1. Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIX.
Where those who are under the control of another have nothing in the
peculium, or have something, but not the entire amount; the persons
having them under their control are liable if what was received has been used
for the benefit of their property, the contract being held to have been rather
made with them.
(1) Nor does the action having reference to the employment of property
in the affairs of another, seem to have been promised without effect, as that
on the peculium would be sufficient; for Labeo very properly says that
the property may be so applied, and the action on the peculium not be
applicable; for what should be done if the owner had taken away the peculium
without malicious intent? What if the peculium is put an end to by
the death of the slave, and the year in which the suit can be brought has
elapsed? For the suit having reference to the employment of property in the
affairs of another is perpetual, and will lie whether the party has taken away
the peculium without malicious intent, or the action on the peculium
is terminated by the lapse of a year.
(2) Moreover, if several are bringing suits on the peculium, he
should be benefited whose money has been employed in the business of the
master, so that he will have the more profitable action. If someone has come
forward and brought an action on the peculium, it should certainly be
considered whether the action founded on the employment of property for
another's benefit will not lie. Pomponius states that Julianus is of the
opinion that the action on the ground of the employment of property for
another's benefit is destroyed by the action on the peculium, because
what has been employed for the benefit of the master and paid on account of the
slave, has been bought into the peculium, just as if it had been paid by
the master to the slave himself, but only so far as the master has paid in the action on the peculium what
the slave had used in his affairs; otherwise, if he has not paid it, the action
based on the employment of the property remains.
2. Javolenus, On Cassius, Book XII.
The action founded on the employment of property for another's benefit
cannot be brought against anyone who has liberated a slave in consideration of
money received; because, by granting him his freedom, he is not enriched by the
money.
3. Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIX.
If, however, the slave pays his master a certain sum of money which he
has borrowed from me, in order that he may be manumitted, the said sum of money
should not be computed as forming part of the peculium, but there is
held to have been employed in the business of the master any amount in excess
of the value of the slave which the latter paid.
(1) Property is held to have been employed in the business of the
master, if the slave uses in his master's business the very article which he
received; as, for instance (where he received wheat and used it up as food for
the slaves of his master) or where he pays to one creditor of his master money
which he has borrowed from another creditor. But if he made a mistake in
paying, and thought a party to be a creditor who was not one, Pomponius says in
the Sixty-first Book that this also is property employed for the benefit of the
master, so far as the right of the latter to recover it as not being due is
concerned; or where the slave, for the sake of transacting or managing the
business of his master, performed any act (for example, if he borrowed money
for the purpose of purchasing grain for the maintenance of his slaves, or in
order to clothe them) or, when, having borrowed for the peculium, he
afterwards uses the money for his master's benefit; for the law which is at
present in force provides that there may be an action on the ground of property
employed for another's benefit, even though he employs it at first for the
benefit of the peculium, and afterwards in the business of his
master.
(2) We state, as a general rule, that an action founded on the
employment of property in the business of another will lie in those cases in
which an agent would be entitled to an action on mandate, or a person who had
transacted business without being empowered to do so, could bring suit on the
ground of voluntary agency; and wherever the slave has consumed anything in
order that the property of the owner might be improved, or not
deteriorated.
(3) Thus, if a slave has obtained money in order to support, feed, and
clothe himself, according to the custom of his master, that is to say, to the
extent to which his master was in the habit of furnishing him with these
necessaries; Labeo states that he will be held to employ the money for his
master's benefit and therefore this will be the case with reference to a
son.
(4) But where, having borrowed money, he adorns his master's house with
stucco work and certain other things which are more for the purpose of pleasure
than for that of utility, he will not be held to have employed the money in
this manner; for the reason that an agent could not have charged this, unless
he had happened to have the order of the master or his consent, nor should the
master be burdened on account of what he himself would not have done. What
course then should be pursued? The master should permit the creditor to remove
these things of course without injury to the house lest the owner
should be forced to sell it in order to make good the amount by which its value
had been increased.
(5) Labeo also says that if a slave having borrowed money from me lends
it to another, the owner is liable to the action based on property used for
another's benefit, because an obligation has been acquired by him; and this
opinion is approved by Pomponius, if he did not make the obligation a liability
of the peculium, but treated it as acquired on the account of his
master. For which reason the master will be bound to the extent that if he did
not think it was advantageous to himself to hold the obligation of the debtor,
he could assign the rights of action to his creditor, and make him his
agent.
(6) Labeo says that it is also an instance of the employment of property
for the business of the master where a slave, having borrowed money, uses it
with his master's consent to purchase articles of luxury, for example,
ointments, or anything which he may have obtained for pleasure, or for some
dishonorable purpose; for we do not consider whether what was consumed was for
the good of the master, but whether it was employed in his affairs.
(7) Hence, it is very properly said also that if a slave has procured
grain for the purpose of feeding the slaves of his master, and has deposited
the same in his master's granary, and it has been destroyed, or spoiled, or
burned, it is held to have been employed in the affairs of the master.
(8) Moreover, if he purchased a necessary slave for his master, and the
slave died, or he propped up a building and it fell down; I should say that an
action for property employed for the benefit of another will lie.
(9) Where, however, he received it for the purpose of employing it in
the affairs of his master, but did not do so, and deceived the creditor; it is
not held to be so employed, nor is the master liable, lest the credulity of the
creditor prejudice the master or the craftiness of the slave injure him. What,
however, would be the case if the slave was one who was in the habit of
employing what he received in the affairs of his master? Even in this instance,
I do not think that this injures a master if the slave receives it with a
different intention, or if he received it with this intention but afterwards
employed it for another purpose; since the creditor should be careful to
ascertain the way in which it was employed.
(10) If the slave borrowed money for the purpose of purchasing clothing
and the money is lost, who can bring the action for property
employed for the benefit of another, the creditor or the vendor? I
think, however, that if the price has been paid, the creditor will be entitled
to the action based on the ground of property employed for another's benefit,
even though the clothing has been destroyed; but if the price has not been
paid, but the money was given for the purpose that clothing should be
purchased, and the money was lost, but the clothing has been divided among the
slaves, the creditor will undoubtedly be entitled to the action for money
employed in the business of another.
But has not the vendor also a right of action, because his property has
been used in the affairs of the master? Reason demands that he should be
liable, hence the result is that the master will be liable to two parties on
account of one transaction. Therefore, even if both the money and the clothing
have been destroyed, it must be said that the master will be liable to both,
since both intended to employ the articles in his affairs.
4. Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book IX.
But it must be said that the position of the more diligent party should
be the better one, for it is unjust that the master should have judgment
rendered against him in favor of both on the ground of the employment of
property for his benefit.
5. Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIX.
If a slave purchases articles, which are not necessary, as if they were
required by his master, as, for instance, slaves; Pomponius says that they will
be held to have been employed in his affairs to the extent of the true value of
the slaves; but if he should purchase articles which were really necessary, the
master will be held liable for the entire amount for which they were sold.
(1) He also says that, whether the master ratifies the contract of the
slave or not, the action on the ground of property employed for his benefit will lie.
(2) An action based on his order can be brought for what the slave
purchased for his master, if he did so at his desire, but if he did not make
the purchase at his desire, but the master indeed ratified his act; or, on the
other hand, if he purchased something necessary or beneficial to the master, an
action for property employed for his benefit will lie; but if none of these
conditions exist, an action on the peculium will lie.
(3) It is established that not only the money which passes at once from
the creditor to the master is employed for the benefit of the latter, but also
that which was in the peculium in the first place. This, however, is
true in every instance in which the slave transacting his master's business
makes him more wealthy with the money of the peculium. Otherwise, if the
master deprives the slave of the peculium, or sells him along with it,
or disposes of the property belonging to the peculium and collects the
price of the same, this is not held to be employed in the business of the
master.
6. Tryphoninus, Disputations, Book I.
For, if this were true, he would be liable to the action for property
employed for his benefit, even before he sold what composed the peculium;
because by this very fact that the slave had the property in the
peculium he would become more wealthy, which is manifestly false.
7. Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIX.
And, therefore, also, if the slave gives his master things forming part
of the peculium, the action for property employed in his affairs will
not lie; and this is true.
(1) It is evident that, if the slave should borrow money, and pay it to
his master with the intention of giving it to him; provided he does not wish to
make him a debtor to the peculium, an action for property employed in
the affairs of the master can be brought.
(2) What Mela says is not true, namely, that if you give silver to my
slave in order that he may make cups out of any silver he chooses, and then,
after the cups have been made, the slave dies; you will be entitled to an
action for property employed for the benefit of another against me, since I can
bring an action to recover the cups.
(3) What Labeo says is entirely true, that is, if the slave purchases
perfumes and ointments and uses them at a funeral which concerned his master,
he will be held to have employed them in his master's business.
(4) He also says that if I purchase from your slave an estate which
belonged to you, and I pay money to the creditors, and then you deprive me of
said estate, I can recover it by an action on purchase; for it would be held
that it was employed in your affairs. Moreover, if I purchase an estate from a
slave in order that I may set off what is due to me from said slave, even
though I paid nothing, still I can recover in an action on purchase what has
come into the hands of the master.
I, however, do not think that the purchaser is entitled to an action for
property employed in the business of another, unless the slave had the
intention of employing it in his master's affairs.
(5) If a son under paternal control, having borrowed money, gives it as
dowry for his daughter, it is held to have been employed in the affairs of his
father to the extent that the grandfather was about to give the dowry for the
granddaughter. This opinion seems to me to be correct, only where he gave the
money with the intention of transacting the business of his father.
8. Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXX.
And Pomponius says that it makes no difference whether he gives it for
his daughter, or his sister, or a granddaughter, the issue of another son. We
shall, therefore, say the same where a slave has borrowed money, and given it
as dowry, on account of the daughter of his master.
9. Javolenus, On Cassius, Book XII.
If, indeed, the father was not about to give a dowry, it is not held to
have been employed in his business.
10. Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIX.
Where a son has become surety for his father and has paid the creditor,
he is held to have employed the money in the affairs of his father, because he
released the latter from liability.
(1) What Papinianus states in the Ninth Book of Questions is an instance
similar to this, namely: where a son undertook the conduct of a case as the
voluntary defender of his father, and judgment was rendered against him, his
father is liable to an action for property employed in his behalf, for the son
released him from liability by undertaking his defence.
(2) Papinianus also discusses the case in which I stipulated with the
son for what the father was compelled to pay, and then I brought suit against
the son; for, in this instance, also, an action will lie for money employed for
another's benefit, unless the son, when he bound himself, intended to make a
gift to his father.
(3) Wherefore, it can be said that if he appears in an action on the
peculium as the defender of his father, the latter will be liable to the
action for property employed for his benefit, to the extent of the peculium;
and the benefit to be derived from this opinion will be that if the action
De peculio should be terminated, he can be sued in that for money
employed for his benefit. I think that the father is liable to an action for
money employed for his benefit, even before an adverse decision was rendered,
after issue has been joined in behalf of the father.
(4) Property is held to have been employed in the affairs of a father to
the extent that any use of the same is made; and hence if a part has been
employed, an action can be brought for that part.
(5) But will the master be held liable only for the principal, or for
the interest as well? And, indeed, if the slave promised interest, Marcellus
states in the Fifth Book of the Digest that the master must pay it, but if he
did not promise it, it certainly is not due, because it was not included in the
agreement. It is evident that if I, having the master in mind, paid money to a
slave who was not managing his master's business, but I myself was managing it,
I shall be able to institute proceedings to collect the interest also, by an
action based on voluntary agency.
(6) We understand property to be employed in the business of a master
when it continues to be so employed; and hence an action on the ground of
property employed in his affairs will only lie where payment has not been made
by the master to the slave or the son. If, however, this has been done to the
prejudice of the creditor, that is to say, if the money has been paid to the
slave or the son who is liable to lose it, since it has been paid, it ceases to
have been employed for this purpose; but it is perfectly just that the action
on the ground of malicious intent should lie either against the father or the
master; for a debtor to the peculium, also, is not released from liability, if
he fraudulently pays the slave what he owed him.
(7) Where the slave is a debtor of the master, and, having borrowed
money from another pays him; he does not employ it in the business of the
latter to the extent to which he is indebted to him, but he does so as far as
the excess is concerned. Hence, if, when he owed his master thirty aurei,
having borrowed forty, he paid the sum to his creditor, or spent it on the
slaves; it must be said that an action for the employment of money in the
business of another to the amount of ten aurei will lie; but if he owes
the whole amount, it is not held to have been employed in this manner; for, (as
Pomponius says), it is considered that relief is granted against the profit of
the master, and therefore, if he was indebted to the master when he used the
property in his affairs, it is held that nothing was employed for that purpose,
but if afterwards he became indebted to him, it ceases to be employed for that
purpose; and the same rule will apply if he should pay him.
He says moreover, that if a master makes him a present of an amount
equal to that which he paid the creditor in his behalf, and this was done with
the intention of remunerating him, the money will not be held to have been
employed for his benefit. If, however, he gave it to him in any other way, the
use of the money for this purpose will still exist.
(8) He also makes the following inquiry. If he employed ten aurei
in the business of his master, and afterwards borrowed the same amount from
the latter, and, in addition to this, he has a peculium of ten aurei,
should it be considered that the employment of the money in his master's
affairs has ceased? Or shall we, indeed, not take away the right of action for
property employed in his affairs, as there is peculium from which the
debt can be paid; or should we preferably make the deduction from each, pro
rata? I think, however, that the action for money employed for the benefit
of the master has ceased to be available, since he has become a debtor to the
master.
(9) He also asks whether, if he has employed money in your affairs, and
has become your debtor, and then your creditor for the same amount that he owed
you, the action based on the employment of money for the benefit of another is
revived, or whether it cannot be reestablished retroactively? The latter
opinion is correct.
(10) He also discusses the point whether a son can employ property in
the affairs of his father in accordance with what may transpire; for example,
if the father and son are co-debtors, and the son, having borrowed money, pays
it in his own behalf; or if you have lent money to the son under the direction
of the father, and the son has paid you the debt. It seems to me that if the
money had actually come into the hands of the father, it will be held to have
been employed in his business; but if this was not the case, and the son paid
while transacting his own affairs, an action on the ground of property employed
in the business of another will not lie.
11. Paulus, On the Edict, Book XXX.
Whatever a slave has borrowed for this purpose, namely, in order to pay
it to his own creditor, will not be employed in his master's business, although
the latter is released from liability to an action on the peculium.
12. Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book IX.
If a son under paternal control or a slave purchases land for his father
or master, this will be held to have been employed in his affairs; but in this
way, that, if it was worth less than the sum for which it was purchased, it
would be held to have been employed in his business to the amount of what it is
worth; if, however, it is worth more, no greater sum will be held to have been
employed for that purpose than that for which it was purchased.
13. Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIX.
If property has been used in the business of one of two masters, the
question arises whether he alone for whose benefit it was employed can be sued,
or his partner as well? Julianus says that he alone should be sued in whose
affairs the money was employed, just as where he alone directed the contract to
be made; and I think this opinion to be correct.
14. Julianus, Digest, Book XI. Note by Marcellus.
Sometimes, also, the action for property employed in the affairs of
another can be brought against one joint-owner; for the reason that such
employment of property has taken place, and he, having been sued, can recover
from his partner the amount for which judgment has been rendered against him.
What shall we say, however, if the slave has been deprived of the peculium
by one of the owners? Paulus says that this question only arises where an
action on the peculium does not lie.
15. Ulpianus, Disputations, Book II.
Where a son under paternal control has agreed to pay what his father
owed, it should be considered whether the action for the employment of property
in the affairs of another ought to be granted. He did not, however, release his
father, for he who makes such an agreement binds himself, indeed, but does not
discharge his father from liability. It is evident that, if he pays after
making the agreement, although he may be held to have done so in his own
behalf, that is on account of his having made the agreement, he will,
nevertheless, be properly said to have employed the property in the affairs of
his father.
16. Alfenus, Digest, Book II.
A certain party leased a tract of land to his slave for cultivation, and
gave him oxen, and as these oxen were unsuitable for the work, he ordered them to be sold and others to be obtained by means of the
money received. The slave sold the oxen, and bought others, but did not pay the
money to the vendor, and afterwards became financially embarrassed. He who sold
the oxen brought suit against the master in an action on the peculium,
and for money which had been employed in his business, as the oxen on
account of which the money was demanded were in possession of the master.
The answer was, that no peculium was held to exist, except what
remained after what the slave owed to the master had been deducted, and that it
seemed to him that the oxen were, in fact, employed in the master's affairs,
but that he had paid on this account the amount that the first oxen had been
sold for; and that judgment should be rendered against the master for the
excess of the value of the last oxen.
17. Africanus, Questions, Book VIII.
A slave, having borrowed money for the business of his master, lost it
without negligence; it was held that, notwithstanding this, an action for money
employed in the business of another could be brought against the master. For,
in like manner, if my agent, being about to spend money in my business, and
having borrowed money lost it without negligence, he can properly bring an
action against me on the ground of mandate, or on that of business
transacted.
(1) I entered into a contract with Stichus the sub-slave of your slave
Pamphilus; the action on the peculium and that for property employed in
the affairs of another ought to be granted in such a way that whatever had been
employed in your business or with reference to the peculium of
Pamphilus, should be included in the same; that is to say, even if it was
brought after Stichus had died, or been alienated.
If, however, I bring suit after the death of Pamphilus, the better
opinion is that, even though Stichus may be living, still, with reference to
what has been employed for the benefit of the peculium of Pamphilus, the
action should not be granted, except within a year from the time when he died;
for I should then be held to be, as it were, instituting proceedings with
reference to the peculium of Pamphilus, just as where I brought suit for
what I lent by his direction.
It should not concern us that Stichus, on whose peculium suit is
brought, is living, since this property cannot be in his peculium,
unless that of Pamphilus still remains. The same principle will compel us
to hold that what has been employed for the benefit of the peculium of
Pamphilus, must be made good in such a way that what Pamphilus owes you shall
first be deducted, but what has actually been used in your business shall be
made good even if what Pamphilus owes you had not been deducted.
18. Neratius, Parchments, Book VII.
Although you have become surety for my slave in a contract which was
made with reference to my business, for example, if where a slave had purchased
grain for the maintenance of the entire body of slaves, you gave security to
the vendor of the grain; still, the better opinion is that you may bring the action De peculio on this account, but
not an action based on the employment of property in the affairs of another; so
that an action on the latter ground will lie in any contract solely in favor of
the person who loaned the very property which has been employed in the affairs
of the matter.
19. Paulus, Questions, Book IV.
A son under paternal control purchased a toga; and afterwards, having
died, his father being ignorant of the fact, and supposing it to be his, used
it at his funeral. Neratius states in the Second Book of Opinions that this is
held to be employment of property in the affairs of the father, but that, in
the action on the peculium, what does not exist should be computed only
in one instance, that is where this is occasioned by the malicious fraud of him
against whom suit is brought.
If, however, the father was obliged to purchase a toga for his son, it
was employed in the affairs of his father, not now when it was used at the
funeral, but at the time he purchased it, for the funeral of the son is a debt
of the father. Neratius, also, who thought that the father was liable on the
ground of property employed in his business, explains that this transaction
(that is to say the burial and the funeral of the son) constitute a debt of the
father and not of the son. He, therefore, having become a debtor to the
peculium, although the property is not in existence, can also be sued on
the peculium; and in this action is also included what has been employed
in his affairs; which addition is, however necessary, after a year has elapsed
from the death of the son.
20. Scævola, Opinions, Book I.
A father promised a dowry for his daughter and agreed that he would
support her; and, as he did not keep his promise, the daughter borrowed money
from her husband, and died during marriage. I gave it as my opinion that, if
what had been lent had been expended for something without which she could not
support herself, or could not maintain her father's slaves, an equitable action
should be granted on the ground of property employed in the business of the
father.
(1) The slave of a party who was absent on public business lent money to
the slaves of a ward, the guardian signing the stipulation, which stated that
the latter was responsible for the contract. The question arose whether an
action would lie against the ward? I answered that, if the property was given
for the business of the ward it was employed for that purpose; and although, in
order that the contract with reference to the slaves might be the better
confirmed, the guardian had made the promise, it should, nevertheless, be said
that an action for property employed in the business of another might be
brought against the ward.
21. The Same, Digest, Book V.
A man married a girl under paternal control, the father having promised
a dowry, and it was agreed between all the parties that either the father, or she herself, should meet the expenses of her support. The
husband lent her money, as he very properly thought that the father would give
her an allowance to the amount that he had proposed to give his daughter. She
used this money for necessary purposes for herself and for the slaves which she
had with her, and the management of his domestic affairs having been committed
to her, she used a certain amount of the money of her husband for the same
purpose. Then, before the father had paid the allowance, the daughter died, the
father refused to pay the expenses, and the husband retained the property of
his wife.
I ask whether an action for money employed for his benefit will lie
against the father? The answer was that if what was lent was expended for
articles without which she could not maintain herself, or support the slaves of
her father, an equitable action for property employed for another's benefit
should be granted.
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