The Problem of Universals. In the Isagoge of Porphyry,
translated by Boethius, which until the thirteenth century was the
common text-book of logic in the schools, the following passage occurs:
Mox de generibus et speciebus, illud quidem sive subsistant, sive in
solis nudis intellectibus posita sint, sive subsistentia corporalia
sint an incorporalia, et utrum separata a sensibilihus an in
sensibilibus posita et circa haec consistentia, dicere reeusabo:
altissimum enim negotium est hujusmodi et majoris egens
inquisitionis. [1]
[1] Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat., Vol. LXIX, col. 82.
This passage, which thrust the problem of universals on the
philosophers of the Middle Ages, proposes three questions: (1) Do the
universals (generic and specific concepts) exist in the world of
reality, or are they merely things of the mind
(nuda intellecta)? (2) If they do exist outside the mind, are
they corporeal or incorporeal? (3) Do they exist in concrete
sensible things or outside them? The dicere recusabo of
Porphyry was a direct challenge to the schoolmen. Boethius in one of
his commentaries had asserted the objective reality of universals,
although in another commentary he had spoken as if he held that they
are merely things of the mind. [2] The early schoolmen were, therefore,
thrown upon their own resources. Not having yet developed an adequate
system of psychology, they were obliged to be content with an
imperfect, and what may be called a provisional, solution of Porphyry's
questions. Little by little, however, the problem of universals
suggested questions of psychology and metaphysics, so that while it is
incorrect to represent all Scholastic philosophy as centering around
the problem of universals, it is true that it was this problem that
occasioned the growth from the primitive form of Scholasticism to the
Scholasticism of the age of perfection, although there were, as we
shall see, other factors which contributed to this development.
[2] Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat., loc. cit.; De Wulf,
op. cit., p. 170.
The answers to Porphyry's questions are generally classed under three
heads: nominalism, conceptualism, and realism. Nominalism
maintains that there is no universality either of concept or of
objective reality, -- the only universality being that of the name.
Conceptualism concedes the universality of the idea, but denies that
there is a universality of things corresponding to the universality of
the mental representation. Realism, in its exaggerated form, maintains
that the universal as such exists outside the mind, -- in other
words, that there are objective realities which, independently of our
minds, possess universality; realism, in its moderate form, known as
Aristotelian, or Thomistic, realism, while it grants that there is in
things an objective, potentially universal reality, contends that the
formal aspect of universality is conferred by the mind, and
that consequently the universal in the full panoply of its
universality exists in the mind alone, having, however, a
fundamentum in re. The formula which came to be the recognized
watchword of the nominalist and conceptualist is universalia post
rem; the formula of exaggerated realism is universalia ante
rem. Moderate realism, in the spirit of true synthesis, maintained
universalia ante rem (the types of things existing in the mind
of God), universalia post rem (concepts existing in the human
mind), and universalia in re (the potentially universal essences
existing in things).
In the first period of Scholastic philosophy Erigena and Fredegis
advocated the exaggerated form of realism. The reason of this is not
far to seek. The doctrine accorded with the pantheistic spirit of
Erigena's philosophy; it offered the most obvious solution of certain
dogmatic problems, such as that concerning the transmission of original
sin; and its assumption of the perfect correspondence of mental
representations with external things commended it to the uncritical
spirit of an age of beginnings. It was for lack of a developed system
of psychology that the age demanded a categorical answer to the
question, Do universals exist outside the mind? When, therefore, Eric
and others deny the objective existence of universals, they are to be
classed not as nominalists or conceptualists, but merely as
anti-realists, for, though they endeavor to find a positive answer to
the question, How do universals exist? their solution of the
problem is to be considered in its negative rather than in its positive
aspect. Nominalism and conceptualism did not appear until the second
period of Scholastic philosophy, and even then the treatment of the
problem of universals was dialectical rather than psychological. [3]
[3] Cf.Arckiv f. Gesch. der Phil., Bd IX (1896), Heft 4.
It cannot be denied that some of the problems discussed by the later
schoolmen were of a frivolous character; it is, however, a serious
mistake to describe the problem of universals
as a barren dispute, a controversy about over-refined subtleties. The
denial of the universal means sensism, and leads incidentally to the
denial of the abstractive power of the human mind. Moreover, the
universal has its ethical as well as its psychological aspect, and the
denial of the universal means ultimately the destruction of moral ideas
and the subversion of the stability of moral principles. Consequently,
the schoolmen are to be admired, not blamed, for attaching so much
importance to the problem of universals. It is interesting to note that
it was this problem that developed the Scholastic method, brought out
the element of rationalism latent in Scholasticism, and led, as has
been remarked, to the growth of Scholastic psychology and metaphysics.