Speeches of Abraham Lincoln 1859 - Speech At Columbus, Ohio
by Abraham Lincoln
SEPTEMBER 16, 1859.
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF OHIO: I cannot fail to remember that I
appear for the first time before an audience in this now great State,--an
audience that is accustomed to hear such speakers as Corwin, and Chase,
and Wade, and many other renowned men; and, remembering this, I feel that
it will be well for you, as for me, that you should not raise your
expectations to that standard to which you would have been justified in
raising them had one of these distinguished men appeared before you. You
would perhaps be only preparing a disappointment for yourselves, and, as
a consequence of your disappointment, mortification to me. I hope,
therefore, that you will commence with very moderate expectations; and
perhaps, if you will give me your attention, I shall be able to interest
you to a moderate degree.
Appearing here for the first time in my life, I have been somewhat
embarrassed for a topic by way of introduction to my speech; but I have
been relieved from that embarrassment by an introduction which the Ohio
Statesman newspaper gave me this morning. In this paper I have read an
article, in which, among other statements, I find the following:
"In debating with Senator Douglas during the memorable contest of last
fall, Mr. Lincoln declared in favor of negro suffrage, and attempted to
defend that vile conception against the Little Giant."
I mention this now, at the opening of my remarks, for the purpose of
making three comments upon it. The first I have already announced,--it
furnishes me an introductory topic; the second is to show that the
gentleman is mistaken; thirdly, to give him an opportunity to correct it.
In the first place, in regard to this matter being a mistake. I have
found that it is not entirely safe, when one is misrepresented under his
very nose, to allow the misrepresentation to go uncontradicted. I
therefore propose, here at the outset, not only to say that this is a
misrepresentation, but to show conclusively that it is so; and you will
bear with me while I read a couple of extracts from that very "memorable"
debate with Judge Douglas last year, to which this newspaper refers. In
the first pitched battle which Senator Douglas and myself had, at the
town of Ottawa, I used the language which I will now read. Having been
previously reading an extract, I continued as follows:
"Now, gentlemen, I don't want to read at any greater length, but this is
the true complexion of all I have ever said in regard to the institution
of slavery and the black race. This is the whole of it; and anything that
argues me into his idea of perfect social and political equality with the
negro, is but a specious and fantastic arrangement of words, by which a
man can prove a horse-chestnut to be a chestnut horse. I will say here,
while upon this subject, that I have no purpose directly or indirectly to
interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists.
I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to
do so. I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality
between the white and the black races. There is a physical difference
between the two which, in my judgment, will probably forbid their ever
living together upon the footing of perfect equality; and inasmuch as it
becomes a necessity that there must be a difference, I, as well as Judge
Douglas, am in favor of the race to which I belong having the superior
position. I have never said anything to the contrary, but I hold that,
notwithstanding all this, there is no reason in the world why the negro
is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration
of Independence,--the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness. I hold that he is as much entitled to these as the white man.
I agree with judge Douglas, he is not my equal in many respects,
--certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or intellectual
endowments. But in the right to eat the bread, without leave of anybody
else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal, and the equal of Judge
Douglas, and the equal of every living man."
Upon a subsequent occasion, when the reason for making a statement like
this occurred, I said:
"While I was at the hotel to-day an elderly gentleman called upon me to
know whether I was really in favor of producing perfect equality between
the negroes and white people. While I had not proposed to myself on this
occasion to say much on that subject, yet, as the question was asked me,
I thought I would occupy perhaps five minutes in saying something in
regard to it. I will say, then, that I am not, nor ever have been, in
favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of
the white and black races; that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of
making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold
office, or intermarry with the white people; and I will say in addition
to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black
races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together
on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they can not
so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of
superior and inferior, and I, as much as any other man, am in favor of
having the superior position assigned to the white race. I say upon this
occasion I do not perceive that because the white man is to have the
superior position, the negro should be denied everything. I do not
understand that because I do not want a negro woman for a slave, I must
necessarily want her for a wife. My understanding is that I can just let
her alone. I am now in my fiftieth year, and I certainly never have had a
black woman for either a slave or a wife. So it seems to me quite
possible for us to get along without making either slaves or wives of
negroes. I will add to this that I have never seen, to my knowledge, a
man, woman, or child, who was in favor of producing perfect equality,
social and political, between negroes and white men. I recollect of but
one distinguished instance that I ever heard of so frequently as to be
satisfied of its correctness, and that is the case of Judge Douglas's old
friend Colonel Richard M. Johnson. I will also add to the remarks I have
made (for I am not going to enter at large upon this subject), that I
have never had the least apprehension that I or my friends would marry
negroes, if there was no law to keep them from it; but as judge Douglas
and his friends seem to be in great apprehension that they might, if
there were no law to keep them from it, I give him the most solemn pledge
that I will to the very last stand by the law of the State which forbids
the marrying of white people with negroes."
There, my friends, you have briefly what I have, upon former occasions,
said upon this subject to which this newspaper, to the extent of its
ability, has drawn the public attention. In it you not only perceive, as
a probability, that in that contest I did not at any time say I was in
favor of negro suffrage, but the absolute proof that twice--once
substantially, and once expressly--I declared against it. Having shown
you this, there remains but a word of comment upon that newspaper
article. It is this, that I presume the editor of that paper is an honest
and truth-loving man, and that he will be greatly obliged to me for
furnishing him thus early an opportunity to correct the misrepresentation
he has made, before it has run so long that malicious people can call him
a liar.
The Giant himself has been here recently. I have seen a brief report of
his speech. If it were otherwise unpleasant to me to introduce the
subject of the negro as a topic for discussion, I might be somewhat
relieved by the fact that he dealt exclusively in that subject while he
was here. I shall, therefore, without much hesitation or diffidence,
enter upon this subject.
The American people, on the first day of January, 1854, found the African
slave trade prohibited by a law of Congress. In a majority of the States
of this Union, they found African slavery, or any other sort of slavery,
prohibited by State constitutions. They also found a law existing,
supposed to be valid, by which slavery was excluded from almost all the
territory the United States then owned. This was the condition of the
country, with reference to the institution of slavery, on the first of
January, 1854. A few days after that, a bill was introduced into
Congress, which ran through its regular course in the two branches of the
national legislature, and finally passed into a law in the month of May,
by which the Act of Congress prohibiting slavery from going into the
Territories of the United States was repealed. In connection with the law
itself, and, in fact, in the terms of the law, the then existing
prohibition was not only repealed, but there was a declaration of a
purpose on the part of Congress never thereafter to exercise any power
that they might have, real or supposed, to prohibit the extension or
spread of slavery. This was a very great change; for the law thus
repealed was of more than thirty years' standing. Following rapidly upon
the heels of this action of Congress, a decision of the Supreme Court is
made, by which it is declared that Congress, if it desires to prohibit
the spread of slavery into the Territories, has no constitutional power
to do so. Not only so, but that decision lays down principles which, if
pushed to their logical conclusion,--I say pushed to their logical
conclusion,--would decide that the constitutions of free States,
forbidding slavery, are themselves unconstitutional. Mark me, I do not
say the judges said this, and let no man say I affirm the judges used
these words; but I only say it is my opinion that what they did say, if
pressed to its logical conclusion, will inevitably result thus.
Looking at these things, the Republican party, as I understand its
principles and policy, believes that there is great danger of the
institution of slavery being spread out and extended until it is
ultimately made alike lawful in all the States of this Union; so
believing, to prevent that incidental and ultimate consummation is the
original and chief purpose of the Republican organization. I say "chief
purpose" of the Republican organization; for it is certainly true that if
the National House shall fall into the hands of the Republicans, they
will have to attend to all the other matters of national house-keeping,
as well as this. The chief and real purpose of the Republican party is
eminently conservative. It proposes nothing save and except to restore
this government to its original tone in regard to this element of
slavery, and there to maintain it, looking for no further change in
reference to it than that which the original framers of the Government
themselves expected and looked forward to.
The chief danger to this purpose of the Republican party is not just now
the revival of the African slave trade, or the passage of a Congressional
slave code, or the declaring of a second Dred Scott decision, making
slavery lawful in all the States. These are not pressing us just now.
They are not quite ready yet. The authors of these measures know that we
are too strong for them; but they will be upon us in due time, and we
will be grappling with them hand to hand, if they are not now headed off.
They are not now the chief danger to the purpose of the Republican
organization; but the most imminent danger that now threatens that
purpose is that insidious Douglas popular sovereignty. This is the miner
and sapper. While it does not propose to revive the African slave trade,
nor to pass a slave code, nor to make a second Dred Scott decision, it is
preparing us for the onslaught and charge of these ultimate enemies when
they shall be ready to come on, and the word of command for them to
advance shall be given. I say this "Douglas popular sovereignty"; for
there is a broad distinction, as I now understand it, between that
article and a genuine popular sovereignty.
I believe there is a genuine popular sovereignty. I think a definition of
"genuine popular sovereignty," in the abstract, would be about this: That
each man shall do precisely as he pleases with himself, and with all
those things which exclusively concern him. Applied to government, this
principle would be, that a general government shall do all those things
which pertain to it, and all the local governments shall do precisely as
they please in respect to those matters which exclusively concern them. I
understand that this government of the United States, under which we
live, is based upon this principle; and I am misunderstood if it is
supposed that I have any war to make upon that principle.
Now, what is judge Douglas's popular sovereignty? It is, as a principle,
no other than that if one man chooses to make a slave of another man
neither that other man nor anybody else has a right to object. Applied in
government, as he seeks to apply it, it is this: If, in a new Territory
into which a few people are beginning to enter for the purpose of making
their homes, they choose to either exclude slavery from their limits or
to establish it there, however one or the other may affect the persons to
be enslaved, or the infinitely greater number of persons who are
afterwards to inhabit that Territory, or the other members of the
families of communities, of which they are but an incipient member, or
the general head of the family of States as parent of all, however their
action may affect one or the other of these, there is no power or right
to interfere. That is Douglas's popular sovereignty applied.
He has a good deal of trouble with popular sovereignty. His explanations
explanatory of explanations explained are interminable. The most lengthy,
and, as I suppose, the most maturely considered of this long series of
explanations is his great essay in Harper's Magazine. I will not attempt
to enter on any very thorough investigation of his argument as there made
and presented. I will nevertheless occupy a good portion of your time
here in drawing your attention to certain points in it. Such of you as
may have read this document will have perceived that the judge early in
the document quotes from two persons as belonging to the Republican
party, without naming them, but who can readily be recognized as being
Governor Seward of New York and myself. It is true that exactly fifteen
months ago this day, I believe, I for the first time expressed a
sentiment upon this subject, and in such a manner that it should get into
print, that the public might see it beyond the circle of my hearers; and
my expression of it at that time is the quotation that Judge Douglas
makes. He has not made the quotation with accuracy, but justice to him
requires me to say that it is sufficiently accurate not to change the
sense.
The sense of that quotation condensed is this: that this slavery element
is a durable element of discord among us, and that we shall probably not
have perfect peace in this country with it until it either masters the
free principle in our government, or is so far mastered by the free
principle as for the public mind to rest in the belief that it is going
to its end. This sentiment, which I now express in this way, was, at no
great distance of time, perhaps in different language, and in connection
with some collateral ideas, expressed by Governor Seward. Judge Douglas
has been so much annoyed by the expression of that sentiment that he has
constantly, I believe, in almost all his speeches since it was uttered,
been referring to it. I find he alluded to it in his speech here, as well
as in the copyright essay. I do not now enter upon this for the purpose
of making an elaborate argument to show that we were right in the
expression of that sentiment. In other words, I shall not stop to say all
that might properly be said upon this point, but I only ask your
attention to it for the purpose of making one or two points upon it.
If you will read the copyright essay, you will discover that judge
Douglas himself says a controversy between the American Colonies and the
Government of Great Britain began on the slavery question in 1699, and
continued from that time until the Revolution; and, while he did not say
so, we all know that it has continued with more or less violence ever
since the Revolution.
Then we need not appeal to history, to the declarations of the framers of
the government, but we know from judge Douglas himself that slavery began
to be an element of discord among the white people of this country as far
back as 1699, or one hundred and sixty years ago, or five generations of
men,--counting thirty years to a generation. Now, it would seem to me
that it might have occurred to Judge Douglas, or anybody who had turned
his attention to these facts, that there was something in the nature of
that thing, slavery, somewhat durable for mischief and discord.
There is another point I desire to make in regard to this matter, before
I leave it. From the adoption of the Constitution down to 1820 is the
precise period of our history when we had comparative peace upon this
question,--the precise period of time when we came nearer to having peace
about it than any other time of that entire one hundred and sixty years
in which he says it began, or of the eighty years of our own
Constitution. Then it would be worth our while to stop and examine into
the probable reason of our coming nearer to having peace then than at any
other time. This was the precise period of time in which our fathers
adopted, and during which they followed, a policy restricting the spread
of slavery, and the whole Union was acquiescing in it. The whole country
looked forward to the ultimate extinction of the institution. It was when
a policy had been adopted, and was prevailing, which led all just and
right-minded men to suppose that slavery was gradually coming to an end,
and that they might be quiet about it, watching it as it expired. I think
Judge Douglas might have perceived that too; and whether he did or not,
it is worth the attention of fair-minded men, here and elsewhere, to
consider whether that is not the truth of the case. If he had looked at
these two facts,--that this matter has been an element of discord for one
hundred and sixty years among this people, and that the only comparative
peace we have had about it was when that policy prevailed in this
government which he now wars upon, he might then, perhaps, have been
brought to a more just appreciation of what I said fifteen months
ago,--that "a house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe that
this government cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free. I do
not expect the house to fall, I do not expect the Union to dissolve; but
I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or
all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further
spread of it, and place it where the public mind will rest in the belief
that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will
push it forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old
as well as new, North as well as South." That was my sentiment at that
time. In connection with it, I said: "We are now far into the fifth year
since a policy was inaugurated with the avowed object and confident
promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of
the policy that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly
augmented." I now say to you here that we are advanced still farther into
the sixth year since that policy of Judge Douglas--that popular
sovereignty of his--for quieting the slavery question was made the
national policy. Fifteen months more have been added since I uttered that
sentiment; and I call upon you and all other right-minded men to say
whether that fifteen months have belied or corroborated my words.
While I am here upon this subject, I cannot but express gratitude that
this true view of this element of discord among us--as I believe it
is--is attracting more and more attention. I do not believe that Governor
Seward uttered that sentiment because I had done so before, but because
he reflected upon this subject and saw the truth of it. Nor do I believe
because Governor Seward or I uttered it that Mr. Hickman of Pennsylvania,
in, different language, since that time, has declared his belief in the
utter antagonism which exists between the principles of liberty and
slavery. You see we are multiplying. Now, while I am speaking of Hickman,
let me say, I know but little about him. I have never seen him, and know
scarcely anything about the man; but I will say this much of him: Of all
the anti-Lecompton Democracy that have been brought to my notice, he
alone has the true, genuine ring of the metal. And now, without indorsing
anything else he has said, I will ask this audience to give three cheers
for Hickman. [The audience responded with three rousing cheers for
Hickman.]
Another point in the copyright essay to which I would ask your attention
is rather a feature to be extracted from the whole thing, than from any
express declaration of it at any point. It is a general feature of that
document, and, indeed, of all of Judge Douglas's discussions of this
question, that the Territories of the United States and the States of
this Union are exactly alike; that there is no difference between them at
all; that the Constitution applies to the Territories precisely as it
does to the States; and that the United States Government, under the
Constitution, may not do in a State what it may not do in a Territory,
and what it must do in a State it must do in a Territory. Gentlemen, is
that a true view of the case? It is necessary for this squatter
sovereignty, but is it true?
Let us consider. What does it depend upon? It depends altogether upon the
proposition that the States must, without the interference of the General
Government, do all those things that pertain exclusively to
themselves,--that are local in their nature, that have no connection with
the General Government. After Judge Douglas has established this
proposition, which nobody disputes or ever has disputed, he proceeds to
assume, without proving it, that slavery is one of those little,
unimportant, trivial matters which are of just about as much consequence
as the question would be to me whether my neighbor should raise horned
cattle or plant tobacco; that there is no moral question about it, but
that it is altogether a matter of dollars and cents; that when a new
Territory is opened for settlement, the first man who goes into it may
plant there a thing which, like the Canada thistle or some other of those
pests of the soil, cannot be dug out by the millions of men who will come
thereafter; that it is one of those little things that is so trivial in
its nature that it has nor effect upon anybody save the few men who first
plant upon the soil; that it is not a thing which in any way affects the
family of communities composing these States, nor any way endangers the
General Government. Judge Douglas ignores altogether the very well known
fact that we have never had a serious menace to our political existence,
except it sprang from this thing, which he chooses to regard as only upon
a par with onions and potatoes.
Turn it, and contemplate it in another view. He says that, according to
his popular sovereignty, the General Government may give to the
Territories governors, judges, marshals, secretaries, and all the other
chief men to govern them, but they, must not touch upon this other
question. Why? The question of who shall be governor of a Territory for a
year or two, and pass away, without his track being left upon the soil,
or an act which he did for good or for evil being left behind, is a
question of vast national magnitude; it is so much opposed in its nature
to locality that the nation itself must decide it: while this other
matter of planting slavery upon a soil,--a thing which, once planted,
cannot be eradicated by the succeeding millions who have as much right
there as the first comers, or, if eradicated, not without infinite
difficulty and a long struggle, he considers the power to prohibit it as
one of these little local, trivial things that the nation ought not to
say a word about; that it affects nobody save the few men who are there.
Take these two things and consider them together, present the question of
planting a State with the institution of slavery by the side of a
question who shall be Governor of Kansas for a year or two, and is there
a man here, is there a man on earth, who would not say the governor
question is the little one, and the slavery question is the great one? I
ask any honest Democrat if the small, the local, and the trivial and
temporary question is not, Who shall be governor? while the durable, the
important, and the mischievous one is, Shall this soil be planted with
slavery?
This is an idea, I suppose, which has arisen in Judge Douglas's mind from
his peculiar structure. I suppose the institution of slavery really looks
small to him. He is so put up by nature that a lash upon his back would
hurt him, but a lash upon anybody else's back does not hurt him. That is
the build of the man, and consequently he looks upon the matter of
slavery in this unimportant light.
Judge Douglas ought to remember, when he is endeavoring to force this
policy upon the American people, that while he is put up in that way, a
good many are not. He ought to remember that there was once in this
country a man by the name of Thomas Jefferson, supposed to be a
Democrat,--a man whose principles and policy are not very prevalent
amongst Democrats to-day, it is true; but that man did not take exactly
this view of the insignificance of the element of slavery which our
friend judge Douglas does. In contemplation of this thing, we all know he
was led to exclaim, "I tremble for my country when I remember that God is
just!" We know how he looked upon it when he thus expressed himself.
There was danger to this country,--danger of the avenging justice of God,
in that little unimportant popular sovereignty question of judge Douglas.
He supposed there was a question of God's eternal justice wrapped up in
the enslaving of any race of men, or any man, and that those who did so
braved the arm of Jehovah; that when a nation thus dared the Almighty,
every friend of that nation had cause to dread his wrath. Choose ye
between Jefferson and Douglas as to what is the true view of this element
among us.
There is another little difficulty about this matter of treating the
Territories and States alike in all things, to which I ask your
attention, and I shall leave this branch of the case. If there is no
difference between them, why not make the Territories States at once?
What is the reason that Kansas was not fit to come into the Union when it
was organized into a Territory, in Judge Douglas's view? Can any of you
tell any reason why it should not have come into the Union at once? They
are fit, as he thinks, to decide upon the slavery question,--the largest
and most important with which they could possibly deal: what could they
do by coming into the Union that they are not fit to do, according to his
view, by staying out of it? Oh, they are not fit to sit in Congress and
decide upon the rates of postage, or questions of ad valorem or specific
duties on foreign goods, or live-oak timber contracts, they are not fit
to decide these vastly important matters, which are national in their
import, but they are fit, "from the jump," to decide this little negro
question. But, gentlemen, the case is too plain; I occupy too much time
on this head, and I pass on.
Near the close of the copyright essay, the judge, I think, comes very
near kicking his own fat into the fire. I did not think, when I commenced
these remarks, that I would read that article, but I now believe I will:
"This exposition of the history of these measures shows conclusively that
the authors of the Compromise measures of 1850 and of the Kansas-Nebraska
Act of 1854, as well as the members of the Continental Congress of 1774.,
and the founders of our system of government subsequent to the
Revolution, regarded the people of the Territories and Colonies as
political communities which were entitled to a free and exclusive power
of legislation in their provisional legislatures, where their
representation could alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and
internal polity."
When the judge saw that putting in the word "slavery" would contradict
his own history, he put in what he knew would pass synonymous with it,
"internal polity." Whenever we find that in one of his speeches, the
substitute is used in this manner; and I can tell you the reason. It
would be too bald a contradiction to say slavery; but "internal polity"
is a general phrase, which would pass in some quarters, and which he
hopes will pass with the reading community for the same thing.
"This right pertains to the people collectively, as a law-abiding and
peaceful community, and not in the isolated individuals who may wander
upon the public domain in violation of the law. It can only be exercised
where there are inhabitants sufficient to constitute a government, and
capable of performing its various functions and duties,--a fact to be
ascertained and determined by" who do you think? Judge Douglas says "by
Congress!" "Whether the number shall be fixed at ten, fifteen or twenty
thousand inhabitants, does not affect the principle."
Now, I have only a few comments to make. Popular sovereignty, by his own
words, does not pertain to the few persons who wander upon the public
domain in violation of law. We have his words for that. When it does
pertain to them, is when they are sufficient to be formed into an
organized political community, and he fixes the minimum for that at ten
thousand, and the maximum at twenty thousand. Now, I would like to know
what is to be done with the nine thousand? Are they all to be treated,
until they are large enough to be organized into a political community,
as wanderers upon the public land, in violation of law? And if so treated
and driven out, at what point of time would there ever be ten thousand?
If they were not driven out, but remained there as trespassers upon the
public land in violation of the law, can they establish slavery there?
No; the judge says popular sovereignty don't pertain to them then. Can
they exclude it then? No; popular sovereignty don't pertain to them then.
I would like to know, in the case covered by the essay, what condition
the people of the Territory are in before they reach the number of ten
thousand?
But the main point I wish to ask attention to is, that the question as to
when they shall have reached a sufficient number to be formed into a
regular organized community is to be decided "by Congress." Judge Douglas
says so. Well, gentlemen, that is about all we want. No, that is all the
Southerners want. That is what all those who are for slavery want. They
do not want Congress to prohibit slavery from coming into the new
Territories, and they do not want popular sovereignty to hinder it; and
as Congress is to say when they are ready to be organized, all that the
South has to do is to get Congress to hold off. Let Congress hold off
until they are ready to be admitted as a State, and the South has all it
wants in taking slavery into and planting it in all the Territories that
we now have or hereafter may have. In a word, the whole thing, at a dash
of the pen, is at last put in the power of Congress; for if they do not
have this popular sovereignty until Congress organizes them, I ask if it
at last does not come from Congress? If, at last, it amounts to anything
at all, Congress gives it to them. I submit this rather for your
reflection than for comment. After all that is said, at last, by a dash
of the pen, everything that has gone before is undone, and he puts the
whole question under the control of Congress. After fighting through more
than three hours, if you undertake to read it, he at last places the
whole matter under the control of that power which he has been contending
against, and arrives at a result directly contrary to what he had been
laboring to do. He at last leaves the whole matter to the control of
Congress.
There are two main objects, as I understand it, of this Harper's Magazine
essay. One was to show, if possible, that the men of our Revolutionary
times were in favor of his popular sovereignty, and the other was to show
that the Dred Scott decision had not entirely squelched out this popular
sovereignty. I do not propose, in regard to this argument drawn from the
history of former times, to enter into a detailed examination of the
historical statements he has made. I have the impression that they are
inaccurate in a great many instances,--sometimes in positive statement,
but very much more inaccurate by the suppression of statements that
really belong to the history. But I do not propose to affirm that this is
so to any very great extent, or to enter into a very minute examination
of his historical statements. I avoid doing so upon this principle,--that
if it were important for me to pass out of this lot in the least period
of time possible, and I came to that fence, and saw by a calculation of
my known strength and agility that I could clear it at a bound, it would
be folly for me to stop and consider whether I could or not crawl through
a crack. So I say of the whole history contained in his essay where he
endeavored to link the men of the Revolution to popular sovereignty. It
only requires an effort to leap out of it, a single bound to be entirely
successful. If you read it over, you will find that he quotes here and
there from documents of the Revolutionary times, tending to show that the
people of the colonies were desirous of regulating their own concerns in
their own way, that the British Government should not interfere; that at
one time they struggled with the British Government to be permitted to
exclude the African slave trade,--if not directly, to be permitted to
exclude it indirectly, by taxation sufficient to discourage and destroy
it. From these and many things of this sort, judge Douglas argues that
they were in favor of the people of our own Territories excluding slavery
if they wanted to, or planting it there if they wanted to, doing just as
they pleased from the time they settled upon the Territory. Now, however
his history may apply and whatever of his argument there may be that is
sound and accurate or unsound and inaccurate, if we can find out what
these men did themselves do upon this very question of slavery in the
Territories, does it not end the whole thing? If, after all this labor
and effort to show that the men of the Revolution were in favor of his
popular sovereignty and his mode of dealing with slavery in the
Territories, we can show that these very men took hold of that subject,
and dealt with it, we can see for ourselves how they dealt with it. It is
not a matter of argument or inference, but we know what they thought
about it.
It is precisely upon that part of the history of the country that one
important omission is made by Judge Douglas. He selects parts of the
history of the United States upon the subject of slavery, and treats it
as the whole, omitting from his historical sketch the legislation of
Congress in regard to the admission of Missouri, by which the Missouri
Compromise was established and slavery excluded from a country half as
large as the present United States. All this is left out of his history,
and in nowise alluded to by him, so far as I can remember, save once,
when he makes a remark, that upon his principle the Supreme Court were
authorized to pronounce a decision that the act called the Missouri
Compromise was unconstitutional. All that history has been left out. But
this part of the history of the country was not made by the men of the
Revolution.
There was another part of our political history, made by the very men who
were the actors in the Revolution, which has taken the name of the
Ordinance of '87. Let me bring that history to your attention. In 1784, I
believe, this same Mr. Jefferson drew up an ordinance for the government
of the country upon which we now stand, or, rather, a frame or draft of
an ordinance for the government of this country, here in Ohio, our
neighbors in Indiana, us who live in Illinois, our neighbors in Wisconsin
and Michigan. In that ordinance, drawn up not only for the government of
that Territory, but for the Territories south of the Ohio River, Mr.
Jefferson expressly provided for the prohibition of slavery. Judge
Douglas says, and perhaps is right, that that provision was lost from
that ordinance. I believe that is true. When the vote was taken upon it,
a majority of all present in the Congress of the Confederation voted for
it; but there were so many absentees that those voting for it did not
make the clear majority necessary, and it was lost. But three years after
that, the Congress of the Confederation were together again, and they
adopted a new ordinance for the government of this Northwest Territory,
not contemplating territory south of the river, for the States owning
that territory had hitherto refrained from giving it to the General
Government; hence they made the ordinance to apply only to what the
Government owned. In fact, the provision excluding slavery was inserted
aside, passed unanimously, or at any rate it passed and became a part of
the law of the land. Under that ordinance we live. First here in Ohio you
were a Territory; then an enabling act was passed, authorizing you to
form a constitution and State Government, provided it was republican and
not in conflict with the Ordinance of '87. When you framed your
constitution and presented it for admission, I think you will find the
legislation upon the subject will show that, whereas you had formed a
constitution that was republican, and not in conflict with the Ordinance
of '87, therefore you were admitted upon equal footing with the original
States. The same process in a few years was gone through with in Indiana,
and so with Illinois, and the same substantially with Michigan and
Wisconsin.
Not only did that Ordinance prevail, but it was constantly looked to
whenever a step was taken by a new Territory to become a State. Congress
always turned their attention to it, and in all their movements upon this
subject they traced their course by that Ordinance of '87. When they
admitted new States, they advertised them of this Ordinance, as a part of
the legislation of the country. They did so because they had traced the
Ordinance of '87 throughout the history of this country. Begin with the
men of the Revolution, and go down for sixty entire years, and until the
last scrap of that Territory comes into the Union in the form of the
State of Wisconsin, everything was made to conform with the Ordinance of
'87, excluding slavery from that vast extent of country.
I omitted to mention in the right place that the Constitution of the
United States was in process of being framed when that Ordinance was made
by the Congress of the Confederation; and one of the first Acts of
Congress itself, under the new Constitution itself, was to give force to
that Ordinance by putting power to carry it out in the hands of the new
officers under the Constitution, in the place of the old ones, who had
been legislated out of existence by the change in the Government from the
Confederation to the Constitution. Not only so, but I believe Indiana
once or twice, if not Ohio, petitioned the General Government for the
privilege of suspending that provision and allowing them to have slaves.
A report made by Mr. Randolph, of Virginia, himself a slaveholder, was
directly against it, and the action was to refuse them the privilege of
violating the Ordinance of '87.
This period of history, which I have run over briefly, is, I presume, as
familiar to most of this assembly as any other part of the history of our
country. I suppose that few of my hearers are not as familiar with that
part of history as I am, and I only mention it to recall your attention
to it at this time. And hence I ask how extraordinary a thing it is that
a man who has occupied a position upon the floor of the Senate of the
United States, who is now in his third term, and who looks to see the
government of this whole country fall into his own hands, pretending to
give a truthful and accurate history o the slavery question in this
country, should so entirely ignore the whole of that portion of our
history--the most important of all. Is it not a most extraordinary
spectacle that a man should stand up and ask for any confidence in his
statements who sets out as he does with portions of history, calling upon
the people to believe that it is a true and fair representation, when the
leading part and controlling feature of the whole history is carefully
suppressed?
But the mere leaving out is not the most remarkable feature of this most
remarkable essay. His proposition is to establish that the leading men of
the Revolution were for his great principle of nonintervention by the
government in the question of slavery in the Territories, while history
shows that they decided, in the cases actually brought before them, in
exactly the contrary way, and he knows it. Not only did they so decide at
that time, but they stuck to it during sixty years, through thick and
thin, as long as there was one of the Revolutionary heroes upon the stage
of political action. Through their whole course, from first to last, they
clung to freedom. And now he asks the community to believe that the men
of the Revolution were in favor of his great principle, when we have the
naked history that they themselves dealt with this very subject matter of
his principle, and utterly repudiated his principle, acting upon a
precisely contrary ground. It is as impudent and absurd as if a
prosecuting attorney should stand up before a jury and ask them to
convict A as the murderer of B, while B was walking alive before them.
I say, again, if judge Douglas asserts that the men of the Revolution
acted upon principles by which, to be consistent with themselves, they
ought to have adopted his popular sovereignty, then, upon a consideration
of his own argument, he had a right to make you believe that they
understood the principles of government, but misapplied them, that he has
arisen to enlighten the world as to the just application of this
principle. He has a right to try to persuade you that he understands
their principles better than they did, and, therefore, he will apply them
now, not as they did, but as they ought to have done. He has a right to
go before the community and try to convince them of this, but he has no
right to attempt to impose upon any one the belief that these men
themselves approved of his great principle. There are two ways of
establishing a proposition. One is by trying to demonstrate it upon
reason, and the other is, to show that great men in former times have
thought so and so, and thus to pass it by the weight of pure authority.
Now, if Judge Douglas will demonstrate somehow that this is popular
sovereignty,--the right of one man to make a slave of another, without
any right in that other or any one else to object,--demonstrate it as
Euclid demonstrated propositions,--there is no objection. But when he
comes forward, seeking to carry a principle by bringing to it the
authority of men who themselves utterly repudiate that principle, I ask
that he shall not be permitted to do it.
I see, in the judge's speech here, a short sentence in these words: "Our
fathers, when they formed this government under which we live, understood
this question just as well, and even better than, we do now." That is
true; I stick to that. I will stand by Judge Douglas in that to the
bitter end. And now, Judge Douglas, come and stand by me, and truthfully
show how they acted, understanding it better than we do. All I ask of
you, Judge Douglas, is to stick to the proposition that the men of the
Revolution understood this subject better than we do now, and with that
better understanding they acted better than you are trying to act now.
I wish to say something now in regard to the Dred Scott decision, as
dealt with by Judge Douglas. In that "memorable debate" between Judge
Douglas and myself, last year, the judge thought fit to commence a
process of catechising me, and at Freeport I answered his questions, and
propounded some to him. Among others propounded to him was one that I
have here now. The substance, as I remember it, is, "Can the people of a
United States Territory, under the Dred Scott decision, in any lawful
way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude
slavery from its limits, prior to the formation of a State constitution?"
He answered that they could lawfully exclude slavery from the United
States Territories, notwithstanding the Dred Scot decision. There was
something about that answer that has probably been a trouble to the judge
ever since.
The Dred Scott decision expressly gives every citizen of the United
States a right to carry his slaves into the United States Territories.
And now there was some inconsistency in saying that the decision was
right, and saying, too, that the people of the Territory could lawfully
drive slavery out again. When all the trash, the words, the collateral
matter, was cleared away from it, all the chaff was fanned out of it, it
was a bare absurdity,--no less than that a thing may be lawfully driven
away from where it has a lawful right to be. Clear it of all the
verbiage, and that is the naked truth of his proposition,--that a thing
may be lawfully driven from the place where it has a lawful right to
stay. Well, it was because the judge could n't help seeing this that he
has had so much trouble with it; and what I want to ask your especial
attention to, just now, is to remind you, if you have not noticed the
fact, that the judge does not any longer say that the people can exclude
slavery. He does not say so in the copyright essay; he did not say so in
the speech that he made here; and, so far as I know, since his
re-election to the Senate he has never said, as he did at Freeport, that
the people of the Territories can exclude slavery. He desires that you,
who wish the Territories to remain free, should believe that he stands by
that position; but he does not say it himself. He escapes to some extent
the absurd position I have stated, by changing his language entirely.
What he says now is something different in language, and we will consider
whether it is not different in sense too. It is now that the Dred Scott
decision, or rather the Constitution under that decision, does not carry
slavery into the Territories beyond the power of the people of the
Territories to control it as other property. He does not say the people
can drive it out, but they can control it as other property. The language
is different; we should consider whether the sense is different. Driving
a horse out of this lot is too plain a proposition to be mistaken about;
it is putting him on the other side of the fence. Or it might be a sort
of exclusion of him from the lot if you were to kill him and let the
worms devour him; but neither of these things is the same as "controlling
him as other property." That would be to feed him, to pamper him, to ride
him, to use and abuse him, to make the most money out of him, "as other
property"; but, please you, what do the men who are in favor of slavery
want more than this? What do they really want, other than that slavery,
being in the Territories, shall be controlled as other property? If they
want anything else, I do not comprehend it. I ask your attention to this,
first, for the purpose of pointing out the change of ground the judge has
made; and, in the second place, the importance of the change,--that that
change is not such as to give you gentlemen who want his popular
sovereignty the power to exclude the institution or drive it out at all.
I know the judge sometimes squints at the argument that in controlling it
as other property by unfriendly legislation they may control it to death;
as you might, in the case of a horse, perhaps, feed him so lightly and
ride him so much that he would die. But when you come to legislative
control, there is something more to be attended to. I have no doubt,
myself, that if the Territories should undertake to control slave
property as other property that is, control it in such a way that it
would be the most valuable as property, and make it bear its just
proportion in the way of burdens as property, really deal with it as
property,--the Supreme Court of the United States will say, "God speed
you, and amen." But I undertake to give the opinion, at least, that if
the Territories attempt by any direct legislation to drive the man with
his slave out of the Territory, or to decide that his slave is free
because of his being taken in there, or to tax him to such an extent that
he cannot keep him there, the Supreme Court will unhesitatingly decide
all such legislation unconstitutional, as long as that Supreme Court is
constructed as the Dred Scott Supreme Court is. The first two things they
have already decided, except that there is a little quibble among lawyers
between the words "dicta" and "decision." They have already decided a
negro cannot be made free by Territorial legislation.
What is the Dred Scott decision? Judge Douglas labors to show that it is
one thing, while I think it is altogether different. It is a long
opinion, but it is all embodied in this short statement: "The
Constitution of the United States forbids Congress to deprive a man of
his property, without due process of law; the right of property in slaves
is distinctly and expressly affirmed in that Constitution: therefore, if
Congress shall undertake to say that a man's slave is no longer his slave
when he crosses a certain line into a Territory, that is depriving him of
his property without due process of law, and is unconstitutional." There
is the whole Dred Scott decision. They add that if Congress cannot do so
itself, Congress cannot confer any power to do so; and hence any effort
by the Territorial Legislature to do either of these things is absolutely
decided against. It is a foregone conclusion by that court.
Now, as to this indirect mode by "unfriendly legislation," all lawyers
here will readily understand that such a proposition cannot be tolerated
for a moment, because a legislature cannot indirectly do that which it
cannot accomplish directly. Then I say any legislation to control this
property, as property, for its benefit as property, would be hailed by
this Dred Scott Supreme Court, and fully sustained; but any legislation
driving slave property out, or destroying it as property, directly or
indirectly, will most assuredly, by that court, be held unconstitutional.
Judge Douglas says if the Constitution carries slavery into the
Territories, beyond the power of the people of the Territories to control
it as other property; then it follows logically that every one who swears
to support the Constitution of the United States must give that support
to that property which it needs. And, if the Constitution carries slavery
into the Territories, beyond the power of the people, to control it as
other property, then it also carries it into the States, because the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Now, gentlemen, if it were
not for my excessive modesty, I would say that I told that very thing to
Judge Douglas quite a year ago. This argument is here in print, and if it
were not for my modesty, as I said, I might call your attention to it. If
you read it, you will find that I not only made that argument, but made
it better than he has made it since.
There is, however, this difference: I say now, and said then, there is no
sort of question that the Supreme Court has decided that it is the right
of the slave holder to take his slave and hold him in the Territory; and
saying this, judge Douglas himself admits the conclusion. He says if that
is so, this consequence will follow; and because this consequence would
follow, his argument is, the decision cannot, therefore, be that way,--"
that would spoil my popular sovereignty; and it cannot be possible that
this great principle has been squelched out in this extraordinary way. It
might be, if it were not for the extraordinary consequences of spoiling
my humbug."
Another feature of the judge's argument about the Dred Scott case is, an
effort to show that that decision deals altogether in declarations of
negatives; that the Constitution does not affirm anything as expounded by
the Dred Scott decision, but it only declares a want of power a total
absence of power, in reference to the Territories. It seems to be his
purpose to make the whole of that decision to result in a mere negative
declaration of a want of power in Congress to do anything in relation to
this matter in the Territories. I know the opinion of the Judges states
that there is a total absence of power; but that is, unfortunately; not
all it states: for the judges add that the right of property in a slave
is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. It does not
stop at saying that the right of property in a slave is recognized in the
Constitution, is declared to exist somewhere in the Constitution, but
says it is affirmed in the Constitution. Its language is equivalent to
saying that it is embodied and so woven in that instrument that it cannot
be detached without breaking the Constitution itself. In a word, it is
part of the Constitution.
Douglas is singularly unfortunate in his effort to make out that decision
to be altogether negative, when the express language at the vital part is
that this is distinctly affirmed in the Constitution. I think myself, and
I repeat it here, that this decision does not merely carry slavery into
the Territories, but by its logical conclusion it carries it into the
States in which we live. One provision of that Constitution is, that it
shall be the supreme law of the land,--I do not quote the language,--any
constitution or law of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. This
Dred Scott decision says that the right of property in a slave is
affirmed in that Constitution which is the supreme law of the land, any
State constitution or law notwithstanding. Then I say that to destroy a
thing which is distinctly affirmed and supported by the supreme law of
the land, even by a State constitution or law, is a violation of that
supreme law, and there is no escape from it. In my judgment there is no
avoiding that result, save that the American people shall see that
constitutions are better construed than our Constitution is construed in
that decision. They must take care that it is more faithfully and truly
carried out than it is there expounded.
I must hasten to a conclusion. Near the beginning of my remarks I said
that this insidious Douglas popular sovereignty is the measure that now
threatens the purpose of the Republican party to prevent slavery from
being nationalized in the United States. I propose to ask your attention
for a little while to some propositions in affirmance of that statement.
Take it just as it stands, and apply it as a principle; extend and apply
that principle elsewhere; and consider where it will lead you. I now put
this proposition, that Judge Douglas's popular sovereignty applied will
reopen the African slave trade; and I will demonstrate it by any variety
of ways in which you can turn the subject or look at it.
The Judge says that the people of the Territories have the right, by his
principle, to have slaves, if they want them. Then I say that the people
in Georgia have the right to buy slaves in Africa, if they want them; and
I defy any man on earth to show any distinction between the two
things,--to show that the one is either more wicked or more unlawful; to
show, on original principles, that one is better or worse than the other;
or to show, by the Constitution, that one differs a whit from the other.
He will tell me, doubtless, that there is no constitutional provision
against people taking slaves into the new Territories, and I tell him
that there is equally no constitutional provision against buying slaves
in Africa. He will tell you that a people, in the exercise of popular
sovereignty, ought to do as they please about that thing, and have slaves
if they want them; and I tell you that the people of Georgia are as much
entitled to popular sovereignty and to buy slaves in Africa, if they want
them, as the people of the Territory are to have slaves if they want
them. I ask any man, dealing honestly with himself, to point out a
distinction.
I have recently seen a letter of Judge Douglas's in which, without
stating that to be the object, he doubtless endeavors to make a
distinction between the two. He says he is unalterably opposed to the
repeal of the laws against the African slave trade. And why? He then
seeks to give a reason that would not apply to his popular sovereignty in
the Territories. What is that reason? "The abolition of the African slave
trade is a compromise of the Constitution!" I deny it. There is no truth
in the proposition that the abolition of the African slave trade is a
compromise of the Constitution. No man can put his finger on anything in
the Constitution, or on the line of history, which shows it. It is a mere
barren assertion, made simply for the purpose of getting up a distinction
between the revival of the African slave trade and his "great principle."
At the time the Constitution of the United States was adopted, it was
expected that the slave trade would be abolished. I should assert and
insist upon that, if judge Douglas denied it. But I know that it was
equally expected that slavery would be excluded from the Territories, and
I can show by history that in regard to these two things public opinion
was exactly alike, while in regard to positive action, there was more
done in the Ordinance of '87 to resist the spread of slavery than was
ever done to abolish the foreign slave trade. Lest I be misunderstood, I
say again that at the time of the formation of the Constitution, public
expectation was that the slave trade would be abolished, but no more so
than the spread of slavery in the Territories should be restrained. They
stand alike, except that in the Ordinance of '87 there was a mark left by
public opinion, showing that it was more committed against the spread of
slavery in the Territories than against the foreign slave trade.
Compromise! What word of compromise was there about it? Why, the public
sense was then in favor of the abolition of the slave trade; but there
was at the time a very great commercial interest involved in it, and
extensive capital in that branch of trade. There were doubtless the
incipient stages of improvement in the South in the way of farming,
dependent on the slave trade, and they made a proposition to Congress to
abolish the trade after allowing it twenty years,--a sufficient time for
the capital and commerce engaged in it to be transferred to other
channel. They made no provision that it should be abolished in twenty
years; I do not doubt that they expected it would be, but they made no
bargain about it. The public sentiment left no doubt in the minds of any
that it would be done away. I repeat, there is nothing in the history of
those times in favor of that matter being a compromise of the
constitution. It was the public expectation at the time, manifested in a
thousand ways, that the spread of slavery should also be restricted.
Then I say, if this principle is established, that there is no wrong in
slavery, and whoever wants it has a right to have it, is a matter of
dollars and cents, a sort of question as to how they shall deal with
brutes, that between us and the negro here there is no sort of question,
but that at the South the question is between the negro and the
crocodile, that is all, it is a mere matter of policy, there is a perfect
right, according to interest, to do just as you please,--when this is
done, where this doctrine prevails, the miners and sappers will have
formed public opinion for the slave trade. They will be ready for Jeff.
Davis and Stephens and other leaders of that company to sound the bugle
for the revival of the slave trade, for the second Dred Scott decision,
for the flood of slavery to be poured over the free States, while we
shall be here tied down and helpless and run over like sheep.
It is to be a part and parcel of this same idea to say to men who want to
adhere to the Democratic party, who have always belonged to that party,
and are only looking about for some excuse to stick to it, but
nevertheless hate slavery, that Douglas's popular sovereignty is as good
a way as any to oppose slavery. They allow themselves to be persuaded
easily, in accordance with their previous dispositions, into this belief,
that it is about as good a way of opposing slavery as any, and we can do
that without straining our old party ties or breaking up old political
associations. We can do so without being called negro-worshipers. We can
do that without being subjected to the jibes and sneers that are so
readily thrown out in place of argument where no argument can be found.
So let us stick to this popular sovereignty,--this insidious popular
sovereignty.
Now let me call your attention to one thing that has really happened,
which shows this gradual and steady debauching of public opinion, this
course of preparation for the revival of the slave trade, for the
Territorial slave code, and the new Dred Scott decision that is to carry
slavery into the Free States. Did you ever, five years ago, hear of
anybody in the world saying that the negro had no share in the
Declaration of National Independence; that it does not mean negroes at
all; and when "all men" were spoken of, negroes were not included?
I am satisfied that five years ago that proposition was not put upon
paper by any living being anywhere. I have been unable at any time to
find a man in an audience who would declare that he had ever known of
anybody saying so five years ago. But last year there was not a Douglas
popular sovereign in Illinois who did not say it. Is there one in Ohio
but declares his firm belief that the Declaration of Independence did not
mean negroes at all? I do not know how this is; I have not been here
much; but I presume you are very much alike everywhere. Then I suppose
that all now express the belief that the Declaration of Independence
never did mean negroes. I call upon one of them to say that he said it
five years ago.
If you think that now, and did not think it then, the next thing that
strikes me is to remark that there has been a change wrought in you,--and
a very significant change it is, being no less than changing the negro,
in your estimation, from the rank of a man to that of a brute. They are
taking him down and placing him, when spoken of, among reptiles and
crocodiles, as Judge Douglas himself expresses it.
Is not this change wrought in your minds a very important change? Public
opinion in this country is everything. In a nation like ours, this
popular sovereignty and squatter sovereignty have already wrought a
change in the public mind to the extent I have stated. There is no man in
this crowd who can contradict it.
Now, if you are opposed to slavery honestly, as much as anybody, I ask
you to note that fact, and the like of which is to follow, to be
plastered on, layer after layer, until very soon you are prepared to deal
with the negro every where as with the brute. If public sentiment has not
been debauched already to this point, a new turn of the screw in that
direction is all that is wanting; and this is constantly being done by
the teachers of this insidious popular sovereignty. You need but one or
two turns further, until your minds, now ripening under these teachings,
will be ready for all these things, and you will receive and support, or
submit to, the slave trade, revived with all its horrors, a slave code
enforced in our Territories, and a new Dred Scott decision to bring
slavery up into the very heart of the free North. This, I must say, is
but carrying out those words prophetically spoken by Mr. Clay,--many,
many years ago,--I believe more than thirty years, when he told an
audience that if they would repress all tendencies to liberty and
ultimate emancipation they must go back to the era of our independence,
and muzzle the cannon which thundered its annual joyous return on the
Fourth of July; they must blow out the moral lights around us; they must
penetrate the human soul, and eradicate the love of liberty: but until
they did these things, and others eloquently enumerated by him, they
could not repress all tendencies to ultimate emancipation.
I ask attention to the fact that in a pre-eminent degree these popular
sovereigns are at this work: blowing out the moral lights around us;
teaching that the negro is no longer a man, but a brute; that the
Declaration has nothing to do with him; that he ranks with the crocodile
and the reptile; that man, with body and soul, is a matter of dollars and
cents. I suggest to this portion of the Ohio Republicans, or Democrats,
if there be any present, the serious consideration of this fact that
there is now going on among you a steady process of debauching public
opinion on this subject. With this, my friends, I bid you adieu.