Mr Buchanan's Administration on the Eve of the Rebellion Chapter IX
by James Buchanan
It is now necessary to recur to the condition of the forts and
other public property of the United States within South Carolina, at the date of the President's annual message, on the 3d
December, 1860. In regard to that property the message says:
"This has been purchased for a fair equivalent, by the consent
of the Legislature of the State, for the 'erection of forts, magazines, arsenals,' and over these the authority 'to exercise exclusive legislation' has been expressly granted by the Constitution
to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made
to expel the United States from this property by force, but if in
this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of
the forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In
such a contingency the responsibility for consequences would
rightfully rest upon the heads of the assailants." Thus if war
must come, the President had determined to fix the whole responsibility for its commencement on South Carolina. In order
to estimate correctly the wisdom of this defensive policy, it is
necessary to revert to the condition of the country on the 3d
December, 1860, when it was announced. At this period we
may divide the Southern States into three classes, holding opin-
ions variant from each other.
1. There was South Carolina, which had been the avowed
and persistent advocate of disunion for more than a quarter of
a century. She had already called a Convention for the purpose of seceding from the Union. Her leading secessionists
were ever on the alert to seize upon any action of the Federal
Government which they might wrest to the purpose of alienating the other slaveholding States from their attachment to the
Union, and enlisting them in her cause.
2. The second class was composed of the six other cotton
States. The people of these, although highly excited against
the abolitionists, were still unwilling to leave the Union. They
would have been content, notwithstanding the efforts of secession demagogues, with a simple recognition of their adjudged
rights to take slaves into the Territories, and hold them there
like other property, until a territorial convention, assembled to
frame a State constitution, should decide the question. To this
decision, whatever it might be, they professed their willingness to
submit. Indeed, as has already been seen from the statements
of Messrs. Douglas and Toombs in the Senate, they would have
consented to abandon their rights in all the Territories north of
360 30', leaving what should remain to them little more than a
name.
3. The third class consisted of the border slaveholding States,
with Virginia at the head. A large majority of their people,
although believing in the right of peaceful secession, bad resisted
all the efforts of the extreme men in their midst, and were still
devoted to the Union. Of this there could be no better proof
than the result of the election held in Virginia, February 4,
1861, for the choice of delegates to her State Convention, even
after the cotton States had all seceded.1 This showed that a
very large majority of the delegates elected were in favor of
remaining in the Union.
1. Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia for 1861, p. 780.
Under these circumstances, it is easy to imagine what would
have been the effect on the other Southern States of sending a
feeble force of United States troops to Fort Moultrie at this critical conjuncture. Had collision been the consequence, and blood
been shed immediately before the meeting of Congress, the
other cotton States, from their well-known affinities, would have
rushed to the support of South Carolina, She would thus have
accomplished her long-sought object. Indeed, it was the current
report of the day that her leading disunionists had declared the
spilling of a little blood would be necessary to secure the cooperation of other Southern States. Besides, in the President's
opinion, there was no necessity, at the time, for any reenforcement to secure the forts in the harbor of Charleston. He was
convinced that while the other slaveholding States were ready
and willing to compromise with the North, South Carolina would
not dare to attack Fort Moultrie. This conviction did not
spring from any confidence in her spirit of forbearance; it
arose from a certain knowledge that such an outrage would be
condemned not only by the border but by the cotton States. It
would estrange and separate them from her, at the very moment
she was most solicitous to conciliate them. Whoever was in
Washington at the time cannot fail to recollect the denunciations
in advance of leading Southern men against such an unprovoked
attack. The public property stood within her limits-three
forts, a custom house, an arsenal, and a post office, covered by
the flag of the country. From these she knew she had nothing
to fear unless she should first make the attack. Such an outrage as the seizure of a fort of the United States by any State
had never before been imagined. There must be a fearful suspense between the conception and the commission of such an
act. It was the supreme object of the President to promote, by all
the means in his power, such a fair and honorable adjustment between the North and the South as would save the country from
the scourge of civil war. It was, therefore, his evident policy to
isolate South Carolina, as far as possible, from the other Southern States; and for this purpose to refrain from any act which
might enable her to enlist them in her cause. If, after all, she
should attack Fort Moultrie, this act would have met their universal condemnation. Besides, nothing short of such an attack
could have united the people of the North in suppressing her revolt. They were then far from being prepared for civil war.
On the contrary, they were intent on a peaceful solution of our
difficulties, and would have censured any act of the administration which might have defeated this purpose and precipitated
them into hostilities. The true policy was that expressed by
President Lincoln to the seceded cotton States in his inaugural
months afterward, in which he informs them, "You can have no
conflict without being yourselves the aggressors." Although the
President believed (and this with good cause, as the event has
shown), that under the existing circumstances, South Carolina
would not attack any of the forts in the harbor of Charleston
whilst he suffered their status quo to remain; yet in this it was
possible lie might be mistaken. To guard against surprise after
the secession of the State, which was then imminent, he had prepared an expedition as powerful as his limited means would
afford, to send reenforcements to Major Anderson, at the first
moment of danger. For this purpose the Secretary of the Navy
had stationed the Brooklyn, a powerful war steamer, then completely ready for sea, in Hampton Roads, to take on board for
Charleston three hundred disciplined troops, with provisions and
munitions of war, from the neighboring garrison of Fortress
Monroe.
Having thus provided for the reenforcement of the forts, in
case of need, the Secretary of War despatched Assistant Adjutant-General Buell to Major Anderson, at Fort Moultrie, with
instructions how he should act in his present position. These
were communicated to him on the 11th December, 1860.
Whilst tifey instructed the Major to avoid every act of aggression, they directed him, in case of an attack upon, or an attempt
to take possession of, any of the three forts under his command,
to defend them to the last extremity. Furthermore, he was
authorized, as a precautionary measure, should lie believe his
force insufficient for the defence of all three, to remove it at his
discretion from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, whenever he
should have tangible evidence of a design, on the part of South
Carolina, to proceed to a hostile act. We say to Fort Sumter,
because the third fort, Castle Pinckney, was wholly indefensible. From the important bearing of these instructions upon
subsequent events, they are entitled to textual insertion. They
are as follows:1 "You are aware of the great anxiety of the
Secretary of War, that a collision of the troops with the people
of the State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination
to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts
in this harbor, which shall guard against such a collision. He
has, therefore, carefully abstained from increasing the force at
this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any
doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not
attempt by violence to obtain possession of the public works or
interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel and acts of
rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint these expectations of the Government, he deems it proper that you shall be
prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He
has, therefore, directed me verbally to give you such instructions.
You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly
tend to provoke aggression, and for that reason you are not,
without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position
which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude, but you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor,
and if attacked you are to defend yourself to the last extremity.
The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to
occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack on or
attempt to take possession of either one of them will be regarded
as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into
either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its
power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar
defensive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design
to proceed to a hostile act."
1. Ex. Doc., H. R., vol. vi., No. 26, p. 10.
The President having observed that Major Buell, in reducing
to writing at Fort Moultrie the instructions he had verbally received, required Major Anderson, in case of attack, to defend
himself to the last extremity, immediately caused the Secretary
of War to modify this instruction. This extreme was not required by any principle of military honor or by any rule of
war. It was sufficient for him to defend himself until no reasonable hope should remain of saving the fort. The instructions
were accordingly so modified, with the approbation of General
Scott.
The President having determined not to disturb the status quo
at Charleston, as long as our troops should continue to be hospitably treated by the inhabitants, and remain in unmolested possession of the forts, was gratified to learn, a short time thereafter,
that South Carolina was equally intent on preserving the peace.
On the 8th December, 1860, four of the Representatives in
Congress from that State sought an interview, and held a conversation with him concerning the best means of avoiding a
hostile collision between the parties. In order to guard against
any misapprehension on either side, he suggested that they had
best reduce their verbal communication to writing, and bring it
to him in that form. Accordingly, on the 10th December, they
delivered to him a note, dated on the previous day, and signed
by five members, in which they say: "In compliance with
our statement to you yesterday, we now express to you our
strong convictions that neither the constituted authorities, nor
any body of the people of the State of South Carolina, will
either attack or molest the United States forts in the harbor of
Charleston, previously to the action of the Convention; and we
hope and believe not until an offer has been made, through an
accredited representative, to negotiate for an amicable arrangement of all matters between the State and the Federal Government, provided that no reinforcements be sent into these forts,
and their relative military status shall remain as at present."1
Both in this and in their previous conversation, they declared
that in making this statement, they were acting solely on their
own responsibility, and expressly disclaimed any authority to
bind their State. They, nevertheless, expressed the confident
belief that they would be sustained both by the State authorities and by the Convention, after it should assemble. Although
the President considered this declaration as nothing more than
the act of five highly respectable members of the House from
South Carolina, yet he welcomed it as a happy omen, that by
means of their influence collision might be prevented, and time
afforded to all parties for reflection and for a peaceable adjustment. From abundant caution, however, he objected to the
word "provided" in their statement, lest, if he should accept it
without remark, this might possibly be construed into an agreement on his part not to reenforce the forts. Such an agreement,
he informed them, he would never make. It would be impossible for him, from the nature of his official responsibility, thus to
tie his own hands and restrain his own freedom of action. Still,
they might have observed from his message, that he had no
present design, under existing circumstances, to change the condition of the forts at Charleston. He must, notwithstanding,
be left entirely free to exercise his own discretion, according to
exigencies as they might arise. They replied that nothing was
further from their intention than such a construction of this
word; they did not so understand it, and he should not so consider it.
1. Ex. Doc., H. R., vol. vi., No. 96, p. 9, &c.
It was at this moment, on the 15th December, 1860, after
the President's policy had been fixed and announced in his annual message; after the "Brooklyn" had been made ready to go
to the relief of Major Anderson in case of need; after he had
received instructions in accordance with this policy; after the
President's pacific interview with the South Carolina members,
and before any action had yet been taken on the first Crittenden Compromise, that General Scott deemed it proper to renew
his former recommendation to garrison the nine Southern fortifications. This appears fiom his report to President Lincoln,
of the 30th March, 1861, entitled "Southern Forts; a Summary," &c., of which we shall often hereafter have occasion to
speak. It is scarcely a lack of charity to infer that General
Scott knew at the time when he made this recommendation
(on the 15th December) that it must be rejected. The President could not have complied with it, the position of affairs still
remaining unchanged, without at once reversing his entire policy, and without a degree of inconsistency amounting almost to
self-stultification. The Senators from the cotton States and
from Virginia, where these forts are situated, were still occupied
with their brother Senators in devising measures of peace and
conciliation. For this patriotic purpose the Committee of Thirteen were about to be appointed, and they remained in session
until the last day of the month. Meanwhile all the Southern
Senators in Congress professed their willingness to adopt the Crittenden Compromise, so much and so justly lauded afterwards by
General Scott himself. If at this moment, whilst they were engaged in peaceful consultation with Senators from the North, the
President'had despatched military expeditions to these nine forts,
it was easy to foresee what would be the disastrous effect, not
only in the cotton, but in all the border States. Its first effect
would have been to dissolve the existing conferences for a peaceable adjustment.
This, the General's second recommendation, was wholly unexpected. He had remained silent for more than six weeks from
the date of his supplemental "Views," convinced, as the President
inferred, that he had abandoned the idea of garrisoning all these
forts with "the five companies only" within his reach. Had
the President never so earnestly desired to reinforce the nine
forts in question, at this time, it would have been little short of
madness to undertake the task, with the small force at his command. Without authority to call forth the militia or accept the
services of volunteers for the purpose, this whole force now consisted of six hundred recruits, obtained by the General since the
date of his "Views," in addition to the five regular companies.
Our army was still out of reach on the remote frontiers, and
could not be withdrawn, during midwinter, in time for this military operation. Indeed, the General had never suggested such a
withdrawal. He knew that had this been possible, the inhabitants on our distant frontiers would have been immediately exposed to the tomahawk and scalping knife of the Indians. Our
weak condition in regard to troops within reach is demonstrated
by the insignificant number of these he was able to collect in
Washington on the 4th March following. This was to resist an
attempt which he apprehended would be made by an armed
force to prevent the inauguration of President Lincoln and to
seize the public property. The General was so firmly convinced
of the reality of this plot, that nothing could shake his faith. It
was in vain that a committee of the House of Representatives,
after hearing the General himself, and after full investigation, had
reported that his apprehensions were unfounded.1 Besides, the
President, relying on his own sources of information, had never
entertained any similar apprehensions. The stake, notwithstanding, was so vast and the General so urgent, that be granted
him permission to bring to Washington all the troops he could
muster to resist an imaginary but dreaded enemy. The whole
number of these, including even the sappers and miners whom
be had withdrawn from West Point. amounted to no more than
six hundred and fifty-three, rank and file. These troops, with a
portion of the district militia, the General had posted in different parts of the city, and had stationed sentinels on the tops of
the highest houses and other eminences, so that all was ready to
attack the enemy at the first moment of their appearance; but
never did an inauguration pass more peacefully and quietly. It
is due to President Lincoln to state, that throughout his long
progress in the same carriage with the late President, both on
the way to the Capitol and the return from it, he was far from
evincing the slightest apprehension of danger.
1. February 14, 1861. House Reports of Committees, vol. ii., No. 79.
Had the President attempted to distribute the General's
thousand men, as he proposed, among the numerous forts in the
cotton States, as well as Fortress Monroe, their absurd inadequacy to the object would have exhibited weakness instead of
strength. It would have provoked instead of preventing collision. It would have precipitated a civil war with the cotton
States without the slightest preparation on the part of Congress,
and would at once have destroyed the then prevailing hopes of
compromise. Worse than all, it would have exasperated Virginia
and the other border States, then so intent on remaining in the
Union, and might have driven them at once into hostile action.
And now it becomes our painful duty to examine the report
of General Scott to President Lincoln of 30th March, 1861.
This was first published at the General's instance, eighteen
months after its date, in the "National Intelligencer" of the
21st October, 1862. It cannot be denied that the report throughout is an indiscriminate censure of President Buchanan's conduct
in dealing with the Southern forts. It evidently proceeded from
a defective memory prejudiced by a strong bias. It rests mainly
on vague and confused recollections of private conversations
alleged to have been held with the President several months
before its date. These having occurred between the commander-
in-chief and the commanding General of the army, on important
military questions, pertaining to their. respective official duties,
were, in their nature, strictly confidential. Were this otherwise,
it would destroy that freedom and unreserve which ought to
characterize such consultations, and instead thereof, the parties
would be ever on their guard in the interchange of opinions, often
greatly to the prejudice of the public interest. Had the General
resolved to violate a confidence as sacred as that between the President and a member of his Cabinet, such is the treachery of the
best human memory, he ought, at the least, to have submitted
his statements to Mr. Buchanan before he had embodied them
in his report. Had he done this, we venture to say from the
sequel that most of them would have never seen the light.
When President Buchanan retired from office, he had reason
to believe he had parted from the General on terms mutually
amicable. Although in former years their friendly intercourse
had been for a season interrupted, yet he believed all this had
been forgotten. A suspicion never entered his mind that the
General held in reserve a quiver of arrows to assail his public
character upon his retirement from office.
This report does not allege that it had been made in consequence of a call from President Lincoln. From its face it appears to have been a pure volunteer offering on the part of the
General. It deals with the past and not with the future. It is
remarkable that it does not contain a word of advice to President
Lincoln, such as might have been expected from the commanding General, as to the manner of recovering the forts which
before its date had been already seized by the Confederates. On
the contrary, it reveals the strange fact that the General, so late
as the 12th March, and after the so-called Confederate Government of the cotton States was in full operation at Montgomery,
had advised President Lincoln to evacuate Fort Sumter, and this
in direct opposition to what had been the well-known and oft-
expressed determination of Mr. Buchanan. We need scarcely
remark that President Lincoln acted wisely in disregarding this
counsel. It was founded on an alleged military necessity. Had
the fort been actually invested by a hostile force so superior as
to render resistance hopeless, this would have justified a capitu-
lation in order to save a useless sacrifice of life. Its voluntary
abandonment, however, to the Confederacy, would have gone
far toward a recognition of their independence.
The General, in this report, would have President Lincoln
believe, on the authority of a Richmond newspaper, that "had
Scott been able to have got these forts in the condition he desired
them to be, the Southern Confederacy would not now exist."
Strange hallucination! In plain English, that South Carolina,
which throughout an entire generation liad determined on disunion, and had actually passed an ordinance of secession to carry
this purpose into effect, and the remaining six powerful cotton
States ready to follow her evil example, unless their adjudged
rights should be recognized by Congress, and which together
have since sent into the field such numerous and powerful
armies, would at once have been terrified into submission by the
distribution of four hundred troops in October, or one thousand
in December, among their numerous fortifications!
Very different must have been his opinion on the 3d March
following, when he penned his famous letter to Secretary Seward.
In this lie exclaims: "Conquer the seceded [cotton] States
by invading armies. No doubt this might be done in two or
three years by a young and able general-a Wolfe, a Dessaix, a
Hoche, with three hundred thousand disciplined men, estimating
a third for garrisons, and the loss of a yet greater number by
skirmishes, sieges, battles and Southern fevers. The destruction
of life and property on the other side would be frightful, however
perfect the moral discipline of the invaders. The conquest
completed, at that enormous waste of human life to the North
and the Northwest, with at least $250,000,000 added thereto,
and citi bono? Fifteen devastated provinces! not to be brought
into harmony with their conquerors, but to be held for generations by heavy garrisons, at an expense quadruple the net duties
or taxes it would be possible to extort from them, followed by a
protector or an emperor." In view of these fearful forebodings,
we are not surprised that he should have despaired of the
Union, and been willing to say to the cotton States, "Wayward
sisters, depart in peace." Nor that he should have fallen back
on his opinion expressed in the "Views " (29th October, 1860),
that "a smaller evil [than such a civil war] would be to allow
the fragments of the great Republic to form themselves into new
Confederacies."
The General, however, in the same letter to Secretary
Seward, presents his alternative for all these evils. He advises
Mr. Lincoln's administration "to throw off the old and assume
a new designation--the Union party; adopt the conciliatory
measures proposed by Mr. Crittenden, or the Peace Convention,
and my life upon it, we shall have no new case of secession, but,
on the contrary, an early return of many if not all of the States
which have already broken off from the Union. Without some
equally benign measure, the remaining slaveholding States will
probably join the Montgomery Confederacy in less than sixty
days, when this city, being included in a foreign country, would
require a permanent garrison of at least thirty-five thousand
troops." His advice to adopt the Crittenden Compromise would
have been excellent had it been given to his Republican friends
in Congress in the previous December, before any State had
seceded, and before any fort had been seized, instead of then
recommending to President Buchanan to despatch small bands
of United States soldiers to each of the forts. This recommendation, had it been followed at the time, would at once have
defeated this very Crittenden Compromise, so much desired, and
served only to provoke the cotton States into secession. It
would have been the stone of Cadmus cast among the armed
men sprung from the dragons teeth, and the signal for immediate fratricidal war and mutual destruction. The advice to
President Lincoln was out of season, after both the Crittenden
Compromise and the measures proposed by the Peace Convention had been finally rejected by Congress, and whilst the Confederacy of the cotton States was in active existence.
Before we proceed to analyze in further detail the General's
report, it is curious to note the reason for its publication. This
was a consequence of the publication of his letter to Secretary
Seward, which was in its very nature confidential. At this
period, in October, 1862, when the rebellion had assnmed a formidable aspect, and when his sinister predictions appeared to
be in the course of fulfilment, he read the original draft, in his
own handwriting, to a friend. This gentleman, whilst extolling
the far-seeing sagacity and the prophetic spirit it displayed,
begged for the draft as an invaluable keepsake. This appeal
to the General proved irresistible. The manuscript was delivered to the friend, who soon thereafter read it, amid great ap
plause, at a public meeting in the city of New York, and whilst
a highly excited political canvass was depending for the office of
Governor. The letter thus published, implying a direct censure
on President Lincoln for not having followed the advice it had
given, created no little astonishment, because of the prevalent
belief at the time, that the General was under many obligations
to the administration for liberal and indulgent treatment in the
face of discomfiture and defeat. The letter having thus been
first published by his friend, it was soon thereafter republished
in the " National Intelligencer," of the 21st October, 1862, under the General's own authority, and in addition, a copy of his
report to President Lincoln. Why he thus connected these two
documents, so distinct and even opposite in character, it would
be difficult to decide. It has been conjectured he may have
thought that the censure of Mr. Buchanan in the report might
prove an antidote to that against Mr. Lincoln in the Seward
letter. Whatever may have caused the publication of this report, Mr. Buchanan has cause to rejoice that it was brought to
light during his lifetime. It might, otherwise, have slumbered
on the secret files of the Executive Department until after his
death, and then been revealed to posterity as authentic history.
And here it is proper to mention, that a few days after the publication of the report, Mr. Buchanan replied to it in a letter
published in the "National Intelligencer," of the 1st November, 1862. This gave rise to a correspondence between himself
and General Scott, which, on both sides, was formally addressed
to the editors of that journal, and was published by them in
successive numbers. This continued throughout the autumn.
It might at first be supposed that the errors in the report had
been sufficiently exposed in the course of this correspondence; but in the present historical sketch of President Buchanan's conduct, it is impossible to pass over the strictures
made upon it by General Scott. The two are inseparably joined
together.
The General, in his report, prefaces the statement of his conversation with President Buchanan, by saying, that on the 13th
December he had "personally urged upon the Secretary of War
the same 'views' [those of the previous October], viz., strong
garrisons in the Southern forts; those of Charleston and Pensacola harbors at once; those on Mobile Bay and the Mississippi
below New Orleans, next, &c., &c. I again pointed out the
organized companies, and the [600] recruits at the principal
depots available for the purpose. The Secretary did not concur
in my views." This, indeed, he could not have done so early
as the 13th December, without placing himself in direct opposition to the well-defined policy of the President. An interview
was, therefore, appointed for the 15th December, between the
President and the General. "By appointment," says the General, "the Secretary accompanied me to the President, December 15th, when the same topics, secessionism, &c., were again
pretty fully discussed." He does not furnish the President's
answer to the proposition to send strong garrisons to the Southern forts. This must unquestionably have referred to the topics
of which his mind was then full, viz., the promising aspect of
compromise at the moment; the certain effect of such a measure in defeating it; the inadequacy of the force at command
for so extended an operation; and the policy which had been
laid down in his annual message. Not a word of all this. But
the General's memory seems to have improved with the lapse
of years and the progress of the rebellion. In his report to
President Lincoln, he speaks of but one conversation with President Buchanan, that of the 15th December, whilst in his letter
of the 8th November, 1862, to the "National Intelligencer," a
portion of the correspondence to which we have referred, he
alleges he had, on the 28th and 30th of the same December,
repeated the recommendation to garrison all the Southern forts.
In this statement, if material, it would be easy to prove he was
mistaken. Indeed, President Buchanan has in his possession a
note from the General himself, dated on Sunday, 30th December, stating that by indisposition he was confined to the house
on that day, and could not therefore call upon him. Of this
hereafter.
According to the report, he merely mentions in general terms
the recruits he had obtained for the expedition, without allotting them among the several forts. According to the letter, he
informed President Buchanan that the number of recruits at
New York and Carlisle barracks was about six hundred, "besides the five companies of regulars near at hand, making about
one thousand men." And he also stated how he would distribute them among the several forts. In this distribution he left
only "about two hundred men for the twin forts of Moultrie
and Sumter, Charleston harbor." He also declared in this letter, that "he considered the force quite adequate to the occasion." But, as if rendered conscious of its inadequacy by the
logic of events, he alleges that President Buchanan "might
have called forth volunteers to garrison these forts, without any
special legislation," and this, too, "with the full approbation of
every loyal man in the Union." That is, that on the 15th December, 1860, before any State had seceded, he might without
law have usurped this authority, when the law-making power
was actually in session and had made no movement to grant it,
and when all were intent, not on war, but on measures of compromise. In this letter he charges the Secretary of War, "with
or without the President's approbation," with "having nearly
denuded our whole eastern seaboard of troops." In doing this,
he must surely have forgotten that he himself had eloquently
urged that all the force on the frontiers was not sufficient for the
protection of our distant fellow-citizens, and had therefore advocated the raising of an additional force by Congress for this
very purpose.
It would seem from the report that the President confined
his observations at their interview exclusively to the reenforcement of the forts in Charleston harbor, for which General Scott,
according to his own statement, in the letter to the "National
Intelligencer," could spare but two hundred men, the remaining
eight hundred being required for the other fortifications. The
President having expressed the opinion, according to the report,
"that there was at the moment no danger of an early secession
beyond South Carolina," he proceeded to state, "in reply to my
[General Scott's] arguments for immediately reinforcing Fort
Moultrie, and sending a garrison to Fort Sumter," that "the
time has not arrived for doing so; that he should wait the action
of the Convention of South Carolina, in the expectation that a
commission would be appointed and sent to negotiate with him
and Congress, respecting the secession of the State and the property of the United States held within its limits; and that if Congress should decide against the secession, then he would send a
reenforcement, and telegraph the commanding officer (Major
Anderson) of Fort Moultrie to hold the forts (Moultrie and
Sumter) against attack."
Now it is probable that in the course of this conversation,
the President may have referred to the rumor then current, that
the South Carolina Convention intended to send commissioners
to Washington to treat with the Government, but it is quite
impossible he could have stated that the reenforcement of the
forts should await the result of their mission. Why ? Because
the Brooklyn had been for some time ready to proceed to
Fort Moultrie, dependent on no other contingency than that
of its attack or danger of attack. Least of all was it possible
the President could have said that if Congress should decide
against secession, he would then telegraph to Major Anderson
"to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumter) against attack," when
instructions of a similar but stronger character had already been
sent and delivered to him, and were of record in the War Department. It is strange that the President should, according to
the General, have made any future action in regard to these
forts dependent upon his own decision, or that of Congress, on
the question of secession, when he had in his annual message, but
a few days before, condemned the doctrine as unconstitutional,
and he well knew it would be equally condemned by Congress.
It is curious to note a trait of the fault-finding temper of the
General in this conversation. In it he makes the Secretary of
War observe, "with animation," "We have a vessel of war (the
Brooklyn) held in readiness at Norfolk, and he would then send
three hundred men in her from Fort Monroe to Charleston;"
but the General objected to this arrangement, saying in answer,
"that so many men could not be withdrawn from that garrison,
but could be taken from New York," &c., &c. In this report
to President Lincoln the General exultingly declares, "that if
the Secretary's three hundred men had then (on the 15th December), or some time later, been sent to Forts Moultrie and
Sumter, both would now have been in the possession of the
United States," &c. And again, "It would have been easy to reenforce this fort (Sumter) down to about the 12th February." In
making these declarations, he must surely have forgotten not
only his own objection to sending these very "three hundred
men" from Fortress Monroe, but also the fate of the Star of
the West, in the early part of January, with his recruits from
New York, which had been substituted under his advice and
direction for the Brooklyn.
The reader must have observed that we speak argumentatively and doubtingly of the General's statement of this conversation. We do this simply because President Buchanan, although a party to it, has no recollection whatever of its particulars. The reason doubtless is, that, believing General Scott to
have been aware before the interview that the President would
not violate his announced policy by sending one thousand men
to all the Southern forts, or two hundred to those in Charleston
harbor, he must have considered this renewed recommendation
rather a matter of form, springing from a motive which he will
not attempt to conjecture, than any thing more serious. But
whatever may have been the cause of his want of memory, the
fact is certainly true. He sincerely wishes it were otherwise.
We may observe generally in regard to this report, that the
attempt, at the end of more than three months, filled with the
most important and stirring events, to write out charges against
President Buchanan, must almost necessarily do him injustice.
Fairly to accomplish such a task, the writer ought to have tested
his own recollection by a reference to dates and official documents
within his reach. Not having done this, the report is confused
throughout, sometimes blending in the same sentence occurrences of distinct date and opposite nature. When these come
to be unravelled, it will appear in the sequel that they are often
contradicted by official and other unimpeachable testimony.
And here it is due to General Scott to mention, that on the
evening of their interview (15th December), he addressed a note
to President Buchanan, reminding him that General Jackson,
during the period of South Carolina nullification, had sent reenforcements to Fort Moultrie to prevent its seizure by the nullifiers and to enforce the collection of the revenue. This example
was doubtless suggested for imitation. But the times had greatly
changed during more than a quarter of a century which had
since elapsed. In 1833 South Carolina stood alone. She had
then the sympathy of no other Southern State. Her nullification was condemned by them all. Even her own people were
almost equally divided on the question. But instead of this, in
December, 1860, they were unanimous, and the other cotton
States were preparing to follow her into secession, should their
rights in the Territories be denied by Congress. Besides, the
President had already declared his purpose to collect the revenue by the employment of vessels of war stationed outside of the
port of Charleston, whenever its collection at the custom house
should be resisted. He hoped thereby to avoid actual collision;
but, whether or not, he had resolved at every hazard to collect
the revenue. Such was the state of affairs on the 15th December, 1860. Meanwhile the forts and all other public property
were unmolested, and Major Anderson and his troops continued
to be supplied and treated in the kindest manner.
