SECTION A.
Caesar and Britain—Breakdown of Roman Republican institutions—Corruption abroad and at
home—Rise of Caesar—Conquest of Gaul.
A. 1.—If the connection of Britain with Rome is
the pivot on which the whole history of our island
turns, it is no less true that the first connection of
Rome with Britain is the pivot whereon all Roman
history depends. For its commencement marks the
furthest point reached in his career of conquest by
the man without whom Roman history must needs
have come to a shameful and disastrous end—Julius
Caesar.
A. 2.—The old Roman constitution and the old
Roman character had alike proved wholly unequal
to meet the strain thrown upon them by the acquisition
of the world-wide empire which they had gained for
their city. Under the stress of the long feud between
its Patrician and Plebeian elements that constitution
had developed into an instrument for the regulation of
public affairs, admirably adapted for a City-state, where
each magistrate performs his office under his neighbour's
eye and over his own constituents; constantly amenable
both to public opinion and to the checks provided
by law. But it never contemplated Pro-consuls bearing
sway over the unenfranchised populations of distant
Provinces, whence news filtered through to Rome but
slowly, and where such legal checks as a man had to
reckon with were in the hands of a Court far more
ready to sympathize with the oppression of non-voters
than to resent it.
A. 3.—And these officials had deteriorated from
the old Roman rectitude, as the Spartan harmosts
deteriorated under conditions exactly similar in the
days of the Lacedaemonian supremacy over Hellas.
And, in both cases, the whole national character was
dragged down by the degradation of what we may call
the Colonial executive. Like the Spartan, the Roman
of "the brave days of old" was often stern, and even
brutal, towards his enemies. But he was a devoted
patriot, he was true to his plighted faith, and above
all he was free from all taint of pecuniary corruption.
The earlier history of both nations is full of legends
illustrating these points, which, whether individually
true or not, bear abundant testimony to the national
ideal. But with irresponsible power, Roman and
Spartan alike, while remaining as brutally indifferent
as ever to the sufferings of others, lost all that was
best in his own ethical equipment. Instead of
patriotism we find unblushing self-interest as the
motive of every action; in place of good faith, the
most shameless dishonesty; and, for the old contempt
of ill-gotten gains, a corruption so fathomless
and all-pervading as fairly to stagger us. The tale of
the doings of Verres in a district so near Rome as
Sicily shows us a depth of mire and degeneration to
which no constitution could sink and live.
A. 4.—Nor could the Roman constitution survive
it. From the Provinces the taint spread with fatal
rapidity to the City itself. The thirst for lucre
became the leading force in the State; for its sake
the Classes more and more trampled down the Masses;
and entrance to the Classes was a matter no longer of
birth, but of money alone. And all history testifies
that the State which becomes a plutocracy is doomed
indeed. Of all possible forms of government—autocracy,
oligarchy, democracy—that is the lowest, that
most surely bears within itself the seeds of its own
inevitable ruin.
A. 5.—So it was with the Roman Republic. As
soon as this stage was reached it began to "stew in
its own juice" with appalling rapidity. Reformers,
like the Gracchi, were crushed; and the commonwealth
went to pieces under the shocks and counter-shocks
of demagogues like Clodius, conspirators like
Catiline, and military adventurers such as Marius and
Sulla—for whose statue the Senate could find no
more constitutional title than "The Lucky General"
[Sullae Imperatori Felici] Well-meaning individuals,
such as Cicero and Pompey, were still to be found,
and even came to the front, but they all alike proved
unequal to the crisis; which, in fact, threw up one
man, and one only, of force to become a real maker
of history—Caius Julius Caesar, the first Roman
invader of Britain.
A. 6.—Caesar was at the time of this invasion (55 B.C.)
some forty-five years old; but he had not long become
a real power in the political arena. Sprung from the
bluest blood of Rome—the Julian House tracing their
origin to the mythical Iulus, son of Aeneas, and thus
claiming descent from the Goddess Venus—we might
have expected to find him enrolled amongst the aristocratic
conservatives, the champions of the régime of
Sulla. But though a mere boy at the date of the strife
between the partisans of Sulla and Marius (B.C. 88-78),
Caesar was already clear-sighted enough to perceive
that in the "Classes" of that day there was no help
for the tempest-tossed commonwealth. Accordingly
he threw in his lot with the revolutionary Marian
movement, broke off a wealthy matrimonial engagement
arranged for him by his parents to become the
son-in-law of Cinna, and in the very thick of the
Sullan proscriptions, braved the Dictator by openly
glorying in his connection with the defeated reformers.
How he escaped with his life, even at the intercession,
if it was indeed made, of the Vestals, is a
mystery; for Sulla (who had little regard for religious,
or any other, scruples) was deliberately extirpating
every soul whom he thought dangerous to the plutocracy,
and is said to have pronounced "that boy" as
"more to be dreaded than many a Marius." He did,
however, escape; but till the vanquished party
recovered in some degree from this ruthless massacre
of their leaders, he could take no prominent part in
politics. The minor offices of Quaestor, Aedile, and
Praetor he filled with credit, and meanwhile seemed
to be giving himself up to shine in Society, which was
not, in Rome, then at its best; and his reputation for
intrigue, his skill at the gaming-table, and his
fashionable swagger were the envy of all the young
bloods of the day.
A. 7.—The Catiline conspiracy (B.C. 63), and the
irregular executions that followed its suppression, at
length gave him his opportunity. While the Senate
was hailing Cicero as "the Father of his country" for
the stern promptitude which enabled him, as Consul,
to say "Vixere" ["They have lived"] in answer to
the question as to the doom of the conspirators,
Caesar had electrified the assembly by his denunciation
of the view that, in whatsoever extremity, the blood of
Roman citizens might be shed by a Roman Consul,
secretly and without legal warrant. Henceforward he
took his place as the special leader on whom popular
feeling at Rome more and more pinned its hopes.
As Pontifex Maximus he gained (B.C. 63) a shadowy
but far from unreal religious influence; as Pro-praetor
he solidified the Roman dominion in Spain (where he
had already been Quaestor); and on his return (B.C. 60)
reconciled Crassus, the head of the moneyed interest,
with Pompey, the darling of the Army, and by their
united influence was raised next year to the Consulship.
A. 8.—A Roman Consul invariably, after the expiration
of his year of office, was sent as Pro-consul
to take charge of one of the Provinces, practically
having a good deal of personal say as to which should
be assigned to him. Caesar thus chose for his proconsular
government the district of Gaul then under
Roman dominion, i.e. the valley of the Po, and
that of the Rhone. In making this choice Caesar
was actuated by the fact that in Gaul he was more
likely than anywhere else to come in for active service.
Unquiet neighbours on the frontier, Germans and
Helvetians, were threatening invasion, and would
have to be repelled. And this would give the Pro-consul
the chance of doing what Caesar specially
desired, of raising and training an army which he
might make as devoted to himself as were Pompey's
veterans to their brilliant chieftain—the hero "as
beautiful as he was brave, as good as he was beautiful."
Without such a force Caesar foresaw that all
his efforts to redress the abuses of the State would
be in vain. As Consul he had carried certain small
instalments of reform; but they had made him more
hated than ever by the classes at whose corruption
they were aimed, and might any day be overthrown.
And neither Pompey nor Crassus were in any way to
be depended upon for his plans in this direction.
A. 9.—Events proved kinder to him than he could
have hoped. His ill-wishers at Rome actually aided
his preparations for war; for Caesar had not yet
gained any special military reputation, while the
barbarians whom he was to meet had a very high
one, and might reasonably be expected to destroy
him. And the Helvetian peril proved of such
magnitude that he had every excuse for making a
much larger levy than there was any previous prospect
of his securing. On the surpassing genius with which
he manipulated the weapon thus put into his hand
there is no need to dwell. Suffice it to say that
in spite of overwhelming superiority in numbers,
courage yet more signal, a stronger individual
physique, and arms as effective, his foes one after
another vanished before him. Helvetians, Germans,
Belgians, were not merely conquered, but literally
annihilated, as often as they ventured to meet him, and
in less than three years the whole of Gaul was at his feet.
SECTION B.
Sea-fight with Veneti and Britons—Pretexts for invading Britain—British dominion of Divitiacus
—Gallic tribes in Britain—Atrebates—Commius.
B. 1.—One of the last tribes to be subdued (in
B.C. 56) was that which, as the chief seafaring race
of Gaul, had the most intimate relations with Britain,
the Veneti, or men of Vannes, who dwelt in what
is now Brittany.68 These enterprising mariners had
developed a form of vessel fitted to cope with the
stormy Chops of the Channel on lines exactly
opposite to those of the British "curraghs."69 Instead
of being so light as to rise to every lift of the waves,
and with frames so flexible as to bend rather than break
under their every stress, the Venetian ships were of the
most massive construction, built wholly of the stoutest
oak planking, and with timbers upwards of a foot in
thickness. All were bolted together with iron pins
"as thick as a man's thumb." Forecastle and poop
were alike lofty, with a lower waist for the use of
sweeps if needful. But this was only exceptional,
sails being the usual motive power. And these were
constructed chiefly with a view to strength. Instead
of canvas, they were formed of untanned hides. And
instead of hempen cables the Veneti were so far
ahead of their time as to use iron chains with their
anchors; an invention which perished with them,
not to come in again till the 19th century. Their
broad beam and shallow keel enabled these ships to
lie more conveniently in the tidal inlets on either
side of the Channel.70
B. 2.—Thus equipped, the Veneti had tapped the
tin trade at its source, and established emporia at
Falmouth, Plymouth, and Exmouth; on the sites of
which ancient ingots, Gallic coins of gold, and other
relics of their period have lately been discovered.
Thence they conveyed their freight to the Seine, the
Loire, and even the Garonne. The great Damnonian
clan, which held the whole of Devon and Cornwall,
were in close alliance with them, and sent auxiliaries
to aid in their final struggle against Caesar. Indeed
they may possibly have drawn allies from a yet wider
area, if, as Mr. Elton conjectures, the prehistoric
boats which have at various times been found in the
silt at Glasgow may be connected with their influence.71
B. 3.—Caesar describes his struggle with the Veneti
and their British allies as one of the most arduous
in his Gallic campaigns. The Roman war galleys
depended largely upon ramming in their sea-fights,
but the Venetian ships were so solidly built as to
defy this method of attack. At the same time their
lofty prows and sterns enabled them to deliver a
plunging fire of missiles on the Roman decks, and
even to command the wooden turrets which Caesar
had added to his bulwarks. They invariably fought
under sail, and manoeuvred so skilfully that boarding
was impossible. In the end, after several unsuccessful
skirmishes, Caesar armed his marines with long billhooks,
instructing them to strike at the halyards of
the Gallic vessels as they swept past. (These must
have been fastened outboard.) The device succeeded.
One after another, in a great battle off Quiberon,
of which the Roman land force were spectators, the
huge leathern mainsails dropped on to the decks,
doubtless "covering the ship as with a pall," as in
the like misfortune to the Elizabethan Revenge in her
heroic defence against the Spanish fleet, and hopelessly
crippling the vessel, whether for sailing or rowing.
The Romans were at last able to board, and the
whole Venetian fleet fell into their hands. The
strongholds on the coast were now stormed, and the
entire population either slaughtered or sold into
slavery, as an object lesson to the rest of the
confederacy of the fate in store for those who dared
to stand out against the Genius of Rome.
B. 4.—Caesar had now got a very pretty excuse for
extending his operations to Britain, and, as his object
was to pose at Rome as "a Maker of Empire," he
eagerly grasped at the chance. Something of a
handle, moreover, was afforded him by yet another
connection between the two sides of the Channel.
Many people were still alive who remembered the
days when Divitiacus, King of the Suessiones (at
Soissons), had been the great potentate of Northern
Gaul. In Caesar's time this glory was of the past,
and the Suessiones had sunk to a minor position
amongst the Gallic clans. But within the last half-century
the sway of their monarch had been acknowledged
not only over great part of Gaul, but in
Britain also. Caesar's words, indeed, would almost
seem to point to the island as a whole having been
in some sense under him: Etiam Britanniae imperium
obtinuit.72
B. 5.—And traces of his rule still existed in the
occupation of British districts by colonists from two
tribes, which, as his nearest neighbours, must certainly
have formed part of any North Gallic confederacy
under him—the Atrebates and the Parisii. The
former had their continental seat in Picardy; the
latter, as their name tells us, on the Seine. Their
insular settlements were along the southern bank of
the Thames and the northern bank of the Humber
respectively. How far the two sets of Parisians held
together politically does not appear; but the Atrebates,
whether in Britain or Gaul, acknowledged the claim
of a single magnate, named Commius, to be their paramount
Chieftain.73 In this capacity he had led his
followers against Caesar in the great Belgic confederacy
of B.C. 58, and on its collapse, instead of holding
out to the last like the Nervii, had made a timely
submission. If convenient, this submission might be
represented as including that of his British dominions;
especially as we gather that a contingent from over-sea
may have actually fought under his banner
against the Roman eagles. Nay, it is possible that
the old claims of the ruler of Soissons over Britain
may have been revived, now that that ruler was Julius
Caesar. It is even conceivable that his complaint of
British assistance having been given to the enemy
"in all our Gallic wars" may point to his having
heard some form of the legend, whose echoes we
meet with in Welsh Triads, that the Gauls who sacked
Rome three centuries earlier numbered Britons amongst
their ranks.
SECTION C.
Defeat of Germans—Bridge over Rhine—Caesar's army—Dread of ocean—Fleet at Boulogne
—Commius sent to Britain—Channel crossed—Attempt on Dover—Landing at Deal—Legionary
sentiment—British army dispersed.
C. 1.—For making use of these pretexts, however,
Caesar had to wait a while. It was needful to bring
home to both supporters and opponents his brilliant
success by showing himself in Rome, during the idle
season when his men were in winter quarters. And
when he got back to his Province with the spring
of A.D. 55, his first attention had to be given to
the Rhine frontier, whence a formidable German
invasion was threatening. With his usual skill and
war-craft—which, on this occasion, in the eyes of his
Roman ill-wishers, seemed indistinguishable from
treachery—he annihilated the Teutonic horde which
had dared to cross the river; and then, by a miracle
of engineering skill, bridged the broad and rapid
stream, and made such a demonstration in Germany
itself as to check the national trek westward for
half a millennium.
C. 2.—By this time, as this wonderful feat shows,
the Army of Gaul had become one of those perfect
instruments into which only truly great commanders
can weld their forces. Like the Army of the Peninsula,
in the words of Wellington, "it could go anywhere
and do anything." The men who, when first enlisted,
had trembled before the Gauls, and absolutely
shed tears at the prospect of encountering Germans,
now, under the magic of Caesar's genius, had learnt
to dread nothing. Often surprised, always outnumbered,
sometimes contending against tenfold odds,
the legionaries never faltered. Each individual soldier
seems to have learnt to do instinctively the right
thing in every emergency, and every man worshipped
his general. For every man could see that it was
Caesar and Caesar alone to whom every victory was
due. The very training of the engineers, the very
devices, such as that of the Rhine bridge, by which
such mighty results were achieved, were all due to
him. Never before had any Roman leader, not even
Pompey "the Great," awakened such devotion amongst
his followers.
C. 3.—Caesar therefore experienced no such difficulty
as we shall find besetting the Roman commanders
of the next century, in persuading his men to follow
him "beyond the world,"74 and to dare the venture,
hitherto unheard of in the annals of Rome, of crossing
the ocean itself. We must remember that this
crossing was looked upon by the Romans as something
very different from the transits hither and thither
upon the Mediterranean Sea with which they were
familiar. The Ocean to them was an object of
mysterious horror. Untold possibilities of destruction
might lurk in its tides and billows. Whence those
tides came and how far those billows rolled was
known to no man. To dare its passage might well
be to court Heaven knew what of supernatural
vengeance.
C. 4.—But Caesar's men were ready to brave all
things while he led them. So, after having despatched
his German business, he determined to employ the
short remainder of the summer in a reconnaissance en
force across the Channel, with a view to subsequent
invasion of Britain. He had already made inquiries
of all whom he could find connected with the
Britanno-Gallic trade as to the size and military
resources of the island. But they proved unwilling
witnesses, and he could not even get out of them
what they must perfectly well have known, the position
of the best harbours on the southern shores.
C. 5.—His first act, therefore, was to send out a
galley under Volusenus "to pry along the coast,"
and meanwhile to order the fleet which he had built
against the Veneti to rendezvous at Boulogne. Besides
these war-galleys (naves longae) he got together
eighty transports, enough for two legions, besides
eighteen more for the cavalry.75 These last were
detained by a contrary wind at "a further harbour,"
eight miles distant—probably Ambleteuse at the
mouth of the Canche.76
C. 6.—All these preparations, though they seem to
have been carried out with extreme celerity, lasted
long enough to alarm the Britons. Several clans
sent over envoys, to promise submission if only
Caesar would refrain from invading the country. This,
however, did not suit Caesar's purpose. Such diplomatic
advantages would be far less impressive in the
eyes of the Roman "gallery" to which he was playing
than his actual presence in Britain. So he merely
told the envoys that it would be all the better for
them if he found them in so excellent and submissive
a frame of mind on his arrival at their shores, and
sent them back, along with Commius, who was to
bring in his own clan, the Atrebates, and as many
more as he could influence. And the Britons on
their part, though ready to make a nominal submission
to "the mighty name of Rome," were resolved not
to tolerate an actual invasion without a fight for it.
In every clan the war party came to the front, all
negotiations were abruptly broken off, Commius was
thrown into chains, and a hastily-summoned levy
lined the coast about Dover, where the enemy were
expected to make their first attempt to land.
C. 7.—Dover, in fact, was the port that Caesar made
for. It was, at this date, the obvious harbour for
such a fleet as his. All along the coast of Kent the
sea has, for many centuries, been constantly retreating.
Partly by the silting-up of river-mouths, partly by the
great drift of shingle from west to east which is so
striking a feature of our whole southern shore, fresh
land has everywhere been forming. Places like Rye
and Winchelsea, which were well-known havens of the
Cinque Ports even to late mediaeval times, are now
far inland. And though Dover is still our great
south-eastern harbour, this is due entirely to the
artificial extensions which have replaced the naturally
enclosed tidal area for which Caesar made. There is
abundant evidence that in his day the site of the
present town was the bed of an estuary winding for a
mile or more inland between steep chalk cliffs,77 not
yet denuded into slopes, whence the beach on either
side was absolutely commanded.
C. 8.—Caesar saw at a glance that a landing here
was impossible to such a force as he had with him.
He had sailed from Boulogne "in the third watch"—with
the earliest dawn, that is to say—and by 10 a.m.
his leading vessels, with himself on board, were close
under Shakespeare's Cliff. There he saw the British
army in position waiting for him, crowning the heights
above the estuary, and ready to overwhelm his landing-parties
with a plunging fire of missiles. He anchored
for a space till the rest of his fleet came up, and
meanwhile called a council of war of his leading
officers to deliberate on the best way of proceeding
in the difficulty. It was decided to make for the
open shore to the northwards (perhaps for Richborough,78
the next secure roadstead of those days), and at three
in the afternoon the trumpet sounded, the anchors were
weighed, and the fleet coasted onwards with the flowing
tide.79
C. 9.—The British army also struck camp, and
kept pace by land with the invaders' progress. First
came the cavalry and chariot-men, the mounted
infantry of the day; then followed the main body,
who in the British as in every army, ancient or
modern, fought on foot. We can picture the scene,
the bright harvest afternoon—(according to the
calculations of Napoleon, in his 'Life of Caesar,' it
was St. Bartholomew's Day)—the calm sea, the long
Roman galleys with their rows of sweeps, the heavier
and broader transports with their great mainsails
rounding out to the gentle breeze, and on cliff and
beach the British ranks in their waving tartans—each
clan, probably, distinguished by its own pattern—the
bright armour of the chieftains, the thick array of
weapons, and in front the mounted contingent hurrying
onwards to give the foe a warm greeting ere he
could set foot on shore.
C. 10.—Thus did invaders and defenders move on,
for some seven miles, passing, as Dio Cassius notes,
beneath the lofty cliffs of the South Foreland,80 till
these died down into the flat shore and open beach
of Deal. By this time it must have been nearly five
o'clock, and if Caesar was to land at all that day it
must be done at once. Anchor was again cast; but
so flat was the shore that the transports, which drew
at least four feet of water, could not come within
some distance of it. Between the legionaries and the
land stretched yards of sea, shoulder-deep to begin
with, and concealing who could say what treacherous
holes and quicksands beneath its surface. And their
wading had to be done under heavy fire; for the
British cavalry and chariots had already come up,
and occupied every yard of the beach, greeting with
a shower of missiles every motion of the Romans to
disembark. This was more than even Caesar's soldiers
were quite prepared to face. The men, small shame
to them, hesitated, and did not spring overboard with
the desired alacrity. Caesar's galleys, however, were
of lighter draught, and with them he made a demonstration
on the right flank (the latus apertum of
ancient warfare, the shield being on every man's left
arm) of the British; who, under a severe fire of slings,
arrows, and catapults, drew back, though only a little,
to take up a new formation, and their fire, in turn,
was for the moment silenced. And that moment was
seized for a gallant feat of arms which shows how
every rank of Caesar's army was animated by Caesar's
spirit.
C. II.—The ensign of every Roman legion was the
Roman Eagle, perched upon the head of the standard-pole,
and regarded with all, and more than all, the feeling
which our own regiments have for their regimental
colours. As with them, the staff which bore the
Eagle of the Legion also bore inscriptions commemorating
the honours and victories the legion had won, and
to lose it to the foe was an even greater disgrace
than with us. For a Roman legion was a much
larger unit than a modern regiment, and corresponded
rather to a Division; indeed, in the completeness of
its separate organization, it might almost be called an
Army Corps. Six thousand was its normal force in
infantry, and it had its own squadrons of cavalry
attached, its own engineer corps, its own baggage train,
and its own artillery of catapults and balistae.81 There
was thus even more legionary feeling in the Roman
army than there is regimental feeling in our own.
C. 12.—At this time, however, this feeling, so potent
in its effects subsequently, was a new development.
Caesar himself would seem to have been the first to see
how great an incentive such divisional sentiment might
prove, and to have done all he could to encourage it.
He had singled out one particular legion, the Tenth,
as his own special favourite, and made its soldiers feel
themselves the objects of his special regard. And this
it was which now saved the day for him. The colour-sergeant
of that legion, seeing the momentary opening
given by the flanking movement of the galleys, after
a solemn prayer that this might be well for his legion,
plunged into the sea, ensign in hand. "Over with you,
comrades," he cried, "if you would not see your
Eagle taken by the enemy." With a universal shout
of "Never, never" the legion followed; the example
spread from ship to ship, and the whole Roman army
was splashing and struggling towards the shore of
Britain.
C. 13.—At the same time this was no easy task.
As every bather knows, it is not an absolutely
straightforward matter for even an unencumbered man to
effect a landing upon a shingle beach, if ever so little
swell is on. And the Roman soldier had to keep his
footing, and use his arms moreover for fighting, with
some half-hundredweight of accoutrements about him.
To form rank was, of course, out of the question.
The men forced their way onward, singly and in little
groups, often having to stand back to back in
rallying-squares, as soon as they came within hand-stroke
of the enemy.82 And this was before they reached dry
land. For the British cavalry and chariots dashed into
the water to meet them, making full use of the advantage
which horsemen have under such circumstances,
able to ply the full swing of their arms unembarrassed
by the waves, not lifted off their feet or rolled over by
the swell, and delivering their blows from above on
foes already in difficulties. And on their side, they
copied the flanking movement of the Romans, and
wheeled round a detachment to fire upon the latus
apertum of such invaders as succeeded in reaching
shallower water.
C. 14.—Thus the fight, in Caesar's words, was an
exceedingly sharp one. It was not decided till he
sent in the boats of his galleys, and any other light
craft he had, to mingle with the combatants. These
could doubtless get right alongside the British chariots;
and now the advantage of position came to be the
other way. A troop of irregular horsemen up to their
girths in water is no match for a boat's crew of
disciplined infantry. Moreover the tide was flowing,83
and driving the Britons back moment by moment.
For a while they yet resisted bravely, but discipline
had the last word. Yard by yard the Romans
won their way, till at length they set foot ashore,
formed up on the beach in that open order84 which
made the unique strength of the Legions, and delivered
their irresistible charge. The Britons did not wait
for the shock. Their infantry was, probably, already
in retreat, covered by the cavalry and chariots, who
now in their turn gave rein to their ponies and retired
at a gallop.
C. 15.—Caesar saw them go, and bitterly felt that
his luck had failed him. Had he but cavalry, this
retreat might have been turned into a rout. But his
eighteen transports had failed to arrive, and his
drenched and exhausted infantry were in no case for
effective pursuit of a foe so superior in mobility.
Moreover the sun must have been now fast sinking,
and all speed had to be made to get the camp fortified
before nightfall. But the Roman soldier was an adept
at entrenching himself. A rampart was hastily thrown
up, the galleys beached at the top of the tide and run
up high and dry beyond the reach of the surf, the
transports swung to their anchors where the ebb would
not leave them grounded, the quarters of the various
cohorts assigned them, the sentries and patrols duly
set; and under the summer moon, these first of the
Roman invaders lay down for their first night on
British soil.
SECTION D.
Wreck of fleet—Fresh British levy—Fight in corn-field—British chariots—Attack on camp—Romans
driven into sea.
D. 1.—Meanwhile the defeated Britons had made
off, probably to their camp above Dover, where their
leaders' first act, on rallying, was to send their prisoner,
Commius, under a flag of truce to Caesar, with a
promise of unconditional submission. That his landing
had been opposed, was, they declared, no fault
of theirs; it was all the witlessness of their ignorant
followers, who had insisted on fighting. Would he
overlook it? Yes; Caesar was ready to show this
clemency; but, after conduct so very like treachery,
considering their embassy to him in Gaul, he must
insist on hostages, and plenty of them. A few were
accordingly sent in, and the rest promised in a few
days, being the quota due from more distant clans.
The British forces were disbanded; indeed, as it was
harvest time, they could scarcely have been kept
embodied anyhow; and a great gathering of chieftains
was held at which it was resolved that all alike should
acknowledge the suzerainty of Rome.
D. 2.—This assembly seems to have been held on
the morrow of the battle or the day after, so that it
can only have been attended by the local Kentish
chiefs, unless we are to suppose (as may well have
been the case), that the Army of Dover comprised
levies and captains from other parts of Britain. But
whatever it was, before the resolution could be carried
into effect an unlooked-for accident changed the whole
situation.
D. 3.—On the fourth day after the Roman landing,
the south-westerly wind which had carried Caesar
across shifted a few points to the southward. The
eighteen cavalry transports were thus enabled to leave
Ambleteuse harbour, and were seen approaching before
a gentle breeze. The wind, however, continued to
back against the sun, and, as usual, to freshen in doing
so. Thus, before they could make the land, it was
blowing hard from the eastward, and there was nothing
for them but to bear up. Some succeeded in getting
back to the shelter of the Gallic shore, others scudded
before the gale and got carried far to the west, probably
rounding-to under the lee of Beachy Head, where they
anchored. For this, however, there was far too much
sea running. Wave after wave dashed over the bows,
they were in imminent danger of swamping, and,
when the tide turned at nightfall, they got under
weigh and shaped the best course they could to the
southern shore of the Channel.
D. 4.—And this same tide that thus carried away his
reinforcements all but wrecked Caesar's whole fleet at
Deal. His mariners had strangely forgotten that with
the full moon the spring tides would come on; a
phenomenon which had been long ago remarked by
Pytheas,85 and with which they themselves must have
been perfectly familiar on the Gallic coast. And this
tide was not only a spring, but was driven by a gale
blowing straight on shore. Thus the sleeping soldiers
were aroused by the spray dashing over them, and
awoke to find the breakers pounding into their galleys
on the beach; while, of the transports, some dragged
their anchors and were driven on shore to become
total wrecks, some cut their cables, and beat, as
best they might, out to sea, and all, when the tide
and wind alike went down, were found next morning
in wretched plight. Not an anchor or cable, says
Caesar, was left amongst them, so that it was impossible
for them to keep their station off the shore by
the camp.
D. 5.—The army, not unnaturally, was in dismay.
They were merely on a reconnaissance, without any
supply of provisions, without even their usual baggage;
perhaps without tents, certainly without any means of
repairing the damage to the fleet. Get back to Gaul
for the winter they must under pain of starvation, and
where were the ships to take them?
D. 6.—The Britons, on the other hand, felt that
their foes were now delivered into their hands. Instead
of the submission they were arranging, the Council
of the Chiefs resolved to make the most of the
opportunity, and teach the world by a great example that
Britain was not a safe place to invade. Nor need this
cost many British lives. They had only to refuse
the Romans food; what little could be got by foraging
would soon be exhausted; then would come the
winter, and the starving invaders would fall an easy
prey. The annihilation of the entire expedition would
damp Roman ambitions against Britain for many a
long day. A solemn oath bound one and all to this
plan, and every chief secretly began to levy his
clansmen afresh.
D. 7.—Naturally, hostages ceased to be sent in;
but it did not need this symptom to show Caesar in
how tight a place he now was. His only chance was
to strain every nerve to get his ships refitted; and by
breaking up those most damaged, and ordering what
materials were available from the Continent, he did
in a week or two succeed in rendering some sixty out
of his eighty vessels just seaworthy.
D. 8.—And while this work was in progress, another
event showed how imperative was his need and how
precarious his situation. He had, in fact, been guilty
of a serious military blunder in going with a mere flying
column into Britain as he had gone into Germany.
The Channel was not the Rhine, and ships were
exposed to risks from which his bridge had been
entirely exempt. Nothing but a crushing defeat
would cut him off from retiring by that; but the
Ocean was not to be so bridled.
D. 9.—It was, as we have said, the season of
harvest, and the corn was not yet cut, though the
men of Kent were busily at work in the fields. With
regard to the crops nearest the camp, the legionaries
spared them the trouble of reaping, by commandeering
the corn themselves, the area of their operations
having, of course, to be continually extended.
Harvesters numbered by the thousand make quick
work; and in a day or two the whole district was
cleared, either by Roman or Briton. Caesar's scouts
could only bring him word of one unreaped field,
bordered by thick woodland, a mile or two from the
camp, and hidden from it by a low swell of the
ground. Mr. Vine, in his able monograph 'Caesar
in Kent,' thinks that the spot may still be identified,
on the way between Deal and Dover, where, by this
time, a considerable British force was once more
gathered. So entirely was the whole country on the
patriot side, that no suspicion of all this reached the
Romans, and still less did they dream that the
unreaped corn-field was an elaborate trap, and that
the woodlands beside it were filled, or ready for
filling, by masses of the enemy. The Seventh legion,
which was that day on duty, sent out a strong fatigue
party to seize the prize; who, on reaching the field,
grounded shields and spears, took off, probably, their
helmets and tunics, and set to work at cutting down
the corn, presumably with their swords.
D. 10.—Not long afterwards the camp guard reported
to Caesar that a strange cloud of dust was
rising beyond the ridge over which the legion had
disappeared. Seeing at once that something was
amiss, he hastily bade the two cohorts (about a
thousand men) of the guard to set off with him
instantly, while the other legion, the Tenth, was to
relieve them, and follow with all the rest of their
force as speedily as possible. Pushing on with all
celerity, he soon could tell by the shouts of his
soldiers and the yells of the enemy that his men
were hard pressed; and, on crowning the ridge, saw
the remnant of the legion huddled together in a half-armed
mass, with the British chariots sweeping round
them, each chariot-crew86 as it came up springing down
to deliver a destructive volley of missiles, then on
board and away to replenish their magazine and
charge in once more.
D. 11.—Even at this moment Caesar found time to
note and admire the supreme skill which the enemy
showed in this, to him, novel mode of fighting. Their
driving was like that of the best field artillery of
our day; no ground could stop them; up and down
slopes, between and over obstacles, they kept their
horses absolutely in hand; and, out of sheer bravado,
would now and again exhibit such feats of trick-driving
as to run along the pole, and stand on the
yoke, while at full speed. Such skill, as he truly
observed, could not have been acquired without
constant drill, both of men and horses; and his
military genius grasped at once the immense advantages
given by these tactics, combining "the mobility
of cavalry with the stability of infantry."
D. 12.—We may notice that Caesar says not a word
of the scythe-blades with which popular imagination
pictures the wheels of the British chariots to have
been armed. Such devices were in use amongst the
Persians, and figure at Cunaxa and Arbela. But
there the chariots were themselves projectiles, as it
were, to break the hostile ranks; and even for this
purpose the scythes proved quite ineffective, while
they must have made the whole equipment exceedingly
unhandy. In the 'De Re Militari' (an illustrated
treatise of the 5th century A.D. annexed to the
'Notitia') scythed chariots are shown. But the scythes
always have chains attached, to pull them up out of
the way in ordinary manoeuvres. The Britons of this
date, whose chariots were only to bring their crews up
to the foe and carry them off again, had, we may be
sure, no such cumbrous and awkward arrangement.87
D. 13.—On this scene of wild onset Caesar arrived
in the nick of time [tempore opportunissimo]. The
Seventh, surprised and demoralized, were on the
point of breaking, when his appearance on the ridge
caused the assailants to draw back. The Tenth came
up and formed; their comrades, possibly regaining
some of their arms, rallied behind them, and the
Britons did not venture to press their advantage home.
But neither did Caesar feel in any case to retaliate the
attack [alienum esse tempus arbitratus], and led his
troops back with all convenient speed. The Britons,
we may well believe, represented the affair as a
glorious victory for the patriot arms.88 They employed
several days of bad weather which followed in spreading
the tidings, and calling on all lovers of freedom
or of spoil to join in one great effort for crushing the
presumptuous invader.
D. 14.—The news spread like wild-fire, and the
Romans found themselves threatened in their very
camp (whence they had taken care not to stir since
their check) by a mighty host both of horse and
footmen. Caesar was compelled to fight, the legions
were drawn up with their backs to the rampart, that
the hostile cavalry might not take them in rear, and,
after a long hand-to-hand struggle, the Roman charge
once more proved irresistible. The Britons turned
their backs and fled; this time cut up, in their
retreat, by a small body of thirty Gallic horsemen
whom Commius had brought over as his escort, and
who had shared his captivity and release. So weak a
force could, of course, inflict no serious loss upon the
enemy, but, before returning to the camp, they made
a destructive raid through the neighbouring farms and
villages, "wasting all with fire and sword far and
wide."
D. 15.—That same day came fresh envoys to treat
for peace. They were now required to furnish twice
as many hostages as before; but Caesar could not
wait to receive them. They must be sent after him
to the Continent. His position had become utterly
untenable; the equinoctial gales might any day
begin; and he was only too glad to find wind and
weather serve that very night for his re-embarkation.
Under cover of the darkness he huddled his troops on
board; and next morning the triumphant Britons beheld
the invaders' fleet far on their flight across the Narrow
Seas.
SECTION E.
Caesar worsted—New fleet built—Caesar at Rome—Cicero—Expedition of 54 B.C.—Unopposed
Landing—Pro-Roman Britons—Trinobantes—Mandubratius—British army surprised—"Old
England's Hole."
E. 1.—Caesar too had, on his side, gained what he
wanted, though at a risk quite disproportionate to the
advantage. So much prestige had he lost that on his
disembarkation his force was set upon by the very
Gauls whom he had so signally beaten two years
before. Their attack was crushed with little difficulty
and great slaughter; but that it should have
been made at all shows that he was supposed to be
returning as a beaten man. However, he now knew
enough about Britain and the Britons to estimate
what force would be needful for a real invasion, and
energetically set to work to prepare it. To make
such an invasion, and to succeed in it, had now
become absolutely necessary for his whole future.
At any cost the events of the year 55 must be
"wiped off the slate;" the more so as, out of all
the British clans, two only sent in their promised
hostages. Caesar's dispatches home, we may be sure,
were admirably written, and so represented matters
as to gain him a supplicatio, or solemn thanksgiving,
of twenty days from the Senate. But the
unpleasant truth was sure to leak out unless it was
overlaid by something better. It did indeed so far
leak out that Lucan89 was able to write: Territa
quaesitis ostendit terga Britannis.
"He sought the Britons; then, in panic dread,
Turned his brave back, and from his victory fled."
E. 2.—Before setting off, therefore, for his usual
winter visit to Rome, he set all his legionaries to work
in their winter quarters, at building ships ready to
carry out his plans next spring. He himself furnished
the drawings, after a design of his own, like our own
Alfred a thousand years later.90 They were to be of
somewhat lower free-board than was customary, and
of broader beam, for Caesar had noted that the choppy
waves of the Channel had not the long run of
Mediterranean or Atlantic rollers. All, moreover,
were to be provided with sweeps; for he did not
intend again to be at the mercy of the wind. And
with such zeal and skill did the soldiers carry out his
instructions, by aid of the material which he ordered
from the dockyards of Spain, that before the winter
was over they had constructed no fewer than six
hundred of these new vessels, besides eighty fresh
war-galleys.
E. 3.—Caesar meanwhile was also at his winter's
work amid the turmoil of Roman politics. His "westward
ho!" movement was causing all the stir he hoped
for. We can see in Cicero's correspondence with
Atticus, with Trebatius, and with his own brother
Quintus (who was attached in some capacity to
Caesar's second expedition), how full Rome was of
gossip and surmise as to the outcome of this daring
adventure. "Take care," he says to Trebatius, "you
who are always preaching caution; mind you don't
get caught by the British chariot-men."91 "You will
find, I hear, absolutely nothing in Britain—no gold,
no silver. I advise you to capture a chariot and drive
straight home. Anyhow get yourself into Caesar's good
books."92
E. 4.—To be in Caesar's good books was, in fact,
Cicero's own great ambition at this time. Despite
his constitutional zeal, he felt "the Dynasts," as he
called the Triumvirate, the only really strong force in
politics, and was ready to go to considerable lengths
in courting their favour—Caesar's in particular. He
not only withdrew all opposition to the additional
five years of command in Gaul which the subservient
Senate had unconstitutionally decreed to the "dynast,"
but induced his brother Quintus to volunteer for
service in the coming invasion of Britain. Through
Quintus he invited Caesar's criticisms on his own very
poor verses, and wrote a letter, obviously meant to be
shown, expressing boundless gratification at a favourable
notice: "If he thinks well of my poetry, I shall
know it is no mere one-horse concern, but a real
four-in-hand." "Caesar tells me he never read better
Greek. But why does he write [rhathumôtera] ['rather
careless'] against one passage? He really does. Do
find out why."
E. 5.—This gentle criticism seems to have somewhat
damped Cicero's ardour for Caesar and his
British glories. His every subsequent mention of the
expedition is to belittle it. In the spring he had
written to Trebatius: "So our dear Caesar really thinks
well of you as a counsel. You will be glad indeed to
have gone with him to Britain. There at least you
will never meet your match."93 But in the summer it
is: "I certainly don't blame you for showing yourself
so little of a sight-seer [non nimis [philotheôron]]
in this British matter."94 "I am truly glad you never went
there. You have missed the trouble, and I the bore
of listening to your tales about it all."95 To Atticus
he writes: "We are all awaiting the issue of this
British war. We hear the approaches [aditus] of the
island are fortified with stupendous ramparts [mirificis
molibus]. Anyhow we know that not one scruple
[scrupulum] of money exists there, nor any other
plunder except slaves—and none of them either
literary or artistic."96 "I heard (on Oct. 24) from
Caesar and from my brother Quintus that all is over
in Britain. No booty.... They wrote on September
26, just embarking."
E. 6.—Both Caesar and Quintus seem to have been
excellent correspondents, and between them let Cicero
hear from Britain almost every week during their stay
in the island, the letters taking on an average about a
month to reach him. He speaks of receiving on
September 27 one written by Caesar on September 1;
and on September 13 one from Quintus ("your
fourth")97 written August 10. And apparently they
were very good letters, for which Cicero was duly
grateful. "What pleasant letters," he says to Quintus,
"you do write.... I see you have an extraordinary
turn for writing [hypothesin] scribendi egregiam.
Tell me all about it, the places, the people, the customs, the
clans, the fighting. What are they all like? And
what is your general like?"98 "Give me Britain,
that I may paint it in your colours with my own
brush [penicillo]."99 This last sentence refers to a
heroic poem on "The Glories of Caesar," which Cicero
seems to have meditated but never brought into being.
Nor do we know anything of the contents of his
British correspondence, except that it contains some
speculations about our tide-ways; for, in his 'De
Natura Deorum,'100 Cicero pooh-poohs the idea that
such natural phenomena argue the existence of a
God: "Quid? Aestus maritimi ... Britannici ...
sine Deo fieri nonne possunt?"
E. 7.—Neither can we say what he meant by the
"stupendous ramparts" against Caesar's access to our
island. The Dover cliffs have been suggested, and
the Goodwin Sands; but it seems much more probable
that the Britons were believed to have artificially
fortified the most accessible landing-places. Perhaps
they may have actually done so, but if they did it was
to no purpose; for this time Caesar disembarked his
army quite unopposed. On his return from Rome he
had bidden his newly-built fleet, along with what was
left of the old one, rendezvous at Boulogne; whence,
after long delay through a continuous north-westerly
breeze [Corus], he was at length enabled to set sail
with no fewer than eight hundred vessels. Never
throughout history has so large a navy threatened our
shores. The most numerous of the Danish expeditions
contained less than four hundred ships, William the
Conqueror's less than seven hundred;101 the Spanish
Armada not two hundred.
E. 8.—Caesar was resolved this time to be in sufficient
strength, and no longer despised his enemies.
He brought with him five out of his eight legions, some
thirty thousand infantry, that is, and two thousand
horse. The rest remained under his most trusted
lieutenant, Labienus, to police Gaul and keep open
his communications with Rome. According to Polyaenus102
(A.D. 180), he even brought over with him a
fighting elephant, to terrify the natives and their
horses. There is nothing impossible about the story;
though it is not likely Caesar would have forgotten to
mention so striking a feature of his campaign. One
particular animal we may be sure he had with him, his
own famous charger with the cloven hoof, which had
been bred in his own stud, and would suffer on its
back none but himself. On it, as the rumour went, it
had been prophesied by the family seer that he should
ever ride to victory.
E. 9.—It was, as the Emperor Napoleon has calculated,
on July 21 that, at sun-set this mighty
armament put out before a gentle south-west air,
which died away at midnight, leaving them becalmed
on a waveless sea. When morning dawned Britain
lay on their left, and they were drifting up the straits
with the tide. By and by it turned, oars were got
out, and every vessel made for the spot which the
events of the previous year had shown to be the best
landing-place.103 Thanks to Caesar's foresight the transports
as well as the galleys could now be thus propelled,
and such was the ardour of the soldiers that both
classes of ships kept pace with one another, in spite
of their different build. The transports, of course,
contained men enough to take turns at the sweeps,
while the galley oarsmen could not be relieved. By
noon they reached Britain, and found not a soul to
resist their landing. There had been, as Caesar learnt
from "prisoners," a large force gathered for that
purpose, but the terrific multitude of his ships had
proved quite too demoralizing, and the patriot army
had retired to "higher ground," to which the prisoners
were able to direct the invader.
E. 10.—There is obviously something strange about
this tale. There was no fighting, the shore was
deserted, yet somehow prisoners were taken, and
prisoners singularly well informed as to the defenders'
strategy. The story reads very much as if these
useful individuals were really deserters, or, as the
Britons would call it, traitors. We know that in one
British tribe, at least, there was a pro-Roman party.
Not long before this there had fled to Caesar in Gaul,
Mandubratius, the fugitive prince of the Trinobantes,
who dwelt in Essex. His father Immanuentius had
been slain in battle by Cassivellaunus, or Caswallon104
(the king of their westward neighbours the Cateuchlani),
now the most powerful chieftain in Britain, and
he himself driven into exile.
E. 11.—This episode seems to have formed part of a
general native rising against the over-sea suzerainty
of Divitiacus, which had brought Caswallon to the
front as the national champion. It was Caswallon
who was now in command against Caesar, and if, as is
very probable, there was any Trinobantian contingent
in his army, they may well have furnished these
"prisoners." For Caesar had brought Mandubratius
with him for the express purpose of influencing the
Trinobantes, who were in fact thus induced in a few
weeks to set an example of submission to Rome, as
soon as their fear of Caswallon was removed. And
meanwhile nothing is more likely than that a certain
number of ardent loyalists should leave the usurper's
ranks and hasten to greet their hereditary sovereign,
so soon as ever he landed. The later British accounts
develop the transaction into an act of wholesale
treachery; Mandubratius (whose name they discover
to mean The Black Traitor) deserting, in the thick of
a fight, to Caesar, at the head of twenty thousand
clansmen,—an absurd exaggeration which may yet
have the above-mentioned kernel of truth.
E. 12.—But whoever these "prisoners" were, their
information was so important, and in Caesar's view so
trustworthy, that he proceeded to act upon it that very
night. Before even entrenching his camp, leaving
only ten cohorts and three hundred horse to guard
the vessels, most of which were at anchor on the
smooth sea, he set off at the head of his army "in the
third watch," and after a forced march of twelve
miles, probably along the British trackway afterwards
called Watling Street, found himself at daybreak in
touch with the enemy. The British forces were
stationed on a ridge of rising ground, at the foot of
which flowed a small stream. Napoleon considers
this stream to have been the Lesser Stour (now a
paltry rivulet, dry in summer, but anciently much
larger), and the hill to have been Barham Down, the
camping-ground of so many armies throughout British
history.
E. 13.—The battle began with a down-hill charge of
the British cavalry and chariots against the Roman
horse who were sent forward to seize the passage of
the stream. Beaten back they retreated to its banks,
which were now, doubtless, lined by their infantry.
And here the real struggle took place. The unhappy
Britons, however, were hopelessly outclassed, and very
probably outnumbered, by Caesar's twenty-four thousand
legionaries and seventeen hundred horsemen.
They gave way, some dispersing in confusion, but the
best of their troops retiring in good order to a stronghold
in the neighbouring woods, "well fortified both
by nature and art," which was a legacy from some
local quarrel. Now they had strengthened it with an
abattis of felled trees, which was resolutely defended,
while skirmishers in open order harassed the assailants
from the neighbouring forest [rari propugnabant
e silvis]. It was necessary for the Seventh legion to
throw up trenches, and finally to form a "tortoise"
with their shields, as in the assault on a regularly
fortified town, before the position could be carried.
Then, at last, the Britons were driven from the wood,
and cut up in their flight over the open down beyond.
The spot where they made this last stand is still, in
local legend, associated with the vague memory of
some patriot defeat, and known by the name of "Old
England's Hole." Traces of the rampart, and of the
assailants' trenches, are yet visible.105
SECTION F.
Fleet again wrecked—Britons rally under Caswallon—Battle of Barham Down—Britons fly to
London—Origin of London—Patriot army dispersed.
F. 1.—It was Caesar's intention to give the broken
enemy no chance of rallying. In spite of the dire
fatigue of his men (who had now been without sleep
for two nights, and spent the two succeeding days in
hard rowing and hard fighting), he sent forward the
least exhausted to press the pursuit. But before the
columns thus detailed had got out of sight a message
from the camp at Richborough changed his purpose.
The mishap of the previous year had been repeated.
Once more the gentle breeze had changed to a gale,
and the fleet which he had left so smoothly riding at
anchor was lying battered and broken on the beach.
His own presence was urgently needed on the scene
of the misfortune, and it would have been madness
to let the campaign go on without him. So the pursuers,
horse and foot, were hastily recalled, and,
doubtless, were glad enough to encamp, like their
comrades, on the ground so lately won, where they
took their well-earned repose.
F. 2.—But for Caesar there could be no rest. Without
the loss of a moment he rode back to the landing-place,
where he found the state of things fully as bad
as had been reported to him. Forty ships were hopelessly
shattered; but by dint of strenuous efforts he
succeeded in saving the rest. All were now drawn on
shore, and tinkered up by artificers from the legions,
while instructions were sent over to Labienus for the
building of a fresh fleet in Gaul. The naval station,
too, was this time thoroughly fortified.
F. 3.—Ten days sufficed for the work; but meanwhile
much of the fruit of the previous victory had
been lost. The Britons, finding the pursuit checked,
and learning the reason, had rallied their scattered
force; and when Caesar returned to his camp at Barham
Down he found before it a larger patriot army
than ever, with Caswallon (who is now named for
the first time) at its head. This hero, who, as we have
said, may have been brought to the front through the
series of inter-tribal wars which had ruined the foreign
supremacy of Divitiacus in Britain, was by this time
acclaimed his successor in a dignity corresponding in
some degree to the mythical Pendragonship of Welsh
legend.106 His own immediate dominions included at
least the future districts of South Anglia and Essex,
and his banner was followed by something very like a
national levy from the whole of Britain south of the
Forth. When we read of the extraordinary solidarity
which animated, over a much larger area, the equally
separate clans of Gaul in their rising against the
Roman yoke a year later, there is nothing incredible,
or even improbable, in the Britons having developed
something of a like solidarity in their resistance to its
being laid upon their necks. Burmann's 'Anthology'
contains an epigram which bears witness to the existence
amongst us even at that date of the sentiment,
"Britons never shall be slaves." Our island is described
as "Libera non hostem non passa Britannia regem."107
F. 4.—Even on his march from the new naval camp
to Barham Down Caesar was harassed by incessant
attacks from flying parties of Caswallon's chariots and
horsemen, who would sweep up, deliver their blow,
and retire, only to take grim advantage of the slightest
imprudence on the part of the Roman cavalry in
pursuit. And when, with a perceptible number of
casualties, the Down was reached, a stronger attack
was delivered on the outposts set to guard the
working parties who were entrenching the position,
and the fighting became very sharp indeed. The
outposts were driven in, even though reinforced by
two cohorts—each the First of its Legion, and thus
consisting of picked men, like the old Grenadier
companies of our own regiments. Though these twelve
hundred regulars, the very flower of the Roman army,
awaited the attack in such a formation that the front
cohort was closely supported by the rear, the Britons
pushed their assault home, and had "the extreme
audacity" to charge clean through the ranks of both,
re-form behind, and charge back again, with great loss
to the Romans (whose leader, Quintus Labienus
Durus, the Tribune, or Divisional General in command
of one of the legions, was slain), and but little
to themselves. Not till several more cohorts were
dispatched to the rescue did they at length retire.
F. 5.—This brilliant little affair speaks well both for
the discipline and the spirit of the patriot army; and
Caesar ungrudgingly recognizes both. He points out
how far superior the British warriors were to his own
men, both in individual and tactical mobility. The
legionaries dare not break their ranks to pursue,
under pain of being cut off by their nimble enemies
before they could re-form; and even the cavalry found
it no safe matter to press British chariots too far or
too closely. At any moment the crews might spring
to earth, and the pursuing horsemen find themselves
confronted, or even surrounded, by infantry in
position. Moreover, the morale of the British army
was so good that it could fight in quite small units,
each of which, by the skilful dispositions of Caswallon,
was within easy reach of one of his series of "stations"
(i.e. block-houses) disposed along the line of march,
where it could rest while the garrison turned out to
take its turn in the combat.
F. 6.—Against such an enemy it was obviously
Caesar's interest to bring on, as speedily as possible, a
general action, in which he might deliver a crushing
blow. And, happily for him, their success had rendered
the Britons over-confident, so that they were
even deluded enough to imagine that they could face
the full Roman force in open field. Both sides,
therefore, were eager to bring about the same result.
Next morning the small British squads which were
hovering around showed ostentatious reluctance to
come to close quarters, so as to draw the Romans out
of their lines. Caesar gladly met their views, and
sent forward all his cavalry and three legions, who, on
their part, ostentatiously broke rank and began to
forage. This was the opportunity the Britons wanted—and
Caesar wanted also. From every side, in front,
flank, and rear, the former "flew upon" their enemies,
so suddenly and so vigorously that ere the legions,
prepared as they were for the onset, could form, the
very standards were all but taken.
F. 7.—But this time it was with legions and not
with cohorts that the enemy had to do. Their first
desperate charge spent itself before doing any serious
damage to the masses of disciplined valour confronting
them, and the Romans, once in formation, were
able to deliver a counter-charge which proved quite
irresistible. On every side the Britons broke and
fled; the main stream of fugitives unwisely keeping
together, so that the pursuers, cavalry and infantry
alike, were able to press the pursuit vigorously. No
chance was given for a rally; amid the confusion the
chariot-crews could not even spring to earth as usual;
and the slaughter was such as to daunt the stoutest
patriot. The spell of Caswallon's luck was broken,
and his auxiliaries from other clans with one accord
deserted him and dispersed homewards. Never again
throughout all history did the Britons gather a national
levy against Rome.
F. 8.—This break-up of the patriot confederacy
seems, however, to have been not merely the spontaneous
disintegration of a routed army, but a deliberately
adopted resolution of the chiefs. Caesar
speaks of "their counsel." And this brings us to an
interesting consideration. Where did they take this
counsel, and why did the fleeing hosts follow one line
of flight? And how was the line of the Roman
advance so accurately calculated upon by Caswallon
that he was able to place his "stations" along it
beforehand? The answer is that there was an obvious
objective for which the Romans would be sure to
make; indeed there was almost certainly an obvious
track along which they would be sure to march.
There is every reason to believe that most of the later
Roman roads were originally British trackways, broad
green ribands of turf winding through the land (such
as the Icknield Way is still in many parts of its
course), and following the lines most convenient for
trade.
F. 9.—But, if this is so, then that convergence of
these lines on London, which is as marked a feature
of the map of Roman Britain as it is of our railway
maps now, must have already been noticeable. And
the only possible reason for this must be found in the
fact that already London was a noted passage over the
Thames. That an island in mid-stream was the
original raison d'être of London Bridge is apparent
from the mass of buildings which is shown in every
ancient picture of that structure clustering between
the two central spans. This island must have been a
very striking feature in primaeval days, coming, as it
did, miles below any other eyot on the river, and
must always have suggested and furnished a comparatively
easy crossing-place. Possibly even a bridge of
some sort may have existed in 54 B.C.; anyhow this
crossing would have been alike the objective of the
invading, and the point d'appui of the defending
army. And the line both of the Roman advance and
of the British retreat would be along the track
afterwards known as the Kentish Watling Street. For
here again the late British legends which tell us of
councils of war held in London against Caesar, and
fatal resolutions adopted there, with every detail of
proposer and discussion, are probably founded, with
gross exaggeration, upon a real kernel of historic
truth. It was actually on London that the Britons
retired, and from London that the gathering of the
clans broke up, each to its own.
SECTION G.
Passage of Thames—Submission of clans—Storm of Verulam—Last patriot effort in Kent
—Submission of Caswallon—Romans
leave Britain—"Caesar Divus."
G. 1.—Caswallon, however, and his immediate realm
still remained to be dealt with. His first act, on resolving
upon continued resistance, would of course be to
make the passage of the London tide-way impossible
for the Roman army; and Caesar, like William the
Conqueror after him, had to search up-stream for a
crossing-place. He did not, however, like William,
have to make his way so far as Wallingford before
finding one. Deserters told him of a ford, though a
difficult one, practicable for infantry, not many miles
distant. The traditional spot, near Walton-on-Thames,
anciently called Coway Stakes, may very probably be
the real place. Both name and stakes, however, have
probably, in spite of the guesses of antiquaries, no
connection with Caesar and his passage, but more
prosaically indicate that here was a passage for cattle
(Coway = Cow Way) marked out by crossing stakes.
G. 2.—The forces of Caswallon were accompanying
the Roman march on the northern bank of the stream,
and when Caesar came to the ford he found them
already in position [instructas] to dispute his passage
behind a chevaux de frise of sharpened stakes, more
of which, he was told, were concealed by the water.
If the Britons had shown their wonted resolution this
position must have been impregnable. But Caswallon's
men were disheartened and shaken by the
slaughter on the Kentish Downs and the desertion of
their allies. Caesar rightly calculated that a bold
demonstration would complete their demoralization.
So it proved. The sight of the Roman cavalry
plunging into the steam, and the legionaries eagerly
pressing on neck-deep in water, proved altogether too
much for their nerves. With one accord, and without
a blow, they broke and fled.108
G. 3.—Nor did Caswallon think it wise again to
gather them. He had no further hope of facing
Caesar in pitched battle, and contented himself with
keeping in touch with the enemy with a flying column
of chariot-men some two thousand strong. His practice
was to keep his men a little off the road—there
was still, be it noted, a road along which the Romans
were marching—and drive off the flocks and herds
into the woods before the Roman advance. He made
no attempt to attack the legions, but if any foragers
were bold enough to follow up the booty thus reft
from them, he was upon them in a moment. Such
serious loss was thus inflicted that Caesar had to
forbid any such excursions, and to content himself
with laying waste the fields and farms in immediate
proximity to his route.
G. 4.—He was now in Caswallon's own country,
and his presence there encouraged the Trinobantian
loyalists openly to throw off allegiance to their
conqueror and raise Mandubratius to his father's throne
under the protection of Rome; sending to Caesar at
the same time provisions for his men, and forty
hostages whom he demanded of them. Caesar in
return gave strict orders to his soldiers against
plundering or raiding in their territory. This mingled
firmness and clemency made so favourable an impression
that the submission of the Trinobantes was
followed by that of various adjoining clans, small and
great, from the Iceni of East Anglia to the little riverside
septs of the Bibroci and Ancalites, whose names
may or may not be echoed in the modern Bray and
Henley. The Cassi (of Cassiobury) not only submitted,
but guided the Romans to Caswallon's own
neighbouring stronghold in the forests near St. Alban's.
It was found to be a position of considerable natural
strength (probably on the site of the later Verulam),
and well fortified; but all the heart was out of the
Cateuchlanians. When the assailing columns approached
to storm the place on two sides at once,
they hesitated, broke, and flung themselves over the
ramparts on the other sides in headlong flight. Caesar,
however, was able to head them, and his troops killed
and captured large numbers, besides getting possession
of all the flocks and herds, which, as usual, had been
gathered for refuge within the stockade.
G. 5.—Caswallon himself, however, escaped, and
now made one last bid for victory. So great was still
the influence of his prestige that, broken as he was,
he was able to prevail upon the clans of Kent to
make a sudden and desperate onset upon the Naval
Station at Richborough. All four of the chieftains
beneath whose sway the county was divided (Cingetorix,
Canilius, Taximagulus, and Segonax) rose with
one accord at his summons. The attack, however,
proved a mere flash in the pan. Even before it was
delivered, the garrison sallied out vigorously, captured
one of the British leaders, Lugotorix, slaughtered the
assailants wholesale, and crushed the whole movement
without the loss of a man. This final defeat of his
last hopes broke even Caswallon's sturdy heart. His
followers slain, his lands wasted, his allies in revolt,
he bowed to the inevitable. Even now, however, he
did not surrender unconditionally, but besought
Caesar's protégé, the Atrebatian chieftain Commius,
to negotiate terms with the conqueror.
G. 6.—To Caesar this was no small relief. The
autumn was coming on, and Caswallon's guerrilla
warfare might easily eat up all the remainder of the
summer, when he must needs be left alone, conquered
or unconquered, that the Roman army might get
back to its winter quarters on the Continent; more
especially as ominous signs in Gaul already predicted
the fearful tempest of revolt which, that winter, was
to burst. Easy conditions were therefore imposed.
Caswallon pledged himself, as Lord Paramount, that
Britain should pay an annual tribute to the Roman
treasury, and, as Chief of the Cateuchlani, that he
would leave Mandubratius on the Trinobantian
throne. Hostages were given, and the Roman forces
returned with all convenient speed to the coast; this
time, presumably, crossing the Thames in the regular
way at London.
G. 7.—After a short wait, in vain expectation of
the sixty ships which Labienus had built in Gaul and
which could not beat across the Channel, Caesar
crowded his troops and the hordes of British captives
on board as best he could, and being favoured by the
weather, found himself and them safe across, having
worked out his great purpose, and leaving a nominally
conquered and tributary Britain behind him. This,
as we have seen from Cicero's letter, was on September
26, B.C. 54.
G. 8.—We have seen, too, that Cicero's cue was to
belittle the business. But this was far from being
the view taken by the Roman "in the street." To
him Caesar's exploit was like those of the gods and
heroes of old; Hercules and Bacchus had done less,
for neither had passed the Ocean. The popular
feeling of exultation in this new glory added to Roman
fame may be summed up in the words of the
Anthologist already quoted:
Libera non hostem, non passa Britannia regem,
Aeternum nostro quae procul orbe jacet;
Felix adversis, et sorte oppressa secunda,
Communis nobis et tibi Caesar erit.
["Free Britain, neither foe nor king that bears,
That from our world lies far and far away,
Lucky to lose, crushed by a happy doom,
Henceforth, O Caesar, ours—and yours—will be."]
G. 9.—Caesar never set foot in Britain again, though
he once saved himself from imminent destruction by
utilizing his British experiences and passing his
troops over a river in coracles of British build.109 He
went his way to the desperate fighting, first of the
great Gallic revolt, then of the Civil War (with his
own Labienus for the most ferocious of his opponents),
till he found himself the undisputed master of the
Roman world. But when he fell, upon the Ides of
March B.C. 44, it was mainly through the superhuman
reputation won by his invasion of Britain that he
received the hitherto unheard of distinction of a
popular apotheosis, and handed down to his successors
for many a generation the title not only of
Caesar, but of "Divus."
Footnotes
[68] They may very possibly have been connected with the
Veneti of Venice at the other extremity of "the Gauls."
[69] See p. 37.
[70] Caesar, 'Bell. Gall.' iii. 9, 13.
[71] Elton, 'Origins of English Hist.,' p. 237. Though less
massive, these vessels are built much as the Venetian. But it is
just as probable they may really be "picts." See p. 232.
[72] This opening of Britain to continental influences may
perhaps account for Posidonius having been able to make so
thorough a survey of the islands. See p. 36.
[73] Elton ('Origins of English Hist.') conjectures
that these tribes did not migrate to Britain till after Caesar's
day. But there is no evidence for this, and my view seems better
to explain the situation.
[74] Solinus (A.D. 80) says of Britain, "alterius
orbis nomen mereretur." This passage is probably the origin
of the Pope's well-known reference to St. Anselm, when Archbishop
of Canterbury, as "quasi alterius orbis antistes."
[75] A Roman legion at this date comprised ten "cohorts,"
i.e. some six thousand heavy-armed infantry, besides a
small light-armed contingent, and an attached squadron of three
hundred cavalry. Each of Caesar's transports must thus have carried
from one hundred and fifty to two hundred men, and at this
rate the eighteen cavalry vessels (reckoning a horse as equivalent
to five men, the usual proportion for purposes of military transport)
would suffice for his two squadrons.
[76] An ancient ship could not sail within eight points of the
wind (see Smith, 'Voyage of St. Paul'). Thus a S.W. breeze,
while permitting Caesar to leave Boulogne, would effectually
prevent these vessels from working out of Ambleteuse.
[77] Hence the name Dubris = "the rivers."
[78] The claims of Richborough [Ritupis] to be Caesar's actual
landing-place have been advocated by Archdeacon Baddeley,
Mr. G. Bowker, and others. But it is almost impossible to
make this place square with Caesar's narrative.
[79] This was four days before the full moon, so that the tide
would be high at Dover about 6 p.m.
[80] The "lofty promontory" rounded is specially noticed by
Dio Cassius.
[81] The principle of the balista that of the sling, of
the catapult that of the bow. Ammianus Marcellinus (xv. 12)
speaks of "the snowy arms" of the Celtic women dealing blows
"like the stroke of a catapult."
[82] Valerius Maximus (A.D. 30) has recorded one such act of
daring on the part of a soldier named Scaeva, who with four
comrades held an isolated rock against all comers till he alone
was left, when he plunged into the sea and swam off, with the
loss of his shield. In spite of this disgrace Caesar that evening
promoted him on the field. The story has a suspicious number
of variants, but off Deal there is such a patch of rocks,
locally called the Malms; so that it may possibly be true
('Memorabilia,' III. 2, 23).
[83] Valerius Maximus (A.D. 30) states that the Romans landed
on a falling tide, which cannot be reconciled with Caesar's own
narrative (see p. 88). The idea may have originated in the fact
that it was probably the approaching turn of the tide which forced
him to land at Deal. He could not have reached Richborough
before the ebb began.
[84] Every soldier was four feet from his nearest neighbour to
give scope for effective sword-play. No other troops in history
have ever had the morale thus to fight at close quarters.
[85] See Plutarch, 'De placitis philosophorum.'
[86] Each chariot may have carried six or seven men, like
those of the Indian King Porus. See Dodge, 'Alexander,' p. 554.
[87] Pomponius Mela ('De Situ Orbis,' I) tells us that
by his date (50 A.D.) it had come in: "Covinos vocant, quorum falcatis
axîbus utuntur."
[88] It is thus represented by Giraldus Cambrensis, who gives
us the story of Caesar's campaigns from the British point of view,
as it survived (of course with gross exaggerations) in the Cymric
legends of his day.
[89] Lucan, the last champion of anti-Caesarism, sung, two
generations after its overthrow, the praises and the dirge of the
Oligarchy.
[90] See my 'Alfred in the Chroniclers,' p. 44.
[91]'Ad Treb.' Ep. VI.
[92] 'Ad Treb.' Ep. VII.
[93] Ep. 10.
[94] Ep. 16.
[95] Ep. 17.
[96] IV. 15.
[97] III. 1.
[98] II. 16.
[99] II. 15.
[100] III. 10.
[101] Wace ('Roman de Ron,' 11,567) gives 696 as the exact total.
[102] 'Strategemata,' viii. 23.
[103] This was probably not Deal, which had not proved a
satisfactory station, but Richborough, where the Wantsum, then a
broad arm of the sea between Kent and Thanet, provided an
excellent harbour for a large fleet. It was, moreover, the regular
emporium of the tin trade (see p. 36), and a British trackway
thus led to it.
[104] Otherwise Cadwallon, which, according to
Professor Rhys, signifies War King, and may possibly have been
a title rather than a personal name. But it remained in use as
the latter for many centuries of British history.
[105] Vine, 'Caesar in Kent,' p. 171. The spot is "in Bourne
Park, not far from the road leading up to Bridge Hill."
[106] See p. 244.
[107] See II. G. 8. The tradition of this sentiment
long survived. Hegesippus (A.D. 150) says: "Britanni ... quidesse
servitus ignorabant; soli sibi nati, semper sibi liberi" ('De Bello
Judiaco,' II. 9).
[108] Polyaenus (A.D. 180) in his 'Strategemata' (viii. 23)
ascribes their panic to Caesar's elephant. See p. 107.
[109] At Ilerda. See Dodge, 'Caesar,' xxviii.
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