He dies intestate who either did not make any will at all, or did not
make it legally, or when the one which he did make was broken or void, or when
no one has become an heir under it.
(1) The inheritances of intestate persons, by law of the Twelve Tables,
belong in the first place to their proper heirs.
(2) But as We have previously stated, those are considered proper heirs
who are under the control of the decedent, as a son or a daughter, a grandson
or a granddaughter by a son, or a great-grandson or a great-granddaughter
derived from a grandson born of a son; nor does it make any difference whether
the children are natural or adopted. With these must also be counted such as
have not been born in lawful marriage, but, nevertheless, obtain the rights of proper heirs in
conformity with the provisions of Imperial Constitutions promulgated with
reference to such matters, by having been brought before the courts of their
cities; and also those included in Our own Constitutions, by which We have
ordered that when anyone has cohabited with a woman not originally intending to
marry her although she was one whom he could have married and has
had children by her, and afterwards, induced by affection, has entered into a
nuptial agreement with her, and had sons or daughters by her; not only shall
those children born after the marriage-gift has been given be legitimate and
under the control of their father, but also those born previously, and who gave
occasion to the bestowal of legitimacy upon those subsequently born.
This rule We have determined shall stand, even though no children should
be born after the execution of the dotal instrument, or where those who have
been born have died. Thus a grandson or a granddaughter and a great-grandson or
a great-granddaughter are included in the number of proper heirs only when the
person superior to them in degree has ceased to be under the control of his
ascendant, whether this has occurred through death, or for some other cause as,
for instance, through emancipation; for if, when a man dies, his son Is under
his control, his grandson by him cannot be a proper heir; and this principle We
understand to be established with reference to other classes of descendants who
are further removed.
Posthumous children, also, who, if they had been born during the
lifetime of their father, would have been under his control, are proper heirs.
(3) Proper heirs become such even when they are ignorant of the fact;
and even though they are insane they can still be heirs, because when anything
can be acquired by us without our knowledge, this can also be done by insane
persons under the same circumstances. Moreover, ownership is, as it were,
continued after the death of a parent, and therefore minors have no need for the consent of a guardian,
since an estate can be acquired by proper heirs without their knowledge; nor is
the consent of a curator necessary for the acquisition of property by an insane
person, since it vests by operation of law.
(4) Sometimes, also, a child becomes the proper heir of his ascendant
although he was not under his control at the time of his death, as, for
example, where a person taken captive by the enemy returns after the death of
his father; for the law of postliminium brings this about.
(5) On the other hand, it sometimes occurs that although a party may
belong to the family of the deceased at the time of his death, he does not
become a direct heir; as, for instance, if a father be convicted of treason
after his death, and on this account his memory is rendered infamous; for then
he cannot have a direct heir, because the Treasury becomes his successor; still
it may be said that he is legally his heir, but that his right of succession
has been lost.
(6) When a son or a daughter, or a grandson or a granddaughter by
another son survive, they are together called to the inheritance, nor does the
one who is nearest in degree exclude the one who is more remote; for it seems
just that grandsons and granddaughters should succeed to the place of their
father.
For the same reason, where there is a grandson or a granddaughter by a
son, and a great-grandson and a great-granddaughter by a great-grandson, they
succeed on equal terms. And because it has been settled that grandsons and
granddaughters, as well as great-grandsons and great-granddaughters, should
succeed to the place of their ascendant, it has appeared to be proper that the
estate should be divided not per capita but per stirpes,-so that
a son may receive half of the estate, and two or more grandsons by another son
the other half; and also where there are grandsons by two sons, by one of them
perhaps one or two, and by the other three or four, one half of the estate
should belong to the one or two and the other half to the three or four.
(7) But when the question arises whether anyone can be a proper heir, We
must, in making the investigation, ascertain the time when it was certain that
the deceased died without making a will, and this takes place where there is a
will which has been abandoned. In accordance with this rule, if a son is
disinherited and a foreign heir appointed, and after the death of the son it
became certain that the heir appointed under the will will not be the heir,
either because he was unwilling, or could not accept, the grandson will become
the proper heir of his grandfather, for the reason that at the time it becomes
certain that the head of the family died intestate, the grandson alone is
found; and this principle is thoroughly established.
(8) And, again, where a grandson is born after the death of his
grandfather, still, if he was conceived while the latter was living, he will
become his direct heir if his father was dead, and the will of his grandfather
was afterwards abandoned. It is evident if he were both conceived and born after his grandfather's death, he cannot become a
direct heir when his father was dead and his grandfather's will was
subsequently abandoned; because he was connected with the father of his father
by no bond of relationship. Nor is anyone whom an emancipated son has adopted
considered as one of the descendants of the grandfather. Such persons, also, as
they are not considered descendants so far as the right to inherit is
concerned, cannot demand the possession of property as next of kin. So much
with reference to proper heirs.
(9) Emancipated children have no right of succession by the Civil Law,
for they are not proper heirs, for the reason that they have ceased to be under
the control of their father; nor are they included by any other right under the
law of the Twelve Tables. The Prætor, however, induced by natural equity,
grants them possession of the property as descendants, just as if they had been
under the control of their ancestor at the time of his death, whether they are
alone, or are in concurrence with proper heirs. Therefore, where there are two
children, one emancipated and the other under the control of his father at the
time of his death, it is evident that he who is under his control is the sole
heir by the Civil Law; that is to say, he is the sole proper heir; but as the
one who was emancipated is entitled to a share in the estate by the indulgence
of the Prætor, it happens that the proper heir has only a right to the
remainder.
(10) But those who after having been emancipated by their father have
allowed themselves to be adopted, are not admitted to share in the estate of
their natural father as children, provided they were in the adoptive family at
the time when he died; although if they had been emancipated by their adoptive
father while their own father was living, they are clearly entitled to the
property of their natural father as they have never been in an adoptive family;
and, agreeably to this, they begin to be in the place of strangers, so far as
relates to their adoptive father; but where they have been emancipated by their
adoptive father after the death of their own father, they are, as far as he is
concerned, also in the position of strangers, and so far as relates to the
property of their natural father they do not any the more obtain the position
of children; and this principle has been adopted for the reason that it would
be unjust for an adoptive father to be able to determine to whom the estate of
their natural father belonged, whether to his own children, or to his
agnates.
(11) For this reason, adoptive children have fewer rights than natural
children; for the latter who have been emancipated by the assistance of the
Prætor, retain their position as children although they lose it by the
Civil Law, but those who are adopted after having been emancipated not only
lose their place as children by the Civil Law but are not aided by the
Prætor; and this is only just, for a civil regulation cannot destroy a
natural right, nor can sons and daughters, or grandsons or granddaughters cease
to be such when they are no longer proper heirs; but adoptive children, after
they have been emancipated, begin to occupy the position of strangers, because
the right and title of son or daughter which they acquired by adoption they lose by another
institution of the Civil Law, that is to say, by emancipation.
(12) These regulations are also observed in the possession of property
which the Prætor promises in opposition to the provisions of the will of
an ascendant to descendants who have been passed over, that is who have neither
been appointed heirs, nor disinherited in conformity with law; for the
Prætor calls to this possession of the estate both those who were under
the control of their father at his death, and those who have been emancipated;
but excludes those who were in an adoptive family at the time their natural
parent died; and still less does he admit, on the ground of intestacy, adopted
children who have been emancipated by their adoptive father, to share in his
estate contrary to the provisions of the will, because they have ceased to be
included in the number of his children.
(13) We must, however, remember that persons who belong to an adoptive
family, or who have been emancipated by an adoptive father after the death of
their natural father, where the latter died intestate, are not admitted to the
succession by that part of the Edict under which children are called to the
possession of their parent's property, but are nevertheless called by another
part, that is to say, that by which cognates of the deceased are admitted.
Under this part they are only admitted when no children, whether proper heirs
or emancipated, stand in their way, and no other relatives on the father's side
appear, for the Prætor first summons children who are proper heirs and
those who are emancipated, then heirs-at-law, and then the nearest
cognates.
(14) All these regulations were indeed approved of by the ancients, and
have been somewhat amended by one of Our Constitutions, which We enacted
concerning those persons who have been given in adoption to others by their own
parents, for We have found some cases in which sons have lost by adoption the
succession to their natural parents; but, as adoption is easily removed by
emancipation, they have been called to the succession of neither of their
father's. Having corrected this in Our ordinary manner, We have drawn up a
Constitution in which We have stated that when a natural parent has given his
son to be adopted by another, all the said son's rights shall be preserved
intact, just as if he had remained under the control of his own father, and
absolutely no adoption had taken place, except only in this instance, namely,
that he may succeed to his adoptive father when the latter dies intestate.
But where he makes a will, the adopted son can, neither by the Civil nor
the Prætorian Law, obtain any portion of his estate, either by demanding
possession of it contrary to the provisions of the will, or by bringing a
complaint of inofficiousness; for the reason that no obligation is imposed upon
his adoptive father either to appoint him his heir, or to disinherit him, since
he is not joined to him by any natural tie, not even where one out of three
male children has been adopted in accordance with the Sabinian Decree of the
Senate; and even in this instance, the fourth of the estate is not preserved
for him, nor does any action lie to enable him to recover the same. He, however, whom a
natural parent has taken to be adopted is excepted from the operation of Our
Constitution, for, both rights, the natural as well as the legal, being united
in this person, We have retained the former regulations in this species of
adoption, just as in the case where the father of a family gives himself to be
arrogated; and these rules may be collected specially and separately from the
terms of the aforesaid Constitution.
(15) Again, antiquity being partial to male descendants, called to the
succession as proper heirs only those grandsons and granddaughters who are
descended in the male line, and gave them the preference in rank over agnates;
but computing grandsons born of daughters and great-grandsons born of
granddaughters among cognates, placed them after the line of agnates, both with
respect to the succession to their maternal grandfather or great-grandfather,
and to that of their grandmother or great-grandmother either on the paternal or
maternal side. The Emperors, however, could not suffer such an injury to nature
to exist without providing a suitable remedy; and as the name of grandson and
great-grandson is common to both descendants proceeding from the male as well
as the female line so they, for this reason, granted them the same degree and
rank in the succession.
But, that some benefit might be enjoyed by those who are sustained not
only by the approval of nature but also by that of the ancient law, they were
of the opinion that the share of the grandsons, grand-. daughters, and other
descendants further removed whom We have enumerated above, should be diminished
to a certain trifling extent; so that they might receive a third part less than
their mother or grandmother would have received, or that their father or
paternal grandfather would have obtained where the person for whose estate a
demand is made is a woman; and where parties of this kind entered upon the
estate, although they may have done so alone, the relatives on the father's
side were not called. And likewise as a law of the Twelve Tables, where a son
dies, calls the grandsons or granddaughters, great-grandsons or
great-granddaughters in the place of the father to the succession of the estate
of the grandfather; so the Imperial regulation summons them to take the place
of their mother or their grandmother, when the deduction of the third part of
the estate has been made as above set forth.
(16) But as there still remained a matter of dispute between the agnates
and the grandchildren previously mentioned, the said father's agnates demanding
for themselves a fourth part of the estate of the deceased by virtue of a
certain Constitution, We have omitted this constitution from Our Code, and have
not permitted it to be inserted therein from the Code of Theodosius. Moreover,
in a Constitution which We have promulgated, We have entirely abrogated this
rule, and have decreed that agnates cannot claim any part in the succession of
a person who is deceased, in case such grandchildren by a daughter, or
great-grandchildren by a granddaughter, or other descendants further removed,
are still living; lest those who are related in the collateral degrees may have
the preference over those descended in the direct line.
This Constitution of Ours We do now also decree shall be enforced in
accordance with its scope and time; in such a way, nevertheless that, as the
ancient law declared an estate shall be divided between sons and grandsons not
per capita but per stirpes, so, likewise, We order a distribution
to be made between sons and grandsons by a daughter, or between grandsons and
granddaughters by a daughter and other descendants further removed, so that the
respective offspring shall obtain the share of their mother, father,
grandmother or grandfather without any diminution; and if there should happen
to be one or two on one side and three or four on the other, the former shall
be entitled to half of the estate, and the latter to the other half.
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