Speeches of Abraham Lincoln 1858 - Second Joint Debate, At Freeport
by Abraham Lincoln
AUGUST 27, 1858
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:--On Saturday last, Judge Douglas and myself first
met in public discussion. He spoke one hour, I an hour and a half, and he
replied for half an hour. The order is now reversed. I am to speak an
hour, he an hour and a half, and then I am to reply for half an hour. I
propose to devote myself during the first hour to the scope of what was
brought within the range of his half-hour speech at Ottawa. Of course
there was brought within the scope in that half-hour's speech something
of his own opening speech. In the course of that opening argument Judge
Douglas proposed to me seven distinct interrogatories. In my speech of an
hour and a half, I attended to some other parts of his speech, and
incidentally, as I thought, intimated to him that I would answer the rest
of his interrogatories on condition only that he should agree to answer
as many for me. He made no intimation at the time of the proposition, nor
did he in his reply allude at all to that suggestion of mine. I do him no
injustice in saying that he occupied at least half of his reply in
dealing with me as though I had refused to answer his interrogatories. I
now propose that I will answer any of the interrogatories, upon condition
that he will answer questions from me not exceeding the same number. I
give him an opportunity to respond.
The Judge remains silent. I now say that I will answer his
interrogatories, whether he answers mine or not; and that after I have
done so, I shall propound mine to him.
I have supposed myself, since the organization of the Republican party at
Bloomington, in May, 1856, bound as a party man by the platforms of the
party, then and since. If in any interrogatories which I shall answer I
go beyond the scope of what is within these platforms, it will be
perceived that no one is responsible but myself.
Having said thus much, I will take up the Judge's interrogatories as I
find them printed in the Chicago Times, and answer them seriatim. In
order that there may be no mistake about it, I have copied the
interrogatories in writing, and also my answers to them. The first one of
these interrogatories is in these words:
Question 1.--"I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands, as he did
in 1854, in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law?"
Answer:--I do not now, nor ever did, stand in favor of the unconditional
repeal of the Fugitive Slave law.
Q. 2.--"I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to-day, as he
did in 1854, against the admission of any more slave States into the
Union, even if the people want them?" Answer:--I do not now, nor ever
did, stand pledged against the admission of any more slave States into
the Union.
Q. 3.--"I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission of
a new State into the Union with such a constitution as the people of that
State may see fit to make?" Answer:--I do not stand pledged against the
admission of a new State into the Union, with such a constitution as the
people of that State may see fit to make.
Q. 4.--"I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the abolition
of slavery in the District of Columbia?" Answer:--I do not stand to-day
pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.
Q. 5.--"I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the
prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States?" Answer:--I
do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the
different States.
Q. 6.--"I desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit slavery in
all the Territories of the United States, north as well as south of the
Missouri Compromise line?" Answer:--I am impliedly, if not expressly,
pledged to a belief in the right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery
in all the United States 'Territories.
Q. 7.--"I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition
of any new territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein?"
Answer:--I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory;
and, in any given case, I would or would not oppose such acquisition,
accordingly as I might think such acquisition would or would not
aggravate the slavery question among ourselves.
Now, my friends, it will be perceived, upon an examination of these
questions and answers, that so far I have only answered that I was not
pledged to this, that, or the other. The Judge has not framed his
interrogatories to ask me anything more than this, and I have answered in
strict accordance with the interrogatories, and have answered truly, that
I am not pledged at all upon any of the points to which I have answered.
But I am not disposed to hang upon the exact form of his interrogatory. I
am rather disposed to take up at least some of these questions, and state
what I really think upon them.
As to the first one, in regard to the Fugitive Slave law, I have never
hesitated to say, and I do not now hesitate to say, that I think, under
the Constitution of the United States, the people of the Southern States
are entitled to a Congressional Fugitive Slave law. Having said that, I
have had nothing to say in regard to the existing Fugitive Slave law,
further than that I think it should have been framed so as to be free
from some of the objections that pertain to it, without lessening its
efficiency. And inasmuch as we are not now in an agitation in regard to
an alteration or modification of that law, I would not be the man to
introduce it as a new subject of agitation upon the general question of
slavery.
In regard to the other question, of whether I am pledged to the admission
of any more slave States into the Union, I state to you very frankly that
I would be exceedingly sorry ever to be put in a position of having to
pass upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to know that there
would never be another slave State admitted into the Union; but I must
add that if slavery shall be kept out of the Territories during the
territorial existence of any one given Territory, and then the people
shall, having a fair chance and a clear field, when they come to adopt
the constitution, do such an extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave
constitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence of the institution
among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but to admit
them into the Union.
The third interrogatory is answered by the answer to the second, it
being, as I conceive, the same as the second.
The fourth one is in regard to the abolition of slavery in the District
of Columbia. In relation to that, I have my mind very distinctly made up.
I should be exceedingly glad to see slavery abolished in the District of
Columbia. I believe that Congress possesses the constitutional power to
abolish it. Yet as a member of Congress, I should not, with my present
views, be in favor of endeavoring to abolish slavery in the District of
Columbia, unless it would be upon these conditions: First, that the
abolition should be gradual; second, that it should be on a vote of the
majority of qualified voters in the District; and third, that
compensation should be made to unwilling owners. With these three
conditions, I confess I would be exceedingly glad to see Congress abolish
slavery in the District of Columbia, and, in the language of Henry Clay,
"sweep from our capital that foul blot upon our nation."
In regard to the fifth interrogatory, I must say here that, as to the
question of the abolition of the slave-trade between the different
States, I can truly answer, as I have, that I am pledged to nothing about
it. It is a subject to which I have not given that mature consideration
that would make me feel authorized to state a position so as to hold
myself entirely bound by it. In other words, that question has never been
prominently enough before me to induce me to investigate whether we
really have the constitutional power to do it. I could investigate it if
I had sufficient time to bring myself to a conclusion upon that subject;
but I have not done so, and I say so frankly to you here, and to Judge
Douglas. I must say, however, that if I should be of opinion that
Congress does possess the constitutional power to abolish the slave-trade
among the different States, I should still not be in favor of the
exercise of that power, unless upon some conservative principle as I
conceive it, akin to what I have said in relation to the abolition of
slavery in the District of Columbia.
My answer as to whether I desire that slavery should be prohibited in all
the Territories of the United States is full and explicit within itself,
and cannot be made clearer by any comments of mine. So I suppose in
regard to the question whether I am opposed to the acquisition of any
more territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein, my answer is
such that I could add nothing by way of illustration, or making myself
better understood, than the answer which I have placed in writing.
Now in all this the Judge has me, and he has me on the record. I suppose
he had flattered himself that I was really entertaining one set of
opinions for one place, and another set for another place; that I was
afraid to say at one place what I uttered at another. What I am saying
here I suppose I say to a vast audience as strongly tending to
Abolitionism as any audience in the State of Illinois, and I believe I am
saying that which, if it would be offensive to any persons and render
them enemies to myself, would be offensive to persons in this audience.
I now proceed to propound to the Judge the interrogatories, so far as I
have framed them. I will bring forward a new installment when I get them
ready. I will bring them forward now only reaching to number four. The
first one is:
Question 1.--If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirely
unobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a State constitution, and
ask admission into the Union under it, before they have the requisite
number of inhabitants according to the English bill,--some ninety-three
thousand,--will you vote to admit them?
Q. 2.--Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way,
against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery
from its limits prior to the formation of a State constitution?
Q. 3. If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that States
cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing
in, adopting, and following such decision as a rule of political action?
Q. 4. Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard of
how such acquisition may affect the nation on the slavery question?
As introductory to these interrogatories which Judge Douglas propounded
to me at Ottawa, he read a set of resolutions which he said Judge
Trumbull and myself had participated in adopting, in the first Republican
State Convention, held at Springfield in October, 1854. He insisted that
I and Judge Trumbull, and perhaps the entire Republican party, were
responsible for the doctrines contained in the set of resolutions which
he read, and I understand that it was from that set of resolutions that
he deduced the interrogatories which he propounded to me, using these
resolutions as a sort of authority for propounding those questions to me.
Now, I say here to-day that I do not answer his interrogatories because
of their springing at all from that set of resolutions which he read. I
answered them because Judge Douglas thought fit to ask them. I do not
now, nor ever did, recognize any responsibility upon myself in that set
of resolutions. When I replied to him on that occasion, I assured him
that I never had anything to do with them. I repeat here to today that I
never in any possible form had anything to do with that set of
resolutions It turns out, I believe, that those resolutions were never
passed in any convention held in Springfield.
It turns out that they were never passed at any convention or any public
meeting that I had any part in. I believe it turns out, in addition to
all this, that there was not, in the fall of 1854, any convention holding
a session in Springfield, calling itself a Republican State Convention;
yet it is true there was a convention, or assemblage of men calling
themselves a convention, at Springfield, that did pass some resolutions.
But so little did I really know of the proceedings of that convention, or
what set of resolutions they had passed, though having a general
knowledge that there had been such an assemblage of men there, that when
Judge Douglas read the resolutions, I really did not know but they had
been the resolutions passed then and there. I did not question that they
were the resolutions adopted. For I could not bring myself to suppose
that Judge Douglas could say what he did upon this subject without
knowing that it was true. I contented myself, on that occasion, with
denying, as I truly could, all connection with them, not denying or
affirming whether they were passed at Springfield. Now, it turns out that
he had got hold of some resolutions passed at some convention or public
meeting in Kane County. I wish to say here, that I don't conceive that in
any fair and just mind this discovery relieves me at all. I had just as
much to do with the convention in Kane County as that at Springfield. I
am as much responsible for the resolutions at Kane County as those at
Springfield,--the amount of the responsibility being exactly nothing in
either case; no more than there would be in regard to a set of
resolutions passed in the moon.
I allude to this extraordinary matter in this canvass for some further
purpose than anything yet advanced. Judge Douglas did not make his
statement upon that occasion as matters that he believed to be true, but
he stated them roundly as being true, in such form as to pledge his
veracity for their truth. When the whole matter turns out as it does, and
when we consider who Judge Douglas is, that he is a distinguished Senator
of the United States; that he has served nearly twelve years as such;
that his character is not at all limited as an ordinary Senator of the
United States, but that his name has become of world-wide renown,--it is
most extraordinary that he should so far forget all the suggestions of
justice to an adversary, or of prudence to himself, as to venture upon
the assertion of that which the slightest investigation would have shown
him to be wholly false. I can only account for his having done so upon
the supposition that that evil genius which has attended him through his
life, giving to him an apparent astonishing prosperity, such as to lead
very many good men to doubt there being any advantage in virtue over
vice,--I say I can only account for it on the supposition that that evil
genius has as last made up its mind to forsake him.
And I may add that another extraordinary feature of the Judge's conduct
in this canvass--made more extraordinary by this incident--is, that he is
in the habit, in almost all the speeches he makes, of charging falsehood
upon his adversaries, myself and others. I now ask whether he is able to
find in anything that Judge Trumbull, for instance, has said, or in
anything that I have said, a justification at all compared with what we
have, in this instance, for that sort of vulgarity.
I have been in the habit of charging as a matter of belief on my part
that, in the introduction of the Nebraska Bill into Congress, there was a
conspiracy to make slavery perpetual and national. I have arranged from
time to time the evidence which establishes and proves the truth of this
charge. I recurred to this charge at Ottawa. I shall not now have time to
dwell upon it at very great length; but inasmuch as Judge Douglas, in his
reply of half an hour, made some points upon me in relation to it, I
propose noticing a few of them.
The Judge insists that, in the first speech I made, in which I very
distinctly made that charge, he thought for a good while I was in fun!
that I was playful; that I was not sincere about it; and that he only
grew angry and somewhat excited when he found that I insisted upon it as
a matter of earnestness. He says he characterized it as a falsehood so
far as I implicated his moral character in that transaction. Well, I did
not know, till he presented that view, that I had implicated his moral
character. He is very much in the habit, when he argues me up into a
position I never thought of occupying, of very cosily saying he has no
doubt Lincoln is "conscientious" in saying so. He should remember that I
did not know but what he was ALTOGETHER "CONSCIENTIOUS" in that matter. I
can conceive it possible for men to conspire to do a good thing, and I
really find nothing in Judge Douglas's course of arguments that is
contrary to or inconsistent with his belief of a conspiracy to
nationalize and spread slavery as being a good and blessed thing; and so
I hope he will understand that I do not at all question but that in all
this matter he is entirely "conscientious."
But to draw your attention to one of the points I made in this case,
beginning at the beginning: When the Nebraska Bill was introduced, or a
short time afterward, by an amendment, I believe, it was provided that it
must be considered "the true intent and meaning of this Act not to
legislate slavery into any State or Territory, or to exclude it
therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and
regulate their own domestic institutions in their own way, subject only
to the Constitution of the United States." I have called his attention to
the fact that when he and some others began arguing that they were giving
an increased degree of liberty to the people in the Territories over and
above what they formerly had on the question of slavery, a question was
raised whether the law was enacted to give such unconditional liberty to
the people; and to test the sincerity of this mode of argument, Mr.
Chase, of Ohio, introduced an amendment, in which he made the law--if the
amendment were adopted--expressly declare that the people of the
Territory should have the power to exclude slavery if they saw fit. I
have asked attention also to the fact that Judge Douglas and those who
acted with him voted that amendment down, notwithstanding it expressed
exactly the thing they said was the true intent and meaning of the law. I
have called attention to the fact that in subsequent times a decision of
the Supreme Court has been made, in which it has been declared that a
Territorial Legislature has no constitutional right to exclude slavery.
And I have argued and said that for men who did, intend that the people
of the Territory should have the right to exclude slavery absolutely and
unconditionally, the voting down of Chase's amendment is wholly
inexplicable. It is a puzzle, a riddle. But I have said, that with men
who did look forward to such a decision, or who had it in contemplation
that such a decision of the Supreme Court would or might be made, the
voting down of that amendment would be perfectly rational and
intelligible. It would keep Congress from coming in collision with the
decision when it was made. Anybody can conceive that if there was an
intention or expectation that such a decision was to follow, it would not
be a very desirable party attitude to get into for the Supreme Court--all
or nearly all its members belonging to the same party--to decide one way,
when the party in Congress had decided the other way. Hence it would be
very rational for men expecting such a decision to keep the niche in that
law clear for it. After pointing this out, I tell Judge Douglas that it
looks to me as though here was the reason why Chase's amendment was voted
down. I tell him that, as he did it, and knows why he did it, if it was
done for a reason different from this, he knows what that reason was and
can tell us what it was. I tell him, also, it will be vastly more
satisfactory to the country for him to give some other plausible,
intelligible reason why it was voted down than to stand upon his dignity
and call people liars. Well, on Saturday he did make his answer; and what
do you think it was? He says if I had only taken upon myself to tell the
whole truth about that amendment of Chase's, no explanation would have
been necessary on his part or words to that effect. Now, I say here that
I am quite unconscious of having suppressed anything material to the
case, and I am very frank to admit if there is any sound reason other
than that which appeared to me material, it is quite fair for him to
present it. What reason does he propose? That when Chase came forward
with his amendment expressly authorizing the people to exclude slavery
from the limits of every Territory, General Cass proposed to Chase, if he
(Chase) would add to his amendment that the people should have the power
to introduce or exclude, they would let it go. This is substantially all
of his reply. And because Chase would not do that, they voted his
amendment down. Well, it turns out, I believe, upon examination, that
General Cass took some part in the little running debate upon that
amendment, and then ran away and did not vote on it at all. Is not that
the fact? So confident, as I think, was General Cass that there was a
snake somewhere about, he chose to run away from the whole thing. This is
an inference I draw from the fact that, though he took part in the
debate, his name does not appear in the ayes and noes. But does Judge
Douglas's reply amount to a satisfactory answer?
[Cries of "Yes," "Yes," and "No," "No."]
There is some little difference of opinion here. But I ask attention to a
few more views bearing on the question of whether it amounts to a
satisfactory answer. The men who were determined that that amendment
should not get into the bill, and spoil the place where the Dred Scott
decision was to come in, sought an excuse to get rid of it somewhere. One
of these ways--one of these excuses--was to ask Chase to add to his
proposed amendment a provision that the people might introduce slavery if
they wanted to. They very well knew Chase would do no such thing, that
Mr. Chase was one of the men differing from them on the broad principle
of his insisting that freedom was better than slavery,--a man who would
not consent to enact a law, penned with his own hand, by which he was
made to recognize slavery on the one hand, and liberty on the other, as
precisely equal; and when they insisted on his doing this, they very well
knew they insisted on that which he would not for a moment think of
doing, and that they were only bluffing him. I believe (I have not, since
he made his answer, had a chance to examine the journals or Congressional
Globe and therefore speak from memory)--I believe the state of the bill
at that time, according to parliamentary rules, was such that no member
could propose an additional amendment to Chase's amendment. I rather
think this is the truth,--the Judge shakes his head. Very well. I would
like to know, then, if they wanted Chase's amendment fixed over, why
somebody else could not have offered to do it? If they wanted it amended,
why did they not offer the amendment? Why did they not put it in
themselves? But to put it on the other ground: suppose that there was
such an amendment offered, and Chase's was an amendment to an amendment;
until one is disposed of by parliamentary law, you cannot pile another
on. Then all these gentlemen had to do was to vote Chase's on, and then,
in the amended form in which the whole stood, add their own amendment to
it, if they wanted to put it in that shape. This was all they were
obliged to do, and the ayes and noes show that there were thirty-six who
voted it down, against ten who voted in favor of it. The thirty-six held
entire sway and control. They could in some form or other have put that
bill in the exact shape they wanted. If there was a rule preventing their
amending it at the time, they could pass that, and then, Chase's
amendment being merged, put it in the shape they wanted. They did not
choose to do so, but they went into a quibble with Chase to get him to
add what they knew he would not add, and because he would not, they stand
upon the flimsy pretext for voting down what they argued was the meaning
and intent of their own bill. They left room thereby for this Dred Scott
decision, which goes very far to make slavery national throughout the
United States.
I pass one or two points I have, because my time will very soon expire;
but I must be allowed to say that Judge Douglas recurs again, as he did
upon one or two other occasions, to the enormity of Lincoln, an
insignificant individual like Lincoln,--upon his ipse dixit charging a
conspiracy upon a large number of members of Congress, the Supreme Court,
and two Presidents, to nationalize slavery. I want to say that, in the
first place, I have made no charge of this sort upon my ipse dixit. I
have only arrayed the evidence tending to prove it, and presented it to
the understanding of others, saying what I think it proves, but giving
you the means of judging whether it proves it or not. This is precisely
what I have done. I have not placed it upon my ipse dixit at all. On this
occasion, I wish to recall his attention to a piece of evidence which I
brought forward at Ottawa on Saturday, showing that he had made
substantially the same charge against substantially the same persons,
excluding his dear self from the category. I ask him to give some
attention to the evidence which I brought forward that he himself had
discovered a "fatal blow being struck" against the right of the people to
exclude slavery from their limits, which fatal blow he assumed as in
evidence in an article in the Washington Union, published "by authority."
I ask by whose authority? He discovers a similar or identical provision
in the Lecompton Constitution. Made by whom? The framers of that
Constitution. Advocated by whom? By all the members of the party in the
nation, who advocated the introduction of Kansas into the Union under the
Lecompton Constitution. I have asked his attention to the evidence that
he arrayed to prove that such a fatal blow was being struck, and to the
facts which he brought forward in support of that charge,--being
identical with the one which he thinks so villainous in me. He pointed
it, not at a newspaper editor merely, but at the President and his
Cabinet and the members of Congress advocating the Lecompton Constitution
and those framing that instrument. I must again be permitted to remind
him that although my ipse dixit may not be as great as his, yet it
somewhat reduces the force of his calling my attention to the enormity of
my making a like charge against him.
Go on, Judge Douglas.
Mr. LINCOLN'S REJOINDER.
MY FRIENDS:--It will readily occur to you that I cannot, in half an hour,
notice all the things that so able a man as Judge Douglas can say in an
hour and a half; and I hope, therefore, if there be anything that he has
said upon which you would like to hear something from me, but which I
omit to comment upon, you will bear in mind that it would be expecting an
impossibility for me to go over his whole ground. I can but take up some
of the points that he has dwelt upon, and employ my half-hour specially
on them.
The first thing I have to say to you is a word in regard to Judge
Douglas's declaration about the "vulgarity and blackguardism" in the
audience, that no such thing, as he says, was shown by any Democrat while
I was speaking. Now, I only wish, by way of reply on this subject, to say
that while I was speaking, I used no "vulgarity or blackguardism" toward
any Democrat.
Now, my friends, I come to all this long portion of the Judge's
speech,--perhaps half of it,--which he has devoted to the various
resolutions and platforms that have been adopted in the different
counties in the different Congressional districts, and in the Illinois
legislature, which he supposes are at variance with the positions I have
assumed before you to-day. It is true that many of these resolutions are
at variance with the positions I have here assumed. All I have to ask is
that we talk reasonably and rationally about it. I happen to know, the
Judge's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, that I have never tried
to conceal my opinions, nor tried to deceive any one in reference to
them. He may go and examine all the members who voted for me for United
States Senator in 1855, after the election of 1854. They were pledged to
certain things here at home, and were determined to have pledges from me;
and if he will find any of these persons who will tell him anything
inconsistent with what I say now, I will resign, or rather retire from
the race, and give him no more trouble. The plain truth is this: At the
introduction of the Nebraska policy, we believed there was a new era
being introduced in the history of the Republic, which tended to the
spread and perpetuation of slavery. But in our opposition to that measure
we did not agree with one another in everything. The people in the north
end of the State were for stronger measures of opposition than we of the
central and southern portions of the State, but we were all opposed to
the Nebraska doctrine. We had that one feeling and that one sentiment in
common. You at the north end met in your conventions and passed your
resolutions. We in the middle of the State and farther south did not hold
such conventions and pass the same resolutions, although we had in
general a common view and a common sentiment. So that these meetings
which the Judge has alluded to, and the resolutions he has read from,
were local, and did not spread over the whole State. We at last met
together in 1886, from all parts of the State, and we agreed upon a
common platform. You, who held more extreme notions, either yielded those
notions, or, if not wholly yielding them, agreed to yield them
practically, for the sake of embodying the opposition to the measures
which the opposite party were pushing forward at that time. We met you
then, and if there was anything yielded, it was for practical purposes.
We agreed then upon a platform for the party throughout the entire State
of Illinois, and now we are all bound, as a party, to that platform.
And I say here to you, if any one expects of me--in case of my
election--that I will do anything not signified by our Republican
platform and my answers here to-day, I tell you very frankly that person
will be deceived. I do not ask for the vote of any one who supposes that
I have secret purposes or pledges that I dare not speak out. Cannot the
Judge be satisfied? If he fears, in the unfortunate case of my election,
that my going to Washington will enable me to advocate sentiments
contrary to those which I expressed when you voted for and elected me, I
assure him that his fears are wholly needless and groundless. Is the
Judge really afraid of any such thing? I'll tell you what he is afraid
of. He is afraid we'll all pull together. This is what alarms him more
than anything else. For my part, I do hope that all of us, entertaining a
common sentiment in opposition to what appears to us a design to
nationalize and perpetuate slavery, will waive minor differences on
questions which either belong to the dead past or the distant future, and
all pull together in this struggle. What are your sentiments? If it be
true that on the ground which I occupy--ground which I occupy as frankly
and boldly as Judge Douglas does his,--my views, though partly coinciding
with yours, are not as perfectly in accordance with your feelings as his
are, I do say to you in all candor, go for him, and not for me. I hope to
deal in all things fairly with Judge Douglas, and with the people of the
State, in this contest. And if I should never be elected to any office, I
trust I may go down with no stain of falsehood upon my reputation,
notwithstanding the hard opinions Judge Douglas chooses to entertain of
me.
The Judge has again addressed himself to the Abolition tendencies of a
speech of mine made at Springfield in June last. I have so often tried to
answer what he is always saying on that melancholy theme that I almost
turn with disgust from the discussion,--from the repetition of an answer
to it. I trust that nearly all of this intelligent audience have read
that speech. If you have, I may venture to leave it to you to inspect it
closely, and see whether it contains any of those "bugaboos" which
frighten Judge Douglas.
The Judge complains that I did not fully answer his questions. If I have
the sense to comprehend and answer those questions, I have done so
fairly. If it can be pointed out to me how I can more fully and fairly
answer him, I aver I have not the sense to see how it is to be done. He
says I do not declare I would in any event vote for the admission of a
slave State into the Union. If I have been fairly reported, he will see
that I did give an explicit answer to his interrogatories; I did not
merely say that I would dislike to be put to the test, but I said
clearly, if I were put to the test, and a Territory from which slavery
had been excluded should present herself with a State constitution
sanctioning slavery,--a most extraordinary thing, and wholly unlikely to
happen,--I did not see how I could avoid voting for her admission. But he
refuses to understand that I said so, and he wants this audience to
understand that I did not say so. Yet it will be so reported in the
printed speech that he cannot help seeing it.
He says if I should vote for the admission of a slave State I would be
voting for a dissolution of the Union, because I hold that the Union
cannot permanently exist half slave and half free. I repeat that I do not
believe this government can endure permanently half slave and half free;
yet I do not admit, nor does it at all follow, that the admission of a
single slave State will permanently fix the character and establish this
as a universal slave nation. The Judge is very happy indeed at working up
these quibbles. Before leaving the subject of answering questions, I aver
as my confident belief, when you come to see our speeches in print, that
you will find every question which he has asked me more fairly and boldly
and fully answered than he has answered those which I put to him. Is not
that so? The two speeches may be placed side by side, and I will venture
to leave it to impartial judges whether his questions have not been more
directly and circumstantially answered than mine.
Judge Douglas says he made a charge upon the editor of the Washington
Union, alone, of entertaining a purpose to rob the States of their power
to exclude slavery from their limits. I undertake to say, and I make the
direct issue, that he did not make his charge against the editor of the
Union alone. I will undertake to prove by the record here that he made
that charge against more and higher dignitaries than the editor of the
Washington Union. I am quite aware that he was shirking and dodging
around the form in which he put it, but I can make it manifest that he
leveled his "fatal blow" against more persons than this Washington
editor. Will he dodge it now by alleging that I am trying to defend Mr.
Buchanan against the charge? Not at all. Am I not making the same charge
myself? I am trying to show that you, Judge Douglas, are a witness on my
side. I am not defending Buchanan, and I will tell Judge Douglas that in
my opinion, when he made that charge, he had an eye farther north than he
has to-day. He was then fighting against people who called him a Black
Republican and an Abolitionist. It is mixed all through his speech, and
it is tolerably manifest that his eye was a great deal farther north than
it is to-day. The Judge says that though he made this charge, Toombs got
up and declared there was not a man in the United States, except the
editor of the Union, who was in favor of the doctrines put forth in that
article. And thereupon I understand that the Judge withdrew the charge.
Although he had taken extracts from the newspaper, and then from the
Lecompton Constitution, to show the existence of a conspiracy to bring
about a "fatal blow," by which the States were to be deprived of the
right of excluding slavery, it all went to pot as soon as Toombs got up
and told him it was not true. It reminds me of the story that John
Phoenix, the California railroad surveyor, tells. He says they started
out from the Plaza to the Mission of Dolores. They had two ways of
determining distances. One was by a chain and pins taken over the ground.
The other was by a "go-it-ometer,"--an invention of his own,--a
three-legged instrument, with which he computed a series of triangles
between the points. At night he turned to the chain-man to ascertain what
distance they had come, and found that by some mistake he had merely
dragged the chain over the ground, without keeping any record. By the
"go-it-ometer," he found he had made ten miles. Being skeptical about
this, he asked a drayman who was passing how far it was to the Plaza. The
drayman replied it was just half a mile; and the surveyor put it down in
his book,--just as Judge Douglas says, after he had made his calculations
and computations, he took Toombs's statement. I have no doubt that after
Judge Douglas had made his charge, he was as easily satisfied about its
truth as the surveyor was of the drayman's statement of the distance to
the Plaza. Yet it is a fact that the man who put forth all that matter
which Douglas deemed a "fatal blow" at State sovereignty was elected by
the Democrats as public printer.
Now, gentlemen, you may take Judge Douglas's speech of March 22, 1858,
beginning about the middle of page 21, and reading to the bottom of page
24, and you will find the evidence on which I say that he did not make
his charge against the editor of the Union alone. I cannot stop to read
it, but I will give it to the reporters. Judge Douglas said:
"Mr. President, you here find several distinct propositions advanced
boldly by the Washington Union editorially, and apparently
authoritatively, and every man who questions any of them is denounced as
an Abolitionist, a Free-soiler, a fanatic. The propositions are, first,
that the primary object of all government at its original institution is
the protection of persons and property; second, that the Constitution of
the United States declares that the citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States; and that, therefore, thirdly, all State laws, whether organic or
otherwise, which prohibit the citizens of one State from settling in
another with their slave property, and especially declaring it forfeited,
are direct violations of the original intention of the Government and
Constitution of the United States; and, fourth, that the emancipation of
the slaves of the Northern States was a gross outrage on the rights of
property, in as much as it was involuntarily done on the part of the
owner.
"Remember that this article was published in the Union on the 17th of
November, and on the 18th appeared the first article giving the adhesion
of the Union to the Lecompton Constitution. It was in these words:
"'KANSAS AND HER CONSTITUTION.--The vexed question is settled. The
problem is solved. The dead point of danger is passed. All serious
trouble to Kansas affairs is over and gone...."
"And a column, nearly, of the same sort. Then, when you come to look into
the Lecompton Constitution, you find the same doctrine incorporated in it
which was put forth editorially in the Union. What is it?
"'ARTICLE 7, Section i. The right of property is before and higher than
any constitutional sanction; and the right of the owner of a slave to
such slave and its increase is the same and as invariable as the right of
the owner of any property whatever.'
"Then in the schedule is a provision that the Constitution may be amended
after 1864 by a two-thirds vote.
"'But no alteration shall be made to affect the right of property in the
ownership of slaves.'
"It will be seen by these clauses in the Lecompton Constitution that they
are identical in spirit with this authoritative article in the Washington
Union of the day previous to its indorsement of this Constitution.
"When I saw that article in the Union of the 17th of November, followed
by the glorification of the Lecompton Constitution on the 18th of
November, and this clause in the Constitution asserting the doctrine that
a State has no right to prohibit slavery within its limits, I saw that
there was a fatal blow being struck at the sovereignty of the States of
this Union."
Here he says, "Mr. President, you here find several distinct propositions
advanced boldly, and apparently authoritatively." By whose authority,
Judge Douglas? Again, he says in another place, "It will be seen by these
clauses in the Lecompton Constitution that they are identical in spirit
with this authoritative article." By whose authority,--who do you mean to
say authorized the publication of these articles? He knows that the
Washington Union is considered the organ of the Administration. I demand
of Judge Douglas by whose authority he meant to say those articles were
published, if not by the authority of the President of the United States
and his Cabinet? I defy him to show whom he referred to, if not to these
high functionaries in the Federal Government. More than this, he says the
articles in that paper and the provisions of the Lecompton Constitution
are "identical," and, being identical, he argues that the authors are
co-operating and conspiring together. He does not use the word
"conspiring," but what other construction can you put upon it? He winds
up:
"When I saw that article in the Union of the 17th of November, followed
by the glorification of the Lecompton Constitution on the 18th of
November, and this clause in the Constitution asserting the doctrine that
a State has no right to prohibit slavery within its limits, I saw that
there was a fatal blow being struck at the sovereignty of the States of
this Union."
I ask him if all this fuss was made over the editor of this newspaper. It
would be a terribly "fatal blow" indeed which a single man could strike,
when no President, no Cabinet officer, no member of Congress, was giving
strength and efficiency to the movement. Out of respect to Judge
Douglas's good sense I must believe he did n't manufacture his idea of
the "fatal" character of that blow out of such a miserable scapegrace as
he represents that editor to be. But the Judge's eye is farther south
now. Then, it was very peculiarly and decidedly north. His hope rested on
the idea of visiting the great "Black Republican" party, and making it
the tail of his new kite. He knows he was then expecting from day to day
to turn Republican, and place himself at the head of our organization. He
has found that these despised "Black Republicans" estimate him by a
standard which he has taught them none too well. Hence he is crawling
back into his old camp, and you will find him eventually installed in
full fellowship among those whom he was then battling, and with whom he
now pretends to be at such fearful variance.