Mr Buchanan's Administration on the Eve of the Rebellion Chapter X
by James Buchanan
On the 20th December, 1860, the South Carolina Convention
adopted an ordinance of secession, and on the 22d appointed
three of their most distinguished citizens to proceed forthwith
to Washington to treat with the Government of the United
States concerning the relations between the parties. These
were Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, and James L. Orr.
They arrived in Washington on Wednesday, the 26th December. On the next morning they received intelligence by telegraph that Major Anderson had, on Christmas night, secretly
dismantled Fort Moultrie; had spiked his cannon, had burnt
his gun-carriages, and had removed with his troops to Fort
Sumter, as if from an impending attack. This information they
sent to the President. He received it with astonishment and
regret. With astonishment, because he had believed Major
Anderson to be in security at Fort Moultrie; and this more
especially whilst the commissioners appointed but three days
before were on their way to Washington. With regret, because
this movement would probably impel the other cotton and
border States into active sympathy with South Carolina, and
thereby defeat the measures of compromise still before the Committee of Thirteen of the Senate, from which he had hoped to
confine secession to that State alone. The President never
doubted for a moment that Major Anderson believed before the
movement that he had "the tangible evidence " of an impending
attack required by his instructions. Still it was difficult to imagine that South Carolina would be guilty of the base perfidy
of attacking any of these forts during the pendency of her mission to Washington, for the avowed purpose of preserving the
peace and preventing collision. Such treacherous conduct would
have been considered infamous among all her sister States. She
has always strenuously denied that such was her intention.
In this state of suspense the President determined to await
official information from Major Anderson himself. After its
receipt, should he be convinced upon full examination that the
Major, on a false alarm, had violated his instructions, he might
then think seriously of restoring for the present the former status
quo of the forts. This, however, was soon after known to be
impossible, in consequence of the violent conduct of South Carolina in seizing all the other forts and public property in the
harbor and city of Charleston.
It was under these circumstances that the President, on
Friday, the 28th December, held his first and only interview
with the commissioners from South Carolina. He determined
to listen with patience to what they had to communicate, taking
as little part himself in the conversation as civility would permit. On their introduction he stated that he could recognize
them only as private gentlemen and not as commissioners from
a sovereign State; that it was to Congress, and to Congress
alone, they must appeal. He, nevertheless, expressed his willingness to communicate to that body, as the only competent tribunal,
any propositions they might have to offer. They then proceeded,
evidently under much excitement, to state their grievances
arising out of the removal of Major Anderson to Fort Sumter,
and declared that for these they must obtain redress preliminary
to entering upon the negotiation with which they had been in
trusted; that it was impossible for them to make any proposition until this removal should be satisfactorily explained; and
they even insisted upon the immediate withdrawal of the Major
and his troops, not only from Fort Sumter, but from the harbor
of Charleston, as a sine qua non to any negotiation.
In their letter to the President of the next day, they repeat
this demand, saying:1 "And, in conclusion, we would urge upon
you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of
Charleston. Under present circumstances they are a standing
menace which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our recent
experience shows, threatens to bring to a bloody issue questions
which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment."
This demand, accompanied by an unmistakable threat of attacking Major Anderson if not yielded, was of the most extravagant
character. To comply with it, the commissioners must have
known, would be impossible. Had they simply requested that
Major Anderson might be restored to his former position at Fort
Moultrie, upon a guarantee from the State that neither it nor the
other forts or public property should be molested; this, at the
moment, might have been worthy of serious consideration.
But to abandon all these forts to South Carolina, on the demand
of commissioners claiming to represent her as an independent
State, would have been a recognition, on the part of the Executive, of her right to secede from the Union. This was not to be
thought of for a moment.
1. Ex. Doc., H. R., vol. vi., No. 26, p. 6.
The President replied to the letter of the commissioners
on Monday, 31st December. In the mean-time information
had reached him that the State authorities, without waiting
to hear from Washington, had, on the day after Major Anderson's removal, seized Fort Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, the custom house, and post office, and over them all had raised the Palmetto flag; and moreover, that every officer of the customs,
collector, naval officer, surveyor, appraisers, together with the
postmaster, had resigned their appointments; and that on Sunday, the 30th December, they had captured from Major Humphreys, the officer in charge, the arsenal of the United States,
containing public property estimated to be worth half a million
of dollars. The Government was thus expelled from all its
property except Fort Sumter, and no Federal officers, whether
civil or military, remained in the city or harbor of Charleston.
The secession leaders in Congress attempted to justify these violent proceedings of South Carolina as acts of self-defence, on the
assumption that Major Anderson had already commenced hostilities. It is certain that their tone instantly changed after his
removal; and they urged its secrecy, the hour of the night when
it was made, the destruction of his gun-carriages, and other attendant incidents, to inflame the passions of their followers. It
was under these circumstances that the President was called
upon to reply to the letter of the South Carolina commissioners,
demanding the immediate withdrawal of the troops of the United
States from the harbor of Charleston. In this reply he peremptorily rejected the demand in firm but courteous terms, and declared his purpose to defend Fort Sumter by all the means in his
power against hostile attacks, from whatever quarter they might
proceed. (Vide his letter of the 31st December, 1860, Ex. Doc.
No. 26, H. R., 36th Congress, 2d Session, accompanying President's message of 8th January, 1861.) To this the commissioners
sent their answer, dated on the 2d January, 1861. This was so
violent, unfounded, and disrespectful, and so regardless of what
is due to any individual whom the people have honored with the
office of President, that the reading of it in the Cabinet excited
indignation among all the members. With their unanimous
approbation it was immediately, on the day of its date, returned
to the commissioners with the following indorsement: "This
paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that
he declines to receive it." Surely no negotiation was ever conducted in such a manner, unless, indeed, it had been the predetermined purpose of the negotiators to produce an open and immediate rupture.
It may be asked, why did the President, at his interview with
the South Carolina commissioners, on the 28th December, offer
to lay the propositions they had to make before Congress, when
he must have been morally certain they would not meet a favorable response? This was to gain time for passion to subside,
and for reason to resume her sway; to bring the whole subject
before the representatives of the people in such a manner as to
cause them to express an authoritative opinion on secession, and
the other dangerous questions then before the country, and
adopt such measures for their peaceable adjustment as might
possibly reclaim even South Carolina herself; but whether or
not, might prevent the other cotton States from following her
evil and rash example.
The insulting letter of the commissioners, which had been
returned to them, was notwithstanding presented to the Senate
by Mr. Jefferson Davis, immediately after the reading of the
President's special message of the 8th January; and such was
the temper of that body at the time, that it was received and
read, and entered upon their journal. Mr. Davis, not content
with this success, followed it up by a severe and unjust attack
against the President, and his example was followed by several
of his adherents. From this time forward, as has been already
stated, all social and political intercourse ceased between the
disunion Senators and the President.
It is worth notice, that whilst this letter of the commissioners was published at length in the "Congressional Globe,"
among the proceedings of the Senate, their previous letter to
the President of the 28th December, and his answer thereto of
the 31st, were never published in this so-called official register, although copies of both had accompanied his special message. By this means the offensive letter was scattered broadcast over the country, whilst the letter of the President, to
which this professed to be an answer, was buried in one of the
numerous and long after published volumes of executive documents.
It is proper to advert to the allegation of the commissioners,
in their letter of the 28th December, that the removal of Major
Anderson to Fort Sumter was made in violation of pledges
given by the President. They also say that "since our arrival
an officer of the United States, acting, as we are assured, not
only without but against your orders, has dismantled one fort
and occupied another, thus altering to a most important extent
the condition of affairs under which we came." As to the al-
leged pledge, we have already shown that no such thing existed.
It has never been pretended that it rests upon any pretext ex-
cept the note of the 9th December, delivered to the President
by the South Carolina members of Congress, and what occurred
on that occasion. All this has been already stated. But if additional evidence were wanting to refute the assertion of a
pledge, this might be found in the statement published afterwards in Charleston by two of their number (Messrs. Miles and
Keitt),1 who, in giving an account of this interview, do not
pretend or even intimate that any thing passed even in their
opinion on either side in the nature of a pledge. By what officer, then, was the assurance given to the commissioners since
their arrival in Washington, that Major Anderson had acted
not only without but against the President's order? It was
none other than the Secretary of War himself, notwithstanding
it was in obedience to his own instructions but a few days before
that the removal was made from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter.
This appears from the letter of Major Anderson to the War
Department of the 27th December, the day after his removal,
which unfortunately did not arrive in Washington until some
days after its date. In this he says: "I will add that many
things convinced me that the authorities of the State designed
to proceed to a hostile act " (against Fort Moultrie), the very
contingency on which the Secretary had not only authorized
but directed the Major to remove his troops to Fort Sumter,
should he deem this a position of greater security. These instructions were in a certain sense peculiarly his own. They
were prepared and transmitted to Major Anderson by himself.
Throughout they do not mention the name of the President,
though in the main they expressed his views.
1. Appleton's "American Annual Cyclopaedia" for 1861, p. 703.
We can refer to a probable cause for this strange conduct on
the part of the Secretary. This was, that three days before the
South Carolina commissioners reached Washington, the President had communicated to him (23d December), through a distinguished friend and kinsman of his own, a request that he
should resign his office, with a statement of the reason why this
was made. When he heard this request he displayed much
feeling, but said he would comply with the President's wishes.
It is proper to state the reason for this request. On the night
before it was made (22d December), the fact was first made
known to the President that 870 State bonds for $1,000 each,
held in trust by the Government for different Indian tribes, had
been purloined from the Interior Department by Godard Bailey,
the clerk in charge of them, and had been delivered to William
H. Russell, a member of the firm of "Russell, Majors & Waddell." Upon examination, it was discovered that this clerk, in
lieu of the bonds abstracted, had from time to time received bills
of corresponding amount from Russell, drawn by the firm on
John B. Floyd, Secretary of War, and by him accepted and
indorsed, and this without any lawful authority. In consequence there was found in the safe where the Indian bonds had
been kept, a number of these accepted bills, exactly equal in
amount to $870,000. These acceptances were thirteen in number, commencing on the 13th September, 1860, and had been
received by Mr. Bailey, according to his own statement, "as
collateral security for the return of the bonds," and as such had
been placed by him in the safe. It is remarkable that the last
of them, dated on the 13th December, 1860, for $135,000, had
been drawn for the precise sum necessary to make the aggregate
amount of the whole number of bills exactly equal to that of
the abstracted bonds.
And here it is due to Secretary Thompson to state, though
a digression, that on Monday morning, the 24th December, at
his own instance, the House of Representatives appointed a
committee "to investigate and report upon the subject," of
which Hon. Mr. Morris, of Illinois, a rancorous opponent of the
administration, was the chairman. After a full investigation,
the committee made their report on the 12th February, 1861.1
In this they state: "They deem it but justice to add that they
have discovered nothing to involve the late Secretary, Hon.
Jacob Thompson, in the slightest degree in the fraud, and nothing
to indicate that he had any complicity in the transaction, or that
he had any knowledge of it until the time of the disclosure by
Godard Bailey." It is to be regretted, for the sake of public
justice, that all the circumstances connected with the abstraction
of these bonds had not been subjected to a judicial investigation.
This was rendered impossible by the action of the committee
itself, in examining John B. Floyd and William H. Russell as
witnesses. For this reason they were relieved from all criminal
responsibility by the Act of Congress of the 24th January, 1857,2
of the existence of which the committee seem to have been ignorant. This act provides that no person examined as a witness
before a committee of either House of Congress, "shall be held
to answer criminally in any court of justice for any fact or act"
"touching which he shall have testified." In this manner both
Mr. Floyd and Mr. Russell escaped without trial.
1. Report of Committee, H. R., 1860-'61, vol. ii., No. 78, p. 3.
2. 11 Laws U. S., p. 155.
To return from our digression. Secretary Floyd's apparent
complicity with this fraudulent transaction covered him with
suspicion, and, whether this were well or ill founded, rendered it
impossible, in the opinion of the President, that he should remain in the Cabinet; and hence the request that he should resign. What effect this request may have produced in suddenly
converting him from having been until then an avowed and consistent opponent of secession to one of its most strenuous supporters, may be readily inferred. Certain it is, that immediately
after the arrival of the South Carolina commissioners, he became
the intimate associate of leading secession Senators, who had
just before been in the habit of openly condemning his official
conduct.
On the evening of the day after the arrival of these commissioners he boldly assumed his new position, and became the only
witness to a pledge which his own instructions of a few days
before prove could never have existed. On that evening, in the
face of all these facts, he read to the President, in Cabinet council, in a discourteous and excited tone, hitherto unknown, a paper
declaring that "it is evident now, from the action of the commander at Fort Moultrie, that the solemn pledges of this Government have been violated by Major Anderson," and that "one remedy only is left, and that is to withdraw the garrison from
the harbor of Charleston altogether." This evidently foreshadowed the demand made by the commissioners on the following
day (28th December), of which we lhave already treated. This
proposition the President heard with astonishment. As he had
stated in his reply to them of the 31st December: "Such an
idea was never thought of by me. No allusion had ever been
made to it in any communication between myself and any human
being."
The Secretary, on the 29th December, sent to the President
the resignation of his office. By this be offered to discharge its
duties until his successor should be appointed. It was instantly
accepted without reference to this offer, and Postmaster General
Holt was transferred to the War Department.
The President had not made the personal acquaintance of
Mr. Floyd before his appointment. Though never in Congress,
he had been, like his father, Governor of Virginia. Mr. Buchanan had been favorably impressed by the fact that he had
refused to accept a recommendation from the Electoral College
of Virginia for a seat in the Cabinet, assigning as a reason that
the President, in making selections for this high and confidential office, ought to be left free and untrammelled to the exercise of his own judgment.
The removal of Major Anderson to Fort Sumter, and the
seizure by South Carolina of all the remaining public property
at Charleston, altogether changed the aspect of affairs from what
it had been at the date of the interview between General Scott
and the President. Fort Sumter was now threatened with an
immediate attack. The time had arrived for despatching the
Brooklyn on her destined expedition for its relief. At this crisis
General Scott, being too unwell to call in person, addressed a
note to the President, on Sunday, the 30th December, asking
his permission to send, without reference to the War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, two hundred and
fifty recruits from New York harbor to reenforce Fort Sumter,
together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition and subsistence stores, expressing the hope "that a sloop-of-war and
cutter may be ordered for the same purpose as early as to-morrow " (31st December).
The President immediately decided to order reinforcements;
but he preferred to send them by the Brooklyn, which had remained in readiness for this service. He thought that a powerful war steamer with disciplined troops on board would prove
more effective than a sloop-of-war and cutter with raw recruits.
Accordingly on the next morning (Monday) he instructed the Secretaries of War and the Navy to despatch the Brooklyn to Fort
Sumter. On the evening of this day the General called to congratulate him on the fact that the Secretaries had already issued
appropriate orders to the respective army and navy officers, and
stated that these were then in his own pocket.
In contradiction to this prompt action, it is difficult to imagine how the General could have asserted, in his report to
President Lincoln, that "the South Carolina commissioners had
already been many days in Washington, and no movement of
defence [on the part of the United States] had been permitted."
In regard to the "many days"' delay:--These commissioners arrived in Washington on the 26th December; the General sent his
request to the President on Sunday, the 30th; and on Monday
morning he himself received the necessary orders for the departure of the expedition. General Scott, notwithstanding this
prompt response to his request, proceeds still further, and charges
the President with having "refused to allow any attempt to be
made" to reenforce Fort Sumter, "because he was holding negotiations with the South Carolina commissioners," although
this alleged refusal occurred at the very time (31st December)
when he himself had in his own hands the order for the Brooklyn to proceed immediately to Fort Sumter. Nay, more: "Afterwards," says the General, "Secretary Holt and myself endeavored, in vain, to obtain a ship-of-war for the purpose, and were
finally obliged to employ the passenger steamer Star of the West."
After this statement, will it be credited that the Star of the West
was employed in place of the Brooklyn at the pressing instance
of General Scott himself? And yet such is the fact. The President yielded to this unfortunate change with great reluctance,
and solely in deference to the opinion of the commanding Gen
eral on a question of military strategy. What a failure and
confusion of memory the report to President Lincoln exhibits!
At the interview with President Buchanan on the evening
of the 31st December, the General seemed cordially to approve
the matured plan of sending reenforcements by the Brooklyn.
Why, then, the change in his opinion? At this interview the
President informed him he had sent a letter but a few hours before to the South Carolina commissioners, in answer to a communication from them, and this letter would doubtless speedily
terminate their mission ;--that although he had refused to recognize them in an official character, yet it might be considered
improper to transmit the orders then in his possession to the
Brooklyn until they had an opportunity of making a reply, and
that the delay for this purpose could not, in his opinion, exceed
forty-eight hours. In this suggestion the General promptly concurred, observing that it was gentlemanly and proper. He,
therefore, retained the orders to await the reply. On the morning of the 2d January the President received and returned the
insolent communication of the South Carolina commissioners
without an answer, and thus every obstacle was removed from
the immediate transmission of the orders. In the mean time,
however, the General had unluckily become convinced, after
advising with an individual believed to possess much knowledge
and practical experience in naval affairs, that the better plan to
secure both secrecy and success would be to send to Fort Sumter
a fast side-wheel mercantile steamer from New York with the
two hundred and fifty recruits.
Such was the cause of the change, according to the undoubted
information communicated to the President at the time by the
Secretaries of War and the Navy. For this reason alone was
the Star of the West substituted for the service instead of the
Brooklyn. The change of programme caused a brief delay; but
the Star of the West, with recruits on board, left New York for
Charleston on the afternoon of the 5th January. On the evening of the same day, however, on which this ill-fated steamer
went to sea, General Scott despatched a telegram to his son-in-
law, Colonel Scott, of the United States army, then at New
York, to countermand her departure; but this did not reach him
until after she had left the harbor.
The cause of this countermand proves how much wiser it
would have been to employ the Brooklyn in the first instance oln
this important service. This shall be stated in the language of
Secretary Holt in his letter of the 5th March, 1861, in reply to
certain allegations which had been made and published1 by Mr.
Thompson, the late Secretary of the Interior. In this he says:
"The countermand spoken of (by Mr. Thompson) was not more
cordially sanctioned by the President than it was by General
Scott and myself; not because of any dissent from the order on
the part of the President, but because of a letter received that day
from Major Anderson, stating, in effect, that he regarded himself secure in his position; and yet more from intelligence which
late on Saturday evening (5th January, 1861) reached the Department, that a heavy battery had been erected among the sand
hills, at the entrance to Charleston harbor, which would probably destroy any unarmed vessel (and such was the Star of the
West) which might attempt to make its way to Fort Sumter.
This important information satisfied the Government that there
was no present necessity for sending reenforcements, and that
when sent they should go not in a vessel of commerce, but of
war. Hence the countermand was despatched by telegraph to
New York; but the vessel had sailed a short time before it
reached the officer (Colonel Scott) to whom it was addressed."
1. National Intelligencer," 5th March, 1861
General Scott, as well as the Secretaries of War and the
Navy, convinced of the blunder which had been committed in
substituting the Star of the West for the Brooklyn, proceeded to
provide, as far as might be possible, against anticipated disaster.
For this purpose the Secretary of the Navy, on the 7th January,
despatched an order to the commander of the Brooklyn (Farragut), and General Scott simultaneously forwarded to him a
despatch to be delivered to the U. S. officer in command of
the recruits on the Star of the West. By this the commander
of the recruits was informed that Captain Farragut had been instructed to afford him "aid and succor in case your [his] ship be
shattered or injured; second, to convey this order of recall, in
case you cannot land at Fort Sumter, to Fort Monroe, Hampton
Roads, there to await further orders." In a postscript he was
further directed "to land his troops at Fort Monroe and discharge the ship." The sequel will show that these precautions
were useless.
The Star of the West, under the command of Captain
McGowan, proceeded on her ill-starred voyage, amid anxious
apprehensions for the fate of the recruits and mariners on board.
She arrived in Charleston harbor on the 9th of January, the flag
of the United States flying at her mast-head; and whilst endeavoring to approach Fort Sumter, was fired upon by order of
Governor Pickens. She then immediately changed her course
and returned to New York. Fortunately no lives were lost, nor
was the vessel materially injured. This statement of facts proves
incontestably that the President, so far from refusing, was not
only willing but anxious, within the briefest period, to recnforce
Fort Sumter.
On the very day and immediately after this outrage on the
Star of the West, Major Anderson sent a flag to Governor
Pickens, informing him of the reason why he had not opened fire
from Fort Sumter on the batteries which had attacked the Star
of the West. This was because he presumed the act had been
unauthorized. He demanded its disavowal, and if this were not
sent in a reasonable time he would consider it war, and fire on
any vessel that attempted to leave the harbor. Had he adhered
to his purpose, the civil war would then have commenced. This
demand of Major Anderson, so worthy of an American officer,
was totally disregarded by the Governor. Instead of disavowing the act or apologizing for it, he had the audacity, but two
days after the outrage, to send the Hon. A. G. Magrath and
General D. F. Jamison, whom he styled as "both members of
the Executive Council and of the highest position in the State,"
to Major Anderson, for the purpose of persuading him to surrender the fort. In the letter which they bore from the Governor,
dated on the 11th January, they were instructed to present to
Major Anderson "considerations of the gravest public character,
and of the deepest interest to all who deprecate the improper
waste of life, to induce the delivery of Fort Sumter to the constituted authorities of the State of South Carolina, with a pledge
on its part to account for such public property as may be in
your charge."
This Major Anderson appears to have regarded, not merely
as an effort to persuade him voluntarily to surrender the fort,
but as an absolute demand for its surrender. In either case,
however, his instructions, already quoted, prescribed his line of
duty. Under these he ought to have peremptorily informed the
emissaries of the Governor that he would not surrender, but
would defend the fort against attack by all the means in his
power. In this course he would not only have obeyed his instructions, but have acted in accordance with the explicit determination of the President, announced but eleven days before
(31st December) to the South Carolina commissioners. But
Major Anderson, notwithstanding these considerations, as well
as his own declared purpose but two days before to consider the
attack on the Star of the West as war, and to act accordingly,
unless it should be explained and disavowed, now proposed to
Governor Pickens to refer the question of surrender to Washington. In his answer of the same date to the Governor's menacing
request, whilst stating that he could not comply with it, and
deeply regretting that the Governor should have made a demand
of him with which he could not comply, he presents the following alternative: "Should your Excellency deem fit, prior to a
resort to arms, to refer this matter to Washington, it would afford
me the sincerest pleasure to depute one of my officers to accompany any messenger you may deem proper to be the bearer of
your demand." This proposition was promptly accepted by the
Governor, and in pursuance thereof he sent on his part Hon. I.
W. Hayne,. Attorney-General of South Carolina, to Washington;
whilst Major Anderson sent as his deputy Lieutenant J. Norman Hall, of the first artillery, then under his command in the
fort. These gentlemen immediately set out for Washington,
and arrived together on the evening of the 13th January, 1861.
Thus, greatly to the surprise of the President, had a truce
or suspension of arms been concluded between Major Anderson
and Governor Pickens, to continue, from its very nature, until he
should again decide against the surrender of Fort Sumter. This
was what the writers on public law denominate "a partial truce
under which hostilities are suspended only in certain places, as
between a town and the army besieging it."1 Until this decision should be made by the President, Major Anderson had thus
placed it out of his own power to ask for reenforcements, and
equally out of the power of the Government to send them without a violation of the public faith pledged by him as the commandant of the fort. In the face of these facts, the President
saw with astonishment that General Scott, in his report to President Lincoln, had stated that the expedition under Captain
Ward, of three or four small steamers, "had been kept back,"
not in consequence of this truce between Major Anderson and
Governor Pickens, "but by something like a truce or armistice
concluded here [in Washington], embracing Charleston and
Pensacola harbors, agreed upon between the late President and
certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana,
&c., and this truce lasted to the end of the administration."
From the confused and inaccurate memory of the General,
events altogether distinct in their nature are so blended in his
report to President Lincoln, that it is difficult to disentangle
them. Such is eminently the case in mixing up the facts relative to Charleston and Pensacola in the same sentences. In
order to render each clear, we shall first treat of Charleston and
afterwards of Pensacola.
1. Vattel's Law of Nations, p. 404.
The expedition of the Star of the West had scarcely returned to New York, when the news of the truce between Major Anderson and Governor Pickens reached Washington (13th
January). Between the two events it was physically impossible to prepare and send a second expedition, and this could not
be done afterwards until the truce should expire, without a violation of public faith. It did not last, as the General asserts,
"to the end of the administration," but expired by its own limitation on the 5th February, the day when Secretary Holt finally
and peremptorily announced to the South Carolina commissioner that the President would not under any circumstances
surrender Fort Sumter. It is possible that, under the laws of
war, the President might have annulled this truce after due notice to Governor Pickens. This, however, would have cast a
serious reflection on Major Anderson for having concluded it,
who, beyond question, had acted from the purest and most patriotic motives. Neither General Scott nor any other person,
so far as is known, ever proposed to violate it. Indeed, from
his peculiar temper of mind and military training, he would
have been the last man to Inake such a proposition; and yet, in
his report to President Lincoln, he does not make the most distant allusion to the fact, well known to him, that such a truce
had ever beern concluded. Had he done this, he would at once
have afforded conclusive evidence against sending reenforcements until it should expire. On the contrary, instead of the
actual truce, "something like a truce," according to his statement, was made, not in Charleston, but in Washington, and not
between the actual parties to it, but "between the late President
and certain principal seceders of South Carolina." Nothing
more unfounded and unjust could have been attributed to President Buchanan.
Major Anderson may probably have committed an error in
not promptly rejecting the demand, as lie understood it, of Governor Pickens for the surrender of Fort Sumter, instead of referring it to Washington. If the fort were to be attacked, which
was then extremely doubtful, this was the propitious moment
for a successful resistance. The Governor, though never so willing, was not in a condition to make the assault. He required
time for preparation. On the other hand, Major Anderson was
then confident in his power to repel it. This is shown by his
letters to the War Department of the 31st December and 6th
January. From these it appears that lie not only felt safe in
his position, but confident that he could command the harbor
of Charleston, and hold the fort in opposition to any force which
might be brought against him. Such was, also, the oft-expressed
conviction at Washington of Lieutenant Hall, whom he had
selected as his deputy, as well as that of Lieutenant Theodore
Talbot, likewise of the 1st artillery, who had left Fort Sumter
on the 9th January, 1861, as a bearer of despatches. Still, had
Governor Pickens attacked the fort, this would have been the
commencement of civil war between the United States and
South Carolina. This every patriot desired to avoid as long as
a reasonable hope should remain of preserving peace. And
then such a hope did extensively prevail, founded upon the expectation that the Crittenden Compromise, or some equally
healing measure, might be eventually adopted by Congress.
How far this consideration may account for Major Anderson's
forbearance when the Star of tke West was fired upon, and
for his proposal two days thereafter to refer the question of the
surrender of the fort to Washington, we can only conjecture. If
this were the cause, his motive deserves high commendation.
Colonel Hayne, the commissioner from South Carolina, as
already stated, arrived in Washington on the 13th January.
He bore with him a letter from Governor Pickens addressed to
the President. On the next morning he called upon the President and stated that he would deliver this letter in person on
the day following. The President, however, admonished by his
recent experience with the former commissioners, declined to
hold any conversation with him on the subject of his mission,
and requested that all communications between them might be
in writing. To this he assented. Although the President had
no actual knowledge of the contents of the Governor's letter,
he could not doubt it contained a demand for the surrender of
the fort. Such a demand he was at all times prepared peremptorily to reject. This Colonel Hayne must have known, because the President had but a fortnight before informed his predecessors this was impossible, and had never been thought of by
him in any possible contingency. The President confidently
expected that the letter would be transmitted to him on the day
after the interview, when his refusal to surrender the fort would
at once terminate the truce, and leave both parties free to act
upon their own responsibility. Colonel Hayne, however, did
not transmit this letter to the President on the 15th January,
according to his promise, but withheld it until the 31st of that
month. The reason for this vexatious delay will constitute a
curious portion of our narrative, and deserves to be mentioned
in some detail. (Vide the President's message of 8th February, 1861, with the accompanying documents, Ex. Doxc., H. R.,
vol. ix., No. 61.)
The Senators from the cotton States yet in Congress am
peared, strangely enough, to suppose that through their influence
the President might agree not to send reenforcements to Fort
Sumter, provided Governor Pickens would stipulate not to attack it. By such an agreement they proposed to preserve the
peace. But first of all it was necessary for them to prevail upon
Colonel iayne not to transmit the letter to the President on
the day appointed, because they well knew that the demand
which it contained would meet his prompt and decided refusal.
This would render the conclusion of such an agreement impossible.
In furtherance of their plan, nine of these Senators, with
Jefferson Davis at their head, addressed a note to Colonel Hayne,
on the 15th January, requesting him to defer the delivery of the
letter. They proposed that he should withhold it until they
could ascertain from the President whether he would agree not
to send reinforcements, provided Governor Pickens would engage not to attack the fort. They informed the Colonel that
should the President prove willing in the first place to enter into
such an arrangement, they would then strongly recommend that
he should not deliver the letter he had in charge for the present,
but send to South Carolina for authority from Governor Pickens to become a party thereto. Colonel Hayne, in his answer
to these Senators of the 17th January, informed them that he
had not been clothed with power to make the arrangement suggested, but provided they could get assurances with which they
were entirely satisfied that no reenforcements would be sent to
Fort Sumter, he would withhold the letter with which he had
been charged, refer their communication to the authorities of
South Carolina, and await further instructions.
On the 19th January this correspondence between the Senators and Colonel Hayne was submitted to the President, accompanied by a note from three of their number, requesting him to
take the subject into consideration. His answer to this note
was delayed no longer than was necessary to prepare it in proper
form. On the 22d January it was communicated to these Senators in a letter from the Secretary of War. This contained an
express refusal to enter into the proposed agreement. Mr. Holt
says: "I am happy to observe that, in your letter to Colonel
Hayne, you express the opinion that it is 'especially due from
South Carolina to our States, to say nothing of other slaveholding States, that she should, so far as she can consistently with
her honor, avoid initiating hostilities between her and the United
States or any other power.' To initiate such hostilities against
Fort Sumter would, beyond question, be an act of war against
the United States. In regard to the proposition of Colonel
Hayne, 'that no reenforcements will be sent to Fort Sumter in
the interval, and that public peace will not be disturbed by
any act of hostility toward South Carolina,' it is impossible for
me to give you any such assurances. The President has no authority to enter into such an agreement or understanding. As
an executive officer, he is simply bound to protect the public
property so far as this may be practicable; and it would be a
manifest violation of his duty to place himself under engagements that he would not perform this duty, either for an indefinite or limited period. At the present moment it is not deemed
necessary to reenforce Major Anderson, because he makes no
such request and feels quite secure in his position. Should his
safety, however, require reenforcements, every effort will be
made to supply them."
It was believed by the President that this peremptory refusal
to enter into the proposed agreement, would have caused Colonel Hayne immediately to present the letter he had in charge
and thus terminate his mission, thereby releasing both parties
from the obligations of the truce. In this expectation the President was disappointed. The secession Senators again interposed, and advised Colonel Hayne still longer to withhold the
letter from the President, and await further instructions from
Charleston. In his answer of 24th January to their note containing this advice, he informs them that although the letter
from the Secretary of War "was far from being satisfactory,"
yet in compliance with their request he "would withhold the
communication with which he was at present charged, and refer
the whole matter to the authorities of South Carolina, and
would await their reply." On the 30th this reply was received,
and on the next day Colonel Hayne transmitted to the President the letter of Governor Pickens demanding the surrender
of the fort, with a long communication from himself. This letter is dated "Headquarters, Charleston, January 12,1861," and
is as follows:
"SIR: At the time of the separation of the State of South
Carolina from the United States, Fort Sumter was, and still is,
in the possession of troops of the United States, under the command of Major Anderson. I regard that possession as not consistent with the dignity or safety of the State of South Carolina, and have this day [it was the day previous] addressed
to Major Anderson a communication to obtain from him the
possession of that fort by the authorities of this State. The
reply of Major Anderson informs me that he has no authority
to do what I required, but he desires a reference of the demand
to the President of the United States. Under the circumstances now existing, and which need no comment by me, I
have determined to send to you Hon. I. W. Ilayne, the Attorney-General of the State of South Carolina, and have instructed
him to demand the delivery of Fort Sumter, in the harbor of
Charleston, to the constituted authorities of the State of South
Carolina. The demand I have made of Major Anderson, and
which I now make of you, is suggested by imy earnest desire to
avoid the bloodshed which a persistence in your attempt to retain possession of that fort will cause, and which will be unavailing to secure to you that possession, but induce a calamity
most deeply to be deplored. If consequences so unhappy shall
ensue, I will secure for this State, in the demand which I now
make, the satisfaction of having exhausted every attempt to
avoid it.
"In relation to the public property of the United States
within Fort Sumter, the Hon. I. W. Hayne, who will hand you
this communication, is authorized to give you the pledge of the
State that the valuation of such property will be accounted for
by this State, upon the adjustment of its relations with the
United States, of which it was a part."
On the 6th February, the Secretary of War, on behalf of
the President, replied to this demand, as well as to the letter of
Colonel Hayne accompanying it. Our narrative would be incomplete without this admirable and conclusive reply. It is as
follows:
"WAR DEPARTMENT, February 6, 1861.1
"SIR: The President of the United States has received your
letter of the 31st ultimo, and has charged me with the duty of
replying thereto.
"In the communication addressed to the President by Governor Pickens, under date of the 12th January, and which accompanies yours now before me, his Excellency says: 'I have
determined to send to you the Hon. I. W. Hayne, the Attorney-
General of the State of South Carolina, and have instructed
him to demand the surrender of Fort Sumter, in the harbor
of Charleston, to the constituted authorities of the State of
South Carolina. The demand I have made of Major Anderson, and. which I now make of you, is suggested because of my
earnest desire to avoid the bloodshed which a persistence in your
attempt to retain the possession of that fort will cause, and
which will be unavailing to secure to you that possession, but
induce a calamity most deeply to be deplored.' The character
of the demand thus authorized to be made appears (under the
influence, I presume, of the correspondence with the Senators
to which you refer) to have been modified by subsequent instructions of his Excellency, dated the 26th, and received by
yourself on the 30th January, in which he says: 'If it be so
that Fort Sumter is held as property, then, as property, the
rights, whatever they may be, of the United States, can be ascertained, and for the satisfaction of these rights the pledge of
the State of South Carolina you are authorized to give.' The
full scope and precise purport of your instructions, as thus modified, you have expressed in the following words: 'I do not come
as a military man to demand the surrender of a fortress, but as the
legal officer of the State--its attorney-general--to claim for the
State the exercise of its undoubted right of eminent domain,
and to pledge the State to make good all injury to the rights of
property which arise from the exercise of the claim.' And lest
this explicit language should not sufficiently define your position, you add: ' The proposition now is that her [South Carolina's] law officer should, under authority of the Governor and
his council, distinctly pledge the faith of South Carolina to
make such compensation, in regard to Fort Sumter and its appurtenances and contents, to the full extent of the money value
of the property of the United States, delivered over to the
authorities of South Carolina by your command.' You then
adopt his Excellency's train of thought upon the subject, so far
as to suggest that the possession of Fort Sumter by the United
States, 'if continued long enough, must lead to collision,' and
that 'an attack upon it would scarcely improve it as property,
whatever the result; and if captured, it would no longer be the
subject of account.'
1. H. R. Ex. Doc., 1860-'61, vol. ix., Doc., No 61.
"The proposal, then, now presented to the President, is simply
an offer on the part of South Carolina to buy Fort Sumter and
contents as property of the United States, sustained by a declaration, in effect, that if she is not permitted to make the purchase
she will seize the fort by force of arms. As the initiation of a
negotiation for the transfer of property between friendly governments, this proposal impresses the President as having assumed a most unusual form. He has, however, investigated the
claim on which it professes to be based, apart from the declaration that accompanies it. And it may be here remarked, that
much stress has been laid upon the employment of the words
'property' and 'public property' by the President in his several messages. These are the most comprehensive terms which
can be used in such a connection, and surely, when referring to
a fort or any other public establishment, they embrace the entire
and undivided interest of the Government therein.
"The title of the United States to Fort Sunmter is complete
and incontestable. Were its interest in this property purely
proprietary, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, it might
probably be subjected to the exercise of the right of eminent domain; but it has also political relations to it of a much higher
and more imposing character than those of mere proprietorship.
It has absolute jurisdiction over the fort and the soil on which it
stands. This jurisdiction consists in the authority to ' exercise
exclusive legislation' over the property referred to, and is therefore clearly incompatible with the claim of eminent domain now
insisted upon by South Carolina. This authority was not derived from any questionable revolutionary source, but from the
peaceful cession of South Carolina herself, acting through her
legislature, under a provision of the Constitution of the 'United
States. South Carolina can no more assert the right of eminent
domain over Fort Sumter than Maryland can assert it over the
District of Columbia. The political and proprietary rights of
the United States in either case rest upon precisely the same
ground.
"The President, however, is relieved from the necessity of
further pursuing this inquiry by the fact that, whatever may be
the claim of South Carolina to this fort, he has no constitutional
power to cede or surrender it. The property of the United
States has been acquired by force of public law, and can only be
disposed of under the same solemn sanctions. The President, as
the head of the executive branch of the government only, can no
more sell and transfer Fort Sumter to South Carolina than he
can sell and convey the Capitol of the United States to Maryland or to any other State or individual seeking to possess it.
His Excellency the Governor is too familiar with the Constitution of the United States, and with the limitations upon the
powers of the Chief Magistrate of the government it has established, not to appreciate at once the soundness of this legal proposition. The question of reinforcing Fort Sumter is so fully
disposed of in my letter to Senator Slidell and others, under date
of the 22d of January, a copy of which accompanies this, that its
discussion will not now be renewed. I then said: 'At the present
moment it is not deemed necessary to reenforce Major Anderson,
because be makes no such request. Should his safety, however,
require reinforcements, every effort will be made to supply
them.' I can add nothing to the explicitness of this language,
which still applies to the existing status.
"The right to send forward reenforcements when, in the
judgment of the President, the safety of the garrison requires
them, rests on the same unquestionable foundation as the right
to occupy the fortress itself. In the letter of Senator Davis and
others to yourself under date of the 15th ultimo, they say: 'We
therefore think it especially due from South Carolina to our States
--to say nothing of other slaveholding States--that she should,
as far as she can consistently with her honor, avoid initiating hostilities between her and the United States or any other power;'
and you now yourself give to the President the gratifying assurance that 'South Carolina has every disposition to preserve
the public peace;' and since he is himself sincerely animated by
the same desire, it would seem that this common and patriotic
object must be of certain attainment. It is difficult, however,
to reconcile with this assurance the declaration on your part that
'it is a consideration of her [South Carolina's] own dignity as a
sovereign, and the safety of her people, which prompts her to
demand that this property should not longer be used as a military post by a government she no longer acknowledges,' and the
thought you so constantly present, that this occupation must
lead to a collision of arms and the prevalence of civil war.
Fort Sumter is in itself a military post, and nothing else; and
it would seem that not so much the fact as the purpose of its use
should give to it a hostile or friendly character. This fortress is
now held by the Government of the United States for the same
objects for which it has been held from the completion of its
construction. These are national and defensive; and were a
public enemy now to attempt the capture of Charleston or the
destruction of the commerce of its harbor, the whole force of the
batteries of this fortress would be at once exerted for their protection. How the presence of a small garrison, actuated by such
a spirit as this, can compromise the dignity or honor of South
Carolina, or become a source of irritation to her people, the
President is at a loss to understand. The attitude of that garrison, as has been often declared, is neither menacing, nor defiant.
nor unfriendly. It is acting under orders to stand strictly on the
defensive; and the government and people of South Carolina
must well know that they can never receive aught but shelter
from its guns, unless, in the absence of all provocation, they
should assault it and seek its destruction. The intent with
which this fortress is held by the President is truthfully stated
by Senator Davis and others in their letter to yourself of the 15th
January, in which they say: 'It is not held with any hostile or
unfriendly purpose toward your State, but merely as property
of the United States, which the President deems it his duty to
protect and preserve.'
"If the announcement so repeatedly made of the President's
pacific purposes in continuing the occupation of Fort Sumter
until the question shall have been settled by competent authority,
has failed to impress the government of South Carolina, the forbearing conduct of his administration for the last few months
should be received as conclusive evidence of his sincerity. And
if this forbearance, in view of the circumstances which have so
severely tried it, be not accepted as a satisfactory pledge of the
peaceful policy of this administration toward South Carolina,
then it may be safely affirmed that neither language nor conduct
can possibly furnish one. If, with all the multiplied proofs
which exist of the President's anxiety for peace, and of the earnestness with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that
State shall assault Fort Sumter, and peril the lives of the handful of brave and loyal men shut up within its walls, and thus
plunge our common country into the horrors of civil war, then
upon them and those they represent must rest the responsibility.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"J. HOLT,
"Secretary of War.
"Hon. I. W. HAYNE, Attorney- General of the State of South Carolina.
"P. S.--The President has not, as you have been informed,
received a copy of the letter to yourself from the Senators, communicating that of Mr. Holt of the 22d January."
This letter of Mr. Holt, though firm and decided in character, is courteous and respectful, both in tone and in terms. It
reviews the subject in an able and comprehensive manner, explaining and justifying the conduct of the President. Unlike
the letters to which it is a response, it contains no menace. In
conclusion it does no more than fix the responsibility of commencing a civil war on the authorities of South Carolina, should
they assault Fort Sumter and imperil the lives of the brave and
loyal men shut up within its walls. It does not contain a word
or an expression calculated to afford just cause of offence; yet
its statements and its arguments must have cut Colonel Hayne
to the quick. To reply to them successfully was impossible.
He, therefore, had no resort but to get angry. Following in the
footsteps of his predecessors, on the 8th February he addressed an
insulting answer not to Secretary Holt, as usage and common
civility required, but directly to the President. He then suddenly left Washington, leaving his missile behind him to be delivered after his departure. From his conduct he evidently anticipated its fate. His letter was returned to him on the same
day, directed to Charleston, with the following indorsement:
" The character of this letter is such that it cannot be received.
Col. Hayne having left the city before it was sent to the President, it is returned to him by the first mail." What has become of it we do not know. No copy was retained, nor have
we ever heard of it since.
What effect this letter of Mr. Holt may have produced upon
the truculent Governor of South Carolina we shall not attempt
to decide. Certain it is, from whatever cause, no attack was
made upon Fort Sumter until six weeks after the close of Mr.
Buchanan's administration. The fort remained unmolested until South Carolina had been for some time a member of the Confederate States. It was reserved for Mr. Jefferson Davis, their
President, to issue the order for its bombardment, and thus
formally to commence the civil war. This he did with a full
consciousness that such would be the fatal effect; because in the
letter from him and other Southern Senators to Col. Hayne,
of the 15th January, both he and they had warned Governor
Pickens that an attack upon the fort would be "the instituting
hostilities between her [South Carolina] and the United States."
Thus ended the second mission from South Carolina to the
President, and thus was he relieved from the truce concluded by
Major Anderson. But in the mean time, before the termination
of this truce, the action of the General Assembly of Virginia,
instituting the Peace Convention, had interposed an insurmountable obstacle to the reenforcement of Fort Sumter, unless attacked or in immediate danger of attack, without entirely
defeating this beneficent measure. Among their other proceedings they had passed a resolution "that ex-President John
Tyler is hereby appointed by the concurrent vote of each branch
of the General Assembly, a commissioner to the President of the
United States; and Judge John Robertson is hereby appointed
by a like vote, a commissioner to the State of South Carolina
and the other States that have seceded or shall secede, with instructions respectfully to request the President of the United
States and the authorities of such States to agree to abstain,
pending the proceedings contemplated by the action of the General Assembly, from any and all acts calculated to produce a
collision of arms between the States and the Government of the
United States."
Mr. Tyler arrived in Washington on the 23d January, a
fortnight before the departure of Col. Hayne, bearing with him
a copy of the Virginia resolutions. These he presented to the
President on the following day, assuring him that whilst the
people of Virginia were almost universally inclined to peace and
reconstruction, yet any efforts on her part to reconstruct or
preserve the Union "depended for their success on her being
permitted to conduct them undisturbed by outside collision."
This resolution, it will be observed, requested the President,
and not Congress, to enter into the proposed agreement. Mr.
Tyler, therefore, urged the President to become a party to it.
This he refused, stating, according to Mr. Tyler's report to the
Governor of Virginia, "that he had in no manner changed his
views as presented in his annual message; that he could give no
pledges; that it was his duty to enforce the laws, and the whole
power rested with Congress." He promised, notwithstanding,
that he would present the subject to that body. This was due
both to its intrinsic importance and to the State of Virginia,
which bad manifested so strong a desire to restore and preserve
the Union.
The President, accordingly, in his message of the 28th January, submitting the Virginia resolutions to Congress, observed
in regard to this one, that " however strong may be my desire
to enter into such an agreement, I am convinced that I do not
possess the power. Congress, and Congress alone, under the
war-making power, can exercise the discretion of agreeing to
abstain 'from any and all acts calculated to produce a collision
of arms' between this and any other Government. It would,
therefore, be a usurpation for the Executive to attempt to restrain their hands by an agreement in regard to matters over
which he has no constitutional control. If he were thus to act,
they might pass laws which he should be bound to obey, though
in conflict with his agreement. Under existing circumstances,
my present actual power is confined within narrow limits. It
is my duty at all times to defend and protect the public property within the seceding States, so far as this may be practicable, and especially to employ all constitutional means to protect
the property of the United States, and to preserve the public
peace at this the seat of the Federal Government. If the seceding States abstain 'from any and all acts calculated to produce a collision of arms,' then the danger so much to be deprecated will no longer exist. Defence, and not aggression, has
been the policy of the administration from the beginning. But
whilst I can enter into no engagement such as that proposed, I
cordially commend to Congress, with much confidence that it
will meet their approbation, to abstain from passing any law
calculated to produce a collision of arms pending the proceedings contemplated by the action of the General Assembly of
Virginia. I am one of those who will never despair of the Republic. I yet cherish the belief that the American people will
perpetuate the union of the States on some terms just and honorable for all sections of the country. I trust that the mediation of Virginia may be the destined means, under Providence,
of accomplishing this inestimable benefit. Glorious as are the
memories of her past history, such an achievement, both in relation to her own fame and the welfare of the whole country,
would surpass them all."
This noble and patriotic effort of Virginia met no favor from
Congress. Neither House referred these resolutions of her General Assembly to a committee, or even treated them with the
common courtesy of ordering them to be printed. In the Senate no motion was made to refer them, and the question to print
them with the accompanying message was debated from time
to time until the 21st February,1 when the Peace Convention
had nearly completed its labors, and after this no further notice
seems to have been taken of the subject. In the House the
motion to refer and print the Virginia resolutions, made by Mr.
Stanton, of Ohio, on the day they were received, was never
afterwards noticed.2 This mortifying neglect on the part of the
Representatives of the States and of the people, made a deep
and unfortunate impression on the citizens of Virginia.
1. Con. Globe, pp. 590, 636.
2. H. J., p. 236. Con. Globe, p. 601.