The Great Republic by the Master Historians The Siege of Vicksburg byBancroft, Hubert H.
[The capture of the defences of the upper Mississippi, and the fall of New
Orleans with the forts that covered it, by no means completed the task of
opening the great Western river, four hundred miles of which remained under
Confederate control. Two strongly-fortified places, Vicksburg on the north and
Port Hudson on the south, with an intermediate intrenched position at Grand
Gulf, defended this portion of the river, and were destined to give the Union
armies no small trouble before they could be taken and the river again made a
national highway. Before describing the movements by which this great purpose
was effected, it is necessary to bring up our review of Western events to the
date of these operations.
The advance of Lee into Maryland had its parallel in a vigorous northward raid
made by Bragg in the West, in which he crossed the national line of defence and
advanced nearly to the Ohio. The capture of Corinth by the Union forces had been
succeeded by some important military operations, which may be briefly
epitomized. Chattanooga, a town situated on the Tennessee River just north of
the Georgia State line, and on the eastern flank of the Cumberland Mountains,
became now a point of great military importance, and Buell was ordered to occupy
it with his army. He commenced his march on June 10, 1862, but moved too
deliberately to effect his purpose. Bragg, the Confederate commander, as soon as
he discerned the object of Buell's march, hastened with the greatest rapidity to
the place, and took firm possession of it before Buell could reach it. The
latter was forced to retreat, and reinforcements were sent him from Grant's
army, to strengthen him against an advance by Bragg. This fact was taken
advantage of by Price and Van Dorn, who confronted Grant with a force of
considerable strength. They made movements intended to induce Grant to weaken
his army still further, hoping for an opportunity to seize Corinth. Grant at
once assumed the offensive. Rosecrans was sent to Iuka, to which place Price had
advanced. He reached this place on September 19. A battle ensued, which ended in
both sides holding their ground. During the night, however, the Confederates
decamped, and marched too rapidly to be overtaken. On October 3, Van Dorn and
Price in conjunction assailed Rosecrans at Corinth, Grant being then at Jackson.
Rosecrans had about twenty thousand men. The Confederates had about forty
thousand, and made their assault with great vigor and persistency. Their charge
on the works, however, ended in a severe and sanguinary repulse and a hasty
retreat, in which they were pursued for sixty miles. They lost, in killed,
wounded, and prisoners, about nine thousand men. The Union loss was about two
thousand four hundred.
While these operations were taking place, Bragg was engaged in an invasion of
Kentucky that threatened disaster to the Union cause. He marched actively
northward with an army of fifty thousand men, reaching the line of the Nashville
and Louisville Railroad at Munfordsville, whose garrison he captured. A division
of his army, under Kirby Smith, marched from Knoxville, and at Richmond,
Kentucky, routed General Manson. Smith claimed to have killed and wounded one
thousand and taken five thousand prisoners, with a valuable spoil in arms,
ammunition, and provisions. He then passed through Lexington, and reached
Cynthiana.
This raid had necessitated a rapid reverse movement on the part of Buell, who
was forced with all haste to march from southern Tennessee to the Ohio, a
distance of three hundred miles. From Munfordsville Bragg moved to Frankfort,
where he formed a junction with Kirby Smith. The one had made feigned movements
against Nashville, and the other against Cincinnati, but intercepted despatches
taught Buell that their true object was Louisville, and to this place he
hastened with all speed. Bragg had moved too slowly. He had been six weeks in
marching from Chattanooga to Frankfort. Yet he would have captured Louisville
but for detention by a burnt bridge, which enabled Buell to get in advance. The
latter had hastened north with the utmost speed, leaving a garrison at
Nashville, and reaching Louisvill on September 25. He found that city in a
panic. At this point he was reinforced by troops from all quarters, till his
army reached the number of one hundred thousand men.
Meanwhile, Bragg had issued a proclamation to the Kentuckians in emulation of
that which Lee had issued in Maryland, and with like unsatisfactory results. The
people of Kentucky had fully decided to remain in the Union. Bragg's foraging-
parties scoured and devastated the surrounding country, carrying off all the
spoil they could find. Men were conscripted and forced into his army. He now
commenced a deliberate retreat, while Buell advanced upon him. A severe battle
took place on October 8 at Perryville, in which both sides lost heavily and
neither gained a decisive advantage. Bragg's retreat, however, continued, and he
reached Chattanooga without further loss. Buell's movements in pursuit were so
annoyingly slow that he was removed from his command by the government and
replaced by Rosecrans. Bragg's expedition, so far as political ends were
concerned, had proved a failure. He had, however, carried off vast quantities of
provisions and clothing.
New movements quickly supervened. Rosecrans at once reorganized his army, and
concentrated it at Nashville. Bragg had hardly reached Chattanooga before he was
ordered to march northward again. He reached Murfreesborough, to the south of
Nashville, whence he sent out detachments of cavalry to cut Rosecrans's
communications, and where he indulged in Christmas festivities, with Davis, the
Confederate President, as his guest. Yet Rosecrans had no intention of remaining
idle. He made a sudden march on December 26, drove back the Confederate
outposts, and on the 30th confronted Bragg, who was stationed two miles in front
of Mur-freesborough. Rosecrans had forty-three thousand and Bragg sixty-two
thousand men. A battle took place at this point on the 31st, Bragg assailing
with such strength as to drive back the right wing of the Union army. The next
division, commanded by Sheridan, held its own with much energy, but was finally
forced back, though in unbroken order. The other divisions were obliged to
follow.
So far the advantage had been with the Confederates. But Rosecrans readjusted
his army, formed a new line, and awaited the triumphant advance of his foe. The
assault was tremendous, but it was met with a withering fire of musketry and
artillery, and though four times repeated, the Union line remained unbroken. A
fresh division of seven thousand men was brought forward and assailed
Rosecrans's left flank, but with the same ill fortune. Night fell, the closing
night of 1862. On New-Year's day the armies faced each other without a renewal
of the battle. So they continued till the 3d, Rosecrans strongly intrenching his
position. On the night of the 3d Bragg secretly withdrew, leaving his antagonist
in possession of the battle-field, though too much crippled to pursue. Each army
had lost about one-fourth of its whole force. Rosecrans had lost more than a
third of his artillery, and a large portion of his train. But he had bravely
held his ground, and taught his enemies that the Ohio River was beyond their
reach. The Cumberland Mountains were thenceforward to be the boundary of the
Confederacy in that quarter.
The military events in the West during 1863 were of the utmost importance,
ending in the opening of the Mississippi and the capture of Chattanooga. The
first achievement had been attempted by Farragut, immediately after the taking
of New Orleans. He sent a part of his fleet up the river, captured Baton Rouge
and Natchez, and advanced to Vicksburg. This city refused to surrender, and was
bombarded by Farragut, who ran the batteries with his fleet. Orders from
Washington checked these operations, there being no land-force ready to co-
operate, and the fleet being unable to silence the batteries.
In the autumn of 1862 Grant made his first efforts towards his projected
reduction of Vicksburg. His army was now large, and he advanced, driving
Pemberton, the Confederate commander at Vicksburg, before him. Sherman was sent
with a strong force to march down the Mississippi, while Grant moved by an
inland route, to take the city in the rear. His scheme was frustrated by an
unforeseen event. Holly Springs had been established as his depot of supplies.
Van Dorn, with the Confederate cavalry, made a rapid movement to Grant's rear,
and captured this place, then guarded by only a single regiment, on December 20.
The vast stores that had been accumulated, valued at more than two millions of
dollars, were destroyed by fire. Grant was forced to give up his overland route,
and move to the river.
In the mean time, Sherman had reached the vicinity of Vicksburg. At this
locality a line of high bluffs border the river, with but a narrow space between
them and the stream. The Yazoo River joins the Mississippi above the city, while
the surrounding soil is cut by numerous deep bayous, and the low lands are very
swampy. A fortified line, fifteen miles in length, had been constructed along
the bluffs. Sherman made a strong but ineffectual assault upon the
fortifications, and found that the Confederates were being reinforced so
rapidly, while he was surrounded with such difficulties, that he was obliged to
abandon the expedition. The only success gained was the reduction of a
stronghold on the Arkansas River, which had served as a basis for steamboat
expeditions against his line of supplies. Here five thousand prisoners and much
valuable material were taken.
The fortifications at Vicksburg were now strengthened until it became an
exceedingly strong post. Grand Gulf and Port Hudson, farther down the river,
were also fortified. Against these strong-holds the efforts of the Western
armies were now mainly directed. General Banks, aided by Farragut's fleet,
entered upon the siege of Port Hudson, while Grant put forward all his strength
against Vicksburg, assisted by the gunboats under Admiral Porter. The Army of
the Tennessee now numbered one hundred and thirty thousand men, of whom fifty
thousand men took part in the expedition against Vicksburg. Porter had a fleet
of sixty vessels, carrying two hundred and eighty guns and eight hundred men.
Grant arrived and took command of the expedition on January 30, 1863. The first
plan of operations adopted was to dig a canal across the neck of land made by a
wide bend in the river at Vicksburg, with the hope that the Mississippi would
take this new course and abandon the city. Two months were spent on this, yet a
rise in the river rendered the labor unavailing, by overflowing all the
surrounding space. Then strenuous efforts were made to transport the fleet and
army below Vicksburg by way of the bayous and larger streams that bordered the
river. Efforts of this kind were made both east and west of the river, but in
both cases without success. The surrounding country meanwhile was so overflowed
and marshy as to interfere greatly with land-operations. It was next determined
to run the batteries with the fleet. The night of the 16th of April was fixed
for this exploit. It was achieved with much greater success than had been
expected. Several of the vessels were wrecked, but the great bulk of the fleet
passed in safety. A land-force had been sent down west of the river, to meet the
vessels. The next project was to attack the fortifications at Grand Gulf, fifty
miles below. An assault by the fleet on this place proved futile. A land-force
was then carried across the river, which attacked and carried Port Gibson and
defeated several detachments in the field. The successes thus gained rendered
Grand Gulf untenable, and it was evacuated, and taken possession of by Grant's
army.
It was now early May. Three months had been spent in the operations against
Vicksburg, and it was still as far from capture as ever. Grant's whole army was
now in the vicinity of Grand Gulf, and a new system of operations was adopted.
Cutting loose from all lines of communication, he marched out into the open
country, determined to subsist his army on the people, defeat all the defenders
of Vicksburg in the field, and carry that place by assault from the rear.
General J. E. Johnston commanded the Confederate forces in the field, and
several engagements ensued, in all of which the Union army was successful. The
city of Jackson was captured, and Pemberton, who marched out from Vicksburg to
co-operate with Johnston, was defeated and forced to retreat to his
intrenchments. Grant rapidly pursued, and on the 19th of May took possession of
the outer works of the Vicksburg lines, definitely shutting the enemy within his
fortifications. The important post of Haines' Bluff was taken, and communication
opened with the fleet.
The campaign had lasted twenty days. In that time Grant had marched two hundred
miles, beaten two armies in five successive battles, captured twenty-seven heavy
cannon and sixty-one pieces of field-artillery, taken six thousand five hundred
prisoners, and killed and wounded about six thousand men. He had forced the
evacuation of Grand Gulf, seized Jackson, the State capital, destroyed thirty
miles of railroad, and ended by investing the strong-hold of Vicksburg. Starting
with two days' rations, he had subsisted his army on the country, and reached
his goal with a loss in all of four thousand three hundred and thirty-five men.
Taking it for granted that Pemberton's men were in no condition for an effective
resistance, an assault was immediately made on the works, and another on the
22d, both of which were repulsed, the Union forces losing heavily. The works
proving far too strong, and the approaches too difficult, for success by this
method, siege-operations were determined on, and ground was broken on the 23d of
May. Of the events which succeeded we select a description of the more
interesting particulars from Badeau's "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant."]
Grant had now about forty thousand men for duty, and, on the 23d, orders were
given for the axe and the shovel to support the bayonet. The hot season was at
hand, the troops had already endured many hardships, they were almost altogether
unprovided with siege-material: so that the difficulties before the national
army were not only for midable, but peculiar. The engineer organization was
especially defective: there were no engineer troops in the entire command, and
only four engineer officers, while twenty would have found ample opportunity for
all their skills. Several pioneer companies of volunteers were, however, used
for engineering purposes, and, although raw at first, became effective before
the close of the siege. There were no permanent depots of siege-material; spades
and picks were kept at the steamboat-landing on the Yazoo, and in the camps near
the trenches; gabions and fascines were made as they were needed, by the pioneer
companies, or by details of troops from the line. Grant's artillery was simply
that used during the campaign, with the addition of a battery of naval guns of
larger calibre, loaned him by Admiral Porter. There was nothing like a siege-
train in all the West, no light mortars, and very few siege-howitzers nearer
than Washington; and there was not time to send to Northern arsenals for
supplies. With such material and means the siege of Vicksburg was begun.
[Camps were made for the men, most of them within six hundred yards of the
Confederate parapets. Stores were accumulated at the landing, and roads and
covered ways opened from camp to camp.]
The first ground was broken on the 23d of May, and batteries placed in the most
advantageous positions to keep down the enemy's fire. Lines of parapet, rifle-
trench, and covered way were then constructed to connect these batteries. The
enemy seldom showed his guns, hardly attempting, indeed, to prevent the
besiegers from getting their artillery into position; for the slightest exposure
or demonstration on the part of the rebels excited the liveliest fire from the
national batteries, and the advantage was always in favor of the latter, as they
could bring to bear a much larger number of guns than the enemy. This, and the
remarkable activity and vigilance of Grant's sharp-shooters, in a great measure
kept down the fire of the besieged. The enemy, however, was undoubtedly scant of
ammunition, and anxious to husband what he had, for more effective use at closer
quarters.
The connecting parapets, as well as all other available positions within rifle-
range, were kept occupied by a line of sharp-shooters during daylight, and by
trench-guards and advanced pickets after dark. Whenever an approach gave
opportunity, loop-holes were formed, by piling sandbags and pieces of square
timber on the parapets, or logs and stumps when these were more convenient: the
men were thus enabled to shelter themselves completely. This timber was rarely
displaced by the enemy's fire; but, had the rebel artillery opened heavily,
splinters must have become dangerous to the besiegers. The positions of the
national sharp-shooters were generally quite as elevated as those occupied by
the rebels; and the approaches, running along the hill-sides and up the slopes
in front of the enemy's works, were lower than the besieged, so that the sappers
and working parties could not be molested by the rebels without very great
exposure on their own part to sharp-shooters of the attacking force. So
effective was this system that by the end of the first fortnight nearly all the
artillery of the enemy was either dismounted or withdrawn, and the rebels
scarcely ever fired.
[Pioneers and negroes did the greater part of the work, which was mainly left to
men ignorant of siege-operations and obliged to depend on their native
ingenuity. Yet the Yankee fertility of resource stood the workers in good stead.
Gabions and fascines were made of grapevine and split cane, and mortars for
close service were made of wooden cylinders with iron bands shrunk on them. The
parapets were made but six or eight feet thick, on account of the feeble nature
of the enemy's fire, the embrasures being closed, when not firing, by plank
shutters or movable timbers. The ground was seared by ravines, rugged and
difficult, but this condition aided the rapid advance of the works.]
The aggregate length of the trenches was twelve miles. Eighty-nine batteries
were constructed during the siege, the guns from those in the rear being moved
forward as the siege advanced. The troops were moved on at the same time, and
encamped in the rear of batteries, at the heads of ravines. On the 30th of June
there were in position two hundred and twenty guns, mostly light field-pieces;
one battery of heavy guns, on the right, was manned and officered by the navy. .
While the investment of Vicksburg was thus proceeding, the menacing attitude of
Johnston had early attracted Grant's attention, and made it necessary to
establish a strong corps of observation in the rear. . . . It was soon learned
that Johnston had been joined by at least ten thousand fresh troops; and Grant
was thus made reasonably certain that the rebels would endeavor to raise the
siege, attacking from the northeast, with all the men they could command. . . .
On the 26th [of May] Grant sent a force of twelve thousand men, under Blair, to
drive off a body of the enemy supposed to be collecting between the Big Black
River and the Yazoo. This command was not expected to fight Johnston, but simply
to act as a corps of observation, and to destroy all forage, stock, roads, and
bridges as it returned. Blair moved along the Yazoo about forty-five miles, and
effectually accomplished the purpose of his expedition, preventing Johnston from
moving upon Vicksburg in that direction, and also from drawing supplies in the
fertile region between the two rivers. He was absent nearly a week, and
reconnoitred the whole region thoroughly.
On the 31st Grant wrote, "It is now certain that Johnston has already collected
a force from twenty thousand to twenty-five thousand strong at Jackson and
Canton, and is using every effort to increase it to forty thousand. With this he
will undoubtedly attack Haines' Bluff and compel me to abandon the investment of
the city, it not reinforced before he can get here." Admiral Porter was
accordingly requested to direct a brigade of amphibious and useful troops at his
disposal, known as the Marine Brigade, to debark at Haines' Bluff and hold the
place until relieved by other forces. . . . On the 7th [of June] the enemy,
nearly three thousand strong, attacked Milliken's Bend, which, however, was
successfully defended by black and white troops under Brigadier-General Dennis,
ably assisted by the gunboats Choctaw and Lexington. . . . On the 8th of June
another division of troops, under Brigadier-General Sooy Smith, arrived from
Memphis, and was ordered to Haines' Bluff, where Washburne was now placed in
command. This place had again become of vital importance; for if the national
forces should be compelled to raise the siege, and yet remain in possession of
Haines' Bluff, with undisputed control of the Mississippi River, they could
still concentrate resources for a new effort, either against the city itself or
its means of supply.
[This bluff lies on the Yazoo, northeast of Vicksburg. It is very precipitous,
and commands the approach to Vicksburg from the north. Below this river the
bluffs border a broad alluvial space, cut by numerous streams, until they touch
the Mississippi at Vicksburg, twelve miles below. Johnston, as soon as he
learned that Pemberton had been driven into Vicksburg and lost his hold on this
commanding point, had ordered him to evacuate the city, as no longer tenable,
and thus save his troops. Pemberton declined to do this, until the extension of
Grant's lines from river to river around the city rendered it impossible.
Haines' Bluff was now ordered to be strongly fortified and obstinately held.
Reinforcements continued to arrive until Grant's force amounted to seventy-five
thousand men.]
On the 21st of June, Grant received curious information through the rebel
pickets: the national works had now approached so close to those of the besieged
that the two picket-lines were within hail of each other; and one of the rebels
made an agreement with a national sentinel that they should lay down their arms
and have a talk. The rebel declared that Grant's cannonading had killed and
wounded a great many in the rifle-pits; that the besieged had fully expected
another assault, and been prepared to meet it; but, as no assault was made, the
troops had been canvassed by their officers, to see if they could not be got
outside to attack the "Yankees." Not only was this declined, but many were ready
to mutiny because their officers would not surrender. The men, however, were
reassured, and told that provisions enough remained to last them seven days
more: in that time two thousand boats would be built, and the besieged could
escape by crossing the Mississippi River. The rebel finished by announcing that
houses in Vicksburg were now being torn down to get material for the boats.
This singular story excited attention, and preparations were made to render
abortive any such attempt at escape as had been described. Admiral Porter was
warned, the pickets were redoubled at night, and material was collected to light
up the river should a large number of boats attempt to cross. Batteries also
were got ready behind the levee on the western bank; but the attempt was never
made.
[On the 22d information was received that Johnston was crossing the Big Black
River, with the intention to march upon Grant. Sherman was sent out with a
strong force to confront him.]
A line of works was now constructed from the Yazoo to the Big Black River, quite
as strong as those which defended Vicksburg, so that the city was not only
circumvallated, but countervallated as well. In case of an attack, Johnston
would have been obliged to assault Grant's rear, under the same disadvantages
that Grant himself had encountered in attacking Vicksburg. Grant's position,
however, was at this time peculiar, if not precarious. He was again between two
large rebel armies: besieging one, he was himself threatened with a siege by the
other; while, if both combined to assault him from different sides, it seemed
quite possible that the garrison of Vicksburg, that splendid prize for which he
had been so long struggling, might even yet elude his grasp. He might be
compelled to throw so much strength on his eastern front that the besieged could
succeed in effecting their escape by some opposite and comparatively unguarded
avenue. To prevent this contingency was the object of unceasing vigilance. It
would not do to go out after Johnston, lest the prey inside should evade the
toils that had been spread so carefully; and yet, while Grant remained in his
trenches enveloping the city, his own communications and base were threatened
from outside. Haines' Bluff was once more an object of immense solicitude, and
the Big Black had again become the line of defence; but this time it was a
defence to national troops against the rebels; for Grant now, in part, faced
east, and the men of the South were striving to fight their way to the
Mississippi.
[Johnston had written to Pemberton on May 29 that he was too weak to save him
without co-operation on his part. On June 14 he wrote him, "By fighting the
enemy simultaneously at the same points of his line, you may be extricated: our
joint forces cannot raise the siege of Vicksburg."]
The garrison, meanwhile, was suffering for supplies. Pemberton was particularly
short of percussion-caps, and his scouts contrived, occasionally, to elude the
pickets of Grant and transmit this information to Johnston. Supplies, in
consequence, were sent as far as Grant's lines, but were generally captured; in
several instances, however, caps were successfully conveyed to the besieged,
sometimes two hundred thousand at a time, canteens full of caps being carried by
rebel scouts in the national uniform and suddenly thrown across the picket-line.
After the assaults in May, the ammunition scattered in the trenches was
collected by the rebels, and even the cartridge-boxes of the dead, in front of
the works, were emptied.
The meat-ration was reduced by Pemberton at first to one-half, but that of
sugar, rice, and beans, at the same time, largely increased. Tobacco for chewing
was impressed, and issued to the troops. After a while, all the cattle in
Vicksburg was impressed, and the chief commissary was instructed to sell only
one ration a day to any officer. At last four ounces of rice and four of flour
were issued for bread,--not half a ration. Still, on the 10th of June, Pemberton
sent word to Johnston, "I shall endeavor to hold out as long as we have anything
to eat. Can you not send me a verbal message by carrier, crossing the river
above or below Vicksburg, and swimming across again, opposite Vicksburg? I have
heard nothing of you or from you since the 25th of May." In the same despatch he
said, "Enemy bombard night and day from seven mortars. He also keeps up constant
fire on our lines with artillery and musketry." On the 15th, "We are living on
greatly-reduced rations, but I think sufficient for twenty days yet.". .
The price of food in the town had by this time risen enormously. Flour was five
dollars a pound, or a thousand dollars a barrel (rebel money); meal was one
hundred and forty dollars a bushel; molasses, ten and twelve dollars a gallon;
and beef (very often oxen killed by the national shells and picked up by the
butchers) was sold at two dollars and two dollars and a half by the pound. Mule-
meat sold at a dollar a pound, and was in great demand. Many families of wealth
had eaten the last mouthful of food they possessed, and the poorer class of non-
combatants was on the verge of starvation. There was scarcely a building that
had not been struck by shells, and many were entirely demolished. A number of
women and children had been killed or wounded by mortar-shells, or balls; and
all who did not remain in the damp caves of the hill-sides were in danger. Even
the hospitals where the wounded lay were sometimes struck, for it was found
impossible to prevent occasional shells falling on the buildings, which of
course would have been sacred from an intentional fire.
Fodder was exhausted, and the horses were compelled to subsist wholly on corn-
tops, the corn being all ground into meal for the soldiers. In the conversations
that nightly occurred between the pickets, the rebels were always threatened
with starvation, even if another assault should fail. For the pickets of both
armies were good-natured enough, and often sat down on the ground together,
bragging of their ability to whip each other. . . . Incidents like these
relieved the tedium of the siege to those outside, and lessened some of its
horrors for the rebels. A favorite place for the meetings was at a well attached
to a house between the lines: hither, after dark, the men from both sides
repaired, slipping outside their pickets in search of the delicious draught; for
water was scarce, and at this point there was none other within a mile. The
house was unoccupied, having been riddled with shot from both besiegers and
besieged, and over the broken cistern the rebel and national soldiers held their
tacit truce, a truce which neither ever violated.
[Mining and countermining were now attempted. Grant fired a heavy mine on the
25th of June. It made a deep crater, into which the troops rushed. But the
Confederates had suspected the intention, and withdrawn to an inner line, and no
important advantage was gained. On July 1 another mine was sprung. This blew up
an entire redan, and injured the inner Confederate works. No assault, however,
was made, the last having proved so ineffective.]
A continuous siege, and a mighty battle imminent. A citadel surrounded by land
and water. The bombardment almost incessant. The beleaguered garrison reduced to
quarter rations; living on mule-meat, and thinking it good fare. The population
of the town hiding in caves to escape the storm of mortar-shells exploding in
their streets. A squadron thundering at their gates, by night as well as by day.
Mines trembling beneath their feet. What rare news came from Johnston far from
cheering; all hope indeed of succor quite cut off. Ammunition almost expended.
The lines of the besieger contracting daily; his approaches getting closer, his
sharp-shooters more accurate; his sap-rollers steadily rising over the hills
that Vicksburg had proudly declared impassable. Every day some new battery
opening from an unexpected quarter; every day the position detected from which
to-morrow still another battery would surely begin its fire. To crown all, after
a few more contractions of the coil, another mighty assault would bring the
enemy immediately beneath the walls, when, covered by their works, and more
numerous than the besieged, the assailants, in every human probability, would
storm the town, and all the unutterable horrors to which fallen cities are
exposed might come upon the devoted fortress. . . .
By the 1st of July the approaches in many places had reached the enemy's ditch.
At ten different points Grant could put the heads of regiments under cover,
within distances of from five to one hundred yards of the rebel works, and the
men of the two armies conversed across the lines. The hand-to-hand character of
the recent fighting showed that little further progress could be made by digging
alone, and Grant accordingly determined to make the final assault on the morning
of the 6th of July. Orders were issued to prepare the heads of approaches for
the easy debouche of troops, to widen the main approaches so that the men could
move easily by fours, and to prepare planks and sand-bags filled with pressed
cotton, for crossing ditches.
Johnston was moving up at the same time. On the night of the 1st he encamped
between Brownsville and the Big Black River, and on the 3d sent word to
Pemberton that about the 7th of the month an attempt to create a diversion would
be made, to enable the garrison to cut its way out. This attack, however, was
never made. The movement to Brownsville was the last operation undertaken for
the relief or the defence of Vicksburg.
[On the morning of July 3, Pemberton wrote to Grant, proposing an armistice, in
order to arrange terms for the capitulation of the city. Grant replied that "the
useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at
any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and
garrison." After some further debate, in which Pemberton protested against the
stringency of these terms, and desired that his men should be permitted to march
out with their muskets and field-guns, he agreed to Grant's proposal, the latter
promising to parole his prisoners. Ten o'clock on the morning of the 4th of July
was fixed as the hour of the surrender. Sherman was directed to march against
Johnston the moment the surrender should be consummated.]
At ten o'clock of Saturday, the 4th of July, the anniversary of American
independence, the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of the lines it had defended
so long, and stacked its arms in front of the conquerors. All along the rebel
works they poured out, in gray, through the sally-ports and across the ditches,
and laid down their colors, sometimes on the very spot where so many of the
besiegers had laid down their lives; and then, in sight of the national troops,
who were standing on their own parapets, the rebels returned inside the works,
prisoners of war. Thirty-one thousand six hundred men were surrendered to Grant.
Among these were two thousand one hundred and fifty-three officers, of whom
fifteen were generals. One hundred and seventy-two cannon also fell into his
hands, the largest capture of men and material ever made in war.
[On the 8th of July, as soon as the news of the surrender of Vicksburg had
reached the defenders of Port Hudson, that place surrendered to Banks, and the
Mississippi, from its source to the sea, became once more a highway of the
United States of America.]
