperial
organization, therefore, grounded as it was in the history of the old empire,
was the central, dominating, irrepressible task of a generation (1750-1788).
If there had been no danger to Britain because of the menace of France
and her Indian allies, events might have moved on quietly for a time; the old
easy-going system of imperial management might have continued undisturbed, save
by the recurring evidence of unrest characteristic of a people on this side of
the water who were not easily content. And if in any crisis the colonists had
freely, generously, and thoughtlessly turned over their funds to be spent in
defense, the problem of imperial order, we may well imagine, would not have
been pressing. But this is only saying that if responsibility, expense, and
coöperation had been assumed voluntarily, there would have been no need of
law or compulsion. The cold fact was, however, that the colonies would not work
together, and if there was one thing they disliked more than granting money
— a dislike common to humanity in general — it was the pain of being
deprived of the right to argue about the matter and of spending the money
themselves, if spend they must.[1] Hesitation, debate, and delay are
among the pains and penalties of popular government.
So varied were the colonies, so different in their social and industrial
life, so far-removed one from the other, that any scheme of voluntary
coöperation or systematic union presented enormous difficulty. Each colony
had a fixed sense of its own importance and not much interest in its neighbors
or sympathy with its neighbors' needs. In one view of the case, this readiness
of each colony to look out for itself, this sentiment of local allegiance, this
sense of self stands forth as the salient feature in the picture of the
mid-century. So evident were the conditions that it appears to-day as a
remarkable fact that the colonies were later, under pressure of common danger,
brought to coöperation and union. And still, underlying all this reality
of variation and of local loyalty, political institutions were strikingly
similar; grumble as the colonists might over navigation acts or disallowance,
they had worked out their system of self-government on the basis of a common
tendency and desire; they all cherished the principles of English liberty, as
they conceived it. From one end of the land to the other they spoke the same
political language, cherished the same ideas, believed in the same fundamental
doctrines; in these respects — omitting differences in religion and in
habits of life and industry which militated against a feeling of common
interest — there existed a real unity, a unity which was based on
possession of certain principles and aspirations. Contradictions often appear
to be the core of life; and so we find the principles of self-government and of
self-control making for segregation, and yet the very desire for political
self-determination constituted a common quality and made for coöperation
when political interests and economic needs were at stake. In the long run,
coöperation and ultimate union were found to be necessary for the
preservation of the separate colonies and states.
Long before the mid-eighteenth century, various suggestions or plans of
union had been put forth as well as attempts on the part of the royal authority
to simplify the colonial system. But it is difficult to trace with assurance
the influence of these proposals upon later movements. The New England
Confederation which was established in 1643 and lasted for fifty years, most of
the time in a state of desuetude, had some effect in suggesting a general
scheme of union when that problem in the eighteenth century demanded an
answer.
After the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which was in reality only a truce,
it was apparent that a new struggle with France was likely to come, a contest
for dominion in the great valley beyond the mountains and also, it might well
be, for the very existence of the coast colonies. What part were the colonies
prepared to play in this encounter? Would they freely enlist their men and open
wide their purses, or would they hesitate and talk and insist upon their
privileges when danger was at their very doors? Their general attitude
furnished little hope or consolation. It was especially necessary to hold the
Iroquois Indians and in general to handle the Indian question with discretion.
Recognizing the need of effective coöperation, the Board of Trade planned
a conference of colonial governors, and in 1753 instructions were sent to the
governors of royal and proprietary colonies [2] north of the
Carolinas directing them to see that commissioners were sent to treat with the
Six Nations and to renew the "Covenant Chain" with them. The formation of some
kind of union appears to have had the sanction of the British authorities.
The outcome was the Albany Congress of 1754. After the Indian matters
were disposed of, the commissioners entered upon consideration of the need for
union and coöperation. They unanimously decided that a union was
absolutely necessary for security and defense, and they drew up a plan of union
which appears to have been based on "Hints" furnished by Franklin and, though
seemingly the product of considerable discussion, was probably largely his own
handiwork. The plan deserves careful examination for various reasons, but
especially because it points unerringly to certain distinct elements in the
general problem of union; and those matters came to the fore and pressed for
consideration not only then but in later years; it plainly discloses the nature
of the task of imperial organization and it points to certain definite powers
which were of common interest and needed to be confided to some central
authority. It marks the beginning of an effort to single out the things that
should be turned over to a central government or an agency of central
administration. Any effort to formulate a basis of classification and
distribution of powers is of commanding interest to the student of the American
political system as it came to be. By the terms of the plan, a Grand Council
was provided for, the members to be chosen by the representative assemblies in
the colonies.[3] The general executive authority was given to a
President General who was to be appointed and supported by the Crown, and who
had the right to negative all acts of the Council; with the advice of the
Council, he was to make all Indian treaties which concerned the colonies
generally, and he was to make peace or declare war with the Indians. The
President and the Council were authorized to regulate Indian trade, and to
"make all purchases from Indians for the Crown, of lands [now] not within the
bounds of particular Colonies, or that shall not be within their bounds when
some of them are reduced to more convenient dimensions." They were to have
charge of founding new settlements on such purchases and of providing laws for
them, until the Crown should "think fit to form them into particular
Governts ." To this central authority also was confided the right to
raise armies and pay them, to equip vessels of war, and "for these purposes" to
levy "duties, imposts or taxes...." A General Treasurer was to be appointed and
also a particular treasurer in each colony when necessary; and the President
General and the Council were to have the extraordinary power of ordering the
sums in the treasuries of each government into the General Treasury, or of
drawing on them "for special payments...." All laws were to be, as near as
might be, agreeable to the laws of England and should be transmitted to the
king for approbation. The President General could nominate for the approval of
the Council all military officers, while all civil officers could be nominated
by the Council for approval by the executive.
The plan, therefore, granted to the proposed central government a method
and the power of raising money; it marked out a fairly definite sphere of
action; and it bestowed ample authority over four subjects of supreme
importance — Indian affairs, war, purchase of wild lands, and control, for
a time at least, of western settlement. The commissioners even ventured to
provide for proportional rather than equal representation of the several
colonies in the Grand Council and to suggest quite plainly the desirability of
limiting the extent of the larger colonies, some of which had claims to a vast
territory beyond the mountains. Both of these latter proposals were sure to
arouse opposition and in later years proved to be especially perplexing
obstacles in the way of forming a federal union.
The document, as we read it to-day, appears remarkably precocious. It
foreshadowed the anxieties, aspirations, disputes, and achievements of the
years ahead. We need not be astonished that thirty-five years later, after the
debates, trials, and tribulations of a generation, Franklin declared that in
his judgment, if this plan or something like it had been adopted and carried
out, "Separation of the Colonies from the Mother Country might not so soon have
happened, nor the Mischiefs suffered on both sides have occurred perhaps during
another Century." [4] But the significance of these proposals lies
not so much in their suggestions for a method of saving the old empire as in
their indication of the route that was to be followed in later years.
There was small ground for hope that the plan would be favorably
received on either side of the ocean. It received short shrift in England. The
Board of Trade had its own ideas and drafted a plan, but it need not detain us;
it is significant, however, as proof of the fact that the home authorities were
seriously considering the problem of empire and chiefly the need of acquiring
and controlling means of defense. No colony accepted the Albany
proposals.[5] Franklin said the plan was not favored in the colonies
because it allowed too much to prerogative and the Crown disapproved it because
it "placed too much Weight in the Democratic Part of the Constitution...."
[6]
The plan indeed was ahead of the time; though measures for defense were
imperative, any general plan of union, in which the colonies would have a large
share, and which would be political in character and not calculated for defense
alone, was objectionable to Britain, and on the other hand, colonial
self-esteem and caution looked askance at intrusion upon hard-won preserves.
How disconcerting to the average colonist was the proposal to establish a
central government — even a central government in which the colonies would
be represented — which could put its hand into the colonial treasury and
draw forth funds even for war against a common enemy! "Every Body," said
Franklin, "cries, a Union is absolutely necessary; but when they come to the
Manner and Form of the Union, their weak Noddles are perfectly distracted."
[7] The task was to distract weak and strong noddles alike for
several decades to come. This was no job for puny minds. Something, the
shrewdest heads on both sides of the water believed, had to be done. The Board
of Trade declared that if the colonies would not acquiesce in some such
arrangement as the one proposed by the Board, there was no alternative but an
act of Parliament.
Eager and anxious for imperial stability and for success in the war with
France, Franklin wrote the next year (1755) that a plan of union ought to "take
Place" and be established by king and Parliament. " 'Till it is done never
expect to see an American War carried on as it ought to be, nor Indian Affairs
properly managed." [8] Colonial governors were beginning to think
that the only way to get money for defense was parliamentary taxation and some
of them advised it. Governor Shirley of Massachusetts declared the behavior of
the colonies showed the necessity not only of "a Parliamentary Union, but
taxation...." [9] The ministry during these years must have received
ample assurance [10] that the colonies would not act of themselves
and that some sort of compulsion was necessary.[11] The course of
the war probably hardened this belief, and yet some of the colonies
participated with a good deal of vigor, especially under the inspiring
leadership of Pitt. And it is an interesting example of the apparent perversity
of human nature that the freer colonies, those most fully in command of
themselves, were the readiest to do their part. In the royal colonies, where
affairs were most directly under royal control, bickerings and disputes with
the governor were prominent and almost continuous. The proprietary colonies
indulged in enjoyable disputes with the representative of the proprietary
authority and yielded with ill grace to any demands for effective
coöperation. The spirit of individual right and an insistence on colonial
privileges were marked features of the situation. Despite all of the
difficulties, Britain triumphed in the war, but the embarrassment resulting
from incoherence and from the absence of a thoroughly articulated empire was
apparent In some respects the war probably brought forth a certain sense of
imperial unity, and it may have developed a recognition of identity of
interests between one colony and another. But we must not speak with too much
assurance. Each colony was quite conscious of itself and of its own right to
guard what it deemed to be its privileges. The war gave special opportunity for
the exercise of political craftsmanship. At the end, if the need of
coöperation was more evident than it had been at an earlier time, and if
there was glorification of British prowess and exultation over the victory,
nevertheless imperial unity, organization on any viable basis suitable to the
conditions, and the establishment of any effective system were even more
remote, to all appearances than before hostilities began.[12] If one
is inclined to blame the British statesmen for not working out a scheme of
imperial order then or at a later time, he must surely also perceive the
herculean nature of the task; and, moreover, the background of colonial
incoherence and of colonial self-sufficiency must be taken into account in any
attempt to appreciate the job which the Americans faced, not only in 1754 but
in later years, when, for their own well-being, there was imperative need of
coöperation and continental organization. The casual reader is probably
inclined to overemphasize the single feature of the individual's belief in his
personal liberties and his readiness to defend them, and is likely to
underestimate the sense of self which was cherished by each colony as a
constituent part of an empire. And we must remember that the empire had grown
up without any consistent and adequate political system, the eyes of the
British administration being fixed largely on trade, while Britain watched her
enemies and her commercial rivals in Europe. A commercial rather than a
well-articulated political empire had received the weight of attention.
[1] Franklin writing in 1754 portrayed the situation: "...
some Assemblies being before at variance with their governors or councils, and
the several branches of the government not on terms of doing business with each
other; others taking the opportunity, when their concurrence is wanted, to push
for favourite laws, powers, or points, that they think could not at other times
be obtained, and so creating disputes and quarrels; one Assembly waiting to see
what another will do, being afraid of doing more than its share, or desirous of
doing less, or refusing to do any thing because its country is not at present
so much exposed as others, or because another will reap more immediate
advantage; from one or other of which causes, the Assemblies of six out of
seven colonies applied to, had granted no assistance to Virginia, when lately
invaded by the French, though purposely convened, and the importance of the
occasion earnestly urged upon them...." Franklin, Writings (A. H. Smyth,
ed.), III, p. 203.
[2] Virginia and New Jersey did not send representatives. The
Lieutenant-Governor of New York seems to have represented Virginia.
Representatives from Rhode Island and Connecticut attended.
[3] No representation from Georgia was provided for. There
were to be not less than two nor more than seven representatives from any one
colony. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of
New-York, VI, p. 889.
[4] Franklin, Writings (A. H. Smyth, ed.), III, p.
226, note 1.
[5] Nothing could more amply bring before us the watchful
regard for colonial pence than the instructions of Connecticut to her
commissioners at the Albany Congress. She desired the commissioners to join
with others in representing to the king the defenseless state of his
governments in America, to make evident the great expense Connecticut had
assumed in comparison with southern colonies in former wars, and to be sure
that the obligation on Connecticut was "no greater than of necessity." The
commissioners were to "agree to no proportion of expence save for the present
occasion," to make no presents to the Indians unless necessary, and to oppose
as far as possible everything of that nature. They were to see to it that
Connecticut troops served with eastern and not western troops, if there were
any such distinction, and they must be careful not to bind the colony in any
way before ratification by "this Hon. Assembly." Public Records of the
Colony of Connecticut. X, p. 268 note.
[6] Franklin, Writings (A. H. Smyth, ed.), III, p. 227
note.
[7] Ibid., III, p. 242.
[8] Ibid., III, p. 267.
[9] Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the
State of New-York, VI, p. 940.
[10] See the "Sharpe Correspondence," I, Archives of
Maryland, VI, pp. 96, 99, 203. "This perverseness of the Virginia Assembly
has induced the Gover[r] to apply home as I am told some other
Governors have also done for an Act of the British Legislature to be obligatory
upon all the Govern[ts] equally, & compel them to contribute
their Quotas for the Defence & Protection of their Properties & His
Majesty's American Dominions...." Sharpe to Calvert, September 15, 1754, in
Ibid., p. 99. Sharpe made his own proposals — a poll tax, or a duty
on wines and liquors, or a stamp duty. "... or can I now think we can have any
Dependence on the Assemblies of the different Colonies with't a B. Act of
Parliam't to raise a gen'l Tax on all his M'y's Subjects on this Cont't.... I
much want to know if any Thing is done in regard to the Union of the Colonies.
The Scheme from Albany on y't head is by no means agreeable to our people, and
I dare not give my Opinion thereon, as I hear it lies with his M'y in Council;
but it will be very agreeable if any Thing can be done to bring the
wrong-headed People in this Part of the World to a proper Understand'g of their
pres't Danger, and to rouse an Emulat'n among them for their Safety in rais'g
proper Supplies for defeat's the Designs of the Com'n Enemy." Governor
Dinwiddie to the Earl of Halifax, February 12, 1755, in "Dinwiddie Papers," I,
Va. Hist. Soc. Collections, new series, III, pp. 496-497. See also
Governor Dinwiddie to the Lords of Trade, February 23, 1756, in "Dinwiddie
Papers," II, Va. Hist. Soc. Collections, new series, IV, p. 340.
[11] For references, see G. L. Beer, British Colonial
Policy 1754-1765, pp. 44-46 note. For an account of conditions, see E. I.
McCormac, "Colonial Opposition to Imperial Authority During the French and
Indian War," University of California Publications in History, I,
no. 1, pp. 1-98.
[12] "Despite the coöperation of many colonies in a
common military undertaking, which, it may be, smoothed the way to an eventual
understanding, the dislike and even the enmity of colony for colony were as
great in 1763 as in 1750, while the absorption of each in its own affairs was
as profound as at any time in its history." C. M. Andrews, The Colonial
Period, pp. 232-233.
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