A verbal obligation is contracted by a question and answer, when we
stipulate for something to be given to us or done for us. From this proceed two
actions-at-law, a personal action for recovery, where the stipulation is
certain, and an action on contract where it is uncertain. A stipulation is
called by this name for the reason that among the ancients stipulum
signified firm, being derived perhaps from stipes.
(1) In a transaction of this kind the following words were formerly
used: "Do you agree?" "I do agree." "Do you promise?" "I do promise." "Do you
pledge your faith?" "I do pledge my faith." "Do you bind yourself?" "I do bind
myself." "Will you give?" "I will give." "Will you do so-and-so?" "I will do
so-and-so." But whether the stipulation is stated in Latin, Greek, or any other
language, does not matter, if both the contracting parties understand it; nor
is it necessary for both of them to make use of the same language, but it is
sufficient if a suitable answer is made to the question; and, moreover, two
Greeks may contract an obligation in the Latin language. These solemn words,
however, were indeed formerly used, but afterwards the Leonine Constitution was
promulgated, which dispensed with the verbal formality, and required that only the meaning and intention
should be understood on both sides, no matter in what language they were
expressed.
(2) Every stipulation is made either absolutely, with reference to a
certain time, or under some condition. It is made absolutely, for example, "Do
you agree to give five aurei?" and they can be demanded without delay.
With reference to a certain time, when the stipulation is made with a day
mentioned on which the money is to be paid, as, for instance: "Do you agree to
pay ten aurei on the next Kalends of March?" What We stipulate to
do at a certain time is in fact due immediately, but cannot be demanded until
the day arrives; nor indeed can it be demanded on the very day provided for by
the stipulation, because the entire day should be granted to the discretion of
the party who is to make payment; for it is not certain that it has not been
paid on the day on which it was promised until that day has gone by.
(3) But if you stipulate as follows: "Do you agree to pay me ten
aurei every year as long as I live?" the obligation is understood to be
absolute and continuous, because it cannot be due for a time; but the heir, if
he brings suit, will be barred by an exception on the ground of contract.
(4) A stipulation is made under a condition when the obligation is
deferred until some event takes place, so that the stipulation becomes
operative if something is, or is not done; as, for instance: "Do you agree to
pay me five aurei if Titius becomes Consul?" and where a man stipulates as
follows: "Do you agree to make payment if I do not go up to the Capitol?" it
will be just as if he had stipulated that he should be paid when he dies. Under
a conditional stipulation there is only a hope that a debt will become due, and
we transmit that hope to our heir, if death seizes us before the condition is
fulfilled.
(5) Places are also inserted in a stipulation, as, for example: "Do you
agree to pay at Carthage?" which stipulation, although it seems to be made
absolutely has, nevertheless, so long a time attached to it as the party
promising would need in order to pay the money at Carthage; therefore, if
anyone stipulates at Rome: "Do you agree to make payment at Carthage to-day?"
the stipulation is void, as the promise given in reply is impossible.
(6) Conditions which relate to past or present time either render the
obligation invalid immediately, or do not defer it at all, as, for example: "Do
you agree to make payment if Titius has been Consul, or if Mævius is
living?" For if these things are not true, the stipulation is worthless; but if
they are true, it becomes valid at once; for such matters as are certain in the
nature of things do not postpone an obligation, although they may be uncertain
so far as Our knowledge of them is concerned.
(7) Not only can property be the object of a stipulation, but deeds,
also as where We stipulate for some act to be performed or not performed; and
it is best to add a penalty to stipulations of this kind, so that the amount
involved in the stipulation may not be uncertain, and it may become necessary
for the plaintiff to prove the amount of his claim; and, therefore, where anyone stipulates for something to be done,
a penalty ought to be added thus: "If it is not done in this way, do you agree
to pay ten aurei by way of penalty?" But if he stipulates by one and the
same statement that certain things are to be done, and certain others are not
to be done, a clause of this description should be added: "If anything is done
in violation of this contract, or anything is done which is not in compliance
with it, do you agree to pay ten aurei by way of penalty?"
|