Admiral Sampson's Report
[The blockade of Cuba was enlivened by captures of Spanish merchantmen and
several minor fights, but was wearisome to the splendid fellows on our ships,
who were pining for a chance to show their quality. It came in due course. The
bombardment of Matanzas opened the ball. The first American officer to sacrifice
his life for his country was Ensign Bagley, who, with four of his men, met death
in the engagement of Cardenas bay. Other sailors lost their lives in destroying
the Spanish cables. There was peril in this coast-service all along the line, as
the enemy had fortified the important points with rapid-fire guns.
The supposedly formidable Spanish fleet that had sailed from Cadiz as far back
as March was causing our navy no little worry. It was deemed necessary to
establish a complete patrol of our coast in case of isolated attempts to damage
our great cities. Others suspected that Cervera's mysterious voyage was towards
Manila, to overcome Dewey before his reinforcements could arrive, or to
intercept the Oregon in its memorable rush from San Francisco round Cape Horn to
Cuba. Admiral Sampson scoured the seas in search of his invisible foe, ending
with his bombardment of San Juan, Porto Rico, by way of leaving his official
message for the Spaniard who had not as yet arrived.
Cervera was actually wandering vaguely in search of coal, and had got to
Martinique, where, to his sorrow, he learned that the neutrality of France
prevented the local authorities from according him that favor. From the 12th
until the 19th of May the Spanish fleet defied the vigilant efforts of Sampson's
captains to locate, much more to capture, it. When at last Cervera was
discovered he was in the snug harbor of Santiago, into which he had quietly
sailed, with a cleverness worthy -- as a feat of seamanship -- of a happier
ending than was in store for him. It was not until ten days later that Commodore
Schley was able to certify the fact from personal investigation. He at once
commenced a bombardment of the land forts, as a challenge, but a few saucy shots
from the safe retreat was all the reply. When Admiral Sampson brought up his
squadron all that was possible was to secure the enemy in his water-prison and
await the results of other forces. No American ship could enter the well-mined
narrow neck of Cervera's fatal "bottle." Those other measures included the
sending of a land-force to co-operate with the navy. Major-General Shafter
received orders, on the day that Schley reported his discovery of Cervera, to
prepare some 20,000 troops for transport to Santiago. On June 1, Admiral Sampson
arrived, took command of the whole fleet, and instituted a close blockade.
Sampson now resolved to execute his plan for blockading the harbor with a
collier, and asked Naval Constructor Richmond P. Hobson to draw up the plan.
This he did, and received permission to execute it. This plan was simply to take
in the collier Merrimac, until he reached a narrow place in the channel, anchor
one end of the vessel, let the other swing with the tide, and, just as the
collier was lengthwise across the channel, sink her with small torpedoes
controlled by electricity. This was one of the most hazardous enterprises ever
undertaken, yet when volunteers were called for nearly every man in the fleet
wanted to go, and there were many heart-burnings over the refusals. Hobson chose
only six men, picked for courage, physical and technical skill. They were Osborn
Deignan, George F. Phillips, Francis Kelly, George Charette, Daniel Montague and
J. C. Murphy. Randolph Clausen, a coxswain of the New York, determined to share
in the work, concealed himself in the Merrimac, and when discovered at the last
moment, refused to leave his self-chosen post, making the eighth man of the
party. The first attempt was made June 2, but it was getting light, and the
enterprise was postponed until the next night, when it was carried out, but not
to a complete success. The Spanish batteries opened on the Merrimac, and the
crew escaped death by a miracle. Unfortunately, the rudder chains were shot
away, part of the torpedo wires cut, and when the collier sank it did not close
the channel. Hobson and his men sank with the vessel and swam to a catamaran,
from which they were taken at daylight by Admiral Cervera, who was out looking
for an American war-ship he supposed he had sunk. On hearing Hobson's story
Cervera was so impressed with his bravery that he sent an officer to Admiral
Sampson under a flag of truce, to allow clothes and money to be sent to the
American prisoners, who were the only ones captured by Spain during the war.
This touch of kindness pleased the American people so much that, later, the
Spanish Admiral received many attentions in this country.
The Morro Castle and batteries along the mouth of the harbor were repeatedly
bombarded, and the men driven from the guns, but the permanent damage was small.
A part of the fleet attacked the batteries at Guantanamo Harbor, east of
Santiago, and on June 10, 600 marines landed and made a camp. They were attached
by Spaniards for two days, and lost four men. The navy shelled the hills, and
the marines held their ground. Admiral Sampson now believed that an army could
capture the batteries at the mouth of the harbor, and wired the President that
with 10,000 men he could take Santiago in twenty-four hours. An army,
principally of regulars, had been collected at Tampa under General Shafter, and
this was hastily embarked on a fleet of transports. There were two divisions of
infantry under Generals Lawton and Kent and one of cavalry under General
Wheeler, but the latter left their horses behind and fought as infantry. The
only volunteers were two squadrons of First Cavalry (Rough Riders), the Seventy-
first New York and the Eighth Massachusetts. Owing to a false alarm, raised by
the report of Spanish cruisers in the Nicholas Channel, the sailing was delayed
several days for more war-ships as convoys, but on June 13 the expedition
sailed, about 16,000 strong, and was off Santiago on the 20th.
There was a difference of opinion between Admiral Sampson and General Shafter
over the order of procedure, the latter declining to sacrifice his men in an
assault which, if successful, would give the fleet a safe path to victory, but
if a failure, as was quite probable, owing to the terrible conditions of heat,
disease, and peril, would be blamed on his generalship. The details of the land-
war follow on another page. Recurring to the Spanish vessels in the harbor:
Cervera might have strengthened his cause by remaining where he was until the
climate had further weakened our forces on land and time had enabled the Spanish
army to send reinforcements to the defenders of Santiago. Instead of this,
orders had been given to the Spanish admiral to make his escape to the harbor of
Havana. He knew it was a fatal blunder, in the condition of his ships and the
impossibility of breaking through the cordon guarding the harbor mouth. Early on
July 3 General Shafter sent a summons to General Toral, commanding at Santiago,
to surrender.
On that morning occurred the second great naval event of the war. General
Shafter desiring to consult with Admiral Sampson as to the shelling of Santiago
by the navy, the latter left on his flag-ship, New York, to meet the General.
Not long after he had left, Cervera's fleet made a sortie out of the harbor. It
was a surprise to the Americans. Being Sunday, many of the vessels had steam
under only a few boilers, and some had their engines uncoupled. Commodore
Schley, the ranking officer, set the signal to close in and fight. The Maria
Tercsa, Almirante Oquendo, and Vizcaya were soon riddled with shot, set on fire
and beached, the officers and crew surrendering. The torpedo-boat destroyers
Pluton, and Furor were quickly sunk, while the Cristobal Colon managed to get
started well to the west, followed by the Brooklyn, Oregon, Texas, and Iowa. The
last two were sent to look after the three beached cruisers, and the others kept
up the chase for about forty miles. The large guns seem to have done little
damage, but the havoc of the smaller calibres was frightful. The Colon was
overtaken, and ran on the beach just as the New York was coming up with Admiral
Sampson on board. Admiral Cervera and all his surviving crew, amounting to
1,300, surrendered. Several hundred were killed or drowned. The Americans lost
but one man. The Spanish officers were sent to Annapolis, and afterwards
paroled. The sailors were sent to Portsmouth, and were finally allowed to go
home.
On July 5, Toral, who had declined the first summons, was again ordered to
surrender, and refused; but a truce was agreed on to allow foreigners and women
and children to leave the city. As it was rumored that Shafter was in a
dangerous situation, reinforcements had been rushed to him, and on July 11
General Miles arrived. Hobson and his crew were exchanged for Spanish prisoners.
The navy bombarded the city on the 10th and 11th, and was preparing to do more
execution when negotiations were opened by which, on the 14th, General Toral
surrendered not only Santiago but the entire eastern end of Cuba, and about
23,000 men, on condition that they be sent back to Spain at the expense of the
United States. This was agreed to and the Santiago campaign was over.
Owing to a wide difference of opinion as to whether Admiral Schley or Sampson
was entitled to the credit for the victory off Santiago, the Senate confirmed
none of the President's naval promotions for gallantry during the war. This
controversy aroused much feeling. Admiral Schley was the popular hero, but
officially Sampson was given the chief credit. It is about the only controversy
over naval matters during the whole war.]
Admiral Sampson's Report to the Secretary of the Navy
UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP "New York," FIRST-RATE, OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 15,
1898.
SIR: I have the honor to make the following report upon the battle with, and the
destruction of, the Spanish squadron, commanded by Admiral Cervera, off Santiago
de Cuba, on Sunday, July 3, 1898:--
The enemy's vessels came quickly out of the harbor between 9:35 and 10 a. m.,
the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at 9:31, and emerging from the
channel five or six minutes later.
The positions of the vessels under my command off Santiago at that moment were
as follows: The flag-ship New York was four miles east of her blockading
station, and about seven miles from the harbor entrance. She had started for
Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go to
the front to consult with General Shafter. A discussion of the situation and a
more definite understanding between us of the operations proposed had been
rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Spanish garrison
of Santiago. I had sent my chief-of-staff on shore the day before to arrange an
interview with General Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I
made arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my flag-ship was in the
position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron appeared in the channel. The
remaining vessels were in or near their usual blockading positions, distributed
in a semi-circle about the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the
westward in the following order:--
The Indiana about a mile and a half from shore; the Oregon, the New York's
place; between these two the Iowa, Texas, and Brooklyn, the latter two miles
from the shore, west of Santiago. The distance of the vessels from the harbor
entrance was from two and one-half to four miles -- the latter being the limit
of day blockading distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about
eight miles. The Massachusetts had left at 4 a. m. for Guantanamo for coal. Her
station was between the Iowa and Texas. The auxiliaries, Gloucester and Vixen,
lay close to the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the larger vessels,
the Gloucester to the eastward, and the Vixen to the westward. The torpedo-boat
Ericsson was in company with the flag-ship, and remained with her during the
chase until ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient service in
rescuing prisoners from the burning Vizcaya. I enclose a diagram, showing
approximately the positions of the vessels as described above.
The Spanish vessels were coming rapidly out of the harbor at a speed estimated
at from eight to ten knots, and in the following order: Infanta Maria Teresa
(flag-ship), Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, and the Almirante Oquendo. The distance
between these ships was about eight hundred yards, which means that from the
time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the
last one was out of the harbor, an interval of only about twelve minutes
elapsed. Following the Oquendo at a distance of about 1,200 yards, came the
torpedo-boat destroyer, Pluton, and after her the Furor. The armored cruisers,
as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon
the blockading vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke from
their guns.
The men of our ships engaged in blockading the port were at Sunday "quarters for
inspection." The signal was made simultaneously from several vessels, "Enemy's
ships escaping," and general quarters was sounded. The men cheered as they
sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within eight minutes by the
vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The New York turned about and steamed
for the escaping fleet, flying the signal, "close in towards harbor entrance and
attack vessels," and gradually increasing speed, until towards the end of the
chase she was making sixteen and one-half knots and was rapidly closing on the
Cristobal Colon. She was not at any time within the range of the heavy Spanish
ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from
the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the
destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the
Gloucester.
The Spanish vessels upon clearing the harbor at once turned to the westward in
column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The heavy
blockading vessels, which had closed in towards the Morro at the instant of the
enemy's appearance, and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire, well
sustained and destructive, speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish fire.
The initial speed of the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockading
vessels, and the battle developed into a chase in which the Brooklyn and Texas
had, at the start, the advantage of position. The Brooklyn maintained this lead.
The Oregon, steaming with amazing speed from the commencement of the action,
took first place. The Iowa and the Indiana having done good work and not having
the speed of the other ships, were directed by me, in succession, at about the
time the Vizcaya was beached, to drop out of the chase and resume blockading
stations. These vessels rescued many prisoners. The Vixen, finding that the rush
of the Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran outside of our own
column, and remained there during the battle and chase.
The remarkably skilful handling and gallant fighting of the Gloucester excited
the admiration of every one who witnessed it, and merits the commendation of the
Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel -- the
yacht Corsair -- and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She was lying
two miles from the harbor entrance, to the southward and eastward, and
immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the
appearance of the Pluton and Furor, the Gloucester was slowed, gaining more
rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the destroyers came out she steamed
for them at full speed and was able to close to short range, where her fire was
accurate, deadly and of great volume. During this fight the Gloucester was under
the fire of the Socapa battery. Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged
from Santiago harbor, the careers of the Furor and the Pluton were ended and
two-thirds of their people killed. The Furor was beached and sunk in the surf;
the Pluton sank in deep water a few minutes later. The destroyers probably
suffered much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle-
ships Iowa, Indiana, and the Texas, yet I think a very considerable factor in
their speedy destruction was the fire, at close range, of the Gloucester's
battery. After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the Gloucester did
excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the Infanta Maria Teresa.
The special method of escape attempted by the Spaniards -- all steering in the
same direction and in formation -- removed all tactical doubts or difficulties,
and made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately
engage and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already stated,
the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the
blockading ships, which could not immediately work up to their best speed; but
they suffered heavily in passing, and the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Oquendo
were probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen minutes of
the engagement; it was afterwards learned that the Infanta Maria Teresa's fire
main had been cut by one of our first shots, and that she was unable to
extinguish fire. With large columns of smoke rising from the lower decks aft,
these vessels gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the beach -- the
Infanta Maria Teresa at about 10:15, at Nima, six and one-half miles from
Santiago harbor entrance, and the Almirante Oquendo at about 10:30 a. m., at
Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port.
The cruiser Vizcaya was still under the fire of the leading vessels; the
Cristobal Colon had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the
range of the guns of the leading American ships. The Vizcaya was soon set on
fire and at 11:15 she turned in shore and was beached at Aserraderos, fifteen
miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and with her reserves of ammunition on
deck already beginning to explode. When about ten miles west of Santiago the
Indiana had been signalled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at Aserraderos
the Iowa was signalled to "resume blockading station." The Iowa, assisted by the
Ericsson and the Hist, took off the crew of the Vizcaya, while the Harvard and
the Gloucester rescued those of the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Almirante
Oquendo.
This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded from the burning Spanish
vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the
day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were
exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main
magazine. In addition to this, a heavy surf was running just inside of the
Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of
humanity was complete.
Of the Spanish ships there now remained afloat only the Cristobal Colon -- but
she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the Cuban
coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the
Vizcaya went ashore, the Colon was about six miles ahead of the Brooklyn and the
Oregon, but her spurt was finished, and the American ships were now gaining upon
her. Behind the Brooklyn and the Oregon came the Texas, Vixen and New York. It
was evident from the bridge of the New York that all the American ships were
gradually overhauling the chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At 12:50
the Brooklyn and the Oregon opened fire and got her range -- the Oregon's heavy
shell striking beyond her -- and at 1:20 she gave up without firing another
shot, hauled down her colors, and ran ashore at Rio Tarquino, forty-eight miles
from Santiago. Captain Cook, of the Brooklyn, went on board to receive the
surrender. While his boat was alongside I came up on the New York, received his
report, and placed the Oregon in charge of the wreck to save her, if possible;
and directed the prisoners to be transferred to the Resolute, which had followed
the chase. Commodore Schley, whose chief-of-staff had gone on board to receive
the surrender, had directed that all their personal effects should be retained
by the officers. This order I did not modify. The Cristobal Colon was not
injured by our firing and probably is not much injured by beaching, though she
ran ashore at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the
working of the sea. But her sea-valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I
am sure, after her surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it became
evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the New York bodily
upon the beach. The New York's stem was placed against her for that purpose, the
ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment. She sank in
shoal water and may be saved. Had this not been done she would have gone down in
deep water and would have been, to a certainty, a total loss.
I regard this most complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the
successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent
and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the
attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in
daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding officer of the
Cristobal Colon.
It seems eminently proper briefly to describe here the manner in which this was
accomplished. The harbor of Santiago is naturally easy to blockade -- there
being but one entrance, and that a narrow one, and the deep water extending
close up to the shore line presenting no difficulties of navigation outside of
the entrance. At the time of my arrival before the port, June 1, the moon was at
its full, and there was sufficient light during the night to enable any movement
outside of the entrance to be detected; but with the waning of the moon and the
coming of dark nights, there was opportunity for the enemy to escape, or for his
torpedo-boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels. It was ascertained,
with fair conclusiveness, that the Merrimac, so gallantly taken into the channel
on June 3, did not obstruct it. I therefore maintained the blockade as follows:
To the battle-ships was assigned the duty, in turn, of lighting the channel.
Moving up to the port at a distance of from one to two miles from the Morro --
dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere -- they threw a searchlight beam
directly up the channel and held it steadily there. This lighted up the entire
breadth of the channel, for half a mile inside of the entrance, so brilliantly
that the movement of the small boats could be detected. Why the batteries never
opened fire upon the searchlight ship was always a matter of surprise to me, but
they never did. Stationed close to the entrance of the port were three picket
launches, and, at a little distance farther out, three small picket vessels --
usually converted yachts -- and, when they were available, one or two of our
torpedo-boats. With this arrangement there was, at least, a certainty that
nothing could get out of the harbor undetected. After the arrival of the army,
when the situation forced upon the Spanish admiral a decision, our vigilance
increased. The night blockading distance was reduced to two miles for all
vessels, and a battle-ship was placed alongside the searchlight ship, with her
broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish
ship should appear. The commanding officers merit the greatest praise for the
perfect manner in which they entered into this plan and put it into execution.
The Massachusetts, which, according to routine, was sent that morning to coal at
Guantanamo, like the others, had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved
a better fate than to be absent that morning. I enclose, for the information of
the department, copies of orders and memorandums issued from time to time,
relating to the manner of maintaining the blockade.
Since all of the above-mentioned work was done so well, it is difficult to
discriminate in praise. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was
fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it -- the
Commodore in command on the second division, the captains of ships, their
officers and men. The fire of the battle-ships was powerful and destructive, and
the resistance of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost before
they had got beyond the range of their own forts. The fine speed of the Oregon
enabled her to take a front position in the chase, and the Cristobal Colon did
not give up until the Oregon had thrown a 13-inch shell beyond her. This
performance adds to the already brilliant record of this fine battle-ship, and
speaks highly of the skill and care with which her admirable efficiency has been
maintained during a service unprecedented in the history of vessels of her
class. The Brooklyn's westerly blockading position gave her an advantage in the
chase, which she maintained to the end, and she employed her fine battery with
telling effect. The Texas and the New York were gaining on the chase during the
last hour, and, had any accident befallen the Brooklyn or the Oregon, would have
speedily overhauled the Cristobal Colon. From the moment the Spanish vessel
exhausted her first burst of speed, the result was never in doubt. She fell, in
fact, far below what might reasonably have been expected of her. Careful
measurements of time and distance give her an average speed -- from the time she
cleared the harbor mouth until the time she was run on shore at Rio Tarquino --
of 13.7 knots. Neither the New York nor the Brooklyn stopped to couple up their
forward engines, but ran out the chase with one pair, getting steam, of course,
as rapidly as possible for all boilers. To stop to couple up the forward engines
would have meant a delay of fifteen minutes -- or four miles in the chase.
Several of the pursuing ships were struck, the Brooklyn more often than the
others, but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being aboard the
Iowa. Our loss was one man killed and one wounded, both on the Brooklyn. It is
difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in a
combat with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish gunnery is poor, at the
best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men
from their guns and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements of
prisoners and by observation. The Spanish vessels, as they dashed out of the
harbor, were covered with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily
diminished in volume and soon almost disappeared. The fire from the rapid-fire
batteries of the battle-ships appears to have been remarkably destructive. An
examination of the stranded vessels shows that the Almirante Oquendo,
especially, had suffered terribly from this fire. Her sides are everywhere
pierced, and her decks are strewn with the charred remains of those who had
fallen.
The reports of Commodore W. S. Schley and of the commanding officers are
enclosed.
A board appointed by me for the purpose several days ago has made a critical
examination of the stranded vessels, both with a view of reporting upon the
result of our fire and the military features involved, and of reporting upon the
chance of saving any of them and of wrecking the remainder. The report of the
board will be speedily forwarded.
Very respectfully,
W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear-Admiral United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief
United States Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.
To THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.
[The following account of the battle-ship Oregon's remarkable voyage around Cape
Horn was given by the vessel's chief engineer.]
UNITED STATES SHIP "OREGON,"
BLOCKADING SANTIAGO DE CUBA,
June 22, 1898.
The Oregon is a first-class coast defence battle-ship of about 10,000 tons'
displacement at the so-called normal draught. In this condition, however, she
has only a certain limited amount of stores on board and only four hundred tons
of coal. When she goes to sea, with her bunkers full of coal, with all stores
and all ammunition on board, her actual displacement is something over 12,000
tons, and her draught of water is then over twenty-seven feet. She was, of
course, in this latter condition when we started out from San Francisco, having
on board at that time about 1,500 tons of coal, all bunkers being practically
full.
We all knew, of course, that we had a remarkably fine ship, but before starting
out we felt some little anxiety as to our ability to keep the machinery fully up
to its work during such a long cruise. Nothing approaching it had ever before
been attempted by a heavy battle-ship. Fortunately, we had just come out of dry
dock in Bremerton (and our trip should really be considered as starting from
that point rather than from San Francisco) and were only nine or ten days in San
Francisco before starting for Callao -- just long enough to fill our bunkers and
magazines. Our machinery, both engines and boilers, were then in excellent
condition, everything having been thoroughly overhauled by our own people while
in dry dock, so it was not necessary to do any great amount of work in San
Francisco.
Having finally filled up with coal, ammunition and stores, we left on March 19,
and proceeded under three boilers direct for Callao, which port we reached on
the morning of April 4, having expended, during this run of sixteen days, nine
hundred tons of coal, leaving six hundred tons still in our bunkers. This we
consider a remarkably efficient performance, having averaged 4.24 knots perton
of coal. The revolutions of the engines during this run were remarkably steady,
averaging at least seventy-five per minute, day after day without a variation of
a tenth of a revolution.
On the afternoon of March 27 smoke and gas were discovered to be coming out of
one of the coal bunkers. This bunker was over half full at the time, having
probably between sixty-five and seventy tons in it. There was nothing to do but
dig for the fire, as it was evidently down somewhere in the body of the pile. So
we started in, working a couple of men in the bunker for about ten minutes at a
time and then sending in a couple more to relieve the first. After about two
hours' work the fire was reached, only about a shovelful of live coal being
found, but probably a couple of tons so hot that it was giving off smoke and
gas. After about four hours' steady work all the dangerous coal had been
removed, and no further trouble was encountered.
On arriving at Callao we found that our coal had been ordered for us by the
Marietta. The lighters had all been loaded, and were brought alongside as soon
as we let go the anchor.
Then began some real work. I started in on the starboard engine and Reeves on
the port engine, and we overhauled connections, scraped in brasses where
necessary, examined, cleaned, and repaired air-pumps, circulating pumps, wiped
out and oiled all the main cylinders and valve-chests. Fortunately for me, my
engine was in pretty good shape, needing only a slight amount of keying up here
and there. Reeves, however, found one of his main cross-head slippers so badly
cut and scored that it was deemed best to remove it and put in place a spare
one, which we carried on board. This sounds easy, but it required twenty-four
hours' continuous work, as it had to be fitted exactly, the face carefully
scraped to a true surface; and, finally, the guides nicely adjusted.
When we arrived here it was evident that war with Spain was inevitable, but it
had not yet broken out. However, every precaution was taken to guard against any
treachery on the part of Spanish sympathizers. The ordinary number of sentries
was doubled and these men were armed with ball cartridges, ammunition was gotten
up for the rapid-fire guns, and the steam launches were manned with armed crews
and kept patrolling around the ship all night, to warn off and prevent any
strange boats from approaching. These precautions were observed whenever we were
at anchor in any port during the whole trip.
All our coal was finally on board by the afternoon of April 7, and out we
started again, using three boilers and averaging something over eleven knots per
hour until the evening of the 9th, when the fourth boiler was put on and the
average speed increased to about thirteen knots, and this was kept up until the
evening of the 16th, when we reached Port Tamar, just inside the entrance of the
Straits of Magellan. We had a few leaky tubes in one boiler a day or so after
leaving Callao, and, of course, stopped them as soon as possible. Soon after
this, in some way which we have never been able to determine, a small amount of
salt water got into our boilers, just enough to cause the density of the water
to become about what it would be if one-quarter of it were sea water. This, of
course, meant a certain amount of scale, but fortunately the amount was so small
that it merely served to make our tube ends tight, without being enough to cause
any bad effects on the boilers. At all events, from that time until long after
our arrival off Santiago we did not have another leaky tube.
We spent the night at anchor in Port Tamar, and the next morning started out
with the intention of making Sandy Point by dark. This, of course, required a
semi-forced draught run, what is known technically as "assisted draught"; that
is to say, the forced draught blowers are run, but the firerooms are not closed
up air-tight, as under full forced draught. We ran our boilers at such a speed
as to give an air-pressure of one-quarter of an inch of water, and were thus
able to run the engines at a speed of 107.3 revolutions per minute, giving the
ship a speed through the water of 14.6 knots per hour. As a matter of fact our
speed from point to point along the shore was much greater, as there was a very
strong current running through the straits in our favor.
While at Callao we had heard that a Spanish torpedoboat was at Montevideo, and
we thought it just possible that she might attempt to intercept us in the
straits, lying behind one of the numerous high points and darting out on us. So
the rapid-fire gun crews were kept at their guns ready for instant work.
However, we saw nothing of her.
Sandy Point was reached in the evening, and the next morning (April 18) began
our usual work -- coaling ship, cleaning, repairing and overhauling machinery.
Of course, the only way to keep the ship going, was to turn to at every
opportunity and do everything possible in the time allowed; but it was beginning
to tell on all of us. We all had to stand watch at sea, and as soon as port was
reached, all hands of the engineer's force had to go at the work and keep it up,
going for every little thing that showed the least sign of wear, and not waiting
even for it to show, but hunting for things of which there was the least
probability of their becoming out of order. But all hands stood the strain well.
We remained at Sandy Point until the morning of April 21, leaving with about
1,200 tons of coal in our bunkers. The Marietta accompanied us from Sandy Point
to Rio, or rather until the morning of the 30th, when we increased our speed to
about fourteen and a half knots an hour, in order to arrive in port during the
afternoon, leaving the Marietta to follow in later. The run from Sandy Point to
Rio was without incident, and was at a lower speed than our previous runs, on
account of the Marietta.
It was at Rio that we received the news that war was on with Spain, and at the
same time a rumor of Dewey's victory at Manila reached us. We also received a
long cablegram from Washington, informing us that Admiral Cervera's squadron of
four heavy armored cruisers and four sea-going torpedo-boats had left for Cuban
waters, and we were advised to avoid them if possible. We remained at Rio until
May 4, doing what repairing we could and filling up with coal, taking something
over a thousand tons. During our stay in this port we were not allowed to visit
the shore. Here, too, we found the Nichteroy, which had been bought by an
American firm and was flying our flag, and which was to be convoyed by us to the
United States. However, she was not allowed to leave port with us, so we stood
up the coast a few miles to wait for her. She joined us the following evening,
but her boilers were in such bad condition that it was decided not to waste time
with her, so she was left in charge of the Marietta, and we went ahead, arriving
at Bahia on the evening of the 8th. Here we put on our war-paint and made
arrangements for refilling our bunkers, but on the evening of the 9th a
cablegram was received from Washington, ordering us to leave, so out we went
immediately, headed for Barbadoes, which was reached at about 3 o'clock on the
morning of May 18. Here we took 240 tons of coal and left the same evening,
standing well to the eastward, and finally reached the Florida coast at Jupiter
Light on the evening of the 24th, reporting our arrival to Washington. Orders
came back to proceed to Hampton Roads if in need of repairs, otherwise to Key
West. There was no hesitation as to which direction to take under these orders,
and, finally, Key West was reached on the morning of the 26th, thus completing
the most remarkable and successful performance ever undertaken by a battle-ship.
I have since heard that there was great anxiety among our own people at home on
account of this ship, and that foreign nations were watching our run with great
interest, while many doubted our ability to successfully accomplish it.
In the first place the machinery of the vessel was beautifully and strongly
built, and, above all, was set in position with the greatest care and
thoroughness. Great credit is therefore due to her builders and to the
inspectors who supervised the work. From the day she went into commission the
greatest care has been taken to keep everything up as nearly to perfection as
possible. On the discovery of the least defect in any part, it has been remedied
immediately. Whenever a run has been made, no matter how short it may have been,
on reaching port again the cylinders and valve-chests, air-pump valves, etc.,
have been carefully examined, cleaned and oiled. The most careful attention has
been paid to the condition of the boilers, and every endeavor has been made to
avoid the use of salt water in them; that, indeed, is the point to which our
success is largely due. Every leak, however small, in the boilers themselves, in
the steam-pipes, in the engines or in the condensers has been stopped just as
soon as possible, and thus only has it been possible to keep down the amount of
water necessary for make-up feed to such a point that our evaporators have been
able to furnish it, in addition to the water required for all other purposes.
The following is a summary, in tabular form, of our runs, showing at a glance
the number of knots run, the speed of the ship in knots per hour, the
consumption of coal, and the knots run per ton of coal. The data in this table
are taken from the time of getting fairly under way, the time while entering and
leaving port being eliminated. The coal, of course, does not include that used
while lying in port, but includes coal consumed for all purposes while at sea.
Distance, Time, Speed, Coal, Knots
Knots. Hours. Knots Tons. Run
per Hour. per Ton
of Coal.
Bremerton to San Francisco 827.7 72 11.49 221.0 3.74
San Francisco to Callao 4,076.5 371 10.99 962.0 4.24
Callao to Port Tamar 2,529.9 212 11.93 785.0 3.22
Port Tamar to Sandy Point 132.0 9 14.55 66.0 2.00
Sandy Point to Rio de Janeiro 2,247.7 223 10.08 657.0 3.42
Rio to Bahia 700.0 (Speeds variable. Data unreliable.) (Speeds variable.
Data unreliable.) 288.0 ..
Bahia to Barbadoes 2,229.0 193 11.55 620.0 3.59
Barbadoes to Jupiter 1,683.9 142 11.86 478.5 3.3
Jupiter to Key West 280.0 27 10.37 77.9 3.6
Totals 14,706.7 4,155.4
C. N. Offley
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