[Passing references are elsewhere made to the succession of striking incidents
that wound up the four-year struggle between South and North. Before proceeding
to the era of peace it is fitting to gather together some of the more important
events, and the views of one of the principal agents in accomplishing that happy
consummation. General Grant's Memoirs are the cherished possession of every
patriotic student of history. Familiar as his last utterances are, they cannot
grow stale by quotation when the subject to be illustrated is the grand drama in
which he was the chief actor. His official report to the secretary of war is a
lasting monument to his simplicity of character as a man and to the directness
of his methods as a soldier.]
When the army had disbanded, with the exception of the fifty thousand retained
under arms, great numbers of the veterans went West, and took up claims in
Kansas and Nebraska, under the liberal land laws then enacted in their favor.
Meanwhile a great tragedy had taken place. There was a large section of the
Democrats of the North who were dissatisfied with the conduct of the war. These
chose General McClellan as their candidate against Lincoln, who was re-elected
in 1864. Fremont had been nominated by dissatisfied Republicans, but he withdrew
before the election. Lincoln had an overwhelming majority in the Electoral
College, but the popular vote was as follows: Lincoln, 2,216,067; McClellan,
1,808,725. Electoral vote: Lincoln, 212; McClellan, 21.
This showed a closer division than might have been expected. McClellan received
almost the same number of votes that Lincoln got in 1860, while Lincoln gained
less than 400,000. The slavery question was still in politics. The Emancipation
Proclamation had not been received well in some portions of the North, where the
question of slavery was of less importance than that of preserving the Union,
and it was feared it would prevent a restoration on any terms. It appeared to
Mr. Lincoln that re-election by Republican votes alone was impossible, so he
determined to secure the nomination of a War Democrat for Vice-President. He
first offered the nomination to General Butler, who declined it, and then to
Andrew Johnson, who accepted it. Johnson was a man of little education, but of
great will power. He had been Governor of Tennessee, Senator, and then Military
Governor, rising from the tailor's bench in a little mountain town.
Great was the joy in the North over the fall of Richmond and the surrender of
Lee. Just four years had the fighting lasted, and peace was welcomed with the
wildest enthusiasm, only to be dampened by the murder of the President. On the
night of Good Friday, April 14, 1865, in Ford's Theatre, Washington, John Wilkes
Booth, the actor, entered the box where the President was seated, shot him, and
jumped to the stage, shouting "Sic semper tyrannis!" He broke the bones of his
ankle in the jump from the box, but managed to escape and, by aid of
confederates, crossed the Potomac and got into Virginia, but in a few days was
discovered. Refusing to surrender, he was shot. On the same night that Lincoln
was shot, Secretary Seward was stabbed seriously, and Grant escaped only by
absence from the city. Lincoln survived until Saturday morning, April 15, 1865,
but died without recovering consciousness.
Terrible was the wrath of the North over the event, and the best men in the
South regretted it equally, for all had come to respect Lincoln, and they
realized that his murder would be laid upon the South, which would suffer
accordingly -- a presentiment that was correct. It developed that there was a
small conspiracy involved, but that it included no one outside of Washington and
was not inspired by any Southern leaders. Just how much each of the parties to
the conspiracy knew is uncertain. The meetings were at the home of Mrs. Surratt.
The others who were found to be most closely involved were men named Harold,
Payne, and Atzerott, who, with Mrs. Surratt, were executed. Others who in any
way aided Booth to escape were punished severely.
And now a few statistics about the war. There were issued ten calls for troops,
for a total of 2,763,670 men. At first the South was called upon, but not
thereafter. These calls were distributed among the States according to
population; and 2,772,408 responded, while 86,724 paid commutation money. But,
as some of these men enlisted twice or more, it is estimated that the actual
number of men who enlisted on a three years' basis numbered 2,320,272, of whom
186,097 were colored. The regular army, in the war, consisted of about 67,000
men. Some of the volunteers served but a short time, in cases of emergency. The
average number of Federal troops present in the field during 1862-3-4 and '65
was 600,000; the largest number being 800,000 in May, 1865. The average number
absent from the army for various causes was about 250,000; so that the total
army rose steadily from 575,917 on January 1, 1862, to 1,000,516 on May 1, 1865.
Altogether there were 1,981 regiments in the three armies, 498 separate
companies, and 232 separate batteries, or about 2,072 regiments, if all had been
properly organized and consolidated.
The losses of the army have never been accurately determined. There were many
persons who deserted and have never been accounted for; many who were killed or
died in prison, of whom no record was kept; but three different estimates by
various bureaus do not greatly differ. Phisterer's estimate, though now believed
to be somewhat too low, is as follows: Killed in battle, 44,238; died of wounds,
49,205; died of disease, 186,216; unknown, suicides, etc., 24,710; total,
304,369.
The latest estimates give the loss as high as 360,000.
There were 2,261 engagements of all kinds, and in 148 of these the Federal loss
was 500 or more.
The following table gives the losses in the principal battles of the Civil War.
The figures are the total for killed, wounded, and missing, as given in
Phisterer's Official Record:
Battle. Union. Confederate.
Bull Run 2,952 1,752
Shiloh 13,573 10,699
Seven Pines and Fair Oaks 5,739 7,997
Seven Days Battles 15,249 17,583
Second Bull Run 7,800 3,700
Antietam 12,469 25,899
Perryville 4,348 7,000
Fredericksburg 12,353 4,576
Murfreesboro 11,578 25,560
Chancellorsville 16,030 12,281
Gettysburg Campaign 23,186 31,621
Chickamauga 15,851 17,804
Chattanooga 5,616 8,684
Wilderness 37,737 11,400
Spottsylvania, etc. 26,461 9,000
Atlanta 3,641 8,499
Franklin 2,326 6,252
Nashville 2,140 15,000
Surrendered at the close, about 100,000
The statistics for the Confederate army are not so easy to give, because many of
the records have been destroyed, and because not all of the calls for troops were met. At first
States' rights were recognized by calling for State troops, but this soon became
unsatisfactory, and the Confederate army was organized. Under the various calls
for troops and the many acts of legislation by the Confederate Congress every
able-bodied man in the Confederacy was, sooner or later, called into the
service, and finally boys and old men were pressed into service for garrison
duty. It is believed that 750,000 men, in all, were regularly enlisted, armed,
and equipped; but probably not 500,000 were ever in the service at one time,
while the real number of effectives must have been considerably less. Yet the
disparity in effectiveness between these two armies was not so great as the
figures suggest. The Confederates were always, with a few exceptions, in their
own territory and generally behind works. The Confederates never won a victory
outside their own borders, not even in the border States of Kentucky or
Maryland, nor did they have any important successes in Tennessee. The Federal
army was obliged to keep up a long line of communication from its base of
supplies, and this constantly depleted the firing line. The great Confederate
victory in the West was at Chickamauga. In the East the victories were in
defending their capital. Both sides fought with great valor, and the end did not
come until the fighting power of the South had gone. It is believed that the
Confederate army lost over 200,000 men killed, died of wounds or disease. There
is one excellent authority who claims, on the basis of the few returns
available, that the loss was at least 300,000, and perhaps more, making a total
sacrifice of nearly 700,000 men.
Financially, both sections were in great trouble much of the time. War is
terribly expensive. The North had more resources than the South, but at first it
had little credit and no cash. The Morrill tariff bill, passed in 1861, provided
for a war revenue, but it was only a drop in the bucket. The Secretary of the
Treasury was authorized to borrow, but lenders were few. The whole nation was
for a time in a dazed condition. Secession, so long threatened, had come, and
many loyal persons believed that it was not possible to maintain the Union by
war and preferred a peaceable separation. Others feared that a war would be
useless, as Europe would interfere on behalf of the South, because almost all
the cotton in the world came from within her borders, and to shut off this
commodity would cause so much distress that international law would be strained
to force an outlet for this great staple. Could the Confederacy have had a
steady outlet for cotton it could have kept up the struggle much longer.
It was with this purpose in view that Mr. Davis sent Mason and Slidell to Great
Britain and France; but the failure was as complete as was an appeal to the Pope
at Rome, who made the abolishment of slavery a sine qua non of recognition. This
of course was impossible. The Confederacy first resorted to loans guaranteed by
cotton, and for a time their loans sold well; but when cotton was no longer
allowed to leave the country except as captured by the Federals, there was
difficulty in making loans on any good basis. The Confederate expenses were
enormous, because of the great risk in getting in supplies from abroad. There
were few good mechanics in the South, and few foundries; the Tredegar Iron
Works, at Richmond, was the only first-class establishment of its kind in the
Confederacy. When loans from the States and bond sales failed to raise money,
resort was had to paper currency, which was issued in large amounts. Just how
much was current will never be known. The workmanship on the notes was poor, and
counterfeits in the North were easily made, so that the South was swamped with
paper money. It declined steadily with the fortunes of the Confederate arms, and
after the war it became, along with the bonds, entirely worthless. Many of these
bonds were held abroad. In fairness it can be said that the finances of the
Confederacy were never well handled, even considering all the difficulties
involved.
The Federal Government was more fortunate. After a short period of gloom and
despair the Northern people resolved to stick together. A meeting of the leading
bankers was held and money was furnished for a time almost as called for. The
Treasury also issued interest-bearing notes for small denominations, but even
these were not sufficient for the strain. When it was found that there was to be
a long and bloody war, entirely original measures were taken. The National
Banking system, substantially as it now is, was established. This had the two-
fold effect of marketing bonds and providing currency for the needs of the
people. Income and internal revenue taxes were laid on many articles. Specie
payments were suspended, but no great disaster came. Finally, non-interest-
bearing Treasury notes to the amount of nearly $450,000,000 were issued to pay
war expenses. They were never on a par with gold, falling to about 40 per cent
at one time, but fluctuating according to the success of the Federal arms. After
the war they rose in value rapidly, but did not reach par until 1878. During the
most trying part of the war Mr. Chase was at the head of the Treasury, but, on
the death of Chief Justice Taney, succeeded him and Hugh McCullough became
Secretary. During the war most of the bonds were sold through the agency of Jay
Cooke, of Philadelphia -- the fourth man from that city to finance our
Government in a war. By August, 1865, the National debt, which was only about
$80,000,000 in 1860, had reached $2,845,000,000. About $800,000,000 was raised
during the war by customs duties, internal revenue, and direct taxes.
General Grant's account of how he heard the news of Lincoln's assassination is
characteristically succinct:
"After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station, I went with my staff and a few
others directly to Burkesville Station on my way to Washington. The road from
Burkesville back having been newly repaired and the ground being soft, the train
got off the track frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the
second day when I reached City Point. As soon as possible I took a despatchboat
thence to Washington City.
"While in Washington I was very busy for a time in preparing the necessary
orders for the new state of affairs; communicating with my different commanders
of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc. But by the 14th I was pretty
well through with this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were
then in Burlington, New Jersey, attending school. Mrs. Grant was with me in
Washington at the time, and we were invited by President and Mrs. Lincoln to
accompany them to the theatre on the evening of that day. I replied to the
President's verbal invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we
would take great pleasure in accompanying them; but that I was very anxious to
get away and visit my children, and if I could get through my work during the
day I should do so. I did get through and started by the evening train on the
14th, sending Mr. Lincoln word, of course, that I would not be at the theatre.
"At that time the railroad to New York entered Philadelphia on Broad Street;
passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the Delaware River, and then ferried
to Camden, at which point they took the cars again. When I reached the ferry, on
the east side of the City of Philadelphia, I found people awaiting my arrival
there; and also despatches informing me of the assassination of the President
and Mr. Seward, and of the probable assassination of the Vice-President, Mr.
Johnson, and requesting my immediate return.
"It would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame me at the
news of these assassinations, more especially the assassination of the
President. I knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, his yielding
disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and above all his desire to see
all the people of the United States enter again upon the full privileges of
citizenship with equality among all. I knew also the feeling that Mr. Johnson
had expressed in speeches and conversation against the Southern people, and I
feared that his course towards them would be such as to repel, and make them
unwilling citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a long
while. I felt that reconstruction had been set back, no telling how far.
"I immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to Washington City;
but Mrs. Grant was with me; it was after midnight and Burlington was but an hour
away. Finding that I could accompany her to our house and return about as soon
as they would be ready to take me from the Philadelphia station, I went up with
her and returned immediately by the same special train. The joy that I had
witnessed among the people in the street and in public places in Washington when
I left there, had been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of
mourning. I have stated what I believed then the effect of this would be, and my
judgement now is that I was right. I believe the people of the South would have
been spared very much of the hard feeling that was engendered by Mr. Johnson's
course towards them during the first few months of his administration. Be this
as it may, Mr. Lincoln's assassination was particularly unfortunate for the
entire nation."
Here is an expert's judgment on the American soldier: "The troops were hardy,
being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready
and fit for duty as they had ever been in their lives. I doubt whether an equal
body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever
gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great battle.
"The armies of Europe are machines; the men are brave and the officers capable;
but the majority of the soldiers in most of the countries of Europe are taken
from a class of people who are not very intelligent and who have very little
interest in the contest in which they are called upon to take part. Our armies
were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what they were fighting
for, and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when
the safety of the nation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more
than equal to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they
were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships."
The great reception given to the troops is thus described:
"On the 18th of May orders were issued by the adjutant-general for a grand
review by the President and his cabinet of Sherman's and Meade's armies. The
review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days. Meade's army occupied over six
hours of the first day in passing the grand stand which had been erected in
front of the President's house. Sherman witnessed this review from the grand
stand which was occupied by the President and his cabinet. Here he showed his
resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been
inflicted upon him by the Secretary of War, by refusing to take his extended
hand.
"Sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the Potomac. During the
night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from the Capitol.
Promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, his troops commenced to pass
in review. Sherman's army made a different appearance from that of the Army of
the Potomac. The latter had been operating where they received directly from the
North full supplies of food and clothing regularly; the review of this army
therefore was the review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and
orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the
experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's country, and
of being ever on the watch. Sherman's army was not so well-dressed as the Army
of the Potomac, but their marching could not be excelled; they gave the
appearance of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships, either by
long and continuous marches or through exposure to any climate, without the
ordinary shelter of a camp. They exhibited also some of the order of march
through Georgia where the `sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground' as
Sherman's army went marching through. In the rear of a company there would be a
captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens and
other food picked up for the use of the men. Negro families who had followed the
army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company, with three or four
children packed upon a single mule, and the mother leading it.
"The sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two successive days, from
the Capitol to the Treasury Building, could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers
marching in columns of companies. The National flag was flying from almost every
house and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the door-steps and
side-walks were crowded with colored people and poor whites who did not succeed
in securing better quarters from which to get a view of the grand armies. The
city was about as full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually
is on Inauguration day."
Read at this distance of time from the year when Grant penned his literary
legacy to his country, these reflections show the qualities of statesmanship in
no ordinary degree.
"It is probably well that we had the war when we did. We are better off now than
we would have been without it, and have made more rapid progress than we
otherwise should have made. The civilized nations of Europe have been stimulated
into unusual activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough
acquaintance among people of different nationalities, have become common;
whereas, before, it was but the few who had ever had the privilege of going
beyond the limits of their own country or who knew anything about other people.
Then, too, our republican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the
breaking out of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that
our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest strain
was brought upon it. Now it has shown itself capable of dealing with one of the
greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have proven themselves to be
the most formidable in war of any nationality.
"But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of
avoiding wars in the future.
"To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war. There
can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last one, occurring
among our own people again; but, growing as we are, in population, wealth and
military power, we may become the envy of nations which led us in all these
particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for it we may be in
danger of a combined movement being some day made to crush us out. Now, scarcely
twenty years after the war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and
are going on as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an
invasion by the fleets of fourth-rate European powers for a time until we could
prepare for them.
"We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put in the
finest possible condition. Neither of these costs much when it is considered
where the money goes, and what we get in return. Money expended in a fine navy
not only adds to our security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is
very material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the mean time. Money
spent upon sea-coast defences is spent among our own people. The work
accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of security."
[For long years to come there will be friendly controversies over the various
acts of the war-drama. Volumes have been filled with narratives of fact viewed
from different standpoints, which discussions may in a considerable degree be
modified by reference to the accepted official statement of the plan and working
out of the campaign by General Grant. This is contained in his Report of the
United States Armies, 1864-1865, from which these selections are taken. It is
dated, Headquarters, Armies of the United States, Washington, D. C., July 22,
1865.]
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the
Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to command the same.
From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea that
active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into
the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy
termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and his numerical strength
were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory,
with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of
river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the
operating armies.
The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a
balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great
advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from East
to West, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large
numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do
the work of producing, for the support of their armies. It was a question
whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by
these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.
From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that
would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and
South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken
I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable
against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force
at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the
possibility of repose for refitting and producing the necessary supplies for
carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force
of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way,
there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal
section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land.
These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns
made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and
execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have
to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have done has
been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what I conceived to
be for the best interests of the whole country.
[After detailing the instructions given to his officers, and sketching the
disposition of General Lee's forces, Grant proceeds with his narrative.]
The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning of the
4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of Major-General Meade,
pursuant to instructions. Before night, the whole army was across the Rapidan
(the fifth and sixth corps crossing at Germania Ford, and the second corps at
Ely's Ford, the cavalry, under Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance), with
the greater part of its trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting
with but slight opposition. The average distance travelled by these troops per
day was about twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed
from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of crossing
the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded
army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country, and
protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps (the fifth, Major-General G. K.
Warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near Mine
Run. The battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the
fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the
density of the forest, and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable
promptness.
General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the Army of the Potomac
moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappahannock River
and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions
not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was secured,
but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This crossing he was
apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of the morning of the
6th he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of his
troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the
Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion, probably
two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches,
and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march.
The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morning of
the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army
holding substantially the same position that it had on the evening of the 5th.
After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing
several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. But the
promptness of General Sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that
part of our line, soon re-formed it and restored order. On the morning of the
7th, reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched
lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this
it was evident to my mind that the two day's fighting had satisfied him of his
inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his
advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works. I
therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and Richmond;
and orders were at once issued for a movement by his `right flank. On the night
of the 7th, the march was commenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth
corps moving on the most direct road. But the enemy having `become apprised of
our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first. On
the 8th, General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to
oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at
Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on the main force, within the
recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe
loss to both sides. On the morning of the 9th, General Sheridan started on a
raid against the enemy's lines of communication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th and
11th were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. Among the
killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier Major-General John
Sedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps. Major-General H.G. Wright succeeded
him in command. Early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on
the enemy in position. The second corps, Major-General Hancock commanding,
carried a salient of his line, capturing most of Johnson's division of Ewell's
corps and twenty pieces of artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that
the advantage gained did not prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th
and 18th were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements
from Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the
enemy at Spottsylvania Court House, orders were issued on the 18th with a view
to a movement to the North Anna, to commence at twelve o'clock on the night of
the 19th. Late in the afternoon of the 19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works
on our extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy
loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the 21st,
when it was commenced. But the enemy again, having the shorter line, and being
in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the North Anna in advance
of us, and took position behind it. The fifth corps reached the North Anna on
the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the sixth corps. The second and
ninth corps got up about the same time, the second holding the railroad bridge,
and the ninth lying between that and Jericho Ford. General Warren effected a
crossing the same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon
after getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy
with great slaughter. On the 25th, General Sheridan rejoined the Army of the
Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed
the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large
supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track; recaptured about four
hundred of our men on their way to Richmond as prisoners of war; met and
defeated the enemy's cavalry at Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works
around Richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by
assault), recrossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge under
heavy fire, and moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where
he communicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing off the
whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy to guard our
trains.
[General Grant makes the following reference to the military qualities of Major-
General Sheridan.]
Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were sent to
Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him at Harper's Ferry
about the 11th of August.
His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September were
both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe
skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful,
but no general engagement took place. The two armies lay in such a position--the
enemy on the west bank of the Opequan Creek covering Winchester, and our forces
in front of Berryville--that either could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat
to us would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for
long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. Under these
circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally,
the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal,
which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to
us, and the importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously
threatened invasion so great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But
fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of
General Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, I left City
Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his headquarters, to decide,
after conference with him, what should be done. I met him at Charlestown, and he
pointed out so distinctly how each army lay; what he could do the moment he was
authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but
two words of instruction necessary--Go in! For the conveniences of forage, the
teams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him if he
could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing
Tuesday morning. His reply was, that he could before daylight on Monday. He was
off promptly to time, and I may here add, that the result was such that I have
never since deemed it necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him
orders.
[In the following passage are interesting criticisms of Generals Hood and
Thomas.]
Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed
to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I had the power to
command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed
to be acting. On the 26th of October, the advance of Hood's army attacked the
garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but failing to carry the place, withdrew towards
Courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on
the north side of the Tennessee River, near Florence. On the 28th, Forrest
reached the Tennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three
transports. On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below
Johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and
eight transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and
was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats becoming
disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to prevent their falling
into the hands of the enemy. About a million and a half dollars' worth of stores
and property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. On the 5th
the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River,
above Johnsonville, moving towards Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the
night of the 5th, General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached
Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, and put in
command of all the troops there, with instructions to watch the movements of
Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the
arrival of General A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until General Wilson
could get his cavalry remounted.
On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas, retarding him
as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for the purpose of
concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements.
The enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by General Schofield, at
Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon and
till late at night, but was in every instance repulsed. His loss in this battle
was one thousand seven hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two
prisoners, and three thousand eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six
general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was two
thousand three hundred. This was the first serious opposition the enemy met
with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the
night, General Schofield fell back towards Nashville. This left the field to the
enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned--so that General Thomas'
whole force might be brought together. The enemy followed up and commenced the
establishment of his line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.
As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennessee River, and
that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was ordered to send to
General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's command, and such other
troops as he could spare. The advance of this reinforcement reached Nashville on
the 30th of November.
On the morning of the 15th of December General Thomas attacked Hood in position,
and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the
utmost confusion, leaving in our hands most of his artillery and many thousand
prisoners, including four general officers.
Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me,
the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased upon learning that the
enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared
Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. After urging
upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I
started West to superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City, I
received General Thomas' despatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the
result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and
apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas,
immediately upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time
to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle,
instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the
inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did.
But his final defeat of Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a
vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.
After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and
infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to abandon many pieces of
artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th of December our advanced
forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the
river.
About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and North Alabama,
making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, General Thomas
stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee River. A small force of
cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th Pennsylvania Volunteers, continued to
follow Hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and the
enemy's pontoon-bridge.
[The battle of Five Forks is here described.]
From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such
torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy
roads were laid from Dinwiddie Court House towards Five Forks, where he found
the enemy in full force. General Warren advanced and extended his line across
the Boydton Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of getting across
the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his
left, was directed to hold on where he was, and fortify. General Humphreys drove
the enemy from his front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess' Mills.
Generals Ord, Wright and Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine
the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported
favorably. The enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from Richmond to
our extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be
penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined, therefore, to
extend our line no farther, but to reinforce General Sheridan with a corps of
infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and
with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. The result of the offensive
effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman,
particularly favored this. The enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at
that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some
points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were
at once made to relieve General Humphreys' corps, to report to General Sheridan;
but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of
the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the White
Oak Road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this, he moved with one
division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in
superior force and driven back on the 2d division before it had time to form,
and it, in turn, forced back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. A
division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven
back with heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak Road gained. Sheridan
advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five Forks;
but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel
cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards
Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayed great generalship.
Instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story
of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only
mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. This compelled the enemy to
deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made his progress
slow. At this juncture he despatched to me what had taken place, and that he was
dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie Court House. General Mackenzie's cavalry and
one division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. Soon
after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could hold our
position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two divisions of the 5th corps
could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once. Thus the operations of the
day necessitated the sending of Warren, because of his accessibility, instead of
Humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. On the morning
of the Ist of April, General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the
enemy back on Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried
his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between five
and six thousand prisoners.
[In concluding his memorable report, which ranks as a state document of the
first historic importance, General Grant pays a generous and merited tribute to
the soldierly qualities of both armies.]
There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat the
designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on our
arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that I have not
mentioned. Many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith
submitted; some in the telegrams and brief despatches announcing them, and
others, I regret to say, have not as yet been officially reported.
It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and the East fight
battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference in their
fighting qualities. All that it was possible for men to do in battle they have
done. The Western armies commenced their battles in the Mississippi Valley, and
received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to
them in North Carolina. The armies of the East commenced their battles on the
river from which the Army of the Potomac derived its name, and received the
final surrender of their old antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia.
The splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories, removed all
sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too much), and
the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have followed had either
section failed in its duty. All have a proud record, and all sections can well
congratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in
restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the
United States. Let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy,
whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of
valor.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
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