The Great Republic by the Master Historians The Victory at Trenton byBancroft, Hubert H.
[The withdrawal of Washington to the Highlands left the garrisons at Forts
Washington and Lee in a position of great insecurity. General Greene had
persisted in retaining the garrison in Fort Washington, and had induced Congress
to order its continued occupation, despite the remonstrances of Washington. The
result justified the fears of the commander-in-chief. Howe invested the fort,
and besieged it with such vigor that its brave commander was obliged to
surrender. The besiegers lost nearly a thousand men in killed and wounded, the
Americans one hundred and forty nine: much valuable artillery and a large number
of small-arms were captured, and more than twenty-six hundred prisoners taken.
An advance was next made on Fort Lee, which lay on the New Jersey side of the
Hudson, about ten miles above the city. The garrison of this stronghold escaped
certain capture by a hasty withdrawal, but much valuable material was abandoned
to the enemy. These were serious disasters to the American army, and Washington
found himself obliged to retreat step by step through New Jersey, followed by
the victorious foe. Fortunately for him, the Howes divided their forces, a
strong expedition being sent to Newport, for the capture of the island of Rhode
Island, the unimportant occupation of which employed a large body of troops for
three years.
Washington, after facing his foe at every step, was finally forced by superior
numbers to cross the Delaware, on which he destroyed or secured every boat for a
distance of seventy miles, to prevent the enemy from following. Howe reached
Trenton on the 8th of December, just in time to see the last of the Americans
safely pass the river.
Meanwhile, General Lee, who had been left in command on the Hudson, delayed his
march to Washington's aid, despite the urgency of the latter, and, while
carelessly passing the night at a distance from his force, was taken prisoner by
some British dragoons. "No hope remained to the United States but in Washington.
His retreat of ninety miles through the Jerseys, protracted for eighteen or
nineteen days, in winter, often in sight and within cannon-shot of his enemies,
his rear pulling down bridges and their van building them up, had for its
purpose to effect delay till midwinter and impassable roads should offer their
protection. The actors, looking back upon the crowded disasters which fell on
them, hardly knew by what springs of animation they had been sustained."
This retreat and pursuit threw the inhabitants of the then seat of government
into the greatest dismay. There were British posts in New Jersey but little
above Philadelphia, and ships of war were rumored to be in the bay. The
inhabitants sent their wives and children, and portable valuables, from the
city. The panic affected Congress, which body hastily voted to adjourn to
Baltimore, their flight seriously injuring the public credit and causing a fall
in the value of the currency. Putnam held the city, which he was charged to hold
to the last extremity. General Howe, satisfied that the fight was thoroughly
taken out of the American army, returned to his winter-quarters in New York,
leaving Donop with two Hessian brigades and the Forty-Second Highlanders to hold
the line from Trenton to Burlington.
European confidence in the success of the British was at its height. "Franklin's
troops have been beaten by those of the King of England," wrote Voltaire: "alas!
reason and liberty are ill received in this world." Rockingham, Lord North,
Burke, and other statesmen of England considered the resistance of the colonists
nearly at an end. In New York the young officers were preparing to amuse
themselves with dramatic performances, while gambling served to fill the
intervals between the frequent balls and parties. Cornwallis left Grant in
command in New Jersey, and was about to embark for England, as he considered the
fighting at an end. All was confidence on the part of the invaders, gloom and
depression on that of the Americans.
Donop declared that Trenton should be protected by redoubts, but Rahl, who
commanded that post, disdained the idea. There were rumors, indeed, that
Washington was threatening Trenton, but no one believed them. "Let them come,"
said Rahl, valiantly: "what need of intrenchments? We will at them with the
bayonet." He neglected all proper measures of security, and spent his time in
carousing, while the men under his command made the most of their opportunities
for plundering.
Yet he was not so secure as he imagined. Washington was less discouraged and
less powerless than his enemies supposed. Perceiving that the forces of the
enemy were scattered and careless, he resolved, on the 16th of December, to take
advantage of the opportunity offered for a surprise. All the boats available
were secured, and his forces, increased by fifteen hundred volunteers from
Philadelphia, guarded all the crossing-places on the Delaware. While waiting for
the proper time to put his scheme in execution, some reinforcements under Greene
and Sullivan joined him. At length the chosen period arrived. We select from
Carrington's "Battles of the American Revolution" a description of the important
events that succeeded.]
On the twenty-fifth day of December, 1776, the regiments of Anspach, Knyphausen,
and Rahl, with fifty chasseurs and twenty light dragoons, making a total
effective force of not quite fifteen hundred and fifty men, constituted the
garrison at Trenton. The command had six pieces of artillery, including two in
front of Colonel Rahl's quarters; but, contrary to the previous advice of
Colonel Donop, there were neither field-works nor defence of any kind before the
ferry or at any of the approaches to the town. One such work on the summit, at
the fork of King and Queen's Streets, and one on Front Street, would have
seriously endangered the American movement, especially under the circumstances
of severe weather, which almost disarmed the assailants. It is well known that
rumors of an impending offensive return by Washington had reached Colonel Rahl,
and that a small picket-guard had been stationed on the old Pennington road,
half a mile beyond the head of King Street, and another was in position, equally
advanced, upon the river road leading to the next upper, or McConkey's Ferry,
past the houses of Rutherford and General Dickinson.
It was Christmas day, a holiday in great favor with the troops which composed
the garrison. It is profitless for the author's purpose to enter into details of
the manner in which that garrison observed that holiday and spent the night
which closed its enjoyment. It is enough to state that military negligence was
absolute, and that it cost the commander his life. That negligence lasted
through the night, and prevailed up to eight o'clock in the morning. It appears
that the usual morning parade routine had been observed, and the men had
returned to their barracks. These barracks, now cleft by a street, were still
standing in 1875, and showed that they afforded a good defensive position, if
promptly occupied and firmly held. The disposition of the American army for the
attack was eminently bold and judicious. Griffin was expected still to occupy
the attention of Donop, as if the demonstrations across the river were but the
faverish action of local militia. A small centre column, under General James
Ewing, of Pennsylvania, whose brigade reported but five hundred and forty-seven
rank and file for duty, was to cross just below Trenton, to occupy the bridge
across the Assanpink, and thus sever communication with Donop's corps at
Bordentown. Still farther down the river, as a constraint upon the possible
movement of that corps to the support of Colonel Rahl, the right wing under
Colonel John Cadwallader, not yet promoted, was ordered to cross at Bristol,
below Bordentown, with view to a direct attack upon Donop from the south, and
thus co-operate with the militia in that quarter. General Washington reserved
for himself the conduct of the left wing, consisting of twentyfour hundred men,
which was to cross nine miles above Trenton, at McConkey's Ferry. Learning that
Maidenhead was almost without garrison, except a troop of dragoons, it was the
purpose of the American commander also to include that sub-post within his raid.
It was also expected that General Putnam would cross from Philadelphia early on
the twenty-sixth, with at least a thousand men. The plan embraced the entire
deliverance of the left bank of the Delaware.
The right wing landed a portion of its troops, but, on account of the ice, could
not land the artillery, and returned to Bristol. Cadwallader expressed his great
regret in his report to Washington, remarking, "I imagine the badness of the
night must have prevented you from passing over as you intended."
It was not until four o'clock that Cadwallader succeeded in regaining Bristol;
and Moylan, who then started to join Washington, found the storm so violent that
he abandoned his purpose, believing that that officer could not possibly effect
a crossing. The centre column failed to effect a landing for the same reason.
The left wing of the army under Washington, accompanied by Greene and Sullivan
as division commanders, formed evening parade under cover of the high ground
just back of McConkey's Ferry, now known as Taylorville. It was designed to move
as soon as darkness set in, so as to complete the crossing at midnight, and
enter Trenton as early as five o'clock on the morning of the twenty-sixth.
It was such a night as cost Montgomery and Arnold their fearful experience under
the rock of Quebec. It was cold, snowy, and tempestuous. A few days of milder
weather had opened the ice; now it was again rapidly freezing, checking the
current and skirting the shore.
The scanty protection of blankets was as nothing to protect men in such a
conflict. There were young volunteers from Philadelphia in that command, going
forth for the first time to study war. There were nearly ragged and shoeless
veterans there, who had faced such storms, and the fiercer storms of war,
before. Stark, of Breed's Hill, was there. Glover, the man of Marblehead, a hero
of the Long Island retreat, and Webb and Scott, and William Washington and James
Monroe, were there. Brain and courage, nerve and faith, were there. Washington's
countersign of the twenty-third, "Victory or death," was in the inner chambers
of many souls, guarding manhood, quickening conscience, and defying nature. This
was all because the path of duty was so well defined. The order to embark and
cross over had been given. It was short, and made no allusion to the swift
current, the cold or snow. These were almost negative facts, circumstances of
delay and discomfort, but could not set aside duty. Those men had been
retreating, and had rested on the bank of the Delaware, almost hopeless of
better times. They were now faced upon their late pursuers. The "man of
retreats" and temporary positions was in his fighting mood, and men went with
him, counting no impediments and sternly in earnest.
"As severe a night as I ever saw," wrote Thomas Rodney; "the frost was sharp,
the current difficult to stem, the ice increasing, the wind high, and at eleven
it began to snow."
The landing of the artillery was not effected until three o'clock, but the army
did not march until four. Retreat could not be made without discovery,
annoyance, and consequent disheartening of his troops, and, late as it was, the
advance was ordered. The snow ceased, but sleet and hail came fiercely from the
northeast, as the march began.
A mile and a quarter from the landing brought them to Bear Tavern, where they
reached the direct river road to Trenton. Three miles and a half more brought
them to Birmingham. Sullivan here notified Washington by a messenger that the
men reported their "arms to be wet." "Tell your general," said Washington, "to
use the bayonet and penetrate into the town. The town must be taken. I am
resolved to take it."
Here the army divided. Sullivan's division moved at once, by the river road,
towards Trenton, then only four and a half miles distant. Washington, with
Greene, took direction to the left, crossed over to the old Scotch road, and
entered the Pennington road one mile from town. This route was about equally
distant with the other from the points aimed at by the respective divisions.
Washington's division, as he says, "arrived at the enemy's advanced post exactly
at eight o'clock; and three minutes after, I found from the fire on the lower
road that that division had also got up." The pickets on both sides behaved
well, but were quickly swept away by the force which already hastened to its
achievement.
Washington moved directly to the junction of King and Queen Streets. The flying
pickets had already given the alarm, and the Hessians were beginning to rally
within sight, as he rode in advance.
Under his direction Colonel Knox placed Forrest's battery of six guns in
position so as to command both streets, which there diverged at a very acute
angle,--Queen Street running southward to the Assanpink, and King Street
inclining east of south, to the crossing of Second and Front Streets, by which
Sullivan must approach. Colonel Rahl occupied the large frame house of Stacy
Potts, near where Perry Street joins King Street. He promptly put himself at the
head of a hastily-gathered detachment for the purpose of advancing up King
Street to its summit, but Captain Forrest's battery of six guns had already
opened fire. The regiment of Knyphausen attempted to form in open ground between
Queen Street and the Assanpink, while a third detachment, completely
demoralized, moved rapidly towards the Princeton road to escape in that
direction. This last detachment was met by Colonel Hand's rifle battalion, which
had been deployed to Washington's left, as a guard upon that possible line of
retreat, as well as to watch the approaches from Princeton. Scott's and Lawson's
Virginia battalions had been thrown still farther to the left, thus completely
closing the gap between Hand and the Assanpink River.
While Rahl was gathering his own companies as rapidly as possible, the two guns
at his head-quarters had been partially manned and were ready to deliver fire;
when Captain Washington, with Lieutenant James Monroe and an active party,
rushed upon the gunners and brought away the pieces before a sufficiently strong
infantry support could be brought up for their protection. Rahl moved his
companies as soon as formed, and joined Knyphausen's regiment, but almost
immediately moved back for the cover which the buildings afforded.
Galloway, Stedman, and some other early writers have alleged that the Hessians
returned to load wagons and carry off their accumulated plunder. It is difficult
to regard such statements as other than traditional fables. Individuals may have
tried to save their effects, but there was very little time to spare for that
business, and Colonel Rahl was too strict a soldier to have permitted it at such
a moment.
Captain Forrest's guns swept the open ground as well as the streets, and the
adjoining orchard was equally untenable, hopelessly exposing the men to a fire
which could not be returned. Two of the guns which were afterwards taken seem to
have been cut off from the reach of the Hessians when they were themselves
drifted eastward from their magazine and barracks by the American control of
both King and Queen Streets; and two guns with the Knyphausen regiment were of
little service. General Sullivan's division entered the town through Front and
Second Streets. Colonel Stark, who led the column, moved directly to the
Assanpink bridge, to cut off retreat towards Bordentown, but the chasseurs, the
light horse, and a considerable infantry force, at least two hundred men, had
already crossed the bridge in retreat upon that post. St. Clair took possession
of the foot of Queen Street, and as Stark swung round and moved up the Assanpink
the Hessians were literally between two fires, while the additional enfilading
fire upon the streets closed their left, and the Assanpink closed their right.
For a short time small parties of Hessians who had been unable to join their
companies kept up a fruitless scattering fire from houses where they had taken
refuge; but the fall of Colonel Rahl while urging his men to assault the summit
where Washington controlled the action, and the advance of Sullivan's division,
which shut up all avenues of escape to Bordentown, forced the Hessians out of
the town to the open field and orchard, where the whole command surrendered.
The American casualties were two killed and three wounded, Captain Washington
and Monroe being among the latter. Several were badly frozen,--in two instances
resulting fatally. The Hessian casualties were given by General Howe as forty
men killed and wounded, besides officers; and nine hundred and eighteen
prisoners were taken, of whom thirty were officers. Subsequently, a lieutenant-
colonel, a deputy adjutant-general, and scattering members of the Hessian corps
were taken, making the total number of prisoners, as reported by Washington on
the twenty-eighth of December, about one thousand. The trophies of war were six
bronze guns, four sets of colors, over a thousand stand of arms, twelve drums,
many blankets, and other garrison supplies. General Howe says, "This misfortune
seems to have proceeded from Colonel Rahl's quitting the post and advancing to
the attack, instead of defending the village." The fact is overlooked that
Washington's position at the head of King and Queen Streets with artillery,
which commanded both streets, afforded a very poor opportunity for the surprised
Hessians. The more men they gathered in those narrow streets, the better it was
for American artillery practice. Rahl followed the instincts of a soldier, and,
as he had not the force to assault the enemy and dispossess them of their
commanding positions, he sought ground where he could form his command and fight
as he could get opportunity. The movement of Washington which threw Hand, Scott,
and Lawson to the left, together with his superiority in artillery, and the
pressure of Sullivan's division from the rear through Second Street, forced
Colonel Rahl to his fate. His mistakes had been made before the alarm of battle
recalled him to duty; and then he did all that time and Washington permitted.
The disparity in casualties is accounted for by the facts stated. The American
artillery had its play at will beyond musket-range and upon higher ground, with
little chance for the Hessians to render fire in return. A few skilfully-handled
guns determined the action. Washington on this occasion evinced the force of
individual will applied, under extreme necessity, to a determining issue. The
battle occupied less than one hour. Its fruit was like the grain of mustard-seed
which developed a tree under whose branches a thousand might take shelter. He
marched back to Newtown with prisoners of war, reaching head-quarters the same
night; a new experience for the American army. This countermarch was attended
with great hardships and suffering. The entire distance marched by the troops
which left Newtown with Washington was nearly thirty miles, before they again
reached their camp, and more than a thousand men were practically disabled for
duty through frozen limbs and broken-down energies.
[The events that succeeded this important victory may be briefly stated.
Washington's good fortune having brought him in reinforcements of militia, and
induced some of his men whose term was about expiring to remain six weeks
longer, he recrossed to Trenton on December 28. The British were now in force at
Princeton. On January 2, Cornwallis reached Trenton with a strong army.
Washington lay intrenched on the east side of the creek, with about five
thousand men. The British threatened an attack the next day, in which defeat
would have been ruinous to the Americans, since the ice in the Delaware rendered
it nearly impassable in the face of an active foe. Washington accordingly
devised a stratagem which proved highly successful. Kindling his camp-fires, and
leaving guards and sentinels, he decamped that night with his whole army, and
reached Princeton the next morning, about the time that Cornwallis discovered
his disappearance. Here he met and defeated a body of soldiers, but, finding
that Cornwallis was marching hastily back, and fearing to be caught between two
fires with a worn-out army, he abruptly left that locality, and marched towards
Morristown, while the British hastened to New Brunswick, to save their stores.
Washington soon took the field again, and overran all northern New Jersey, while
Howe's army became confined to the two posts of Amboy and New Brunswick. The
people of New Jersey, who had been cruelly abused by the invaders, now
retaliated by a guerilla warfare, cutting off outposts, attacking stragglers,
and so annoying the British that they hardly dared venture beyond their lines.]
