History of Philosophy German Philosophy: The Kantians, The Romantic Movement, Fichte, Schelling byTurner, William (S.T.D.)
Kant's philosophy was opposed by the exponents of Wolffian dogmatism,
such as Eberhard (1739-1809), by the sceptic Schulze
(1761-1833), by the eclectic Herder (1744-1803), and by
the Fideists, Hamann (1730-1788) and Jacobi (1743-
1819). It was defended and developed by Reinhold (1758-1823), who
was successively a Jesuit novice, a member of the Barnabite order, a
member of the staff of the Deutscher Merkur, and professor
of philosophy at Jena and Kiel. With Reinhold are associated
Salomon Maimon (1756-1800), Krug (1770-1842), who was
Kant's successor at Konigsberg, and Beck (1761-1840), who, like
Fichte, attempted to give greater systematic unity to the Kantian
system. The poet Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) contributed to
Popularizing the moral and aesthetic doctrines of Kant.
THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT
The romantic movement corresponded with the beginning of the era of
national reconstruction in Germany and was not without effect on the
development of philosophic thought in that country. It accentuated the
importance of the spiritual life not only of the individual, but of the
race, and even in a certain analogical sense of nature itself. Jean
Paul Richter (1763-1825), whose dialogue on the immortality of the
soul, entitled Kampanerthal, is less widely known than it
deserves to be, is one of the first of the romanticists, or, as some
prefer to consider him, a forerunner of the romantic movement. [1] After
passing through different phases of subordination of individual
spiritual progress to the general spiritual concept of nature,
romanticism reached its final form in the writings of Novalis
(Friedrich von Hardenberg, 1772-1801) Friedrich Schlegel
(1772-1829), author of Lucinde, turned ultimately from the
cultus of genius to the profession of the Catholic faith, where he
found that emancipation from the limitations of the commonplace which
he had in vain sought in romanticism.
[1] Cf. Francke, Social Force: in German Literature (New
York, 1897), pp. 402 ff.
It was Fichte who imparted to the Kantian system its highest systematic
unity, and at the same time combined the many and diverse elements of
romanticism in his assertion of the supremacy of the inner
consciousness and inner spiritual life of the individual.
FICHTE
Life. Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born at Rammenau in Upper
Lusatia in 1762. After studying at Meissen and at Pforta, he took a
course of theology at Jena and Leipzig. From 1788 to 1790 he lived at
Zurich as family tutor. In 1791 he went to Königsberg, and it was
through Kant's influence that he was enabled to publish, in 1792, his
Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung. After that he published
several political treatises. In 1794 he obtained the chair of
philosophy at Jena and published his Wissenschaftslehre. On
being dismissed from the University of Jena, he lectured successively
at Berlin, Erlangen, and, for a brief interval, at Königsberg. In
1808 appeared the famous Reden an die deutsche Nation, and when,
in 1810, the University of Berlin was founded, Fichte was appointed to
a professorship, which he held until his death in 1814.
Sources. Fichte's complete works were edited by his son, J. H.
Fichte, in 1845-1846. Several of Fichte's more important treatises were
translated by Dr. William Smith under the title, Fichte's Popular
Works (fourth edition, London, 1889). The Wissenschaftslehre
was translated by C. C. Everett (Fichte's Science of Knowledge,
Chicago, 1884), and the Rechtslehre by A. E. Kroeger (The
Science of Rights, London, 1889). Consult Adamson, Fichte
(Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, Edinburgh and Philadelphia,
1892); A. B. Thompson, The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of
Knowledge (Boston, 1895).
DOCTRINES
Starting Point and Aim. Fichte is commonly said to hold to Kant
and Spinoza the same relation that Plato held to Socrates and
Parmenides. His immediate starting point is Kant's philosophy; his aim
is to complete and unify what is incomplete and only partially unified
in that system of thought. Kant was well aware that his theory of
knowledge as expounded in the Critique of Pure Reason was
incomplete and lacking in coherent unity, but he was not equally
conscious of the lack of a logical and consistent transition from the
conclusions of the first critique to the principles with which the
Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment
begin. It was Fichte's aim, as indeed it was the aim of Schelling and
Hegel, to supply a single principle, an all-embracing formula, which should at
once complete Kant's analysis of speculative thought and afford a
systematic and logical basis for the analysis of the data of ethics and
aesthetics. Such a principle Fichte found in the Ego, which
takes the place of the thing-in-itself as the ultimate reality, and is,
moreover, the ultimate in the practical as well as in the speculative
order. For, in Fichte's doctrine of the Ego we find that
self does not stand merely for self-consciousness, but
also for duty. When he styled his most important constructive
treatise Wissenschaftslehre he did not intend to convey the
impression that his philosophy is merely an account of the methods of
scientific research; he meant rather that it is a science of knowledge,
understanding by knowledge the sum total of our experience as it
presents itself in consciousness; so that philosophy may be defined as
a rethinking in self consciousness of the experience which is
presented as a completed whole in direct consciousness.
It is usual to distinguish the earlier and the later forms of Fichte's
philosophical system.
Earlier Form. Here we may further distinguish Fichte's
theoretical and practical doctrines.
A. Theoretical Philosophy. Thought cannot be reduced to being,
but being can be reduced to thought. Similarly, thought cannot be
derived from being, but being can be derived from thought. Kant was
unsuccessful in his synthesis of knowledge because he tried to deduce
the categories and other forms of thought from the logical relations of
subject to predicate and, therefore, ultimately from experience. If, on
the contrary, we deduce the forms of thought from the nature of
consciousness, we shall find that experience and all its noumenal
content (the thing-in-itself) are capable of being derived from the
conscious activity of the Ego, -- from the deed-acts
(Thathandlungen) of the thinking subject. Thus the
thing-in-itself is absorbed, so to speak, in the subject, and instead
of ultimate dualism we have idealistic monism. The Ego, and the
Ego alone, is real. We need not go beyond experience to find the ultimate reality, but in our
analysis of experience we abstract the Ego, which is, therefore,
transcendental though not transcendent.
The three principles. Taking up now the deed-acts of
consciousness, we find that in every act of self-contemplation we
affirm, or posit, the identity of subject and object, -- the self as
representing and the self as represented. We have, therefore, the first
principle, -- "The Ego posits itself." It is hardly necessary to
point out that by Ego Fichte does not mean the individual, but
the universal self-consciousness, the I-ness (Ich-heit). Take
the proposition A = A. It posits nothing about A; for A is for the
Ego simply and solely by virtue of being posited by the
Ego. Therefore the nexus between A and A is the position of the
Ego, the affirmation that I am. [2] What, considered in
the abstract, is the logical law of identity, is, in its application to
objects, the (only) category of reality. But if we continue our
examination of the facts of empirical consciousness, we find there a
certain opposition, which may be expressed in the general formula Not-A
is not equal to A (not to be confounded with Not-A = Not-A, which is a
case of identity), and if we treat this proposition as we treated the
first, we find that it means that in the Ego the non-Ego
is opposed to the Ego. Here we have the second principle, -- "A
non-Ego is opposed to the Ego." Now, since the Ego
is the only reality, it is through the Ego that the
non-Ego is posited and the Ego denied. Therefore the
Ego both posits and negates itself. It is, however, as
fundamental for Fichte as it was for Spinoza that all negation is
limitation. Therefore the Ego in part negates the
non-Ego, and the non-Ego in part negates the Ego,
-- which is the third principle. In this thesis, antithesis, and
synthesis we find the germ of the Hegelian triadism. It is important to
note also that Fichte identifies the Ego with self-activity, and
teaches that it exists not only for itself (für sich) but
through itself (durch sich).
[2] Werke, I, 98.
From these principles Fichte deduces not only the fundamental laws of
thought, but also the fundamental laws of being, -- the law of
causation, the principle of sufficient reason, etc.
The question, however, remains to be answered, Why does the Ego
interrupt the unbroken activity by which it posits itself? Why does it
posit the non-Ego? Fichte, we have already said, regards the
idea of duty as no less essential to the Ego than the idea of
self-consciousness. Taking up, therefore, the moral aspect of the
Ego, he answers that effort and struggle are necessary
for the attainment of the highest good. The Ego posits the
non-Ego in order to make effort and struggle possible; the
Ego is theoretical, in order to be practical: it represents a
non-Ego in order to act upon it, to overcome its limitations, and
thus to make it disappear in the Ego. This consideration is the
basis of practical philosophy.
B. Practical Philosophy. Without conflict there is no morality.
Activity is, therefore, the essence of morality, and inertness is the
radical evil. Man should strive to become self-dependent and thereby
attain independence and freedom. To this general maxim is added the
special rule of conduct for each individual: Always follow the inner
necessity which urges you to attain to freedom through action; fulfill
your vocation; act according to your conscience. [3]
[3] Cf. Höffding, op. cit., II, 158.
Besides this internal necessity (conscience), Fichte admits an
external necessity, namely right, which has exclusive reference
to external conduct, just as conscience refers to internal disposition.
Although right is external, it originates from the Ego; for as
in general the Ego, in positing itself, posits also the
non-Ego, so the practical Ego, in positing itself as a
free agent, posits the other-self, the thou, as another
free agent. From the coexistence of free agents arises the limitation
of the freedom of the Ego, imposed by the necessity of
respecting the freedom of others: this necessity is right. The law
of right is, therefore,
So limit thy freedom that others may be free along with thee. When
this limitation is not observed and the freedom of others is infringed,
it is the duty of the State -- not of the individual who is
injured -- to interfere and enforce the observance of the limitations
of freedom. And, as it is the duty of the State to safeguard the rights
of its subjects, it is the mission of the Church to impress on all men,
by means of symbols, the limitations of the individual, and by so doing
to deepen and strengthen moral convictions. [4]
[4] Op. cit., II, 160.
Later Form of Fichte's philosophy. During the last years of his
life Fichte devoted special attention to the political and religious
aspects of his philosophy of self-consciousness. His Addresses to
the German Nation contributed much to the growth of the national
ideal among his fellow-countrymen, an ideal which was realized in the
educational and political reconstruction of the country during the
latter half of the nineteenth century. In the later expositions of the
Science of Knowledge, he developed his religious philosophy,
bringing out into special prominence the truth that in the Deity there
is something more than self-consciousness, that in piety there is
something more than moral conduct, and that religion is, therefore,
something more than philosophy and ethics; for it is peace and life
and blessed love. The Ego, which he had identified with God, he
now regards as an image of the Absolute (God). Here we see, on the one
hand, the influence of Spinoza's pantheism, and, on the other, that of
the Christian doctrine of the Logos.
Historical Position. Fichte's system is the first of a series of
post-Kantian efforts to reduce the incomplete synthesis which Kant had
effected to a more compact and coherent form -- by substituting the unity
of a single formula for the Kantian trinity of idea,
thing-in-itself, and subject. The formula which Fichte
proposed was the Ego. From this he deduced all thought and all
being, including the thing-in-itself; and from the Ego he
derived all reality, as the Neo-Platonists had derived it from the
one, and Spinoza from the substance. His philosophy is, therefore,
monistic. It may be styled a system of subjective idealism, or
pan-egoism, if when we use the term pan-egoism we remember
Fichte's protest against identifying the Ego with individual
self-consciousness. Fichte's relation to Kant and his place in the
romantic movement are evident in his doctrine of the essentially
ethical aspect of the activity of the Ego, -- the inclusion of
duty, or spiritual activity, as well as conscious representation, in
the notion of self.
SCHELLING
Life. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph (von) Schelling was born at
Leonberg, in Würtemberg, in 1775. At the age of sixteen he entered
the theological seminary at Tübingen, where he studied theology,
philosophy, and philology. He spent the years 1796-1797 at Leipzig,
where, while fulfilling his duties as tutor to a young nobleman, he
studied mathematics and natural science and published his first work,
Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. In 1798 he was appointed
to lecture at Jena, where he had Fichte for colleague. From 1803 to
1841 he taught successively at Würzburg, Erlangen, and Munich. In
1841 he was made member of the Academy of Sciences at Berlin, and
lectured at the university for several years. He died at Ragatz in
Switzerland in 1854.
Sources. Besides the Ideen, Schelling wrote several
treatises on the philosophy of nature. He contributed to the philosophy
of religion and of mythology several important treatises. The most
systematic of his works is Der transcendentale Idealismus,
published in 1800. His works were collected and published in fourteen
volumes by his son (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856 ff.). Consult Watson's
Schelling's Transcendental Idealism (Griggs' Philosophical
Classics, Chicago, 1882).
DOCTRINES
General Character of Schelling's Philosophy. While Schelling was
a student at Tübingen, his favorite authors were Kant, Fichte, and
Spinoza; later he came in contact with Hegel, and was impelled, by way
of reaction against Hegel's naturalism,
to turn for inspiration to the mysticism of the Neo-Platonists and of
Jakob Böhme. Herder and Giordano Bruno also left traces of their
influence on his philosophy. Schelling was at first a disciple of
Fichte, but he subsequently transferred his allegiance to different
schools in succession, and since, as Hegel said, he "carried on his
studies in public," he expounded successively at least five different
systems.
First System. Previously to the publication of the Ideas for
a Philosophy of Nature (1797) Schelling adhered to the doctrines of
Fichte.
Second System. During the years 1797-1800, the most productive
period of his literary life, Schelling expounded a philosophy of nature
and a transcendental philosophy of spirit.
1. Philosophy of Nature. Fichte regarded nature as merely a
limitation of the Ego, as at most a means to the exercise of
man's spiritual and moral activity; Schelling advocates the recognition
of nature as a source of spiritual activity. He teaches that
nature is not merely object but also subject, not indeed a subject
fully conscious, or completely awake, but semi-conscious and
slumbering. We should therefore study nature in order to discover the
laws by which spirit is developed out of nature into
self-consciousness. For nature is not the antithesis of spirit, both
being the products of a higher principle which posits nature (wherein
it reflects itself imperfectly) and through nature attains to spirit
(where it reflects itself consciously, and to that extent
adequately). [5]
[5] Cf. Falckenberg, op. cit., p. 364 (English trans., p.
448).
Empirical physics regards nature as mere being, or product; speculative
physics (the philosophy of nature) looks upon nature as becoming, or
productive. But, just as Fichte recognized the limitations of the
activity of the Ego, Schelling limits the productivity of nature
by positing its essential polarity. If, he observes, there were
no arrest of productivity, nature would continue striving towards the
Infinite, and there would be no
product; there is, therefore, a retarding as well as a stimulating
force. All nature is dual; the magnet, with its union of opposite polar
forces, is the symbol of the life and productive activity of nature. In
an essay entitled On the World-Soul (1798), Schelling developed
the idea of an animated nature pervaded by an organizing principle,
which originates and maintains the conflict of contending forces. Hence
the inorganic is to be explained by the organic, and, in general, the
lower by the higher.
2. Transcendental Philosophy of Spirit. The philosophy of spirit
concerns itself with the phenomena of the spirit as they manifest
themselves in representation, action, and artistic enjoyment. We have,
therefore, three divisions of transcendental philosophy.
(a) Theoretical philosophy. Here we start with
self-consciousness and proceed to explain how it is that we represent
to ourselves certain images of external reality, or, in other words,
how it is that in the act of representation we feel compelled, as it
were, by an external something, to represent in a certain manner. The
general explanation is that there are two opposing forces, the
one real and the other ideal, which by their alternate action limit the
spirit to the state of sensation, then to that of reflection, and
finally to that of volition, which is at once the culmination of the
theoretical life and the beginning of the practical life of the spirit.
(b) Practical philosophy. Here we start with impulse, which
arises from the theoretical activity of the spirit positing the
distinction between self and not-self, and which differs from that
theoretical activity by a mere difference of degree. Progress in moral
life means the gradual overcoming of the non-ego, and the final
goal of moral striving is complete independence of the ego as
will. It is only in the initial concept of nature as reproduced,
not produced by the ego, and in the "supplementary"
considerations on law, state, and history, that Schelling
differs from Fichte in his practical philosophy; both identify moral
life with independence.
(c) AEsthetic philosophy. In the theory of art Schelling
introduces Kant's notion of the beautiful, modifying it, as he modified
Kant's teleological concept, to suit the needs of his more compact
idealistic system. The beautiful, he teaches, is the perfect
realization of the union of the sublective and oblective, -- a
union to which history approximates, but which art accomplishes. In art
the antithesis between the real and the ideal, between action and
representation, between impulse and reflection disappears. Art
is, therefore, the solution of all the problems of philosophy.
[6]
[6] Cf.op. cit., p. 370 (English trans., p. 456).
Third System. So far Schelling may be said to have extended and
modified the subjective idealism of Fichte by distinguishing the
philosophy of nature from that of spirit, and by recognizing as the
prius of both nature and spirit a common ground or principle
from which both are deduced. In his third system he emphasizes the
importance of this principle, which he calls the Absolute, and
which he defines as the identity of the real and the ideal. [7]
Here the line of thought and even the method and manner of exposition
are Spinozistic. To the philosophy of nature and the transcendental
philosophy of spirit, which still remain as integral portions of the
system, there is added the philosophy of identity, in which all
things are viewed sub specie aeterni, and are thus led back to
the Absolute, God, in Whom they are identified. It is important,
however, to note that the identification of the real and the ideal in
the Absolute is complete, not because of the power of the Absolute to
develop the real and the ideal, but because of its
indetermination . On account of this indetermination Schelling's
Absolute was compared by Hegel to the night in which all cows are
black.
[7] Cf. Windelband, History of Philosophy (trans. by
Tufts, New York, 1901), p. 608.
In the derivation of the real from the Absolute we are to distinguish
three moments: gravity, light, and organization. The
organic concept of nature is, however, preserved; for even in the first
moment organization is present, inasmuch as the inorganic is the
residuum of the organic, -- that which failed to attain complete
organization.
Fourth System. In the fourth system Schelling, after the manner
of the Neo-Platonists, accounts for the origin of the universe by a
"breaking away," or "falling off," from the Absolute. In the previous
system the world was swallowed up, so to speak, in the indifference of
the Absolute; now it is placed in striking contrast with it, and the
independence of the Absolute is emphasized. We find in this fourth
system a fuller and deeper realization of the problem of evil, and at
least an implied confession of the inability of monism to account
satisfactorily for the existence of evil in the world.
Fifth System. This may be briefly described as a theogony and
cosmogony after the manner of Jakob Böhme. [8]
[8] Cf. Höffding, oo. cit., II, 171, 172.
Historical Position. Schelling's philosophy is deserving of
careful study both by reason of its intrinsic importance and of the
influence, direct and indirect, which it exerted on other systems.
It offers, however, more than usual difficulty because of the wealth of
imaginative power which Schelling brought to bear on even the most
abstruse problems of metaphysics, and also because of the successive
change of view in the five periods into which his mental history is
divided. Taking the third system, the philosophy of identity, as the
most typical stage in the development of Schelling's thought, we may
describe it as a system of idealistic monism in which subject and
object are identified in the indifference of the Absolute. Thus it
stands contrasted, on the one hand, with the subjective idealism of
Fichte, and, on the other, with the dynamic idealism of Hegel, who
identified subject and object in an Absolute which is
universal, not because it is indifferent, but because in it all
differences are immanently contained.
Before we pass to the study of Hegel, mention must be made of the
disciples and co-workers of Schelling, who represent different phases
of his philosophy of nature and his philosophy of religion. Among the
naturalists influenced by Schelling are Steffens (1773-1845),
Oken (1779-1851), Schubert (1780-1860), and Carus
(1789-1869), all of whom were distinguished in their day as biologists,
physicists, or psychologists. Among the philosophers of religion whom
Schelling influenced, the two best known are Baader (1765-1841),
who, from the Catholic standpoint, attempted a religio-philosophical
synthesis of Neo-Platonism, Scholasticism, post-mediaeval mysticism,
and German transcendental philosophy, and Schielermacher (1768-
1834), who, from the Protestant standpoint, endeavored to combine the
most varied elements in an eclectic philosophy of religion.