After having enumerated the different kinds of contracts, let Us
consider those obligations which are not understood to properly arise from
contracts, but, nevertheless, because they do not partake of the nature of an
illegal act are considered to arise "as it were from a contract".
(1) Therefore, whenever anyone attends to the affairs of another while
he is absent, rights of action reciprocally arise between them which are
designated those of "business transacted"; but a direct action lies in favor of
the owner of the matter in question as against the party who transacted the
business; and a contrary action also lies in favor of the latter. It is evident
that, properly speaking, these do not arise from any contract, since actions of
this kind can be instituted when anyone has meddled with the affairs of another
without authority, and for this reason those whose business has been transacted
are made liable without being aware of the fact.
This rule has been adopted for public convenience, so that when persons
are compelled by some sudden emergency to travel in foreign countries no
one being entrusted with the transaction of their business during their absence
their affairs may not be neglected; for certainly no one would take
charge of them if he did not have any right of action to recover what he had
expended for that purpose. But just as he who has transacted the business of
another advantageously places the owner of the same under an obligation; so, on
the other hand, he also is bound to render an account of his administration;
and in this instance he is alleged to render it in compliance with requirements
of the most exact diligence, nor will it be sufficient for him to have employed
the same diligence which he is accustomed to make use of in his own business,
if someone else who was more prudent could have discharged his duties in a
better manner.
(2) Guardians, also, who are liable to an action of guardianship cannot
properly be understood to be bound by a contract, for no contract exists
between a guardian and a ward; but for the reason that they are evidently not
liable on account of criminality, they are considered to be so upon a
quasi-contract. In this instance, likewise the actions are reciprocal; for not only is the ward entitled to an action
of guardianship against his guardian, but, on the other hand, the guardian has
a contrary action of guardianship against the ward, either when he has expended
anything for the benefit of the latter, or has become liable for him, or has
encumbered his own property to his creditor.
(3) Moreover, where property is held in common by several persons and no
partnership exists; for example, where it has been bequeathed or given to them
jointly, and one of them is liable to the other in an action for a division of
property held in common because he alone has collected the crops from said
property, or because his associate alone has incurred necessary expenses for
the benefit of the same; he is not, strictly speaking, considered to be bound
by a contract, (since no agreement was entered into by them) but as he is not
liable for any illegal act, he is considered to be bound by a
quasi-contract.
(4) The same principle applies with reference to a party who is liable
to his co-heir in an action for partition of the estate.
(5) The heir, also, is not actually liable upon a contract for the
payment of legacies (as it cannot properly be said that the legatee has
transacted any business with either the heir or the deceased) and still, for
the reason that the heir is not liable on account of a criminal act, he is
considered to be indebted under a quasi-contract.
(6) Moreover, he to whom another by mistake pays a debt which he does
not owe is held to be liable under a quasi-contract, for to such an extent is
he not properly to be considered bound under a contract, that if we examine the
genuine reason, he may be said, as We stated above, to be liable through the
dissolution rather than through the making of a contract, for he who pays money
with the intention of discharging a debt appears rather to pay it in order to
terminate a contract than to enter into one; nevertheless, the party who
receives the money is bound just as if it had been loaned to him for
consumption, and therefore is liable in a personal action for recovery.
(7) In some instances, however, where a debt which is not due is paid by
mistake there can be no recovery; for, the ancients declared that in every case
where the sum claimed in an action was increased by denial, there could be no
recovery where money was paid which was not due; as, for example, under the
Lex Aquilia, or in actions for a legacy.
The ancients, however, intended this principle only to be applicable to
such legacies as were expressed in definite terms, and were bequeathed to
anyone by condemnation; but one of Our Constitutions has invested all legacies
and trusts with a similar character, and has likewise extended this increase to
all of them; but this was not done for the benefit of all legatees, but only
with regard to such legacies and trusts as have been left to holy churches and
other venerated places honored by the spirit of religion or piety, and if these
are paid when they are not due they cannot be recovered.
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